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PERSONAL PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE: 
THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY 
IN AN INFORMATION-ORIENTED SOCIETY 
Arthur R. Miller* 
Probably the most distinctive characteristic of classical utopian 
designs is the basic "humanitarian" bent of their value struc-
tures .... 
And perhaps the most notable difference to be found between 
the classical system designers and their contemporary counterparts 
(system engineers, data processing specialists, computer manufactur-
ers, and system designers) consists precisely in the fact that the 
humanitarian bent has disappeared. The dominant value orienta-
tion of the utopian renaissance can best be described as "effi-
ciency" rather than "humanitarianism.''1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE almost geometric expansion of published materials in recent years indicates that our society is experiencing an informa-
tion, as well as a population, explosion. Fortunately, a techno-
logical revolution, centered around a species of machines gener-
ically referred to as "the computer," is in progress and promises to 
increase man's capacity to accumulate, manipulate, store, retrieve, 
and transmit information. Dramatic confirmation of the dimen-
sions of this new technology's capability is provided each time man 
reaches toward the moon and the planets beyond. Our ability to 
thrust an object countless miles into space would be of limited 
value without the associated technological resources to measure 
and manipulate its flight, monitor the performance of its various 
systems and the body functions of the people inside it, and com-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1955, University of Rochester; 
LL.B. 1958, Harvard University.-Ed. 
The author would like to thank Mr. Barry B. Boyer, currently a third-year law 
student at the University of Michigan Law School and one of the Article and Book 
Review Editors of the Michigan Law Review, for his extensive contributions to this 
Article. He gathered much of the documentation that appears in the footnotes and 
provided numerous substantive suggestions. In addition, his assistance in collecting, 
revising, and elaborating many of the author's past expressions on this subject-con-
tained in various speeches, panel discussions, Senate subcommittee hearings, and sev-
eral specialized articles published in nonlegal periodicals-was invaluable. Were it not 
for Mr. Boyer's efforts, it is doubtful that this Article would have been written. An 
additional note of appreciation is extended to Mr. Frederick W. Lambert, also a third-
year law student at the University of Michigan Law School, for his valuable research 
assistance. As is usual in these matters, the author reserves credit for all heresies 
appearing in these pages. 
1. R. BOGUSLAW, THE NEW UTOPIANS, A STUDY OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
202 (1965). 
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pute instantaneously where it is, where it will be, and when and 
where it will return to earth. 
A number of contemporary prophets have predicted that the 
advent of the new information transfer technologies will prove to 
be as significant as the invention of movable type.2 As they per-
ceive the future, information will not be preserved as alphabetical 
imprints or pictures in a book but rather as holes in punch cards, 
magnetic fields on tapes or discs, electrical impulses moving through 
the memory core of a computer, and, perhaps, radiations generated 
in vats of complex chemicals. 
But this transition is bound to be accompanied by abrasive 
dislocations and deviations from traditional norms. For example, 
in recent years there has been a growing awareness of the effects 
that certain applications of computer technology may have on 
individual privacy. The ponderousness of movable-type technology 
inhibited man's urge to collect and preserve information about his 
peers. But many people have voiced concern that the computer, 
-with its insatiable appetite for information, its image of infallibility, 
and its inability to forget anything that has been stored in it, may 
become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society 
into a transparent world in which our homes, our finances, and our 
associations will be bared to a wide range of observers.3 These fears 
have been exacerbated by the clarion in some quarters for the 
2. A. CLARKE, PROFILl!S OF THE FUTURE 265-79 (1962); M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG 
GALA.'l:Y 11-279 (1962); H. KAHN &: A. WEINER, THE YEAR 2000, at 88-98, 348-49 (1967); 
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158-68 (1967); Hearings on the Computer and In-
vasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govt. Operations, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 1966) (statement of Vance Packard) [hereinafter House Hear-
ings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy]; Russel, Playing for Fun, PLAYBOY, 
April 1969, at 110, 174. See also note 249 infra. 
An example of the scientific community's views of the impact of the computer on 
our society is the following excerpt from a speech by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, reprinted in Hearings on Computer Privacy 
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Com• 
puter Privacy]: 
Springing from our Scientific Revolution of recent decades is what is being 
called our "Cybernetic Revolution." This revolution which, comparatively speak-
ing, is only in its infancy today amplifies (and will to a large extent replace) man's 
nervous system. Actually, this is an understatement because computers amplify 
the collective intelligence of men-the intelligence of society-and while the 
effect of the sum of men's physical energies may be calculated, a totally different 
and compounded effect results from combining facts and ideas • . . . Add this 
effect to the productive capacity of the machine driven by an almost limitless 
energy source like the atom and the resulting system can perform feats almost 
staggering to the imagination. That is why I refer to cybernation as a quantum 
jump in our growth. 
3. V. FERKISS, TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 227 (1969); Miller, The National Data Center 
and Personal Privacy, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1967, at 53; cf. Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) Oustice Douglas, dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 
427, 450 (1963) Oustice Brennan, dissenting). See also notes 141-44 infra. 
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establishment of a National Data Center, by the emergence of crim-
inal-intelligence data centers and computer-based credit-reporting 
services, and by the hypnotic attraction for digital record-keeping 
being exhibited throughout government, industry, and academe. 
The purpose of this Article is to survey the new technology's 
implications for personal privacy and to evaluate the contemporary 
common-law and statutory pattern relating to data-handling. In the 
course of this examination, it will appraise the existing framework's 
capacity to deal with the problems created by society's growing 
awareness of the primordial character of information.4 The Article 
is intended to be suggestive; any attempt at definitiveness would 
be premature. Avowedly, it was written with the bias of one who 
believes that the new information technology has enormous long-
range societal implications and who is concerned about the conse-
quences of the notion that man shapes his tools and then they 
shape him. The assumption throughout is that the computer is not 
simply a sophisticated indexing machine, a miniaturized library, 
or an electronic abacus; it is the keystone of a new communications 
medium that eventually will have global dimensions. Thus, it 
would be overly simplistic to examine the computer-privacy issue 
from the perspective of a particular machine or group of machines 
operating in a federal office building, in the headquarters of one 
of the nation's major industrial complexes, or in the recesses of 
a great university. Indeed, the analogy between the forces that gave 
rise to the multifaceted regulation of the airlines, railroads, radio, 
and television and the problems that already are generating pressure 
for the regulation of computer transmissions and facilities seems 
obvious. It is against the template of the potential need for a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme embracing some uses of the technology 
in both the public and private sectors that the question of protecting 
individual privacy in the computer age must be placed. 
II. THE CYBERNETIC REVOLUTION 
A. The New Technology 
Since the first commercial digital computers were introduced 
shortly after vVorld War II,5 there has been a rapid proliferation and 
4. The computer's threat to personal privacy is beginning to attract attention in 
foreign countries also. See generally CONSERVATIVE R.EsEARCH DEPARTMENT, COMPUTERS 
AND FREEDOM (1968) (England); NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, PRIVACY UNDER 
ATTACK (1968) (England); ONTARIO LAw REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROTECTION 
OF PRIVACY IN ONTARIO (1968); N.Y. Times, April 21, 1969, at 50, cols. 7-8. 
5. For a concise history of the early development of computers, see J. BERNSTEIN, 
THE ANALYTICAL ENGINE 50-80 (paper ed. 1966). 
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sophistication of data-processing devices, especially in this country.6 
During this relatively brief period of time, the burgeoning family 
of machines has outgrown its original role as an electronic cal-
culator performing arcane tasks for scientists and has become the 
cerebrum of expansive multipurpose and multimedia information 
systems in business, government, and education. It is easy to under-
stand why so many sectors of society have embraced the new tech-
nology so eagerly. The computer's basic ability to store vast quan-
tities of data and to retrieve or perform operations upon it in 
accordance with a programmed set of instructions7 enables the tech-
nology to be employed fruitfully in virtually any activity that re-
quires the systematic manipulation of large bodies of information. 
Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the computer age has been 
the rate at which the technology has evolved. Computer "hard-
ware"-loosely speaking, the physical elements of the machine-
already has experienced three generations of development.8 As a 
result, the present-day computer designer is able to draw on a 
variety of memory devices including relatively slow storage media 
such as punch cards or magnetic tape, faster devices such as discs, 
and, more recently, magnetic cores9 that enable a computer to 
6. At present there are over 40,000 computers in operation in the United States. 
This figure represents about 65 per cent of the total number of computers in the 
world. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1968, at 57. A more recent estimate puts the "computer 
population" at 67,200. Russel, supra note 2, at 116. 
7. The following simplified description of a computer's capabilities was given by 
Dr. Emanuel R. Piore, Vice President of IBM, in Senate Hearings on Computer 
Privacy 118: 
The memory device, the storage device of the computer, contains a large 
number of cells. Each of these can hold a single piece of information, such as a 
number or a name in code. Each cell •.. has a numerical address. 
To process data, the computer can perform very rapidly such functions as 
these: It can move a piece of information from an input device to a memory cell; 
add the number in one memory cell to a number in another cell; send a copy 
of information in a memory cell to an output device. 
But before a computer can do anything whatsoever, someone must give it an 
organized sequence of instructions called a program. 
Each instruction specifies one of the basic functions which the computer can 
perform. And each instruction, like each piece of data, can be stored • • • in a 
memory cell of the machine. 
A user can put a program into the machine-and thus gain command of it-
in two ways, and only two. He can put it in by hand, through a set of keys and 
buttons at the console of the central part of the machine. Or he can put in a 
program which in turn can bring in a second program from any input device, 
and give the second program temporary control. 
A more detailed description of the workings of the computer, in terms intelligible to 
the layman, may be found in Campbell, How the Computer Gets the Answer, LIFE, 
Oct. 27, 1967, at 60. For a simplified description of programming techniques, see J. 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 3-17. 
8. For a brief description of the different computer "generations," see Taylor, 
Computer Systems, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 40 (American Bar Assn. Standing 
Comm. on Law & Technology, 2d ed. 1969). 
9. The choice of a particular storage medium will largely depend upon the nature 
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retrieve data at the rate of a few nanoseconds (billionths of a sec-
ond) per bit of information.10 Information-handling capacity is 
another characteristic of computer hardware that has changed dra-
matically over the years. As the requirements of modern science and 
industry provide the incentive for the hardware manufacturers to 
produce memories that can accommodate a billion bits of informa-
tion in a single system, researchers are turning to exotic storage 
media using devices such as lasers,11 photochromic materials respon-
sive to ultraviolet light,12 and complex chemical solutions.13 
The "software" of the electronic age-the programs or instructions 
of the tasks that a given computer system is expected to perform. See Mayer, Com-
puters on the Brain, EsQUIRE, Jan. 1969, at 100, 103, 148: 
The central distinction between different kinds of black boxes is whether they 
are primarily memory ("storage and retrieval") systems, which is what business 
needs, or primarily computational systems for research use. The computer which 
prepares the payroll simply churns forward through lists of names, slotting in as 
needed appropriate changes in salary data, hours worked, percentages for deduc-
tion, etc. Though the memory function is vital, the memory device can con-
veniently be a simple reel of magnetic tape, which gives a predetermined sequen-
tial access rather than random access • . . • 
Other activities need the computer as a kind of super filing system, so deci-
sions can be made on the basis of full information. • • • For this purpose, a 
memory on reels of magnetic tape is inadequate because the machine must do 
considerable checking back on already processed data. But the electronic speeds 
of • • • magnetic cores are not required; a mechanical whirling drum or disc 
with magnetic coatings will be sufficiently random and sufficiently fast •••• 
Finally, a very different black box is required if the machine is to be used 
for immensely rapid computation of immense numbers of variables-to control 
a rocket, or to guide an airplane into a socked-in airport • . • • This system 
demands an enormous random-access memory delivering its information at max-
imum speed, because so many possible different programs must be available for 
processing depending on the results of prior computation. 
10. Mayer, supra note 9, at 103. A nanosecond is to one second as one second is to 
thirty years. Ream, New Directions in Computer Utilization, in COMPUTERS AND CoM-
MUNICATIONs-TowARD A COMPUTER UTILITY 3, 6 (1968). 
11. A working model of a system for storing information on plastic tape in the form 
of minute craters burned by a laser beam is described in A. "WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREF.00111 167 (1967). This process permits the storage of 645 million bits of data per 
square inch of tape, recorded at the rate of 12 million bits per second. A bit of in-
formation is described as follows in Furth, Computers, in COMPUTERS AND THE LA.w 26 
(American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Law &: Technology, 2d ed. 1969): 
Basically information is represented in the various components of a computer 
in a form which requires only two distinct states of a storage position: ON or OFF, 
0 or 1. Such a system of representation is called "binary" and each position of 
storage is referred to as a "binary digit" or a "bit." 
12. Univac has advertised that it has developed "a non-fatiguing photochromic 
material ••• that can be used as a reservoir for computer information. Exposure of this 
material to ultraviolet light records the information. The information can then be read 
with a low-intensity light beam •••• " The potential reductions in storage space made 
possible by this process have led the company to speculate: "Someday it may be 
possible to store the medical records of every American in the space of a cold capsule. 
Or the tax records of the nation may fit in one file cabinet." TIME, Sept. 27, 1968, at 51. 
13. Cf. Diebold, The New World Coming, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 17: "Looking 
ahead, we see important changes in technology such as chemical memories; fluid and 
pneumatic systems that have instantaneous response; ability to store images, graphs, 
drawings and photographs, and to transmit them around the world." 
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that control the storage, retrieval, and manipulation of informa-
tion ·within the huge computer memories-has undergone a com-
parable transformation. Programs no longer are laboriously derived 
from highly personal and detailed computer languages useful and 
intelligible to only a few. Today's common programming languages 
such as FORT AN and COBOL are becoming the lingua franca of the 
new technocracy, enabling extraordinarily complex information-
handling tasks to be performed in response to relatively simple 
instructions understood by virtually all machines. Sophisticated 
programs have been designed to edit raw data, to perform different 
operations in sequence with the contours of each step dictated by 
the results of the preceding process, to permit virtually instanta-
neous random access to any given item of information stored in the 
memory, and to shift a computer's information-handling capacity 
among a number of users so rapidly that each can proceed with his 
work almost as if the machine were reacting only to his commands. 
Although there still are significant problems of system compatibility 
to be solved, it may not be long before computers are communicating 
with each other and with their operators in much the same manner 
as their operators communicate among themselves. Indeed, there are 
some programs that enable machines to "learn" as part of a process 
that is very similar to the socratic method of teaching.14 
14. The following dialogue between man and machine is given in Fano, The Com-
puter Utility and the Community, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS-TOWARD A 
COMPUTER UTILITY 39, 48 (1968). The computer's responses are given in upper case 
letters, while those of the human operator are in lower case. 
WHICH SCRIPT PLEASE 
arithm 
PLEASE BEGIN 
The area of a sphere is pi times the diameter of the sphere squared. 
The area of a circle is pi times the radius of the circle squared. 
The diameter of an object is twice the radius of the object. 
The radius of a ball is 10. 
What is the area of the ball 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT BALL IS SPHERE AND OBJECT IS CONSIS-
TENT-SHALL I GO ON? yes 
IT'S 1256.6359 
What is the diameter of the ball 
IT'S 20. 
The radius of a dish is 10. 
A dish is an object. 
What is the diameter of the dish 
IT'S 20. 
What is the area of the dish 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT DISH IS SPHERE IS CONSISTENT-SHALL I GO 
ON? no 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT DISH IS CIRCLE IS CONSISTENT-SHALL I GO 
ON? yes 
IT'S 314.15899 
The radius of a globe is 10. 
A globe is a sphere. 
What is the area of the globe 
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Each rapidly succeeding stage of hardware-software development 
has been accompanied by substantial reductions in the cost of in-
formation-processing,15 and has opened new vistas for the applica-
THE ASSUMPTION THAT GLOBE IS OBJECT IS CONSISTENT-SHALL I 
GO ON? yes 
IT'S 1256.6359 
The radius of a thing is 10. 
A sphere is an object. 
A thing is a sphere. 
What is the area of the thing 
IT'S 1256.6359 
Thank you 
YOU'RE QUITE WELCOME, COME AGAIN 
[The answers above are erroneous past the fifth digit (for the smaller number) and 
past the sixth digit (for the larger). The error is apparently based upon an approxi-
mation of pi which is incorrect past the fourth decimal. (3.1415927, not 3.1415899, is 
the co1Tect approximation to seven places.) For reasons peculiar to ease of computer 
expression, the programmer may not have intended accuracy past the fourth decimal, 
but if so, the program should have called for an answer with fewer digits.-Ed.] 
Professor Fano concludes: 
The important points to observe are that the information is provided in arbi-
trary order and in a relatively free format and that the program can make 
nontrivial inferences from the available information and generate reasonable 
conjectures in the absence of complete information. The program is being in-
structed in the way that people like to instruct other ,people, that is, by making 
statements and answering questions. 
Id. at 47. For the view that man and machine ultimately will become indistinguishable, 
see R. LANDERS, MAN'S PLACE IN THE DYBOSPHERE (1966). 
Professor Layman E. Allen, Research Associate Prudence C. Abram, and this 
writer have produced a computer-based dialogue to assist in teaching part of a 
first-year course in civil procedure. Although it was demonstrated at the 1968 annual 
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools and tested during March and 
April 1969 on approximately 150 first-year students at the University of Michigan Law 
School, it still must be considered experimental. Nonetheless, preliminary evaluation 
indicates a high level of receptivity on the part of the students and reasonable suc-
cess in terms of educational values. N.Y.L.J., March 31, 1969, at 1, col. 1. 
15. Diebold, The New World Coming, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 17: 
Between 1963 and 1972-a single decade-there will be a decrease of 85 per cent 
in the cost of completing a typical data-processing job. During this period, the 
cost of storage by magnetic tape will go down by 97 per cent; the cost of image 
storage by 96 per cent; and communications line costs, because of increased speeds 
of transmission, will decrease by 50 per cent. 
Even experts in the data-processing field frequently underestimate the potential mar-
ket and rate of change; see, e.g., Hearings on the Coordination and Integration of 
Government Statistical Programs Before the Subcomm. on Economic Statistics of the 
Joint Economic Comm., 90tll Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7 (1967) (statement of Dr. Edgar S. 
Dunn, Jr., Research Analyst, Resources for the Future, Inc.) [hereinafter Hearings on 
Statistical Programs]: 
[T]here is a tendency to grossly underestimate the value of new systems in the 
information field. Back in 1950 ••• IBM undertook a careful market study to deter-
mine whether they should try to get into [the computer] market. They concluded 
that there was a market for something like five or six of these machines in the 
United States ..•• With [sic] 5 years 1,275 machines had been sold and the entire 
industry was turning to the design of a whole new generation of computers .••• 
(B]efore [the National Academy of Sciences] first acquired a Xerox machine they 
made a careful study of the staff to estimate its use •••• Within a period of less 
than 2 years they had exceeded their estimate by something like a factor of IO and 
had gone through two changes of equipment. 
See also Burck, Tne Computer Industry's Great Expectations, FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at 
93. 
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tion of computer techniques. Among the well-publicized recent in-
novations are computerized medical checkups,16 tax return prepara-
tion,17 date-matching, and airline reservations.18 It is perhaps less 
well known that computers also are being used to prepare astro-
logical horoscopes,19 to furnish religious leaders with statistical 
profiles of their congregations,20 and to help teach basic educational 
skills in the ghettos. The possibilities for the future appear to be 
limited only by the ingenuity of the designers and programmers.21 
16. Stevens, Now-The Automated Physical Checkup, READERS DIGEST, July 1966, at 
95. See also Fleming, The Computer and the Psychiatrist, N.Y. Times, § 6 (Magazine), 
April 6, 1969, at 44; How Computers Help MDs Diagnose, BULL, lNTERUNIVERSITY 
COMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL (EDUCOM), April 1966, at 3-6. 
A related aspect of the computerization of medical files is the trend toward 
networking medical data systems so that a physician will have immediate access to a 
patient's complete medical record, regardless of where the patient is when he is 
taken ill. The U.S. Public Health Service currently is making a detailed study of the 
problems of interconnecting the nation's hospitals into a single computer network. 
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1968, at 47, col. 6. See also Freed, A Legal Structure for a 
National Medical Data Center, 49 B.U. L. REv. 79 (1969); Freed, Legal Aspects of 
Computer Use in Medicine, 32 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 674 (1967); Sarnoff, No Life 
Untouched, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 21. 
This type of technique also is being used to produce initial medical histories. 
Expenditure of doctors' time in performing a relatively ministerial task is reduced, 
and there is some evidence that the patient is more open with the computer than 
he would be with the doctor. Wall St. J., May 8, 1969, at 1, col. 5. 
17. See generally Halstead, Use of Computers in Preparing Tax Returns, in COM-
PUTERS AND THE LAW 77 (American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Law&: Technology, 
2d ed. 1969). The Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, is using computers to 
detect inconsistencies in individual tax returns. Hearings on Statistical Programs 23 
(statement of Professor Richard Ruggles). 
18. Star, The Computer Data Bank: Will It Kill Your Freedom?, LooK, June 25, 
1968, at 27, 28. The implications of this computer application are discussed in text 
accompanying notes 103-04 infra. 
19. That New Black Magic, TIME, Sept. 27, 1968, at 42: "New York's TBS Com-
puter Centers Corp. now cranks out 20-page personal horoscopes for a mere $15, the 
electronic brain taking only a minute to compute a life history that flesh-and-blood 
astrologers need a week to prepare." 
20. TIME, March 29, 1968, at 92: 
This past winter, at their monastery near St. Louis, the Roman Catholic 
Redemptorist Fathers -put into operation an electronic data-processing service 
designed to provide "a 71-facet view of each practicing Catholic." Pastors who 
want to make use of the service must distribute a questionnaire to their faithful, 
then wait for the Redemptorists to feed the answers to an IBM System 360 com-
puter. The 180-page printout that the machine delivers gives the pastor a 
cybernetic summary of his parishoners' religious attitudes. 
21. Even the Congress of the United States may be computerl.:'!d. See Wall St. J., 
March 27, 1969, at 23, col. 2: 
House leaders are considering [a] computerized "information retrievai" system that 
would store and serve up data on legislation, the budget and other t.:::,ics. The 
House Banking Committee installed a rudimentary version of such a sys~m in 
January; it feeds information about banking legislation into a Library of Congi0 ss 
computer, which provides data via teletypewriter when the committee staff re-
quests it. 
Cf. H.R. 404, H.R. 5522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); INFORMATION SUPPORT PROGRAM 
BUDGETING AND THE CONGRESS (1968). Chartrand, Computer Technology and the Legis-
lator, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAw 90 (American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Law &: 
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One of the pioneers of new programming techniques predicts that 
it soon will be cheaper to store a page of English text in a computer 
than to preserve it on paper,22 a possibility that has startling rami-
fications for the publishing and printing industries.23 
B. The Development of Time-Sharing 
The growth in concern over the interrelationship between com-
puters and personal privacy directly parallels the development of 
increasingly efficient methods of utilizing data-processing equip-
ment. When computers were first marketed commercially, they were 
designed to handle data-processing jobs sequentially-to "batch 
process" different tasks. But this mode of operation leaves the heart 
of the machine idle during the period in which the data is being 
put into the system and again during the printout phase. In addi-
tion, the machines are so fast that few organizations were able to 
generate enough work to keep them busy. Thus, it was apparent 
that customers were using only a fraction of the computer's poten-
tial; in turn, the low level of computer use was a primary factor 
in the high cost of machine processing.24 
The industry's solution was to connect several input-output 
terminals to the same machine, and to design a complex program 
that would enable the computer to switch its attention among the 
commands of the various users at very high speed.25 Thus, some 
users could be inputting data, others receiving the computer-pro-
Technology, 2d ed. 1969). See generally Detroit Free Press, Dec. 14, 1968, § B, at 14, 
col. 1 (computer used to check chromosomes); Detroit News, Oct. 27, 1968, § H, 
at I, col. 1 (computer used to appraise real estate); N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1968, 
§ C, at 30, col. 1 (computer used to study molecular interaction); Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 
1966, at 1, col. 1 (computer used in electronic sketching of technical drawings). 
22. Fano, supra note 14, at 39. 
23. See, e.g., M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 265-79 (1962). The potential 
implications of computers on copyrighted works also are causing a great deal of 
difficulty in the current attempt to revise the copyright laws. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 
597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, pt. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 190-213 (1967). See also Miller, Com-
puters and Copyright Law, MICH. ST. B.J., April 1967, at 11; Note, Copyright Protec-
tion for Computer Programs, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1274 (1964); Recent Development, 
Copyright-Protection Denied to Verbal Expression of Simple Subject Matter, 67 MICH. 
L. REv. 167, 174-78 (1968); Project, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: 
Reprography and Computers, 15 UCLA L. REv. 931 (1968). The copyright revision bill 
currently being considered by Congress is S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
24. See, e.g., Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE 
L.J. 1299 (1967): "Under the traditional batch-processing method, access to the com-
puter was limited to one user at a time, although even the most complex scientific 
problems consumed less than 10% of the computer's capacity." 
25. Main, Computer Time-Sharing-Everyman at the Console, FORTUNE, Aug. 1967, 
at 88: 
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duced responses to their requests as output, and still others having 
their data processed by the system's central unit at the same time. 
This "time-sharing" procedure enabled users to employ the full 
capacity of the machine, and it gave each user the functional equiv-
alent of his own computer at a greatly reduced cost. However, the 
simultaneous exposure of several distinct bodies of data in one 
information system created the risk that one user would gain access 
to another's files, either by accident or by design, and thus com-
promise the privacy of fellow users or of third parties whose per-
sonal data was being stored or manipulated in the time-share sys-
tem.26 
The next step in the maturation of time-sharing was to move 
the input-output terminals away from the central processor, to dis-
perse them into strategic locations such as the regional offices of a 
national corporation or an important customer's place of business, 
and to link them with the computer's memory unit by communica-
tions channels. This seemingly obvious development has enormous 
implications for the development of information transfer capacity. 
Observers of recent trends in data-processing assert that remote-
access time-sharing is merely the first stage in the ultimate amal-
gamation of computer and communications technologies.27 They 
[A] time-sharing computer requires an "executive" or "control'' program .... The 
executive keeps the whole system running efficiently and in a sequence determined 
by priorities. It assigns actual computing time among its many users, say 200 
milliseconds for each client on line. . . . The executive fetches the client's data 
or programs out of storage, and puts them back there once the client is finished. 
It also can prevent one user from interfering with the program of another and 
altering it or wiping it out-a facility that goes by the technical name of "memory 
protection." It keeps a record of who uses the machine, makes corrections, even 
gives helpful hints to unskilled users . • . • 
.•. The executive-the critical item of software in a time-sharing system-
is an enormously complicated set of instructions permanently stored in the high-
speed core memory of the computer. 
26. See Mayer, Computers on the Brain, EsQUIRE, Jan. 1969, at 100, 103: 
M.I.T.'s Project M.A.C. is in process of moving from a system which permits about 
thirty access terminals to be used at once to a system which will have place for 
about fifty. "Its complexity," says [Robert M. Fano, the project's organizer] " ... is 
at the limit of human understanding." Part of this complexity, incidentally, is 
required by the need to maintain the security and privacy of each user's programs. 
"Experience has shown," Fano wrote grimly in a recent issue of the Journal of 
Engineering Education, "that vandalism within a time-sharing system and the 
forging of user accounts are to be expected in universities as well as elsewhere." 
See also text accompanying notes 74-83 infra. 
27. See, e.g., Bauer, Computer/Communications Systems: Patterns and Prospects, in 
COMPUTERS AND COMJIWNICATIONS-TOWARD A COMPUTER UTILITY 13 (1968): 
During this decade, a significant process is occurring-the marriage of two im-
portant technologies: computers and communications. The history of modern 
technology records few events of the importance and scope of this process-two 
giant industries, proceeding in the past on two relatively independent courses, 
are now on a path of confluence. Each technology is having and will have a 
great leavening effect on the other. 
It has been estimated that half of all computer usage in the next decade will involve 
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also forecast that the result will be an "almost biological" growth 
of a natural monopoly28 as small data-processing systems become 
integrated into one or more national and international networks. 
The intersection of the two technologies already has become appar-
ent in the context of the telephone system, which currently carries 
the bulk of "on-line" data transmissions along leased lines.29 Tele-
phone officials are beginning to recognize the significant parallels 
between the modus operandi of their system and that of the remote-
access computer system.30 Indeed, the telephone system is in the pro-
cess of converting its electromechanical switching devices to elec-
tronic equipment31 and eventually even voice transmissions will 
be sent over the telephone lines in digital form.32 These changes 
will give the telephone system the basic attributes of a data-process-
ing center.33 To press the analogy between the two technologies 
communications systems. Loevinger, Federal Regulation of Computers, in COMPUTERS 
AND THE LAW 101, 104 (American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Law & Technology, 
2d ed. 1969). 
28. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 121 (statement of 
Paul Baran, computer expert for the Rand Corporation). 
29. Federal Communications Commission Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 16,979, 
reprinted in Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 89. 
l!O. Romnes, Managing the Information Revolution, BUSINESS AUTOMATION, Aug. 
1966, at 31: 
The telephone system is itself a computer. Its components are dispersed across 
the continent but they work as one. Equipped with more than 90 million input-
output stations, this enormous computer can be commanded to provide any 
one of the 3 million billion "answers" it takes to connect any one of its stations---
telephones---with any other and do it in a matter of seconds. It is a "real time" 
operation by definition and design. 
It should not be surprising, then, that the communication and computer 
technologies should have much in common. Indeed, our newest electronic switch-
ing systems, like computers, are internally programed and are endowed with the 
same kind of quasi-human memory ascribed to commercial computers. 
31. Irwin, supra note 24, at 1301. 
32. Why Ma Bell Chops Up the Signals, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 13, 1968, at 82. The 
conversion to digital transmission will greatly improve the capabilities of the telephone 
system as a data carrier: 
A regular telephone line used in home and office does well if it carries 1,200 
to 2,400 bits of data per second, enough for a Teletypewriter but slow for com-
puters or facsimile transmission. By comparison, one voice channel equivalent on 
a digital transmission system carries 56,000 bits per second-about 22 times as 
much data as a normal voice channel. 
Id. at 84. See also note 422 infra. 
33. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 158 (statement of Paul Baran, com-
puter expert for the Rand Corporation) (emphasis in original): 
At present, these electronic switches are not believed to be more economical than 
their electromechanical switch counterparts. But their prime advantage lies in the 
new additional services that they offer because of the general computer nature of 
the control mechanism of the switching center. For example, it will be possible 
to dial only two digits to reach the few numbers that you call often. It will be 
possible to relay a call to another telephone if you are temporarily away. 
The present reluctance of the Bell System to enter the data-processing field may be 
due to an antitrust consent decree. Titus, Computers, Communciations, and the FCC, 
10 COllr!IIUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 62 (1967). 
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further, one of the key concepts of computer time-sharing-the 
ability to switch messages among different users at very high 
speeds-has long been a mark of the communications common 
carriers.34 Other communications media-private microwave sys-
tems,35 the telegraph,36 communications satellites,37 and even the 
community antenna television systems38-are not far behind the 
telephone companies in their ability to provide mass transmissions 
of digital data. As computer networks multiply, both the data-
processing and communications industries surely will tailor their 
systems to obtain the full benefit of the interaction between the two. 
In light of the constantly broadening range of computer ap-
plications and the development of remote-access time-sharing, it 
does not require clairvoyance to predict that eventually there will 
be some form of national computer "utility" providing a variety 
of data-processing services to everyone, perhaps through the medium 
of inexpensive home terminals such as the touch-tone telephone.30 
Several time-sharing data-processing systems already are being 
offered to the public in two general configurations: either the 
customer provides the data to be stored in the service company's 
computers, or the service company provides a body of specialized 
data that can be tapped at will by time-share customers at remote 
terminals.40 
Regardless of the form in which computing facilities ultimately 
34. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 29, at 89. 
35. See generally Comments of Microwave Communications, Inc. (submitted in 
connection with In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdepen-
dence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, FCC Docket No. 16,979) 
(March 5, 1968). 
36. Western Union is establishing computer centers in order to provide customers 
with data-processing services. Irwin, supra note 24, at 1301; Titus, supra note 33, at 
62; Notice of Inquiry, supra note 29, at 88. 
37. Statement of Control Data Corporation 20 (submitted in connection with In re 
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities, FCC Docket No. 16,979) (March 1, 1968): 
[C]ommunications satellites may eventually provide the capability for flat-rate 
[data transmission] charges regardless of the distance traversed since there is no 
cost differential determined by the distance between transmission and receiving 
station locations. Distance related costs appear only from the point of origin to 
the transmitting station and between the receiving station to the destination. 
See also Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1966, at 1, col. 1. 
38. See Brown, Tomorrow's Many-Splendored Tune-In, SAT. EVENING Pos-r, Nov. 
30, 1968, at 38, 78. 
39. See generally D. PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF A COMPUTER UTILITY (1966); 
COMPUTERS AND COllfMUNICATIONS-TOWARD A COMPUTER UTILITY (1968); Irwin, supra 
note 24. A comprehensive study of this subject was undertaken in a symposium en-
titled "Symposium on the Computer Utility: Implications for Higher Education, May 
5-7, 1969. The symposium papers and proceedings will be published in book form. 
40. Bigelow, Legal and Security Issues Posed by Computer Utilities, 45 HARV. Bus. 
REv., Sept.-Oct. 1967, at 150, 151. 
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are offered to the general public, it is clear that the need for these 
services provides enough economic incentive to guarantee the con-
tinued centralization of large bodies of data-an indeterminate 
amount of which is personal information. In addition, the move-
ment of this data among different machine systems over relatively 
low-security communications channels, such as telephone circuits, is 
certain to become more prevalent. Unfortunately, little is being 
done to insure that computerized data in central storage or transit 
is any safer from the intrusive activities of snoopers than private 
telephone conversations have been in the past. 
C. The Information-Based Society 
Ever since the federal government's entry into the taxation and 
social-welfare spheres, increasing quantities of information have 
been elicited from citizens and recorded. Moreover, in recent years 
access to governmental largesse-at all levels-has depended in-
creasingly upon a willingness to divulge private information. Brief 
reflection about the data acquisition implications of federal in-
volvement in home-financing, urban renewal, and public health 
as well as the activities of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the 
Job and Peace Corps, and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development provides graphic evidence of these trends. 
As information-recording processes have become cheaper and more 
efficient, this appetite for data has intensified and been accompanied 
by a predilection toward centralization and collation of file material. 
In accordance with a principle akin to Parkinson's Law, as capacity 
for information-handling increases there is a tendency to engage 
in more extensive manipulation and analysis of recorded data, 
which, in turn, motivates the collection of data pertaining to a 
larger number of variables.41 The availability of electronic data 
storage and retrieval has accelerated this pattern in a number of 
contexts; witness the expansion in the scope of questions on the 
1960 and the proposed 1970 censuses42 and the ever-increasing 
number of government questionnaires to which individuals are 
subjected. It also is reasonable to assume that one consequence of 
increased computer capacity is that many governmental agencies 
will go beyond current levels of inquiry and begin to ask more 
complex, probing, and sensitive questions. Perhaps future inter-
rogations will touch upon such subjects as associations with other 
41. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy at 74-75 (statement of the author). 
42. See discussion in text accompanying notes 341-66 infra. 
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people, location and activity at different points in time and space, 
medical history, and individual attitudes toward various institu-
tions and persons. 
The increased application of computer technology resulting 
from time-sharing, remote-access terminals, and other forms of cost 
reduction also is causing a profound change in the manner in which 
the industrial and academic sectors of our society regard informa-
tion and the uses to which it is put. Perhaps this trend has man-
ifested itself most clearly in the social sciences. Largely because 
of the computer, scholars in these disciplines are increasingly able 
to base their theoretical structures on mathematical models rather 
than on "intuitive feeling and casual empiricism."43 To construct 
and manipulate effective and sophisticated models44 of the environ-
ment with the expectation of analyzing and predicting human 
behavior and natural or societal phenomena necessitates vast 
amounts of detailed information-"microdata"-rather than the 
broad and comparatively superficial summaries that social scientists 
traditionally have used.45 This is true partly because accurate de-
scription of a complex system often requires investigation of an 
enormous number of potentially significant variables.46 In addition, 
there may be unsuspected relationships inherent in the data that 
43. Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Computers, 
Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 216 (1968). Professor Rug-
gles describes the problems facing social scientists before the introduction of the com-
puter: 
Where empirical research is undertaken, it generally tends to concern itself with 
observations of global aggregates or with very small samples of data to which the 
social scientist may have obtained access. This situation is not of the social scien-
tists' own choosing. The kinds of information required for an understanding of 
the social system have not been available, and prior to the development of the 
computer would not have been usable even if they had been available. 
44. The term "model" is generic, and encompasses a variety of techniques. Crosson 
&: Sayre, Modeling: Simulation and Replication, in THE MODELING OF MIND: COMPUTERS 
AND INTELLIGENCE 3 (1968), subdivide models into (I) replications, which reproduce 
some physical aspect of the original; (2) formalizations, which are symbolic repre-
sentations of an original system that can be analyzed by paper-and-pencil mathematical 
operations; and (3) simulations, which, in contrast to formalizations, produce not a 
general solution but rather a statistical description of a large number of particular 
solutions for the more important variables. The simulation is the kind of model that 
most frequently requires the use of an electronic computer. For a simplified discussion 
of the methodology involved in making this kind of computer analysis, see Lozowick, 
Steiner,&: Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 1641 (1968). See also Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to 
Individual Freedom and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 270, 275-76 
(1964). The computer also can be programmed to edit the raw data and discover 
inconsistencies that would go unnoticed in hand editing. The Internal Revenue 
Service is currently using this capacity to detect inconsistencies in individual tax 
returns. Hearings on Statistical Programs 23 (statement of Professor Richard Ruggles). 
45. See, e.g., House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 199; Hear-
ings on Statistical Programs 4 (statement of Edgar Dunn, Jr., research analyst, Re-
sources for the Future, Inc.). 
46. Cf. Lozowick, Steiner, &: Miller, supra note 44, at 1652-60. 
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would be lost if only summaries or smaller quantities of informa-
tion were available for analysis.47 Identification of individual units 
of information also is necessary if, for example, the researcher 
,vishes to discover how certain characteristics of the members of a 
particular group change during a period of time.48 Highly detailed 
information also may enable researchers to "use the same basic data 
again and again for different analytic purposes."49 
Of course, social scientists are not the only ones employing the 
new technologies for assistance in decision-making, record-keeping, 
and various forms of analysis. Institutions of every description are 
turning to electronic data-processing to increase their information-
handling capacity and to improve the efficiency of their operations. 
The result is a seemingly inexorable trend toward ever larger and 
more complex computer systems that digest greater quantities of 
information about increased numbers of people.1!0 Without question, 
many of these systems help various governmental institutions in 
their economic policy-making51 and social welfare programs, 52 en-
47. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 199. 
48. See House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 52, 59, 97-98 
(statement of Raymond T. Bowman). 
49. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 199. 
50. A. WrsnN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 161 (1967). THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1967) (a report to the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice) [hereinafter TASK 
FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY] documents several facets of this trend in the 
application of computers to the criminal justice field. In summarizing the typical 
evolution of a police data-processing system, the Report concludes that most agencies 
utilizing electronic data-processing began with relatively modest punclied-card systems, 
then expanded them until that format became impractical, switching to electronic 
systems as funds became available. Id. at 157. The Report also notes a trend toward 
consolidating the records of all municipal agencies into one central file (id. at 159) 
and makes its own contribution to the acceleration of these movements, recommending 
at 71: 
[T]o support court and correctional decision-making some States could establish 
more detailed records on persons in their directories [of persons who have records 
with state criminal justice agencies]. This registry could contain suclI background 
information as education, employment, military service, and probation reports. 
SuclI files could also be used to provide basic data for assessing the effectiveness of 
the State's different correctional programs. 
51. See, e.g., Hearings on Statistical Programs 129-30 (statement of Arthur M. Okun, 
Member, Council of Economic Advisors): 
At one time, the economic policymaker was essentially a fireman, standing by 
much of the time until the alarm sounded the onset of recession or inflationary 
boom. Now, however, policymaking is clearly a continuous matter, aimed to help 
promote steady growth and noninflationary prosperity all the time. An information 
system could be adequate in sounding the alarm to herald major disruptions and 
still fall far short of meeting the needs of our current policy strategy. 
A full employment economy also brings to the fore the interrelationship 
between monetary and fiscal policy. It increases the need for detailed information 
on the relation between financial flows and income-expenditure flows. This puts 
special emphasis on accurate and prompt flow-of-funds information that is inte-
grated with the national income and product accounts. 
52, House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 258: 
In part • . • the clianges in information requirements stem from radical clianges 
1106 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1089 
able industry to develop products to meet spiraling consumer de-
mands and to respond quickly to the needs of an increasingly mo-
bile population, 153 and permit academic institutions to process 
applications, schedule classes, record grades, and handle the myriad 
tasks that beset a modern educational system.154 
As a result of the heightened value being placed on informa-
tion by contemporary institutions, a substantial portion of informa-
tion that hitherto has been treated as private is now considered as 
appropriate grist for the computer mill and fair game for the data 
collector. It may be a bit premature to conclude that "informa-
tion is becoming the basic building block of society"155 or that "all 
forms of wealth result from the movement of · information,"156 but 
there does seem to be considerable truth in the assertion that elec-
tronic technology is making the world into a "global village"57 
in which the domain of strictly private action is steadily being 
eroded.58 On the assumption that there are some intrinsically 
in demand factors distinct from .•• responses to expanded technical capability. 
Public policy in recent years has turned increasingly to a concern about the 
problems of social structure. . . . The issues of poverty, education, health, area 
depression, urban organization, etc., all require an increase in relevant detail for 
sub-system components of the total economy or total culture. At the same time the 
analytical disciplines in the social sciences ..• have been turning increasingly to 
quantitative methods and procedures. 
Cf. Benn, Where Power Belongs, THE NATION, Aug. 26, 1968, at 136: 
Government should be allowed to know a great deal more than it does about 
the community it was elected to serve. This requirement is essential if we want 
to see decisions made on the basis of fact. You cannot manage an advanced society, 
which is a vast, complex, interconnecting system, unless the facts are available, 
53. Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom 
and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 270, 275 (1964): 
As population and mobility increase, there will be other incentives to establish 
central data files, for these will make it easier for the consumer in new environ-
ments • • • to acquire quickly those conveniences which follow from a reliable 
credit rating and an acceptable social character. • . • In consequence, we can 
expect a great deal of information about the social, personal, and economic char-
acteristics of individuals to be supplied voluntarily-often eagerly-in order that, 
wherever they are, they may have access to the benefits of the economy and the 
government. 
54. See generally G. BROWN, J. MILLER, & T. KEENAN, EDUNET (1967); Miller, 
Privacy Implications of Instructional Technology-A Preliminary Overview (March 
1969) (unpublished paper prepared for the Study on Instruction~ Technology). 
55. Sarnoff, No Life Untouched, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 21. 
56. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 65 (paper ed. 
1964). 
57. M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM Is THE MASSAGE 63 (paper ed. 1967). See 
also id. at 12-24. 
58. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 10 (statement of 
Vance Packard): 
Unless there are safeguards, pressures will surely grow to assemble more and more 
specific data about specific individuals. When the social security program began 
we were assured that our social security number would be guarded as a secret so 
that no one could possibly use it to keep track of our movements. Today we must 
write our social security number not only on our income tax return, but must 
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valuable aspects of individual privacy that should be protected from 
this erosion, it is appropriate to turn to an examination of the 
ways in which computer technology is magnifying the threat to 
privacy that always has been present in the handling of personal 
information. 
III. THE NEW TECHNOLOGY'S THREAT TO PERSONAL PRIVACY 
A. The Individual's Loss of Control over Personal Information 
Privacy, as many commentators have noted, is a concept that is 
impossible to define59 or to fit into a coherent framework of legal 
doctrine.60 With greater frequency, however, lawyers and social 
scientists are expressing the view that the basic attribute of an effec-
tive right to privacy is the individual's ability to control the flow of 
information concerning or describing him61-a capability that often 
is essential to the establishment of social relationships62 and the 
supply it to banks holding our money and to organizations making payments to 
us .••• 
Or consider the census. The authors of the U.S. Constitution called for an 
"enumeration" of the population every IO years ..••• Many millions of citizens 
in 1960 had to answer 165 questions about their lives, purchasing habits, and 
incomes. And the pressure is growing to add a host of new inquiries such as 
ethnic origins, religious affiliation, schooling, et cetera • . • . 
59. A typical complaint is the assertion that "[f]ew concepts ••• are more vague 
or less amenable to definition and structured treatment than privacy. Under this 
emotional term march[es] a whole congeries of interests, some closely interrelated, some 
almost wholly unrelated and even inconsistent." Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: 
Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 197, 199 
(1965). 
60. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) ("The state of the law is still that of a hay-
stack in a hurricane."); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 326, 333 (1966) ("[T]he tort [of invasion of pri-
vacy] has no legal profile.'). 
61. One of the clearest statements of this position can be found in OFFICE OF 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND 
BEHAVIORAL R.EsEARCH 8-9 (1967): 
[W]hat is private varies for each person and varies from day to day and setting 
to setting. Indeed, the very core of the concept is the right of each individual to 
determine for himself in each particular setting or compartment of his life how 
much of his many-faceted beliefs, attitudes and behavior he chooses to disclose. 
Every person lives in several different worlds, and in each his mode of response 
may-indeed must-be different ..•. The right to privacy includes the freedom 
to live in each of these different roles without having his performance and aspira-
tions in one conte.xt placed in another without permission. 
See also Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
253, 254 (1966); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Foreword by former Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey to E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS vii (1967). The idea is hardly 
a new one; see Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 198 
(1890): "The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordi-
narily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated 
to others." 
62. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 61, at 482: "To refer ••• to the privacy of a lonely 
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maintenance of personal freedom.63 Correlatively, when the indi-
vidual is deprived of control over the information spigot, he in some 
measure becomes subservient to those people and institutions that 
are able to gain access to it.64 Thus, it has been suggested that the 
individual whose data profile is bartered or sold has become little 
more than a commodity.65 
Informational privacy has been relatively easy to protect in the 
past for a number of reasons: (1) large quantities of information 
about individuals have not been collected and therefore have not 
been available; (2) the available information generally has been 
maintained on a decentralized basis; (3) the available information 
has been relatively superficial in character and often has been 
allowed to atrophy to the point of uselessness; (4) access to the avail-
able information has been difficult to secure; (5) people in a highly 
mobile society are difficult to keep track of; and (6) most people are 
man on a desert island would be to engage in irony. The person who enjoys privacy 
is able to grant or deny access to others." See also id. at 475-86; A. ,VESTIN, PRIVACY 
AND FREEDOM 32-39 (1967). 
63. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965): 
rs]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance ...• Various guar-
antees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra 
of the First Amendment is one. . . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition 
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the 
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment 
explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth 
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 
See also Fried, supra note 61, at 475; OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH 2 (1967). But cf. 
Bettelheim, The Right to Privacy Is a Myth, SAT. EVENING PoST, July 27, 1968, at 8. 
64. See, e.g., House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 12-13 
(statement of Vance Packard), describing the dangers of a federal data center: 
[T]here is [a] hazard [in] permitting so much power to rest in the hands of the 
people in a position to push computer buttons. When the details of our lives 
are fed into the central computer where they are instantly retrievable, we all to 
some extent fall under the control of the machine's managers .•.. 
The filekeepers of Washington have derogatory information of one sort or 
another on literally millions of citizens. The more such files are fed into central 
files, the greater the hazard the information will become enormously tempting to 
use as a form of control. 
See generally Shils, Privacy and Power, reprinted in Senate Hearings on Computer 
Privacy 23 I. 
65. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 988 (1964): 
No man wants to be "used" by another against his will, and it is for this 
reason that commercial use of a personal photograph is obnoxious. Use of a photo-
graph for trade purposes turns a man into a commodity and makes him serve the 
economic needs and interest of others. In a community at all sensitive to the 
commercialization of human values, it is degrading to thus make a man part of 
commerce against his will. 
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unable to interpret and infer revealing information from the avail-
able data. But a casual perusal of the 'testimony elicited by various 
congressional subcommittees66 and brief reflection on the intrusive 
capabilities of the new surveillance devices and information tech-
nologies leads to the conclusion that these traditional safeguards on 
informational privacy no longer are reliable. 
In a computerized environment, the power to control the flow 
of data about oneself can be compromised in a variety of ways. On 
the theoretical level, computer systems and other media that handle 
personal information are capable of inflicting harm on the data 
subject in two principal ways: (1) by disseminating evidence of 
present or past actions or associations to a wider audience than the 
subject consented to or anticipated when he originally surrendered the 
information (deprivation of access control), and (2) by introducing 
factual or contextual inaccuracies that create an erroneous impres-
sion of the subject's actual conduct or achievements in the minds 
of those to whom the information is exposed (deprivation of ac-
curacy control).67 Traditionally, the law has attempted to remedy 
these two wrongs separately by dealing with them under the re-
spective theories of invasion of privacy and defamation,68 although 
the line between the two torts often proves to be extremely nebu-
lous. Inasmuch as today's computer technology is the progenitor 
of a new communications medium, it seems desirable to determine 
the character and extent of the damage that can be inflicted on 
individual privacy by various aspects of data-processing. This should 
facilitate consideration of the possibility that the existing legal 
pattern is not sufficiently responsive to the challenges presented by 
the technology and requires modification or replacement by a new 
format. 
1. Deprivation of Access Control 
The most significant computer-privacy problem is caused by the 
vulnerability of machine components and software to accident or 
intrusion. In the typical time-sharing system, there are at least six 
66. See, e.g., Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter 
House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus]; Senate Hearings on Computer 
Priva0•; Hearings on Statistical Programs; House Hearings on the Computer and In-
vasion of Privacy. 
67. See Karst, The Files: Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of 
Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 342, 343 (1966); Comment, Copyright 
Pre-emption and Character Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and 
Compco, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1018, 1035-36 (1968). See also Senate Hearings on Computer 
Privacy 68 (statement of the author). 
68. See text accompanying notes 256-79 infra. 
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operational stages that deserve attention as possible points through 
which improper access to the stored data may be gained or at which 
distortion may occur.69 The first, and perhaps most obvious of these, 
is the information files, which generally are stored on some memory 
device in machine-readable form when they are not being used. 
In this condition the records are exposed to the danger of theft-a 
possibility that is enhanced by the extreme compactness and con-
centration of computerized records. Similarly, machine-readable 
records can be duplicated more rapidly and with less effort than 
their paper counterparts, usually without leaving any trace of tamper-
ing.10 
When information is moved from the files into the central pro-
cessor of a time-sharing system, a number of additional dangers 
arise. Despite their image of infallibility, computers are so intricate 
and delicate that occasionally they can be rendered inoperative by a 
speck of dust.71 As a result, a minor mechanical failure may cause 
random distortion of data72 or direct a message to the wrong terminal 
on a remote-access system.73 Furthermore, the computer's rapid 
69. Except as otherwise indicated, the following discussion of security in time• 
sharing systems is generally based upon Ware, Security and Privacy in Computer 
Systems, 30 AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 279 (1967). 
70. Allen, Danger Ahead! Safeguard Your Computer, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 
1968, at 97, 99: "A tape with 50 million characters of data, say, can be copied in a 
few minutes, leaving no traces; this tape might be a valuable mailing list, a set of 
computer programs, or other sets of operating procedures." 
Another aspect of the vulnerability of computerized records is that they are easier 
to destroy than paper files. A simple magnet or a match can erase the enormous quan-
tities of information stored on a reel of magnetic tape. One incident has been recorded, 
and others undoubtedly have occurred, in which a single disgruntled employee using 
this technique virtually wiped out a business enterprise "in no time at all." Allen, 
supra, at 99. See also note 75 infra. By way of contrast, the logistical difficulties 
of destroying large quantities of information maintained in traditional record books 
are well illustrated by the abortive attempt-admittedly made under intense stress-
to destroy classified documents during the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. TIME, Feb. 14, 
1969, at 22. 
71. See, e.g., Surface, What Computers Cannot Do, SAT. REv., July 13, 1968, at 58: 
[C]omputers need not be erroneously operated to precipitate calamitous situations. 
There is increasing evidence that computers can be so erratic or so easily made 
inoperative ..• that, when used for some functions, they still must be considered 
as experimental machinery ..•• 
Such difficulties are so potentially ruinous that they have fostered at least two 
new businesses: computer detective agencies and insurance against computer-
inflicted disasters. 
72. Allen, supra note 70, at 98: 
An electrical equipment company discovered a faulty magnetic tape drive in 
its computer only after it had incorrectly processed hundreds of reels of tape. The 
defective equipment was not identified immediately because although it was dis-
torting data at random, it continuously checked its own operation and reported 
that it was functioning properly. 
73. Given the present state of the art, any data communication will result in the 
creation of errors. According to the Sperry-Rand UNIVAC Response to the Inquiry 
of the FCC, H & 1-11 to H & 1-12 (submitted in connection with In re Regulatory and 
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switching among a number of users of a time-share system may leave 
a residuum of one customer's information accessible to the next user 
who is placed in control of the heart of the machine.74 Even if the 
system is functioning perfectly, there remains a possibility that a 
snooper could "eavesdrop" on electromagnetic energy radiating from 
the computer; this energy then could be reconstituted elsewhere in 
the form of the information in the system at the time the radiations 
were captured. 
Indeed, the key software item of a time-share system-the monitor 
or control program-seems to be particularly vulnerable to pur-
poseful intrusion. For example, there have been several reports that 
students have been successful in penetrating the protective features of 
university computers.75 Once the access code of the control program 
of the particular computer system is broken, the intruder has the 
ability to display and manipulate the data stored within the system. 
Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications 
Facilities, Docket No. 16,979) (undated) [hereinafter UNIVAC Brief]: 
Studies published by the Bell System concerning error rates in data transmitted 
over voice channels at 600 bits per second and at 1,200 bits per second indicate that 
the frequency of the occurrence of incorrectly received data doubles when the 
speed of transmission doubles and increases in general with increases in dis-
tance .••• 
In transmitting data, redundancy is the only remedy for faulty transmission. A 
single wrong bit, when detected, must either be corrected or retransmitted. To 
some extent, data may be corrected by error correcting codes which require built• 
in redundancy of the data transmitted. In most other instances erroneously re• 
ceived data must be retransmitted. 
74. Petersen &: Turn, System Implications of Information Privacy, 30 AFIPS CON-
FERENCE PROCED>INCS 291, 298 (1967): 
[C]opying of residual information in the dynamic portions of the storage hierarchy 
during the following time-slice seems likely. Since erasing all affected storage areas 
after each time-slice could be excessively time consuming, a reasonable solution 
may be • . • to set aside certain areas of the core for private information and 
erase only those areas .•• after each time-slice. 
75. ELECTRONICS, Jan. 9, 1967, at 25: 
The home of time-sharing, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has 
been having trouble with students who break the elaborate codes that are supposed 
to insure the privacy of the users of its Project MAC (machine-aided cognition) 
computers. On one occasion, it's been reported, students tapped into lines carrying 
Government data, including information from the Strategic Air Command at 
Omaha. Some of this tinkering has had the effect of jamming the lines. 
Cf. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 84 (testimony of the author): 
Computer experts at the University of Michigan ••. tell me that a programmer 
with less than a month's training, can break the more elaborate encoding proce-
dures currently being used in large data banks within 5 hours .••• [A]t our insti• 
tution • • • we occasionally leave a terminal unattended in an unlocked room to 
see if our students can work their way into the system by breaking the access 
code. They have never failed us. 
See also Safeguarding Time-Sharing Privacy-An All-Out War on Data-Snooping, 
ELECTRONICS, April 17, 1967, at 157, 159; note 26 supra. 
The experiment in computer-assisted instruction in law described in note 14 supra 
was almost destroyed by an unknown person who discovered one of the access codes 
for the University of Michigan remote-access terminal system. The intruder succeeded 
in destroying a number of other computer files. 
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The personnel servicing the central processor are another po-
tential source of weakness in security. The programmer, for instance, 
could insert a secret "door" in the monitor program that would en-
able unauthorized people to bypass protective devices, or "could 
'bug' a machine in such a sophisticated manner that it might remain 
unnoticed for an extensive pe_riod."76 More simply, the computer's 
operator, or even a maintenance man, might reveal the nature of 
protective devices to snoopers or provide them with access keys. It 
also has been suggested that a corrupt repairman could "re-wire the 
machine so that certain instructions appeared to behave normally, 
whereas in fact, the protective mechanisms could be bypassed."77 
When computerized information moves from the central pro-
cessor through the communications links, the familiar specter of 
wiretapping is present. In addition to the relatively unsophisticated 
process of bugging the transmission line and recording or siphoning 
off the digital communications, the ingenious wiretapper with ad-
vanced equipment could attach a terminal to the line and join the 
group sharing the computer's services. This could be done in several 
ways: by using a previously planted "door" in the control program; 
by intercepting a user's communication and substituting his own; 
by invading the system while a remote-access user has his channel 
open but is not transmitting; or by intercepting and cancelling a 
user's sign-off signal in order to continue operating the system under 
that user's name. 78 
The next two stages of the data-processing system-the switching 
center and the remote console-also are vulnerable to attempts to 
eavesdrop on electromagnetic radiations. In addition, the switch-
ing center, either by mistake or as a result of tampering, may make 
a wrong connection and direct data to an unauthorized recipient. 
Finally, even when codes are used to protect the security of the 
remote-access terminals, an unauthorized user may "crack" the code 
or forge the required identification, or a malevolent authorized user 
may employ his console to alter the protective programs, "revise" 
the stored data, or misuse a printout of stored information that he 
obtained by a legitimate exercise of his access rights. 
The simplest of these techniques-forging access codes and mak-
ing unauthorized copies of storage media such as tape-seem to 
have been successfully employed already.79 Although some of the 
76. Ware, supra note 69, at 281. 
77. Id. 
78. Petersen &: Turn, supra note 74, at 291. 
79. See notes 70, 75 supra. 
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other techniques discussed above may seem rather esoteric, it would 
be folly to think that they are not within the realm of the techno-
logically possible; some are feasible today, the rest will be in the 
future. The science fiction mystique surrounding cybernetics has a 
tendency to create a false sense of inviolability and impregnability, 
even among those on intimate terms with the machines. For example, 
one knowledgeable individual has argued that computerizing per-
sonal information will offer greater protection for privacy than does 
yesterday's manila folder because the putative snooper will need "a 
machine, a codebook, a set of instructions, and a technician" in 
order to gain access to the data and translate it into comprehensible 
notation.80 It is doubtful that this is an accurate summary of con-
ditions even in the present state of the eavesdropper's art. Indeed, 
other experts have flatly asserted that most program languages are 
easy to decipher,81 that digital transmission of data "does not provide 
any more privacy than ... Morse code,"82 and that "modest resources 
suffice to launch a low-level infiltration effort."83 
Even assuming the high cost of making a successful penetration 
of the data, there are countervailing factors that negate the supposed 
gain in protection achieved by converting data into a machine-
readable format. For one thing, the payoff for a successful intrusion 
may be higher than would be true if the records were kept in a more 
mundane style. The centralization of formerly decentralized stores of 
information that results from computerizing records often will mean 
that one invasion will secure for the intruder vast quantities of data 
that formerly could be obtained only by several file penetrations. 
In addition, the snooper who has access to a single remote terminal 
·will be able to reach all of the relevant data in a computer network 
that may be composed of numerous information nodes geographically 
distributed across the continent or around the world. Finally, the 
computer-based record system of the future simply is likely to contain 
more extensive information than traditional files. For these reasons, 
the snooper's "cost per unit of dirt" actually may be lower for poach-
ing computerized records than it is for paper files. 
Given the incentive of a potentially high payoff for invading com-
puterized files or intercepting data transmissions, there is no 
80. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 94 (statement of 
Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., research analyst, Resources for the Future, Inc.). 
81. Allen, supra note 70, at 100. 
82. Petersen &: Turn, supra note 74, at 291. 
8!1. Id. at 298. See also UNIVAC Brief at J-15: "There are many devices on the 
market today which make it possible to -pick up intelligence from a [computer] com-
munications terminal and record the content of messages." 
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doubt that elements of organized crime, a variety of governmental 
agencies, and segments of private industry will invest sufficient re-
sources to launch sophisticated snooping programs.84 One group that 
undoubtedly will have the facilities and the inclination to intercept 
digital transmissions is the law enforcement establishment, which 
recently has been granted extensive statutory authority to wiretap 
and eavesdrop.85 As the telephone company converts its voice lines to 
digital transmission,86 police will have to acquire the equipment and 
expertise to convert digital to voice communication. And once they 
have that hardware and training, the police can be expected to apply 
it in contexts other than the simple interception of conversations 
being carried by digital transmission. 
2. Deprivation of Accuracy Control 
To the vulnerability of machine components must be added 
numerous possibilities for human error in information-handling 
that are created or exacerbated by computer technology. The risk 
that careless or malicious administrators will introduce errors into 
records containing personal data is a familiar one, and its origins 
cannot be attributed to the advent of the computer. However, as 
computer capacity increases the range and volume of individualized 
data that is stored, this risk undoubtedly ·will be magnified. Indeed, 
until highly accurate mechanical input devices-such as optical 
scanners87-become operational, the likelihood of human error 
in the recording process necessarily is going to be higher than it is 
in the context of traditional record-keeping because of the extra 
handling stage that is necessary to translate raw data from alpha-
betic notation into the appropriate computer input format. 
For these and other reasons, there is a widespread and legitimate 
fear of overcentralizing individualized information and then increas-
ing the number of people who, by having access to it, have 
the capacity to inflict damage through negligence, sheer stupidity, 
or a lack of sensitivity to the value of personal privacy. Unthink-
ing people are as capable of injuring others by unintentionally 
rendering a record inaccurate, losing it, or disseminating its con-
tents to unauthorized users as are people acting out of malice or 
for personal aggrandizement. It simply is unrealistic to expect subtle 
84. It has been suggested that outside intrusion into a computer system could 
serve as the basis of a "change your dossier for a fee" service, for example. Petersen 
& Turn, supra note 74, at 292. 
85. See text accompanying notes 327-345 infra. 
86. See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra. 
87. See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra. 
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standards of care and basic principles of individual privacy to be 
consistently understood or implemented by people in clerical posi-
tions. 88 
The centralization of information from widely divergent sources 
also creates serious problems of contextual accuracy. Information 
can be entirely accurate and sufficient in one context and wholly 
incomplete and misleading in another. As large numbers of remote 
terminals are linked to computers and as today's local and regional 
data centers are linked together in national or international net-
works, information will be moved and stored far from its point of 
original recordation and employed for purposes and by people un-
associated with its collection--conditions that, it has been suggested, 
virtually guarantee inaccurate human interpretation.89 Errors of this 
type can occur in a number of ways. Raw, unevaluated data about 
an individual can give rise to damaging inferences that a fuller 
explication, direct knowledge of the information's source, or a 
highly professional analysis would prevent. Illustrative of this type 
of distortion is a terse entry stating that the subject was arrested, 
convicted of a felony, and sentenced to a federal penitentiary for a 
certain number of years. The impact of this data on the individual's 
ability to obtain employment or credit surely will be detrimental. 
Yet the "felon" may have been a conscientious objector who could 
not meet the requirements for exemption from military service that 
existed at the time he was to be inducted. If the events occurred in 
the distant past and the legal or social attitude toward the par-
ticular "offense" has moderated, the entry is doubly dangerous.90 
Other difficulties are likely to increase the risk of inaccurate in-
terpretation in subtle ways. What appears to be "hard," "factual" 
data often takes on different shades of meaning in different con-
texts, and the individual who is asked to provide a simple item of 
information for one purpose may omit explanatory details that be-
come crucial when his file is surveyed for unrelated purposes. An 
unexplicated notation of an individual's marital status conveys differ-
ent connotations to the Selective Service System, a credit bureau, 
the Interhal Revenue Service, and the Social Security Administra-
tion. Similarly, many information gatherers fail to appreciate the 
88. See generally Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 75-76 (statement of the 
author). 
89. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 24 (testimony of 
Professor Charles Reich). 
90. Or consider the impact of a hypothetical dossier on Mr. William F. Ricken-
backer, whose felony was to refuse to answer part of the 1960 census questionnaire. 
See United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
962 (1963). 
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necessity of entering supplemental data that may ameliorate an 
earlier entry that has some derogatory overtones.91 For example, 
police departments throughout the nation can obtain an FBI "rap 
sheet" containing a suspect's criminal record by sending his finger-
prints to Washington. These sheets are supposed to include in-
formation on the court disposition following each arrest, but in the 
past this data has not been furnished in thirty-five per cent of the 
cases.92 
The computer's image of infallibility often leads people to accept 
its output unthinkingly. This is unfortunate. To paraphrase a remark 
by Senator Fulbright in the course of his debate with Secretary of 
Defense Laird over the ABM: Just because data is stored in a com-
puter doesn't make it accurate.93 But this belief does exist, and it 
may accentuate a problem that always has inhered in the compilation 
of personal information-the danger of relying on "soft" or sub-
jective data for human evaluations or decision-making. Psychological 
tests can be designed for machine scoring, and the results, either in 
raw form or after evaluation, can be added to the individual's dossier. 
Despite the apparently authoritative character of such tests, a sub• 
stantial number of people in the scientific community question theh 
ability to reflect accurately the complexities of an individual's be 
liefs and attitudes.94 Thus, their presence in a computer file, eithe1 
as raw test responses or in the form of an evaluation, can be ex-
tremely dangerous to the subject unless the test data is accompanied 
by an extensive explanation of the conditions under which the test 
was administered and the purpose for which it was taken. Since the 
cost of preparing and storing such a lengthy caveat would be high, 
there is considerable likelihood that it will not be included. 
Similarly, efficiency ratings for employees and students are valu-
able and have a long history of use, but there is a possibility that 
computerization will render them less reliable. For one thing, factors 
91. Even if these information managers wanted to ameliorate pieces of data with 
supplementing information, there are a number of reasons why they might be unable 
to do so. First, their system may not be designed to accommodate such data. Second, 
since many large data banks may have many uses, the managers may have no idea 
when a piece of information is fed into the system whether or not amelioration will 
later be necessary. Furthermore, they may not be able to tell exactly what will 
ameliorate an entry, since they do not know all of the purposes for which the entry 
will be used. 
92. TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 76. 
93. The Fulbright-Laird exchange is described in NEWSWEEK, March 3, 1969, at 22; 
TIME, Feb. 28, 1969, at 23-24; N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1969, at 1, col. 6. 
94. Miller, Psychological Testing and Privacy in an Information Oriented Society 
(to be published in Think Magazine May-June 1969); Douglas, Computerized Man, 
33 VITAL SPEECHES 700 (1967). 
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of cost, ease of administration, and system configuration may force 
evaluations to be framed in conclusory categories such as "excellent," 
"fair," or "good." Exchange of evaluative information among differ-
ent organizations that lack common traditions of scoring or inter-
preting performance can compound the confusion, since a "fair" 
rating may denote average performance in one setting and very poor 
work in another.95 The problem of sharing information based upon 
noncomparable categories or premises is not insubstantial.96 Data 
gatherers always have exhibited a marked propensity to cooperate 
with each other in exchanging information, 97 and there is no reason 
to expect that the practice will decline as machine interfaces for the 
transfer of data become easier to establish. This ease of information 
movement, coupled with the technology's aura of omniscience, may 
motivate some administrators to rely on soft data without a reason-
able investigation as to its source, the purpose for which it originally 
was collected, or the evaluation standards of the data originator. 
Thus, success or failure in life ultimately may tum on what other 
people decide to put in an individual's file and the programmer's 
ability, or inability, to evaluate, process, and interrelate informa-
tion. These prospects are made even more depressing by the realiza-
tion that the great bulk of the data likely to find its way into the 
95. Professor Karst, supra note 67, at 356, points out that the danger of personal 
evaluation "lies in the fact that the evaluator and the recipient of his information may 
not share the same standards for reducing a complex set of facts to evaluative inferences 
or even the same language." The example given is the military officer's effectiveness-
rating system, in which an apparently average rating really connotes low quality 
performance. See also Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 75-76 (statement of the 
author). 
96. The difficulties caused by incompatible categories are one of the chief impedi-
ments to creation of a uniform federal statistical system. See, e.g., SuncoMMIITEE ON 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS OF THE JOINT EcoNOl\UC COMMITI'EE, THE COORDINATION AND 
INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL PROGRAMS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967): 
In general, the bodies of data [collected by federal agencies] do not mesh ac-
cording to any overall system and there is much inflexibility which often prevents 
fitting the micro data to behavioral models. Reasons for the incompatibility in-
clude the follov.ing: 
(1) differing definitions, classifications, and timing of respondent reports when 
uniformity is needed; 
(3) differing qualities of data and inconsistent documentation. 
The difficulties in obtaining comparable statistics even when the categories are uniform 
are discussed in Hearings on Statistical Programs 12: 
We have such things as a Standard Industrial Classified Code or codes which are 
in effect and utilized by different agencies .... The descriptive phrases which are 
used to label these collection boxes are supposed to be standard for the different 
agencies, but there are some practical problems. • . . It is possible for one agency 
or one statistical program to wind up with a box with the same standard classi-
fication label as another, but each containing a different collection of respondents. 
. • • Agencies may occasionally establish different cutoff points that determine 
which box will actually receive a given respondent unit. 
See also id. at 116. 
97. See, e.g., notes 177-78, 376-91, 546-47 infra and accompanying text. 
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files will be gathered and processed by relatively unskilled and un-
imaginative people who will lack the discrimination and sensitivity 
necessary to warrant reliance on their judgment. Furthermore, a 
computerized file has a certain indelible quality-adversities cannot 
be overcome with time absent an electronic eraser and a com-
passionate soul willing to use it. 
The computer's demonstrated ability to assemble and collate large 
quantities of information relevant to a given subject also may lead 
to an abdication of human responsibility for making important 
judgments or debilitate the willingness of decision makers to return 
to the original information source to seek out more or better data. 
Although it often is stated that the computer's utility necessarily is 
limited by the quality of the input-hence the maxim "garbage in, 
garbage out" (GIGO)-the hypnotic effect of being able to manipu-
late enormous data bases with the press of the proverbial button 
makes it questionable whether human evaluations always will pro-
vide a final check on the application of the computer's output. By 
using the computer to quantify intangible elements or by asking 
it the wrong questions, an administrator can produce plausible 
answers that, when acted upon, might precipitate disaster.08 Some 
notion of the problems that may arise in the handling of personal 
data as an assist in policy-making can be divined from a report of 
one controversial computer application: 
[In New York a] ... computer that had been fed accumulated 
information from bettors, police and other sources spewed out the 
names of eighty-six alleged bookmakers. Indictments followed. The 
machine had not only stored the information but had evaluated it. 
The government claimed that the three-year statute of limitations on 
the charges might have expired before human investigators could 
have evaluated the data.99 
A number of disturbing questions are raised by this brief account. 
Although programming a computer to select names of people for 
indictment may fall within the prosecutor's discretion, are there 
any constraints on the procedures employed? Must they meet some 
minimal standard of computer science? More important, who deter-
mines what raw data has sufficient probative value to warrant 
being fed into the computer and what weight is to be assigned 
to particular items within each category of information? Will 
the official who is invested with authority to decide whether an 
indictment should be sought on the basis of the computer output 
98. Cf. E. MORISON, MEN, :MACHINES, AND MODERN TIMES 91-93 (1966). 
99. E. LONG, THE lN'IRUDERS 54 (1967). 
April 1969] Computers and Privacy 1119 
have enough understanding of the computer's capabilities and 
method of operation to make a rational assessment of its product? 
The possible prejudice to the individual resulting from the practice 
is not likely to end with the decision to seek an indictment. Com-
menting on this particular computer application, a lawyer observed: 
"[T]he ... computer can tell you where the stars are going to be a 
million years from now. Do you think a jury is not going to believe 
that it can tell you where a bookie is in the Bronx?"100 
B. Cybernetics As an Instrument of Surveillance 
Perhaps the most serious apprehensions concerning the implica-
tions of the computer for personal privacy are warranted when con-
sidering the use of the new technology in concert ·with surveillance 
activities. One rather obvious application of this type that is 
alluded to throughout this Article is the development of a "record 
prison" from the computer's prodigious storage capacity. The ability 
of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive womb-to-
tomb dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national net-
work is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolu-
tion.101 
Another possible application of the new technology stems from 
the capacity to manipulate a highly detailed data base in order to 
simulate the behavior of a complex organization. If a corpora-
tion has enough information about one of its competitors, for 
example, it may be able to predict the rival's future actions, a 
useful resource in the context of contract bidding. But beyond 
these relatively benign applications, it also seems feasible to employ 
computer analysis to determine what types of false stimuli or 
corporate feints are likely to cause a desired response on the part 
of the competitor.102 It does not require a vivid imagination to 
conjure up a number of simulation activities involving human 
manipulation if extensive enough dossiers are available. 
In addition to using the computer to construct and manipulate 
personal files, however, it also is possible to use the machine in 
conjunction with seemingly unrelated data files to analyze an in-
100. Id. at 54-55. For the most comprehensive discussion to date of the impact of 
science on problems of proof, see Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLU!I!. 
L. R.Ev. 1080 (1966). See also B. BOTEIN, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE (1963). 
IOI. See, e.g., M. McLUHAN &: Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM Is THE MASSAGE 12 (paper ed. 
1967); Address by Arthur J. Goldberg, The Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture: Can 
We Afford Liberty?, Feb. 20, 1960, at 4. See also note 3 supra; notes 141-44 infra; Sym-
posium-Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1968). 
102. Big Corporations Can Have Their Own CIA, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 
1967, at 18. 
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dividual's activities to see if they bear any relation to the conduct of 
other investigation subjects. This capacity for "inferential relational 
retrieval"103 is demonstrated by the following description of Ameri-
can Airlines' seemingly innocuous flight reservation computer: 
American's computer can be queried about any traveler's move-
ment in the past two or three months. In a furious burst of speed, 
the electric type·writer spews out a dossier; flights traveled, seat 
number, time of day, telephone contact, hotel reservation, car reser-
vation, fellow travelers, etc . 
. . . [A] computer expert for the airline says that IO to 15 investi-
gators a day (Federal, state, local and other) are permitted to delve 
into the computer for such information. Some of them want ( and 
get) a print-out of the entire passenger list of a certain flight to see 
who might be traveling with a particular person.104 
A further significant threat to personal freedom is presented by 
the inevitable linking of computers to existing surveillance devices 
for monitoring people and their communications. One of the simplest 
of the present generation of snooping devices is the pen register, 
which, when attached to a telephone line, records on paper a series 
of dashes representing all numbers dialed from the selected tele-
phone.105 But this snooping capability would be increased by several 
orders of magnitude if a few pen registers were attached to suspects' 
telephone lines and the information drawn in by these devices 
fed into a central computer. This technique could quickly provide 
a revealing analysis of patterns of acquaintances and dealings among 
a substantial group of people. Indeed this may be possible without 
pen registers; when the telephone companies' move to digital trans-
mission is complete, a by-product may be a ready-made data base on 
past communications that awaits only cross-correlation. 
Yet, the computer-pen register combination is relatively prim-
itive and its surveillance yield is relatively low compared to the 
forecasted marriage between computers and the emerging optical 
scanner technology. IBM recently announced the availability of 
103. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 119-35 (testimony 
of Paul Baran, computer expert with the Rand Corporation). 
104. Star, The Computer Data Bank: Will It Kill Your Freedom?, LooK, June 25, 
1968, at 27, 28 (emphasis added). 
105. Sullivan, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A. Review of the Current Law, re• 
printed in Hearings on S. 928 (Right of Privacy A.ct of 1967) Before the Subcomm. on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62-63 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on the Right of Privacy 
A.ct, pt. 1). A technical description of the pen register may be found in Hearings on 
Invasions of Privacy (Government Agencies) Before the Subcomm. on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 2, at 954-61 (1965). 
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a mechanical page reader capable of reading and inputting into a 
computer typed or hand-printed letters, words, and numbers at 
the rate of 840 single-spaced typewritten pages per hour.106 Be-
cause of the universally acknowledged need for accurate high-
speed input devices, more spohisticated successors are certain to 
follow. The installation of these devices in strategic post office facili-
ties across the country would enable the government to maintain 
"mail cover"107 operations on a massive scale. By computerizing 
the data drawn in by the scanners and subjecting it to a sophis-
ticated control program, this type of surveillance could yield ex-
haustive lists of the mail sent and received by thousands of in-
dividuals and organizations. 
There are many other possible applications for scanners. For 
example, computers presently are being used to help trap scoff-
laws in a number of jurisdictions. The most common of the current 
procedures calls for police officers at a checkpoint to radio the 
license plate numbers of passing cars to a computer operator. The 
operator then inputs the number, the computer responds by pro-
viding a printout revealing whether any violations are outstand-
ing against that license number or the person in whose na~e the 
car is registered, and the operator informs the officers of the re-
sults.108 Optical scanners designed to decipher license numerals 
106. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1968, at 61, col. 2. Early models of optical scanners are 
already in use in several government agencies. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 
69-70, 97-98, 125; Hearings on Statistical Programs 123. Apparently most of the major 
computer companies are working to develop optical scanners. See Riley, Punched Cards 
on the Ropes?, ELECTRONICS, April 15, 1968, at 193, 202; 
Optical character readers are made by several companies, including the Optical 
Scanning Corp., National Cash Register, Farrington Electronics Inc., IBM, the 
Control Data Corp., Recognition Equipment Inc., and the Philco-Ford Corp. Some 
machines read only single lines, while others can assimilate whole pages. Some 
read only stylized type fonts, other[s] almost anything. 
See also Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 98 (letter from the author). 
107. The Post Office Department's mail cover procedure was described as follows 
by the Chief Postal Inspector in Hearings on Invasions of Privacy (Government Agen-
cies) Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1965): 
A mail cover simply consists of recording from a piece of mail the name and 
address of the sender, the place and date of postmarking, and the class of mail. 
Mail is neither delayed nor opened ...• Only the material appearing openly on 
the v.Tapper is noted. The recording is done by a postal employee. A mail cover is 
authorized only when there is good reason to believe that it may be instrumental 
in the solution of a crime. Information obtained from a cover is used as leads 
in an investigation, not as evidence in court. 
The legality of mail cover operations has been upheld in United States v. Schwartz, 
283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961), and United States v. 
Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 881-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958). See generally 
E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 102-08 (1967). 
108. TIME, Sept. 3, 1965, at 72. See also Hirsch, The Punchcard Snoopers, THE 
NATION, Oct. 16, 1967, at 369, 371: 
[A] nation-wide computerized network designed to help keep undesirable drivers 
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and send them directly to the computer obviously would make the 
process more efficient-and, as a by-product, might enable the 
compilation of comprehensive records of the movements of a per-
son's automobile, perhaps for later inferential relational analysis. 
The ultimate step in mechanical snooping, however, may be the 
implantation of sensing devices in the human body itself. Assum-
ing an improved state of the art, these devices might be capable 
of transmitting data relating to physiological and chemical changes 
resulting from various bodily processes to · a computer that is pro-
grammed to monitor and record the data, transmit a response to 
the sensor, or sound an alarm when specified chemical or biological 
events occur. To be sure, monitoring systems of this type are adapt-
able to many beneficial and humanitarian purposes, such as allow-
ing a patient under treatment to resume his normal activities wear-
ing sensing devices that will warn his doctor instantaneously when 
physiological changes symptomatic of impending danger appear.109 
But telemetry also can be imposed on a so-called "antisocial" or 
"aberrational" individual in order to reveal whether or not the 
concentration of personality-altering chemicals in his bloodstream 
is at a "stable" level, 110 or to administer rewards and punishments 
off the highway is being developed within the Department of Transportation. 
Each state will feed in the records of individual drivers whose licenses have been 
revoked; all states then will be able to check their driver license applications 
against this file, routinely and instantly. The basic idea is to prevent a driver 
who loses his license in one state from getting relicensed in another. 'Who will 
have access to this information has not been disclosed. 
109. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 72 (statement of the author); Freed, 
Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine, 32 LAW &: CoNTEM.P. PROB. 674, 691 (1967); 
Miller, The National Data Center and Personal Privacy, THE An.ANTIC, Nov. 1967, 
at 53; cf. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1969, at 11, col. 2: 
G.D. Searle &: Co., a pharmaceutical manufacturer, said it has begun marketing 
a commercial line of biomedical instrument systems that can be used for rapidly 
screening and examining patients in large numbers . 
• . • [T)he system, which may be sold or leased to hospitals, clinics or physi, 
cians, consists of a variety of measuring instruments that feed data from the 
patient directly into a computer. 
• • • Automated instruments measure hearing, vision, blood pressure, height, 
weight, and other body functions. 
Computer-linked sensing devices will undoubtedly play an increasingly large role 
in industry and commerce. See, e.g., Sarnoff, No Life Untouched, SAT. R.Ev., July 23, 
1966, at 21: 
Even the soil will be computerized. The long-range outlook for agriculture in• 
cludes new sensing devices that will be placed on larger farms, feeding informa-
tion to the computer on soil moisture, temperature, weather outlook, and other 
details. The computer will calculate the best crops to plant, the best seeding times, 
the amount of fertilizer, and even the correct harvesting time for maximum yield. 
A computer-based check verification system to thwart forgers is now available in 
California. Wall St. J., May 12, 1969, at I, col. 4. 
110. See, e.g., Fleming, The Computer and the Psychiatrist, N.Y. Times, § 6 (Maga-
zine), April 6, 1969, at 45: 
[T]he impact of drug therapy on psychiatry has been revolutionary. It is 
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by remote control when sensors reveal that the subject has engaged 
in certain kinds of behavior.111 As might be expected, the propo-
nents of these pervasively intrusive systems assert that they will be 
used only for "ethical" and "benevolent" purposes; but the enor-
mous potential for abuse inherent in surveillance procedures of 
this type makes one wonder whether the assurances of these advo-
cates are sufficient protection.112 
C. The Psychological Aspects of a Dossier Society 
Since the right to privacy has been conceived in part to assure 
the individual's emotional integrity,113 it is appropriate to consider 
currently saving the State of New York, alone, some $30-million a year, according 
to a report from the office of Dr. Alan D. Miller, Commissioner of Mental Hy-
giene .••• [T]hanks largely to drug therapy, releases from the state's hospitals 
have soared from 10,394 a year in 1955 to 32,625 in 1968. Across the nation, in 
other states which invest more cash per capita in the care of mental illness ••• 
the results have been even more dramatic, with caseloads declining as much as 
25 per cent. 
See also Michael, Speculation on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom 
and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 270, 281 (1964). 
The actual use of these techniques is described in Berry, Project Brain Control, 
reprinted in Ill CONG. REc. 16,181, 16,182 Uuly 9, 1965): 
ESB [electrical stimulation of the brain] has •.• been used experimentally to 
treat mental patients. At Tulane University ••• a select group of chronic mental 
cases were equipped with self-stimulators. Buttons on a special belt activated 
electrodes in their brains. Whenever a patient felt depressed, he pushed the but-
ton. ESB, washing away anxiety, helped restore a more cheerful mood. In cases 
where patients had severe psychotic seizures, ESB turned uncontrollable rage into 
euphoria. 
111. Note, Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REv. 403, 
407 (1966): 
If criminality is acquired, like other behavior, by imitation and social condi-
tioning, it should be possible to remove it by conditioning more acceptable con-
duct. Tracking is a useful tool for such conditioning: it indicates when the act 
to be rewarded takes place, and it enables the reward to be given immediately, 
which is vital. Two effective rewards, [verbal] approval and electrical stimulation 
of the brain, are easy to administer through a tracking system. 
See also Miller, On Proposals and Requirements for Solutions, in Symposium-Com-
puters, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 226-27 (1968). These 
concepts seem likely to gain increasing approval in medical and scientific circles. See, 
e.g., McConnell, Psychoanalysis Must Go, EsQUIRE, Oct. 1968, at 176, 280: 
Maybe "mental illness" is a myth-maybe what's wrong with most patients is that 
they've learned bad or "sick" behavior patterns. And if they've learned those be-
haviors, they can be induced to unlearn them if we go about things in the right 
way. 
To phrase it another way, perhaps the trouble with crazy people is that they 
act crazy. Not that they are crazy, but that they act crazy. You and I act sane be-
cause we've been rewarded for acting sane, and punished severely if our behavior 
gets too far out of line. If we want to cure "sick" behavior, perhaps we can do 
so by rewarding patients for acting sane, or by punishing them for acting insane, 
or both. This very simple, intriguing idea is rapidly turning psychology and psy-
chiatry upside down. 
112. Some of the limitations on total surveillance are pointed out in V. FERKISS, 
TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 166·67 (1969). 
113. See generally Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 
193-96 (1890). 
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briefly the possible psychological impact on our citizenry of un-
checked computerization. In view of the computer's ability to pre-
serve and retrieve vast quantities of minute personal data and assist 
in the administration of socially desirable welfare and environ-
mental programs, it might seei::n anomalous that one of the chief 
apprehensions concerning the computer age is that it brings with 
it the threat of depersonalization.114 Upon reflection, this incongru-
ity unfortunately proves to be only superficial. As the populace be-
comes increasingly aware that a substantial number of personal 
facts are being preserved on "the record," people may start to doubt 
whether they have any meaningful existence apart from the pro-
file in the computer's files.115 As a result, they may begin to base 
their personal decisions, at least in part, on whether it will enhance 
their record image in the eyes of third parties who have control 
over important aspects of their lives: 
The terms consequential behavior and acting for the record . 
[may be] used interchangeably. They involve not only the control 
of forethought to our behavior, but also mean that one should 
act so that things must appear on the record in a limited way. One 
puts to oneself not only the admonition that "I had better be care-
114. Representative Comeilius E. Gallagher stated his view in House Hearings on 
the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 2: 
"The Computerized Man," as I see him, would be stripped of his individuality 
and privacy. Through the standardization ushered in by technological advance, 
his status in society would be measured by the computer, and he would lose his 
personal identity. His life, his talent and his earning capacity would be reduced 
to a tape with very few alternatives available. 
This complaint is not unique to the computer age. It was a common objection to the 
industrial revolution and the so-called mass society and mass culture. See generally 
V. FERKISS, supra note 112, at 60-76. 
115. Michael, supra note 110, at 277: 
As the society grows more complex and the individual's sense of his ability to 
influence it in his own interest seems smaller, the tendency to depend for place-
ment and advancement on what can be revealed about oneself which can be evi-
denced and acted on "scientifically" may well increase. . • . This response also 
will be a natural extension of our dependency on the machine, which in this case 
will help the expert or make the decisions itself about the value of the individual, 
impersonally but with great precision . • • . 
In fact, there may be a very real sense in which a person does not exist outside of 
his computer dossier. Consider the following colloquy taken from House Hearings 
on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 145: 
MR:. GALLAGHER ..•. Since the IRS has now set up a central data collection 
service and now that we have the potential of erasing from the computer's memory 
and truly making a person an "unperson," would it be ,possible for a skilled com-
puter expert to make himself a nontaxpayer, by programming himself out of 
existence? 
MR. SQUIRES. That is a very interesting question. I suspect that it would be. 
MR. GALLAGHER. Therefore, by sending in the wrong card or the right card, 
or the wrong answers, he could be eliminated from existence from the rolls of 
the IRS. 
MR. SQUIRES. That seems to me quite reasonable. 
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ful: This may go on the record," but also the question as to how 
will it look and be interpreted by those who are not immediately 
involved in this activity and will judge it from its appearance to 
them .... 
Thus, the technical demand for more personal information to be 
recorded and a conscious public concerned with keeping the record 
straight lie at the root of the new invasion of privacy. It is a depriva-
tion of privacy that cannot be legislated against nor moralized 
against. It is a source of social control which necessitates new tech-
niques and a pervading inquiry into our social, economic, and 
political actions and our motivations for them. It is an invasion 
which most people willingly accept, since they have not known other 
conditions and are happy to be publicly significant to someone.116 
This psychology may be augmented by the conception of the 
computer as the unforgetting and unforgiving watchdog of the in-
formation managers. As one observer has remarked, "the possibility 
of the fresh start is becoming increasingly difficult. The Christian 
notion of redemption is incomprehensible to the computer."117 
It thus is not surprising that there appears to be a reaction 
against computerized decision-making and other appearances of 
human abdication to the machine. Increasingly, the computer is 
becoming a convenient scapegoat for a number of man's ills; there 
is evidence that the frustrations generated by the computerized 
environment are provoking highly irrational responses on the part 
of disenchanted groups. People have written letters to computers 
operated by commercial dating services, commenting on the dates 
that have been arranged for them;118 naked protesters have pick-
eted IBM offices with signs stating that "Computers are Ob-
scene";119 and computer operators reportedly have ascribed human 
personalities to their machines.120 Personification of computers has 
carried over into the arts: computers have emerged from the world 
116. Wagner, Records and the Invasion of Privacy, reprinted in Ill CONG. REc. 
10,821, 10,823 (May 18, 1965). 
117. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 12 (statement of 
Vance Packard). 
118. Hearings on Computer Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 
pt. 2, at 289 (1968) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy, pt. 2]. 
119. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1968, § 1, at 27, col. 5. 
120. See, e.g., That New Black .Magic, TIME, Sept. 27, 1968, at 42: 
Computer technology is bewitched with superstition. For one thing, today's 
young cyberneticists tend to anthropomorphize their tools. Tom Allison, 25, a 
Coca-Cola executive in Atlanta, is convinced that his computer is feminine. "She 
keeps cutting me off at the most inopportune times," he complains. A programmer 
in Los Angeles will not feed blue cards into his computer-he feels she deserves 
pink. Seymour Greenfield, a research manager for the military DRC-44 computer 
program at Dynamics Research Corp. near Boston, complicates the matter further. 
"I hired everyone building the computer by the zodiac signs under which they 
were born," he says. As a Leo, he has prejudices. "I hired two Cancer men and 
they both ended up with ulcers." 
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of science fiction121 to become sinister protagonists or anthropo-
morphic figures in novels,122 plays,123 motion pictures,124 and 
poems.125 It also has been suggested that widescale computeriza-
121. E.g., M. FRAYN, THE TIN MAN (paper ed. 1965); R. HEINLEIN, THE MooN Is A 
HARSH MISTRESS (paper ed. 1966); o. JOHANNESSON, THE TALE OF THE BIG COMPUTER 
(1968); D. JONES, COLOSSUS (1966). 
122. E.g., E. BURDICK, THE 480 (1964); T. TYLER, THE MAN WHOSE NAME WOULDN'T 
FIT (paper ed. 1968). 
123. E.g., Kerr, Push Button "A" for Laugh "B", N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1968, at 
DI, col. 1, describing a sketch in a play entitled "The Fourth Wall": 
[A] chap who was starved for female companionship, if it's still called that, 
arranged himself a date on the computer system, presumably getting a girl whose 
card-indexed characteristics matched his needs. 
She came, she was tall, she was red-haired, she was compliant. A less resistant 
partner for the evening could scarcely be imagined. Everything she said was right. 
The boy had no need to delay matters. "Would you like to kiss me?" he asked, 
fairly quickly. "I'm terribly excited," she said, responding in low tones, on cue. 
Only one thing wrong. Those tones. They were low, all right, just where they 
should have been. And they were cold, cold as an ice cube tray that has stuck to 
your hands because your hands are wet. They were efficiently responsive, mathe-
matically responsive, synthetically responsive. At this point, of course, we tumbled 
to the joke. The girl herself was the computer, out for the night. 
124. E.g., Hot Millions (described in Dick.on, Hot Millions and the Computer 
Ethic, CAREERS TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 12); 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
125. E.g., Hayakawa, "Solemn Thoughts on the Second Industrial Revolution," 
23 ETC: A REVIEW OF GENERAL SEMANTICS 7-8 (1966) [footnotes in original]: 
In each insurance company, in every bank and store, 
Are filing clerks and billing clerks and typists by the score; 
The work that all these people do will one day disappear 
In ERMAl systems tended by a lonely engineer. 
(But they'll never mechanize me-not me! 
Said Charlotte, the Louisville harlot.) 
While former auto workers try to fill their empty days, 
The automated auto-plant will turn out Chevrolets: 
With automatic pilots landing jet planes on the strip, 
The present men who guide them will not need to take the trip. 
(But how can they automate me? Goodness me! 
Asked Millie, the call girl from Philly.) 
Who'll keep the inventory up, who'll order the supplies 
Of paper towels, linens, iron pipe, or railroad ties? 
Executives now do this with a steno and a phone, 
But big computers soon will make decisions all alone. 
(They cannot cybernate me, tee heel 
Laughed Alice, the hooker from Dallas.) 
Machines will teach our children how to read and add and spell; 
Because they've lots of patience, they will do it very well. 
If business men and managers are not on the alert, 
Their functions will be taken on by CPM2 and PERT .3 
(I'll never be coded in FOR TRAN4-wheel 
Cried Susie, the Hackensack floozie.) 
CHORUS OF CHARLOTTE, MILLIE, ALICE, AND SUSIE 
The future will be like the past despite all dire foreseeings; 
We stoutly shall defend the human use of human beings. 
1 Electronic Recording and Machine Accounting. 
2 Critical Path Method. 
3 Program Evaluation and Review Technique. 
4 Formula Translation. 
See also Auden, "The Unknown Citizen," in MODERN PoETRY 206-07 (2d ed., paper, 
1961): 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint, 
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tion may give rise to an "underground" movement, reminiscent 
of the Luddites, to sabotage society's machines, perhaps by violating 
contemporary society's eleventh commandment: "Do not fold, bend, 
spindle, or mutilate."126 In fact, one federal court has found it 
necessary to grant an injunction restraining a civil rights group 
from defacing an electric company's punchcard bills as a means of 
protesting the company's hiring policies.127 Student activists have 
taken note of the new technology and have vented their anger on 
the computer and its trappings as symbols of the dehumanization 
of modem mass education.128 
Perhaps little attention should be paid to such aberrational and 
atavistic behavior. After all, there is little doubt that the new tech-
nology actually promotes a number of vital humanistic concerns in 
our society, and it may even prove to be essential to the proper func-
tioning and preservation of our representative form of govem-
ment.129 Moreover, the ability to present a parade of horribles does not 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint. 
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community. 
Except for the War till the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got fired, 
l3ut satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc. 
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views, 
For his Union reports that he paid his dues. 
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound) 
And our Social Psychology workers found 
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink. 
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way. 
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured, 
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured. 
Doth Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare 
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan 
And had everything necessary to the Modem Man, 
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire. 
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year; 
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went. 
He was married and added five children to the population, 
'Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his generation. 
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education. 
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard. 
126. Michael, supra note 110, at 284-85: 
If the computerized world of tomorrow produces the kinds of rationalized stan-
dards which increase one's frustration and inhibition, then certainly this invasion 
of one's right to hope (i.e., to fantasy antisocial success) will be interpreted as some 
kind of invasion of his personal freedom. If so, there most certainly will be an 
acceleration of a trend already under way: "Frustrate" the machines. In a spirit 
of desperation and vengeance people are bending punchcards, filling prepunched 
holes, and punching out additional ones. • •• 
127. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of C.O.R.E., 210 F. Supp. 
418 (D.D.C. 1962). 
128. TIME, Feb. 21, 1969, at 39; N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1969, at 3, col. 3. 
129, Shubik, Information, Rationality, and Free Choices in a Future Democratic 
Society, DAEDALUS, Summer 1967, at 771, 777: 
The influence of the high-speed digital computer upon society cannot be 
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provide a basis for jettisoning the technological developments of the 
past three decades. Nor does it advance the task of fashioning work-
able limits to preserve essential privacy values in a society that is 
increasingly oriented toward science and technology. 
Nevertheless, the breadth of concern over the dehumanization 
of modem society and the animus directed at the computer cannot 
be ignored. The omnipresence of the computer cannot help but 
have a numbing effect on the congeries of values we subsume 
under the heading "personal privacy." Generations of children reared 
in an environment of terminals, punchcards, and computer assisted 
instruction cannot help but have a set of attitudes and values differ-
ent from those of the present population, unless some effort is 
made to infiltrate the curriculum of the future with at least a 
minimal level of privacy indoctrination.130 As Richard L. Tobin 
commented in a Saturday Review editorial captioned "1984 Minus 
Sixteen and Counting," "we cannnot assume ... that privacy will 
survive simply because man has a psychological or social need for 
it."181 
IV. BALANCING THE EFFICIENCY INTEREST 
It should now be apparent that it is necessary to undertake a 
thorough examination of the vehicles that the advocates of efficiency 
and economy have used to bring about the present trends in com-
puter use. We also must probe the legitimacy of their objectives, 
and ultimately decide how best to achieve some equilibrium be-
tween these forces and the desiderata of personal privacy. In this 
section of the Article, two applications of information technology-
one from the public sector and one from the private sector-will 
be dissected in the hope of shedding some light on the nature of 
the conflicting considerations. The proposal for a National Data 
Center and the activities of private credit bureaus were selected be-
underestimated. If we wish to preserve even modified democratic values in a multi• 
billion-person-society, then the computer, mass data processing, and communica-
tions are absolute necessities. • • . The computer and modern data processing 
provide the refinement-the means to treat individuals as individuals rather than 
as parts of a large aggregate. 
The treatment of an individual as an individual will not be an unmixed bless-
ing. Problems concerning the protection of privacy will be large. 
See also Sherill, Instant Electorate, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1968, at 155; Miller, The Town 
Meeting Reborn, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 34. 
130. Miller, Privacy Implications of Instructional Technology-A Preliminary 
Overview 27-29 (undated) (unpublished paper prepared for the Study on Instructional 
Technology; copies are on file with the Michigan Law Review). But cf. Bettelheim, 
The Right to Privacy Is a Myth, SAT. EVENING PoST, July 27, 1968, at 8. 
131. SAT. REv., April 13, 1968, at 77-78. See also Maron, Large Scale Data Banks, 
60 SPECIAL LIBRARIES 3 (1969). 
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cause they present a cross-section of problems; numerous other com-
puter applications also are spawning their own privacy problems and 
are in need of examination and prescription, but for present pur-
poses the two chosen should suffice. 
A. The National Data Center 
The federal government long has been the nation's primary user 
of data-processing equipment; in fact, it was a government agency-
the Bureau of the Census-that purchased the first commercial com-
puter nearly two decades ago.132 Reliance on data-processing was a 
natural response to the proliferation of citizen reports and data 
collection activities that are the inevitable by-product of expansive 
federal programs in health, social security, employment, taxation, 
and education. Administration of the social security and income tax 
programs alone necessitates more than 600 million annual reports.133 
Moreover, as noted earlier,134 federal programs generate statistics 
that are becoming increasingly crucial as a foundation for sound 
social and economic research and policy-making. But these reports 
and statistics in turn beget additional reports and statistics, and 
the over-all effect is a seemingly unremitting stream of data engi-
neered by some diabolical Sorcerer's Apprentice. 
Computerized statistical and information systems have a vital 
role when the government commits itself to the solution of problems 
requiring analysis and correlation of a large number of factors. 
In these contexts, the computer's ability to manipulate vast bodies 
of detailed information permits the testing of hypotheses by using 
a greater mass of data concerning a larger number of potentially 
relevant variables encompassing longer periods of time than has 
hitherto been feasible.135 
As federal agency functions currently are arranged, however, 
only one government bureau, Census, has the collection and analysis 
132. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 198. 
133. HOUSE COMM. ON Posr OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK 
JUNGLE, H.R. REPr. No. 52, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1965) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL 
PAPERWORK JUNGLE]. 
134. See notes 51-52 supra. 
135. See generally The Design of a Federal Statistical Data Center in House Hear-
ings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy, appendix C, at 288: 
Acceptable prediction under changing circumstances requires analytical models 
which give much more detailed and explicit recognition to interrelationships 
among the criteria and variables which will be affected by the changed conditions. 
Such analytical models generally describe the mechanisms in greater detail than 
associative models; they use more information, and they often rely less heavily on 
trends or the postulation of only slow changes among the variables in the model. 
The present and prospective accelerated pace of technological and statistical 
change now requires the development and use of more detailed and complex 
models than can be created or supported by the present Federal statistical system. 
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of statistics as its principal goal. The other agencies generate statistic~ 
only as an incident of their operations, and frequently fail to pre-
serve data that might be valuable to some other governmental or 
private organization. Moreover, effective information practices are 
prevented because some agencies, such as the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission, 
must operate under relatively stringent confidentiality require-
ments that preclude the general release of data.136 A decentralized 
system also creates obstacles to the user of statistics; some govern-
ment data is classified, and available collections of data often are 
almost impossible to locate, are arranged inconveniently for access 
and analytical purposes, or are difficult to compare because of differ-
ences in agency procedures.137 With the possible exception of the 
Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSA TI) 
of the Federal Council of Science and Technology,138 there is no 
single government organization that can provide a reference guide 
to the kinds and locations of information being collected. COSA TI 
also seems to be the only body that is directly concerned with the 
quality of the Government's information activities, despite the fact 
that the Government expends over one billion dollars annually in 
information activities. 
These deficiencies in the federal government's information 
activities have several deleterious side-effects. First, the duplication 
of effort and time wasted in locating data and translating it into a 
form that is functional for second and subsequent users means a 
reduction in the over-all efficiency of governmental operations and 
an increase in its cost. Second, duplication in information collection 
often means an unnecessarily high and repetitious reporting burden 
on individuals and institutions.139 Third, large quantities of useful 
136. Review of Proposal for a National Data Center in House Hearings on the 
Computer and Invasion of Privacy, appendix 2, at 260-64. See also id. at 199, 201; 
Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 28-29; cf. Sawyer 8: Schechter, Computers, Pri-
vacy, and the National Data Center: The Responsibility of Social Scientists, 23 THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 810, 813 (1968): 
The major advantages a national data center holds for research are that (a) 
more data will be available, (b) data will be available more cheaply, (c) data will 
be available for more and better sampled respondents, (d) data collection will be 
less redundant, (e) variables will be more comparable, (f) variables will cover 
more areas, and (g) analyses will be easier to verify. 
137. See note 96 supra. 
138. See generally COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION OF THE 
FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORUM OF FED• 
ERALLY SUPPORTED INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTERS (1967). The need for the develop-
ment of an over-all information policy on the federal level is discussed by the chair-
man of COSATI in A. Aines, The Quest for National Policies for Information Systems 
(Feb. 18, 1969) (unpublished mimeo). 
139. See Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Com-
puters, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211, 217-18 (1968). 
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data never see the light of day and never reach government users 
who would be advantaged by its availability. There is a significant 
store of data hidden away in the interstices of the governmental 
structure that could be utilized profitably in endeavors such as the 
quest for consumer protection; government information pools of 
this sort-and nongovernmental data bases of comparable character 
-should be made readily available to those people who are partic-
ularly vulnerable to or concerned about various social problems. All 
things considered, therefore, it was eminently logical for the Bureau 
of the Budget to take a moderate step toward reform by proposing 
the creation of a single federal statistical center that would relieve 
the operating agencies of the task of generating statistics and cen-
tralize the existing diffused bodies of data in one location.140 
But the data center proposal became a lightning rod for the 
vague feelings of discontent and apprehension generated by the 
computer revolution. First Congress,141 then the newspapers142 and 
magazines,143 and finally the law reviews144 took turns castigating 
the idea, often in emotive or highly symbolic terms. To a degree, 
the clamor was most fortunate; the original proposals were in-
credibly myopic in their obsession with efficiency. For example, none 
of the three reports recommending establishment of a federal data 
bank gave the problem of privacy more than token attention and 
despite early protestations to the contrary, proponents of the data 
center later admitted that individual identification would have to 
be linked to data deposited in the center145-an admission that 
has enormous implications for individual privacy. One of the chief 
advocates of the center subsequently characterized this failure to 
140. The proposal to create a federal data center was advanced in a series of three 
reports: Report of the Committee on the Preservation and Use of Economic Data to 
the Social Science Research Council (April 1965) (Ruggles Report), reprinted in House 
Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 195-254; Statistical Evaluation 
Report No. 6-Review of Proposal for a National Data Center (Dunn Report), re-
printed in House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 254-94; Report 
of the Task Force on the Storage of and Access to Government Statistics (Kaysen 
Report), reprinted in Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 25-37. 
141. See generally House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy; Sen-
ate Hearings on Computer Privacy; Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy, pt. 2; ll2 
CONG. REc. 19,961 (Aug. 18, 1966). 
142. See, e.g., Labor, April 13, 1968, at 8, col. l; N.Y. Times, July 28, 1966, § C, at 
18, col. l; id., July 27, 1966, § M, at 33, col. 4. 
14!1. See, e.g., Chains of Plastic, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1966, at 27; A Government 
Watch on 200 Million Americans?, U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD REPORT, May 16, 1966, at 56; 
Miller, The National Data Center and Personal Privacy, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1967, at 
53. 
144. Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 
82 HARv. L. REv. 400 (1968); Project, The Computerization of Government Files: What 
Impact on the Individual?, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1371 (1968). 
145. See House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 52, 59, 97-98. 
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come to grips with the privacy question as "a gigantic oversight."146 
Nonetheless, the failure of the center's proponents to give de-
tailed consideration of the privacy question does not represent, as 
some suggested, a disregard of human values or evidence of bu-
reaucratic bad faith. The proposals envisioned only a statistical 
center and they were limited in scope; thus, if the potential for 
expansion and individualization of the center's files is put to one 
side, reasonable men might view the threat to individual privacy 
as a relatively remote one. Moreover, until the contours of the 
center were more sharply delineated, the forms in which invasions 
of privacy might occur would remain obscure, making it difficult 
to formulate precise proposals for protection. 
In the course of the congressional debate it became clear that 
the decentralized nature of the federal reporting system, which the 
statisticians and social scientists derisively characterized as ineffi-
cient, serves as one of the basic safeguards against the compilation 
of extensive government dossiers on each citizen.147 Indeed, its 
maligned inefficiency virtually assures that. And, although propo-
nents of the data center were astute to point out the excellent record 
of protecting sensitive information compiled by some federal agen-
cies, most notably the Census Bureau, the dialogue also revealed 
that several federal agencies and bureaus had a less enviable past 
history in the privacy arena.148 Moreover, it became apparent that 
the bodies of information that ultimately would find their way 
into the proposed data bank would be "orders of magnitude more 
sensitive than those now at the Bureau of the Census,"149 with 
each failure of security likely to be "many times more destructive 
to an individual."150 Chastened by the public outcry, the statisti-
cians and administrators retreated to reconsider their proposal and 
to investigate the safeguards that would be necessary to render a 
·National Data Center more palatable.151 
146. Dunn, The Idea of a National Data Center and the Issue of Personal Privacy, 
reprinted in Hearings on Statistical Programs 32, 35. 
147. Cf. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 74. 
148. See generally notes 546-47 infra. 
149. HOUSE COMllUITEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL 
DATA BANK CONCEPT, H.R. REPT. No. 1842, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968) [hereinafter 
PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL DATA BANK CONCEPT]. 
150. Id. at II. 
151. The House Committee on Government Operations recently recommended that 
"no work be done to establish the national data bank until privacy protection is ex• 
plored fully and guaranteed to the greatest extent possible to the citizens whose per-
sonal records would form its information base." PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL DATA 
BANK CONCEPT 6. See also Zwick, A National Data Center, in ABA SECTION OF IN· 
DlVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, MONOGRAPH No. 1, at 32 (1967): 
There does not exist today ••• a fully developed plan for a National Data Center. 
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This apparent victory in the fight to preserve privacy, however, 
probably has been a Pyrrhic one. Information collections prepared 
for statistical purposes, which bore the brunt of the outcry during 
the data center controversy, comprise only about one fifth to one 
third of the reports extracted from citizens.152 Thus, the public de-
bate never really reached the question of preserving the integrity of 
the bulk of the sensitive data held by the government and the 
problem of regulating the government's penchant for increased in-
formation collection. Moreover, purely statistical studies generally 
do not contain sensitive data of the type that is attractive to snoop-
ers; therefore, they are somewhat easier to protect against intrusion 
than investigative files, although the claimed distinction between 
statistical systems and surveillance systems153 does not appear to be 
particularly valid.15-1 
Ironically, the failure to establish a data center under a legis-
lative mandate to take the steps necessary to protect individual 
privacy may undermine individual privacy if nothing is done to 
curb the present tendency of each federal agency to "constitute 
itself a data center."155 The legal authority for this pattern al-
ready exists. The Administrator of the General Services Admin-
istration (GSA), for example, has statutory power to establish inter-
agency pools of data-processing equipment and facilities,156 and the 
And without a carefully developed plan the Administration has no intention of 
creating a Data Center. Furthermore, the Administration is committed to obtain-
ing congressional approval before it would proceed to activate a National Data 
Center. 
152. THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 18. 
153. E.g., House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 92-93 (state-
ment of Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., research analyst, Resources for the Future, Inc.): 
The distinction is basic. Intelligence systems generate data about individuals 
as individuals. They have as their purpose "finding out" about the individual. •.. 
[A] statistical system is busy generating aggregates, averages, percentages, and 
so forth that describe relationships. No information about the individual is 
generated. 
No information about the individual needs to be available to anyone under 
any circumstances for the statistical information system to perform its function. 
154. See House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 112, 142; 
Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 67-68. 
155. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 61. See also remarks 
of Rep. Gallagher on H.R. 7659 (authorizing a middecade census), 113 CONG. REc. 
10,383 (Aug. 10, 1967): "[N]o matter what name the Census Bureau gives to its 'in-
formation system,' what it is actually creating is a very complete and thorough Na-
tional Data Bank." 
156. Pub. L. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127, § lll(b)(l) (1965): 
The Administrator is authorized to transfer automatic data processing equipment 
between Federal agencies, to provide for joint utilization of such equipment by 
two or more Federal agencies, and to establish and operate equipment pools and 
data processing centers for the use of two or more such agencies when necessary 
for its most efficient and effective utilization. 
See also id. § 11 l(g). 
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Deputy Administrator of the GSA has testified that "the most 
effective and economical" way to implement this authority is to 
augment existing computer equipment with the ultimate purpose 
of providing several agencies with "huge multiaccess, remote con-
trol, time sharing systems" servicing other agencies.157 Moreover, 
the Secretary of Commerce has authority to develop uniform fed-
eral standards for data-processing,158 and at present "a major stan-
dardization effort" is underway "to provide a universal language 
of machine intercommunication."159 Finally, many of the panels 
~nd task forces operating under COSA TI are addressing themselves 
to the facilitation of transmitting data among agencies and the 
improvement of access to federal information by various govern-
mental and nongovernmental institutions and people. 
At this writing approximately twenty federal agencies, bureaus, 
and departments operate time-sharing computer systems or are in 
the process of establishing them.160 The system that currently is 
handling personal medical records in the Social Security Admin-
istration provides a rather graphic example of what we can expect 
in the future: 
The Social Security Administration [has a] ... policy of storing 
in a computer in the Social Security Administration Headquarters, 
Baltimore, the basic data indicating the social security status of every 
157. Hearings on Data Processing Management in the Federal Government Before 
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
54-55 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on Data Processing Management]. 
158. Pub. L. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1128 § 111(£) (1965): 
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized ••• to make appropriate recommenda-
tions to the President relating to the establishment of uniform Federal automatic 
data processing standards. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to undertake 
the necessary research in the sciences and technologies of automatic data processing 
computer and related systems, as may be required under the provisions of this 
subsection. 
159. Hearings on Data Processing Management 72 (statement of A. V. Astin, Di-
rector of the National Bureau of Standards). See also id. at 25 (statement of Phillip S. 
Hughes, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget): 
A number of important data processing standards have already been approved 
for voluntary use under the programs of United States of America Standards Insti-
tute; and these are now under consideration for adoption as Federal standards in 
which their use, with few exceptions, would become mandatory upon Federal 
agencies .••• 
The development of greater compatibility among hardware and software will, 
however, solve only part of the problem related to the more effective development 
of our information systems. There still remains the need to develop greater com-
patibility among the data that is being exchanged. . . • To meet this problem, 
the Bureau of the Budget is formulating a Government-wide program for stan-
dardizing data elements and codes in those cases where standardization is essential. 
160. Statement on Behalf of the Customer Interest of the Executive Agencies of 
the United States 9-27 (submitted in connection with In re Regulatory and Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Ser• 
vices and Facilities, FCC Docket No. 16,979) (March 5, 1968). 
April 1969] Computers and Privacy 1135 
citizen with a social security registration. This has now been ex-
tended to equivalent records on all phases of the Medicare program. 
. . . [T]he Social Security Administration has established some 
725 field offices throughout the United States. Registrants visit or 
write to these field offices for information concerning their Social 
Security or Medicare status, or to apply for payments under the 
respective programs. Each such inquiry or application typically 
results in a communication to Baltimore ... . 
. . . [E]ach field station is equipped ... with automatic trans-
mitters, that transmit or receive at 100 words per minute. . . . 
[The information] is sent via high-speed, dedicated circuits to Balti-
more, where it is received on magnetic tape ready for input to the 
Social Security Administration's computer .... 
The Social Security Administration also maintains magnetic-
tape-to-magnetic-tape transmissions systems from the National Blue 
Cross Headquarters to Baltimore.161 
The growth of interconnected systems will enable the government 
to coordinate the information-gathering programs of the various 
agencies and to foster the sharing of data bases.162 Since the Bureau 
of the Budget does have extensive authority to promote these 
activities,163 it is apparent that as soon as enough agency interfaces 
161. Johnson, Computers and the Public Welfare-Law Enforcement, Social Ser-
vices and Data Banks, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS-TOWARD A COMPUTER 
UTILITY 173, 187-88 (1968). 
162. See, e.g., Hearings on Data Processing Management 5 (statement of Elmer B. 
Staats, Comptroller General of the United States): 
We believe that, as third-generation systems grow and as data communications 
systems develop, the concept of sharing of large data bases and programs will 
come into play to such a significant degree that only through the greatest coor-
dination of effort on a Government-wide, or, at least, on an interagency basis will 
we be able to avoid extensive duplication of effort in designing and redesigning 
of systems in future periods. 
Congressman Roman Pucinski of the House Education and Labor Committee has 
actively pursued the idea that a national data-processing and retrieval system should 
be established under federal auspices to serve to integrate private and governmental 
information networks. H.R. 8809, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
163. The Budget Bureau's powers were summarized as follows in SuscoMM. ON 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90th Cong .• 1st Sess., REPORT 
ON THE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL PROGRAMS 8 ijoint 
Comm. Print 1967) (emphasis added): 
The major responsibility for the coordinating function is with the Bureau of 
the Budget through its Office of Statistical Standards. Legislation provides the 
Bureau with strong backing for its task of coordination. The Budget and Ac-
counting Procedures Act of 1950 in Title I, Part I, Section 103, states that "The 
President, through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, is authorized and 
directed to develop programs and to issue regulations and orders for the improved 
gathering, compiling, ••• and disseminating of statistical information •.•. This 
provision of law is carried out under Executive Order 10253. 
Specific authority is also provided by the Federal Reports Act of 1942 for the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget (a) to transfer the responsibilities for the 
collection of statistical information from one agency to another, and with certain 
safeguards, to transfer information among agencies to avoid duplication and pro-
mote efficiency; and (b) to review, and approve or disapprove, •.• proposals by 
Federal executive agencies for obtaining information from the public. 
CJ. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privac-y 197. 
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are established a system roughly equivalent to, and perhaps even 
more all-embracing than, a National Data Center will exist, even 
though it may not be denominated as such. 
The prospect of an omnibus, de facto federal data center evolving 
without prior comprehensive congressional review or any defined 
obligation to protect privacy is not a happy one in view of past 
revelations about some government information-handling prac-
tices. Perhaps most disheartening is the fact that the existing con-
trols on the type and volume of information that may be exacted 
from the public seem to have been largely ineffectual. The Fed-
eral Reports Act164 provides that federal agencies must obtain clear-
ance from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget before col-
lecting data from ten or more persons. Clearance is rarely denied;165 
indeed, the Budget Bureau has been known to act as an advocate as 
well as a judge, intervening in Congress to obtain support for cer-
tain information-gathering projects.166 Even this highly permissive 
procedure is thought to be unduly burdensome by some agencies, 
however, and on occasion they have circumvented the Federal 
Reports Act by failing to obtain clearance for data-gathering done 
for them by independent contractors.167 Agencies also may evade 
the clearance requirements by securing bodies of data from fed-
erally financed state agencies under the threat of withholding 
funds,168 or by claiming exemptions from the requirements of the 
Act.109 
Moreover, Congress' ultimate power over appropriations, which 
was advanced as a practical control mechanism on the nature of the 
information that might be stored in the proposed federal data 
center,170 hardly seems capable of remedying deficiencies in the 
164. 5 u.s.c. § 139 (1964). 
165. THE FEDERAL PAPER.WORK JUNGLE 14-15. 
166. Id. at 39. 
167. HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SER.VICE, STA'l'ISTICAL ACTIVITIES OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND CONTRACT Cosrs, H.R. REPT. 
1130, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1964). 
168. THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 94-95: 
Since federally supported State programs have mushroomed in recent years, we 
are faced with rapidly expanding reporting and paperwork programs which, for 
all practical purposes, fall outside of any Federal or State supervision. This situa• 
tion lends itself to all kinds of abuses since the Federal agency can threaten the 
state agency by withholding funds unless all of its demands for information are 
met. 
See also id. at 84. 
169. Id. at 87: "Although the regulatory agencies are not specifically exempted 
from the Federal Reports Act (as are the fiscal and banking agencies), they claim that 
their organic acts give them full authority to collect information, from the public ••• .'' 
170. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 5 (statement of Carl Kaysen, 
Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton University). 
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conduct of a number of individual agencies. Appropriation levels 
generally are determined on the basis of an over-all view of agency 
programs without any significant consideration of the reporting 
requirements that may be involved. In any event, appropriations 
committees usually are more concerned with agency personnel re-
quests than with the minutiae of proposed programs.171 The limited 
attention Congress gives to agency information practices should 
not be surprising in light of the fact that top-level administrators 
often are unaware of the amount and kinds of information that 
their own agency demands from the public.172 
Another fact of federal agency life that argues against allowing 
interagency computerized information pools to grow without super-
vision is that governmental data gatherers may abuse their statutory. 
data collection powers. A recent survey by a congressional subcom-
mittee revealed many instances of excesses and concluded that "the 
majority of government forms require either nonessential or too de-
tailed information from the individual citizen."173 In addition, agency 
information collectors may deceive the public into believing that 
they are required by law to respond to reports that in fact are 
voluntary; "in their zeal to increase the coverage and accuracy of 
a survey," one report concluded, "administrators have been known 
to use deceptive language in the wording of their questionnaires" 
to coerce responses.174 
171. THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 98. 
172. Id. at 14. 
173. SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 90ra CONG., lsr SESS., GOVERNMENT DOSSIER 8 (Comm. 
Print 1967) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT DossIER]. See also Okun, Investigation of Jurors 
by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEo. L. J. 839, 852-53 (1968): 
When the United States is a litigant it is the FBI which appears to play the 
major role in investigation of jury panels .••• While the approaches and goals of 
the FBI are basically similar to those of private detective agencies, there are 
several factors which distinguish the FBI investigation. It has access to informa-
tion which is usually beyond the reach of the commercial investigator. A given 
United States Attorney may feel that knowledge of the financial lives of the pro-
spective jurors will be valuable in impaneling the jury. The FBI will probably be 
able to secure for him information from banks, stock brokerage firms, insurance 
companies, and other institutions which would not make available their records 
to the private investigator . 
• • • The guess may be ventured that in the overwhelming number of cases 
mere display of FBI credentials is a guarantee of rather full disclosure of all 
information sought. Moreover, the FBI is subject to no practical limitations on 
the type of inquiry it conducts or the extent thereof. 
174. The FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 36. See also id. at 33: 
On the surface it would appear that all Federal requests for information are 
"authorized" by law, since the Appropriations Committee must approve the funds 
for such activities and Congress must pass the appropriation acts for the depart-
ments and agencies. In fact, as brought out in subcommittee hearings, the general 
public often is misled into believing that all Federal reports are mandatory and, 
m cases of doubt, the respondent often feels "safer" if he complies with the 
request. 
See also text accompanying notes 359-62 infra. 
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The deficiencies of the existing system of government informa-
tion-handling and the threat of unrestrained expansion of com-
puterization by the agencies are not simply problems of the un-
authorized procurement of data. The information that is exacted, 
whether procured legally or not, often is taken without any assur-
ance that it will be handled on a confidential basis; if the agency 
does make a pledge, it is a virtually meaningless one not to release 
the information outside of the government.175 It is highly unreal-
istic to expect the donor of the data to have any accurate conception 
of the uses to which it will be put or the potential audience to 
which it will be exposed. Even if confidentiality restrictions control 
a particular agency's activities, they are likely to reflect little more 
than ad hoc judgments rather than a carefully developed statutory 
or regulatory system for protecting citizen privacy.176 Those safe-
guards that do exist often are vitiated by the propensity of bureau-
crats to cooperate with each other in exchanging information of 
the most sensitive nature.177 
The reports of past excesses would be understandable, perhaps 
pardonable, if they had resulted solely from efforts to obtain data 
that is essential to the solution of pressing social problems. Often, 
however, this has not been the case. As a congressional subcom-
mittee revealed, "a number of surveys are conducted at the request 
(and often at the expense) of industry groups, trade associations, 
and often business organizations."178 Big business easily can absorb 
the cost of replying to myriad governmental questionnaires, and 
can hire the analysts and marketing experts necessary to make prof-
itable use of government statistics.179 On the other hand, the burden 
on small businessmen is a heavy one and they receive little or no 
175. GOVERNMENT DOSSIER 8. 
176. See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STORAGE OF 
.AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, reprinted in Senate Hearings on Computer 
Privacy 25, 27-28, noting that in some agencies, "formal policies regarding disclosure 
have not been set up, and in many of these cases the protection depends on the judg-
ment of those who are in charge of the different programs involved." 
177. See, e.g., Packard, Don't Tell It to the Computer, N.Y. Times, § 6 (Magazine), 
Jan. 8, 1967, at 44, 89: 
Federal agencies have also developed increasingly systematic patterns for ex-
changing information. When a Federal agent makes a National Agency Check on 
a person, for example, he customarily checks the files of at least eight Federal 
agencies. A Congressional investigator reported that the results of lie-detector 
tests taken by one agency were freely passed around to personnel officials in other 
agencies. And we know that various government units are developing a central 
information center to exchange information on individuals involved in criminal 
investigations. 
Cf. Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Computers, 
Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 218-19 (1968). 
178. THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 39. 
179. Id. at 64. 
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direct benefit from these statistical programs.180 Ironically, when 
individual citizens become outraged enough to complain about the 
torrent of questionnaires, federal information managers often tum 
these supplications to their o,m advantage by requesting increased 
computer power and the authority to share bodies of data in order 
to "ease the burden on respondents." As might be expected, this 
argument was advanced by the advocates of the National Data 
Center.181 
Of course, past abuses are not a justification for abolishing or 
drastically reducing the government's statistical or information 
activities. As stated above, extensive gathering and analysis of 
information is essential to the functioning of a highly complex 
society. However, past history does afford ample reason to be skep-
tical of demands for more information and facile assertions that 
the establishment of computerized government data centers will in-
crease the protection given to individual records. The claim that 
these centers will make it easy and desirable to purge stale records 
because computer storage costs are relatively high no doubt has 
validity;182 it becomes less persuasive, however, when considered 
in light of congressional findings that the mounting cost of storing 
paper records already is necessitating the destruction of stale data,183 
and that "computer technology shares the responsibility for increas-
ing Federal reporting requirements.''184 This is consistent with the 
notion advanced earlier185 that the very expansion of data-handling 
capacity tends to encourage an expanded appetite for information. 
The denouement of the original proposal for a National Data 
Center and the debate over it should indicate that isolated re-
180. Id. at 41. 
181. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 42-43 (statement of Charles 
J. Zwick, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget); House Hearings on the 
ComfJUter and Invasion of Privacy 49-50 (statement of Raymond T. Bowman, Assistant 
Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget). See also Ruggles, supra note 
177, at 217-18. 
182. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 89 (statement of H. C. Jordan, 
President of Credit Data Corp.): 
One of the statements which I hear most often with respect to computerized 
data banks is that a computer is unable to forget, and as a result of this mechan-
ical "total recall" an individual is never able to redeem himself ..•. 
While the above is technically possible, it is neither desirable nor economically 
feasible. Unlike old-fashioned paper files, where storage is very cheap but removal 
of data is very expensive, in the case of the computer file, storage is very expensive 
and selective removal is very cheap .••• Consequently, the storing of information 
which is old and outdated simply cannot be permitted. On the other hand, it is 
possible to review all of the data in a computer file within a few hours to remove 
that which is outdated. 
183. THE FEDERAL PAPERWORK JUNGLE 49-52. 
184. Id. at 47. 
185. See text accompanying notes notes 41-42 supra. 
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action to individual information-gathering proposals will not end 
the growing incursions on personal privacy that are a natural by-
product of the increased level of federal data collection. But the 
episode also confronts us with an interesting dilemma. If defeat 
of the National Data Center simply encourages the proliferation 
of unregulated intra-agency data centers and machine interfaces 
among the various agencies, then the cure may be more dangerous 
than the disease. The more attractive alternative appears to be a 
data center that is functionally circumscribed and is structured to 
place a heavy premium on privacy considerations. Prior to estab-
lishing such a center, the government's information policies must 
be comprehensively evaluated in the hope of achieving an over-all 
balance between the need for massive amounts of raw data that 
can be handled efficiently and used for a variety of purposes and 
the obligation of the national government to preserve the privacy 
of its citizens. Moreover, this evaluation must be a continuing one 
in order to keep pace with changing agency practices in the col-
lection and use of data. 
B. The Computerized Credit Bureau 
The privacy implications of the increase in credit information 
services in the private sector have received almost as much attention 
in the recent past as has the proposal to establish a National Data 
Center. Buying on credit has become an integral part of daily life 
in the United States, and the number of credit consumers and the 
amount spent annually on credit purchases are steadily increasing.186 
Along with the new pace of credit transactions, the urbanization and 
mobility of the population has made it necessary for most credit 
grantors to base their decisions on information gathered by credit 
bureaus rather than on personal knowledge of the borrower as was 
true in more halcyon days. 
The vast majority of people willingly (and often unthinkingly) 
supply lenders and credit bureaus with substantial quantities of per-
sonal information in order to obtain the benefits of the credit econ-
omy.187 To augment this data, many credit bureaus also regularly 
comb newspapers, court records showing the institution of lawsuits, 
and other public files for bits of personal data that might be relevant 
to the decision about whether an individual is an acceptable credit 
186. The growth of credit buying is documented in H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY 
LATER (1961). Each month approximately eight billion dollars worth of credit is 
extended in the United States. TIME, Dec. 20, 1968, at 79. 
187. See, e.g., Michael, Speculation on the Relation of the Computer to Individual 
Freedom and the Right to Privacy, 53 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 270, 275 (1964). 
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risk.188 In some instances this information is further supplemented 
with reports on a person's payment habits received by the bureaus 
from the previous credit grantors, and perhaps by reports of field 
investigators who check on the subject's status in the community. 
These activities and the pool of information they create pose sub-
stantial access and accuracy problems of the type discussed earlier.189 
The credit-reporting industry's record of protecting personal 
privacy has been extremely spotty. Testimony presented to congres-
sional subcommittees indicates that some of the practices of the re-
tail credit-reporting associations--companies that cater primarily to 
insurance companies and employers-are subject to sharp criti-
cism.190 In addition to the activities described in the preceding para-
graph, they engage in a fair amount of surveillance and rely on 
information gathered from third persons. As might be expected, 
these reports usually contain hearsay narratives gleaned from quick 
interviews with neighbors, landlords, employers, and "friends" con-
ducted by poorly paid, relatively unsophisticated, and frequently 
insensitive functionaries.191 By way of defense, in many cases it prob-
ably is true that the bureaus seek sensitive information only because 
their clients have requested it.192 And, it is probably true that they 
188. See, e.g., Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-26 (1968) (herein-
after House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus]. 
189. See pt. III.A.-B. supra. 
190. See generally Hearings on Credit Bureaus Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust 
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) 
(These hearings have not been published as of this writing. General descriptions of 
them may be found in TIME, Dec. 20, 1968, at 79; N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1968, § I, at 58, 
col. 2.); Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus; Hearings on the Retail Credit Com-
pany Before the Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (hereinafter Hearings on Retail Credit Com-
pany]. (These hearings have not been published as yet; page citations refer to the 
unofficial transcript.) See also note 218 infra and accompanying text. 
191. See, e.g., Sesser, Big Brother Keeps Tabs on Insurance Buyers, THE NEW R.E-
Punuc, April 27, 1968, at II: 
Retail Credit officials are hesitant to discuss in detail their investigative tech-
niques. But no such reluctance exists on the part of their main competitor, 
Hooper-Holmes Bureau Inc., which has files on nine million people. Hooper-
Holmes and Retail Credit both say their operations are identical. 
••• Frederick E. King, president of Hooper-Holmes, describes the procedure 
of an inspector suspicious of an extramarital affair: "You go to a neighbor and 
establish rapport," he says. "Then you ask, 'What's your opinion of X's home 
life; how do you think of him as a family man?' This will usually elicit some 
hint .••• Then you start digging. You press them as far as they go, and if they 
become recalcitrant, you go somewhere else." 
The president of Retail Credit Company has testified that their investigators custom-
arily interview "(e]mployers, former employers, references, fellow club members, neigh-
bors and former neighbors, [and] financial and professional people." Hearings on 
Retail Credit Company 52. 
192. See, e.g., Hearings on Retail Credit Company 51 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, 
President of Retail Credit Co.): 
Life insurance companies want information which will be helpful in evaluating 
the applicant as a life insurance risk. This includes such matters as the appli-
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do not record the disposition of a lawsuit against a file subject be-
cause it is very difficult to discover such information given the archaic 
filing practices of most courts.193 But if the episodes recounted before 
Congress are any indication of the level of care being exercised by 
credit bureau investigators, or of their concern for privacy, it is clear 
that a substantial mass of dangerous and often inaccurate informa-
tion has been gathered. This data undoubtedly is causing consider-
able damage to some individuals.194 
In contrast to the retail credit bureaus, the commercial credit 
organizations-companies primarily designed to serve credit grant-
ors195-claim to limit themselves to "hard" financial data that is less 
cant's duties, his finances, his health history, the extent of his use of alcohol, his 
mode of living, and hazardous avocations. Automobile insurance companies, on the 
other hand, emphasize other factors, among them the ages and abilities of the 
drivers, the uses and condition of an automobile, distance driven, prior accidents, 
and the history, if any, of driving under the influence of alcohol. Similarly, there 
are varying requirements for information in connection with other types of 
business transactions, such as property lines of insurance, prospective employment, 
claims investigations, and marketing information. 
193. See, e.g., William J. Mangan, General Manager of the Credit Bureau of 
Greater Boston, Inc., Statement Before a Public Study Session of the Procedures and 
Practices of Credit Bureaus, Consumers' Council, Boston, Massachusetts, Oct. 15, 1968, 
at 7 (unpublished mimeo): 
We ••• copy from the local court houses filings of bankruptcies, divorces, 
attachments, and notices of supplementary process, which are a matter of public 
record, and we put this information into our files. . • • 
We have no difficulty picking up the filings of these matters because they are 
listed in the various records chronologically. We would like to pick up all dispo• 
sitions on the same general basis, but it is impossible to do so. Daily dispositions 
are not available in a chronological listing; they are posted back to the original 
filing and we have no way of knowing which book to go to, let alone which page. 
194. For example, an actual bonding report prepared by the Retail Credit Com-
pany was submitted to the House Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy in conjunction 
with the Hearings on Retail Credit Company. The subject of the report, a retired 
army lieutenant colonel, was described as follows: 
He was known to be a rather wild tempered, unreasonable and uncouth person 
who abused his rank and wasn't considered a well adjusted person. He was known 
to roam the reservation at Ft. Hood and shoot cattle belonging to ranchers who 
had leased the grazing land from the Army. 
Reports of this kind may be very common, in light of the company practices de-
scribed by Retail Credit's President: 
·we check the former employer. ·we check possibly his school record to deter-
mine what his record was in school if this is relevant to his particular employ-
ment situation. We check to see if he has certain characteristics that might be 
advantageous for that particular job. 
If, for example, he is a sales prospect, is he a man with an outgoing person-
ality? Does he get along well with people, has he shown leadership characteristics 
and this sort of thing. 
Then, of course, we try to see if he has had job difficulty, difficulty holding a 
job, or if for any reason he hasn't gotten along well with his previous employers. 
Hearings on Retail Credit Company 76 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, President of 
Retail Credit Corporation). 
195. The distinction between "credit-reporting agencies" such as the Retail Credit 
Company, and "credit bureaus" serving retail merchants, such as the ACB, is dis-
cussed in House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 104-05. However, the dis-
tinction is far from sharp. For example, a wholly owned subsidiary of Retail Credit 
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vulnerable to objection.196 But there is evidence that the commercial 
credit bureaus have been remiss in terms of limiting access to their 
files. As part of a television news report,197 CBS News staff members 
created a fictitious "systems" company, which requested financial 
information from twenty commercial credit bureaus in various parts 
of the country. The reports requested were on people chosen at 
random from the telephone directories in the locale of the selected 
bureaus. The CBS company's letter simply indicated that it was in-
terested in extending credit to a particular person residing in the 
area covered by the bureau that was contacted. Despite the vigorous 
assertions by Mr. John Spafford, Executive Vice President of Asso-
ciated Credit Bureaus of America (ACB), a nationwide organization 
of independent credit bureaus, that it was "impossible" to secure a 
report from an ACB member bureau unless the requesting party 
was a "bona fide creditor," the fictitious CBS company received, 
"without further question," full reports from ten of the bureaus.198 
The experiment was repeated following the adoption of new ACB 
"Credit Bureau Guidelines To Protect Consumer Privacy," which 
require the signing of a contract in which the client certifies that 
inquiries will be made only for credit-granting purposes.199 To make 
it even more difficult, the CBS letter of request did not indicate that 
the information sought was to be used for credit-granting purposes; 
moreover, credit reports were sought on people who had complained 
to congressional investigators about their credit problems. Nonethe-
less, seven out of twenty-eight of the selected bureaus provided the 
information without hesitation.200 
In each sample group, some of the bureaus that did not comply 
with the initial request for a report stated in reply that they would 
Company controls sixty credit bureaus, Hearings on Retail Credit Company 4, while 
the ACB makes its files accessible to more than 1,400 collection agencies. Senate Hear-
ings on Credit Bureaus (Remarks of John L. Spafford, Executive Vice President of 
Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., submitted Dec. 10, 1968). 
196. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Credit Bureaus (statements of Henry C. Jordan, 
President of Credit Data Corporation, and John L. Spafford, Executive Vice President 
of Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.); House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 
87-88. 
197. CBS Evening News, March 17, 1969, reprinted in ll5 CoNG. REc. S3008-09 
(daily ed. March 17, 1969) [hereinafter CBS News]. 
198. Id. at S3009. 
199. Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., Credit Bureau Guidelines To Protect Con-
sumer Privacy, § C: 
I. Credit bureaus shall require service contracts in which the regular subscriber 
or the occasional user certifies that inquiries will be made only for the purposes 
of credit granting or other bona fide business transactions .... 
2. The bureau shall refuse service to any prospective subscriber or user who will 
not so certify. 
200. CBS News at S3009. 
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furnish the information when the systems company signed a con-
tract with them. In one case the fictitious company did this, and the 
information was immediately forthcoming, despite the fact that an 
investigation by the bureau would have revealed that the request did 
not come from a bona fide credit grantor. As CBS commentator 
Mike Wallace remarked: "It would seem that signing a written con-
tract is not much of a safeguard; all the client has to do is lie."201 
Even if the bureaus limit themselves to providing bona fide 
creditors with information about the financial history of consum-
ers202 and refrain from supplying derogatory or innuendo-filled tid-
bits,203 the problem of how to insure the accuracy of the financial 
reports that reach the credit grantor remains. At present credit 
bureau practices are virtually unregulated. A simple notation de-
scribing the customer as "slow-pay," for example, can be extremely 
damaging, yet it may conceal an honest dispute in which the cus-
tomer withheld payment in order to obtain the goods or services he 
bargained for in acceptable condition.204 Once an error of this type 
finds its way into a file, it may be virtually impossible to correct, or 
even to discover.205 One national organization, the Retail Credit 
201. Id. 
202. See, e.g., House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 110 (statement of 
John L. Spafford, Executive Vice President of the Associated Credit Bureaus of 
America): 
Some people mistakenly feel that the purpose of the credit bureau is to pre• 
vent individuals and families from obtaining credit ...• On the contrary, the 
credit bureau, by providing factual information promptly and efficiently to credit 
grantors helps more people obtain more goods and services on credit. 
203. See M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 35 (1964), in which a credit bureau's 
manager is quoted as saying, "If everybody comes out white, the clients don't need 
us." It could be argued that a credit bureau which desires to maintain a reputation 
for accuracy will take measures to insure that its reports are truthful; but since the 
bureau's inaccuracy will be discovered only if credit is extended and the subject of 
the report subsequently defaults, it seems clear that the bureau's natural tendency 
would be to err on the side of supplying derogatory information. 
204. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 81 (statement of the author). See 
also House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 11 (testimony of Professor Alan 
F. Westin): 
I think all of us, as buyers and consumers, appreciate that withholding payment 
is our most effective leverage in getting the performance of the contract as we 
believe it has been made. 
But what may often happen, especially when hot words may be exchanged 
between the ••. dealer and the consumer, is that the seller may report this as 
simply nonpayment or slow payment. He may even take a certain amount of 
relish in the fact that the obnoxious lady on the telephone .•• is being fixed in 
the credit record • . • . It is an anonymous treatment, because the reporter of 
the information is never accountable for it. 
205. See, e.g., TIME, Dec. 20, 1968, at 79; The National Observer, March 3, 1969, at 
I, col. I. 
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Company, even has a provision in its contract prohibiting its cus-
tomers from telling anyone that a credit report has been made.206 
When the credit bureau is local, there may be a chance 
to learn about and correct inaccurate or misleading entries. How-
ever, these smaller, local bureaus seem destined to disappear. The 
average credit bureau using a manual file system is likely to be a 
relatively inefficient operation that will prove increasingly incapable 
of storing, updating, retrieving, and transferring207 the information 
necessary to keep pace with the booming credit economy. Com-
puter technology, mated with a high-speed transmission medium, is 
the ideal and inevitable method of improving the system. But this 
new equipment is expensive, and a trend toward large-scale credit 
information organizations already is evident. 
As early as September 1965, Credit Data Corporation inaugu-
rated a large on-line computerized credit information system in 
California. In 1967 that company linked its Los Angeles and San 
Francisco offices to provide, in effect, a statewide computer credit 
network. During the same year, Credit Data opened a com-
puterized center in New York City, and plans are underway for 
another center in Detroit.208 Credit Data responds to telephone in-
quiries from subscribers by reading a printout of the computerized 
206. Hearings on Retail Credit Company, appendix A: 
All reports, whether oral or written, will be kept strictly confidential: except 
as required by law, no information from reports nor your identity as the report-
ing agency will be revealed to any other person except a person whose duty re-
quires him to pass on the transaction in relation to which the report was ordered. 
,v. Lee Burge, President of Retail Credit Company, sought to justify this clause by 
explaining that "it is a protection to the sources of information." Id. at 31. He also 
described the tortuous process that an individual would have to go through in order 
to track down an error in a Retail Credit Company Report: 
Let me reconstruct a typical conversation between a personnel manager and a 
person who has just been declined a job. 
He might say "'\Thy don't I get the job," and [the personnel manager would 
reply], "Because in our investigation we have found that through some of your 
previous employers you embezzled funds," and on the strength of this information 
he says, "Well, who made the investigation?" And the personnel man says, "I am 
not at liberty to divulge this." 
On the basis of this, then, the man begins to ferret around to find out who is 
likely to make investigations of this sort. Of course, we come to the forefront 
under circumstances like this simply because of our prevalence in the business 
information field. 
Id. at 24-25. Obviously, the chances of an individual completing this process ex-
peditiously are virtually nonexistent. See note 205 supra. 
207. The importance of rapid retrieval and transmission is evident when it is realized 
that a computer system will enable data to be made available to a merchant quickly 
enough so that he can determine whether or not to grant credit before the customer 
leaves the premises or changes his mind about the purchase. See Senate Hearings on 
Commercial Credit Bureaus (statement of the author). 
208. See House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 93, 147 (testimony of 
H.C. Jordan, President, Credit Data Corporation). 
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record on the potential borrower. The response time averages two 
minutes.209 
At present, Credit Data serves lenders in a geographic area con-
taining over thirty-five million people. It has computerized credit 
information on over twenty million Americans and is adding new 
files on approximately 50,000 Americans each week.210 It is inter-
esting to note that the company's original data base was secured by 
convincing a number of California banks to turn over their credit 
apparatus to them; Bank of America alone gave Credit Data eight 
million items. 211 It seems clear that Credit Data will continue to de-
velop regional information nodes. It will then interconnect them by 
wire or microwave relay to establish a national credit information 
network. It also seems reasonable to forecast that large users of Credit 
Data's services will be provided with remote-access terminals permit-
ting direct entry into the bureau's computerized files. This will 
greatly reduce the cost of having operators process individual tele-
phone inquiries. Thus, a request for information at one point in the 
company's system would provide access to relevant data maintained 
at any other point in the network. 
ACB has been working on computerization since August 1965, 
when research began on a real-time212 computer system for member 
credit bureaus. The ACB system has been installed in Dallas and 
Houston, and another operation exists in Chicago. Currently there 
are more than 2,000 credit bureaus in this association, serving 365,-
000 credit grantors and maintaining files on approximately 100,-
000,000 Americans.213 
In September 1968 ACB announced that it had signed an agree-
ment with International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to 
provide ACB members with computerized credit-reporting services. 
The new ACB-IT&T system will offer local credit bureaus the option 
of computerizing their own operations without bearing the heavy 
financial burden of buying or leasing computer equipment and de-
veloping their own data-processing systems and programs.214 At the 
209. Id. at 74; cf. id. at lll. 
210. Id. at 87. 
211. Id. at 83-84. 
212. See UNIVAC Brief at A-9: "A real-time system is one which provides the 
ability to obtain information in time to affect events as they occur." 
213. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 109. 
214. According to Harold S. Geneen, president of IT&:T: "[IT&:T] is currently 
accelerating its programs for the establishment of an international system of data 
processing service centers, supplementing existing operations in England, Sweden, 
Germany, and France." John L. Spafford, Executive Vice-President of ACB added: 
"This system will combine the most advanced communications and computer tech-
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moment, computerization by individual bureaus within the associa-
tion is not contemplated. However, given the resources of a company 
such as IT&T, the raw data available in the files of the more than 
2,000 members of ACB, and the seemingly inexorable march of com-
puter technology in terms of increased speed and storage capacity, 
the consequences of the ACB-IT&T operation seem obvious.215 
Computerization of credit bureau files and the creation of na-
tional networks connecting numerous data bases whose contents will 
be available on a remote-access basis require concerted activity on the 
part of four previously independent industries: the computer manu-
facturers, the credit bureaus, the communications carriers, and the 
credit grantors. Probably only a few large credit information com-
panies command the necessary financial resources, data bases, and 
technical expertise to survive in this sophisticated national market. 
For example, it took the ACB nearly four years to develop a stan-
dardized language of credit-reporting that 1vould eliminate some of 
the softness in credit data and make machine processing easier.216 
In addition, recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Monopoly and Antitrust revealed that firms in the other three in-
dustries may extend their operations into the credit information 
market,217 and this may make it difficult for new firms to enter the 
field and may result in a potentially unhealthy level of business con-
centration.218 
If in fact only a small number of companies or networks survive 
as suppliers of credit information, vast stores of financial and per-
sonal data will be centralized in the hands of relatively few people. 
This necessarily will result in the network managers having a con-
siderable amount of economic power. In addition, a person's status 
in the community may be at the mercy of those who purport to have 
his financial history in their data bank.219 Another concern about 
nologies through the use of 'third-generation' computers, standard communications 
lines, and a variety of typewriter-like or visual display terminals." Credit News Bureau 
press release, Sept. 20, 1968. 
215. See Senate Hearings on Credit Bureaus (statement of the author). 
216. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 105. 
217. "\Vestern Union, for example, has acquired an interest in a firm which pro-
poses to transmit credit information by common carrier, while International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company has designed a computer system for the ACB. House 
Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 149; Credit News Bureau press release, Sept. 
20, 1968. See also Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE 
L.J. 1299, 1302. 
218. See Senate Hearings on Credit Bureaus (statement of the author). 
219. Senate Hearings on Credit Bureaus (statement of the author); Symposium-
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 2ll, 236 (1968) 
(remarks of John de J. Pemberton, Jr.). 
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the trend toward computerization and concentration of credit data 
is that the capabilities of the new technology will encourage credit 
bureaus to acquire more information about individual and institu-
tional borrowers than they have in the past. This "improvement" in 
the data means that the bureaus will inevitably gather soft and sensi-
tive information.220 In addition, given the massive investment re-
quired to computerize a large credit data base and the technology's 
ability to manipulate bits of information in unique ways, the temp-
tation to use the data for non-credit-granting purposes will not be 
easy to resist. This is especially likely if the data base has been aug-
mented by other information. A detailed account of a person's 
:financial transactions, especially when accompanied by the type of 
investigative information collected by some of the credit bureaus, 
makes it easy to reconstruct his habits, associations, travel, and life 
style.221 If data of this type is compiled on a large group, it can be 
used for a number of noncredit commercial purposes, such as gen-
erating a special mailing list containing the names of consumers with 
certain characteristics who might be interested in a particular prod-
uct, 222 or rating the creditworthiness of a list of people who are 
likely prospects for a promotion campaign centered around the 
distribution of unsolicited credit cards.223 
220. See pt. II.C. supra. 
221. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 165 (1967); Westin, The Snooping 
Machine, PLAYBOY, May 1968, at 130. 
222. Professor 'Westin has related that the editors of Reader's Digest used computer 
technology to generate a mailing list consisting of the neighbors of subscribers, which 
proved surprisingly effective: 
The approach had a kind of "All the neighbors are doing it" quality, but 
more significantly, the individual was pleased that the Reader's Digest knew him 
as an individual and could relate him to two others on his block. . • • 
Millions of people subscribe to the Reader's Digest. The Reader's Digest 
editors were struck by this because they said they didn't want so much power. 
They were appalled that they were able to affect so many people through such a 
simple technique. 
House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 50. See also Trillin, Onward and 
upward with the Arts: You Can't Wear Out a List, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 1966, 
at 126. A recent case in which several New York City bookstores were accused of selling 
lists of the names and addresses of women who had subscribed to computerized dating 
services is a rather extreme example of the abuse of the new technology. N.Y. Times, 
July 30, 1968, at 41, col. I; cf. Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F.Supp. 
880 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967); 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. 
III, 1965-1967) ("Prohibition of pandering advertisements in the mail"). 
223. See, e.g., Credit News Bureau press release, November 20, 1967: 
[Cyril Jedlicka, banking counsel of the ACB] cited Western Auto in Kansas 
City as a profitable example of prechecking consumer credit before mailing un-
solicited credit cards. 
""When Western Auto made the decision to go into the credit card business, 
they gave a list of a substantial number of names to the Credit Bureau of Greater 
Kansas City," Jedlicka said. "These names were checked by the credit bureau and 
rated A, B and C." 
"The A's, quite obviously, were the best credit risks; B's were in between; and 
C's were undesirable," Jedlicka said, "Western Auto mailed credit cards to every-
one with an A rating." 
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Furthermore, employers,224 insurance companies,2215 and govern-
ment investigators226 all have occasion to make extensive inquiries 
concerning certain individuals, and this task can be expedited mea-
surably if the examination can start with an inexpensive and com-
prehensive credit bureau report, especially if the credit bureau itself 
supplies the requesting party with nonfinancial data.227 Some credit 
bureaus open their files to government investigators without charge 
or protest,228 possibly in the hope of currying official favor.229 Even 
224. E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 50-51 (1967): 
The dossier-minded employer can be found in every line of business .••• Often 
a private detective agency is employed to do the job. Its investigators check 
candidates thoroughly; their routine reports include examinations of academic 
records, court records, personal credit and litigation, marital status, police records, 
political affiliation, neighborhood background, newspaper files, past earning capac-
ity and past employment records, personal (drinking and even sexual) habits and 
conduct, and moral character. 
The concern of the employer may extend to the prospective employee's wife 
and family •••• There will be a full report on [the wife's] character and a com-
pilation of her controversial characteristics, including her social mannerisms and 
drinking habits; reference will be made to her education and to her ability to 
adjust to her home and neighborhood; a list of her club and religious affiliations 
will be included. 
225. See generally M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 45 (1964). 
226. M. BRENTON, supra note 225 at 30, makes the wry observation that "it must 
be assumed the nation's credit bureaus are ethical and doing a good job. Otherwise 
government investigators and local police departments would not be using the bureaus' 
files as much as they do." See also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 160 (1967); Star, 
The Computer Data Bank: Will It Kill Your Freedom?, LOOK, June 25, 1968, at 27. 
227. Retail Credit Company, with files on 45,000,000 individuals, performs in-
surance and employment reporting as well as providing credit information. House 
Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 13. The firm has a staff of approximately 
7,000 investigators. A. WESTIN, supra note 226, at 159; cf. M. BRENTON, supra note 225, 
at 29. It is estimated that the company controls sixty per cent of the credit reporting 
field. Hearings on Retail Credit Company 3. 
228. See, e.g., House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 7-10, 121-24. See alsa 
Hearings on Retail Credit Company 90-91 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, President of 
Retail Credit Company): 
Let me illustrate what I mean by a favor report. Someone who is a regular con-
tact of ours, an executive of a large business might be about to employ a new 
minister at his church. If there is some reason for us to make the investigation be-
cause of the reputability of the individual involved, and our business relationship 
with him, we might have the report made, and then we might look it over before 
it ever goes to him, and then, depending on the circumstances, we might say that 
we have investigated your prospective minister and he has a good reputation •••• 
If we had some other things to say, we would handle it somewhat this way. 
We would say based on our investigation ••• we don't believe this man is the 
minister you want for your Church. 
But cf. id. at 93. 
229. But cf. the explanation offered by an ACB official in House Hearings on Com-
mercial Credit Bureaus 133: 
Credit bureaus consider it a responsibility in the interest of good government 
to assist government investigations with information that may be helpful. Some 
of these agencies are interested in identifying information rather than credit 
information. If the bureau file shows a former address, a former employer, or 
other clue to pertinent history, the agency investigator uses the lead to continue 
his investigation. We believe that this substantially reduces the expenditure of 
time and money by the various agencies. 
Both Retail Credit Company and Hooper-Holmes Bureau cooperate with government 
investigatory efforts. Hearings on Retail Credit Company 57; Sesser, Big Brother Keeps 
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if the credit bureau refuses, the file still may be vulnerable since the 
Government can resort to its subpoena power.230 However, the legal 
obligations of a credit bureau to grant the Government access to its 
files have not been fully defined. 
The possible abuses of a computerized credit information net-
work are not the only aspects of the credit bureau of the future that 
deserve attention. The "watch service" offered by ACB members, 
for example, actually constitutes an unsophisticated form of sur-
veillance. It involves monitoring the public records and an individ-
ual's transactions after he has made a credit purchase, in order to 
inform the lender promptly if there is any indication that the cus-
tomer will not be able to meet his obligation.231 Control over an 
individual's credit history also provides considerable leverage for 
collecting debts that otherwise might be written off by the credit 
grantor. ACB supplies economic data to collection agencies as well as 
to credit grantors,232 and, in the course of "counselling" the consumer 
on his credit problems, bureaus and agencies that are members of 
ACB often are able to "convince" individuals to "rehabilitate 
their credit by paying off delinquent accounts over ten years old."233 
This practice reflects the enormous in terrorem effect of a permanent 
credit bureau file and graphically demonstrates its ability to outlive 
the applicable statute of limitations. Finally, it has been suggested 
that the ownership of Welcome Newcomer by ACB has potentially 
sinister implications for individual privacy.234 If the welcoming 
committee sponsored by the local merchants is really a cloak-and-
dagger group designed to report on the characteristics and status of 
new members of the community, would paranoia be unjustified? 
Another trend that will have considerable long-range impact on 
credit bureaus is the increasing involvement of the banking industry 
in a variety of commercial fields that depend on computer technol-
ogy and individualized information. Banks were among the first 
institutions to computerize financial information as a means of 
Tabs on Insurance Buyers, Tm NEW REPUBLIC, April 27, 1968, at II. Credit Data 
Corporation seems to be the only national credit information company which has 
resisted the Government's attempts to use its files for fishing expeditions. See House 
Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 90-93. 
230. See, e.g., House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 91. 
231. Credit News Bureau press release, Nov. 30, 1967. 
232. See note 195 supra. 
233. Credit News Bureau press release, Nov. 30, 1967. 
234. News Release from Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher, March 20, 1969: 
" 'I am particularly distressed to learn that the Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc. owns 
Welcome Newcomer,' Congressman Gallagher continued .•.• 'In spite of their flow-
ered hats and sweet smiles, these hostesses are, in effect, private investigators [for the 
ACB].'" 
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expediting paperwork, and the string of machine-readable numbers 
at the bottom of checks now is universally familiar. Computers also 
have enabled the banks to provide a wider variety of customer 
services-payroll computations, accounting, mortgage servicing, and 
miscellaneous data-processing.235 One endeavor that major banking 
institutions recently have embarked upon is the bank or universal 
credit card. Universal card systems often require individual card 
transactions to be processed through an independent credit bu-
reau.230 In California, however, a group of banks participating in a 
charge card plan apparently has established its own clearinghouse for 
credit transactions.237 The increasing acceptance of the universal 
credit card has enormous significance; it may herald the first stage 
of a checkless, cashless society in which all financial transactions are 
reflected as electronic debits and credits in the cardholder's com-
puterized account that are shifted among sellers, and bank com-
puters linked together by a nationwide network of communications 
lines.238 Present-day bank credit-granting easily can be incorporated 
into this system. 
In a checkless, cashless society, the credit-granting and credit-
rating industries might cease to exist as separate entities.239 The 
customer in each transaction would inform the bank computer 
of the terms and conditions on which he had agreed to make pay-
ment through a remote terminal located in the retail store. The deci-
sion to grant credit would be made by the computer, on line and 
in real time, on the basis of the current status of the customer's com-
puterized account and his past credit performance. If the transaction 
is approved, the merchant would be relieved of the risks of collec-
tion. Over time, procedures of this type would result in a diminution 
of the need for independent credit information and credit bureaus 
would be under great pressure to combine with the bank credit card 
systems or to find other profitable uses for their dossiers. Judging 
from some of the practices described earlier in this section, the com-
mercial outlets chosen almost certainly would result in a sacrifice 
of individual privacy. 
235. See Money Goes Electronic in the 1970's, BUSINESS ·wEEK, Jan. 13, 1968, at 54, 
74; 115 CoNG. REc. E2613 (daily ed. April 2, 1968). 
236. See, e.g., House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 149. 
237. Money Goes Electronic in the 1970's, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 13, 1968, at 54, 64. 
238. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy, pt. 2, at 327-33 (statement of 
Paul Armer, Associate Head, Computer Sciences Department, the Rand Corporation); 
O'Brien, The Bank of Tomorrow: Today, COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, May 1968, at 
26; Electronic Money, FORBES, April 1, 1967, at 42; Kramer &: Livingston, Cashing In 
on the Checkless Society, 45 HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1967, at 141; E. Weiss, The 
Marketing Implications of the Checkless Society (1968). 
239. See Karst, "The Files" Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of 
Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 342, 375 (1966). 
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The credit-reporting industry has been surprisingly free of regu-
lation thus far, but there is growing awareness of the potential threat 
to privacy created by credit bureaus. Congressional hearings have 
been held in both the Senate and the House,240 and Senator Prox-
mire has introduced a bill that would add a new title to the recently 
enacted Truth-in-Lending Act241 to provide safeguards in the field 
of credit-reporting.242 The purpose of the bill is "to protect con-
sumers against arbitrary or erroneous credit ratings, and the unwar-
ranted publication of credit information." It would require that: (1) 
credit bureaus employ effective procedures for guaranteeing the 
confidentiality of the information they collect; (2) credit information 
be withheld from noncreditors such as government investigatory 
agencies without the express consent of the person involved; (3) 
an individual be given an opportunity to correct inaccurate infor-
mation in his credit file, and be notified when a derogatory public 
record item is entered in his credit record; (4) procedures be devel-
oped for discarding irrelevant and outdated information in an in-
dividual's credit file; and (5) users of credit reports notify an indiv-
idual who has been adversely affected by a report and identify the 
bureau that issued it.243 State legislatures also are beginning to scru-
tinize the credit industry.244 
240. See note 190 supra. 
241. Pub. L. No. 90-321 (I',fay 29, 1968). 
242. S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see 115 CONG. REc. S1163-69 (daily ed., Jan. 
31, 1969). See also 114 CONG. REc. S10,029 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1968). Broad hearings on 
the bill were held on May 19-23, 1969. 
243. The current draft of S. 823 is not without deficiencies, however. For example, 
a strict reading of the bill, especially the language in section 164(c), limits its pro-
hibitions to financial data and would not prevent free collection and utilization of 
the more dangerous forms of personal information described in text accompanying 
notes 190-94, 220-30 supra. Along the same lines, the bill requires only that the data 
subject be notified by the bureau "whenever information which is a matter of 
public record is obtained • • • and which is, or is likely to be interpreted by the 
agency or its clients as, adverse to the credit rating of the individual • • •• " Why 
shouldn't the individual be notified of the receipt of any form of adverse data 
whether or not it is from a public record? And why are his rights limited to sub-
mitting "an explanatory statement with respect thereto"? Why shouldn't he be ena-
bled to have the items expunged from the agency's file if he can demonstrate their 
inaccuracy or their lack of probity? Moreover, the bill does not expressly insure that 
the individual's "explanatory statement" accompany any report that is disseminated 
on the individual. Finally, in most cases damage suits under the bill will involve 
under $10,000, the basic jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). 
Arguably, therefore, the proposed act should confer subject matter jurisdiction for 
disputes arising under it without regard to the amount in controversy. Section 166 
of the bill, even section 166(b), which appears to be simply a limitations provision, 
is unclear on this point. 
244. Cf. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 
57 GEo. L.J. 509, 529 (1969): "An Oklahoma statute [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81-85 
(1965)] is the only legislation, state or federal, which specifically deals with the credit 
bureau problem." Bills have been introduced in several states during the past year. 
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Perhaps the most salient feature of the Proxmire bill is its recog-
nition that information handlers have been remiss in excluding the 
data subject from transactions involving information relating to him. 
By assuring the individual access to his credit file, the proposal en-
ables people to have a modicum of control over the flow of inform-
ation about them. It also represents an important step toward im-
posing obligations on the credit bureau industry that will help 
achieve some type of balance between the need for accurate financial 
data to maintain the flow of credit throughout the nation and the 
preservation of the right of individual privacy. 
Obviously in the hope of avoiding the imposition of legislative 
restraints, ACB has developed a series of guidelines, mentioned 
earlier,245 to protect consumer privacy. Although these guidelines 
contain some safeguards, they were composed by an industry group 
with minimal consumer representation, they are not binding upon 
anyone-particularly not upon the many bureaus unaffiliated with 
ACB-and they are bountifully endowed with loopholes. For exam-
ple, the ACB guidelines authorize the bureaus to collect matters 
of public record-bankruptcies, lawsuits, arrests, indictment or 
conviction of crime-but they are obliged only to "make a rea-
sonable effort to learn and report disposition" of each such item.246 
ACB seeks to absolve its members by putting the onus on the 
credit grantor to "inquire further as to the . . . disposition of any 
items of significance to his credit decision, or authorize the bu-
reau to do so,"241 and by requiring the complaining consumer 
to sign "a statement granting immunity from legal action both to 
the credit bureau and to its sources of information."248 Perhaps ACB 
is to be congratulated for its effort; unfortunately, the CBS News 
experiment described earlier indicates that a number of bureaus 
See, e.g., N.Y. Sen. Introductory No. 338, N.Y. Assembly Introductory No. 570 (1968); 
Des Moines Register, April 14, 1969, at 10, col. I. At this writing, however, none of 
them appears to have been enacted. 
Congressman Cornelius Gallagher commented on this situation in House Hearings 
on Commercial Credit Bureaus 115: 
In every State and every township in the country there are regulations con-
cerning the transfer of ownership of dogs ••• yet there are really no regulations 
whatsoever pertaining to the transfer of this kind of information affecting a man's 
standing in the community, his dignity, his economic transactions, his private life, 
his very name itself • • • • 
An individual American certainly has far less [sic] rights under this system than 
a dog has. 
245. See note 199 supra. 
246. ACB, Inc., Credit Bureau Guidelines To Protect Consumer Privacy, § E(l)(b) 
(emphasis added). 
247. Id. at§ E(l)(c). 
248. Id. at § A(2). 
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failed to implement the guidelines. But even rigorous application 
0£ these guidelines does not obviate the need for further regulation. 
C. Regulating the Flow of Information-The Need for a 
Broad Perspective 
The problem of safeguarding the individual's right to exercise 
some control over information relating to him must be approached 
with the realization that we are dealing with an entirely new me-
dium of communications, one that is likely to restructure our so-
ciety in much the same manner as did movable type or the Industrial 
Revolution.249 As suggested above, it may not be sufficient simply 
to apply the existing legal structure to the new fact situations created 
by computer technology. Unfortunately, the law historically has 
been slow to accommodate existing doctrines to new technologies. 
The length of time it took the law of warranty and tort to adjust 
to the automobile and the years of confusion that transpired before 
radio, television, and the airplane came under effective regulation 
testify to the legal system's somewhat ponderous reaction to novel 
situations posed by technological advances. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if the existing patchwork of legal proscriptions governing 
the misuse of individualized information-although suggestive of 
meaningful restrictions on the increasing flow of highly personal 
data-proves to be unequal to the challenges posed by the computer 
revolution. 
Before examining in detail the existing common-law doctrine 
and legislative pronouncements on the handling of personal infor-
mation, an important reminder must be interjected. As the discus-
sion of the proposed National Data Center and the credit bureau 
industry indicates, the patterns of growth and integration among 
computerized data-processing services are widespread, complex, and 
249. See note 2 supra. See also E. MORISON, MEN, MACHINES, AND MODERN TIMES 78 
(1966): 
[O]ur society [is] based upon the instrumentation of the industrial process. All our 
economic and social arrangements-how we feel about what we do, which is all 
that culture is-are founded upon the way our industrial energy is organized. How 
large a part and what kind of part do we want the computer, with its overriding 
skill in the rational analysis of the measurable data, to take in the decisions that 
determine the way this energy will be organized? 
A rather pessimistic assessment of our long-range ability to control computer technol• 
ogy is given in Clarke, The Mind of the Machine, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1968, at 116, 118: 
[I]t should be realized that as soon as the borders of electronic intelligence are 
passed, there will be a kind of chain reaction, because the machines will rapidly 
improve themselves. In a very few generations-computer generations, which by 
this time may last only a few months-there will be a mental explosion; the merely 
intelligent machine will swiftly give way to the ultra-intelligent machine. 
See also Clarke, The Computer Takes Over, The Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1968, 
Panorama Magazine, at 4. 
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often uncertain. It seems clear, therefore, that an attempt to achieve 
a workable balance between privacy and efficiency for any particular 
application of computer technology has little promise of success 
unless proper account is taken of the great variety of factors and 
relationships that tend to encourage computerization, system 
interconnection, and data-sharing. The National Data Center 
and credit bureaus merely provide two intrinsically interesting 
models for study-the parameters of the problem have a much wider 
scope. Increased abrasion between computers and individual pri-
vacy can be anticipated in many individual contexts. Businesses,250 
hospitals,251 educational institutions,252 and federal,253 state,254 and 
local26:; governments are quickening the pace of computerization 
and recognizing common interests in having data fl.ow among them. 
But these new applications should not be examined one at a time. 
As suggested earlier, nothing short of a complete survey of the rami-
250. See generally Allen, Time Sharing Takes Off, HARV. Bus. R.Ev., March-April 
1968, at 128; Burck, The Computer Industry's Great Expectations, FORTUNE, Aug. 
1968, at 92; Dearden, Computers: No Impact on Divisional Control, HARV. Bus. REv., 
Jan.•Feb. 1967, at 99; Brady, Computers in Top-Level Decision Making, HARv. Bus. 
REv., July-Aug. 1967, at 67. 
251. See, e.g., Freed, A Legal Structure for a National Medical Data Center, 49 
B.U. L. REv. 79 (1969); Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine, 32 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 674 (1967); Sarnoff, No Life Untouched, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 21; 
Stevens, Now-The Automated Physical Checkup, READERS DIGEST, July 1966, at 95. 
252. A number of colleges and universities are recognizing the advantages of main-
taining joint computer facilities and sharing data bases. See, e.g., the description of 
a nonprofit corporation formed by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology for the purpose of establishing a joint telecommunications system 
based on shared computer facilities in N.Y. Times, July 7, 1968, § 2, at 52, col. 4. The 
Interuniversity Communications Council (EDUCOM), another nonprofit corporation, 
also is designed to promote the application of the new communications technology 
to education. See also Miller, Potentialities of a Multi-Media, Inter-University Educa-
tional Network, in CmA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM ON COMMUNICATION IN SCIENCE: Docu-
MENTATION AND AUTOMATION 235-52 (1967). 
253. See the description of the FBI's computerized National Crime Information 
center in notes 385-88 infra and accompanying text. This center is designed to facil-
itate the exchange of various kinds of dossiers among federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers. 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Justice Department is 
considering a proposal to create a national computer system devoted to information 
on organized crime. The system would contain data supplied by police departments, 
information on real estate transactions from recorders' offices, and records of state and 
local tax and license fees. Chicago Daily News, April 19, 1969, at 1, col. 3 (state 
weekend ed.). 
254. See, e.g., the description of California's efforts to establish a statewide data-
processing system in Project-The Computerization of Government Files: What Im-
pact on the Individual?, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1371, 1401-10 (1968). See also Symposium-
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 2ll, 234-35 (1968) 
(description of the New York State Identification and Intelligence System by Professor 
Richard Ruggles). Wall St. J., April 9, 1969, at 1, col. 6 (description of Maryland 
State Employment Service computerized "job bank"). 
255. See, e.g., A City Where Computers Will Know About Everybody, U.S. NEWS &: 
WORLD REPORT, May 15, 1967, at 78. 
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fications of the new technologies will suffice if a reasonable accom-
modation is to be reached between individual privacy and the 
effective flow of information in society. 
V. THE CURRENT LAW OF PRIVACY: THE COMMON LAW 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The development of the law relating to personal privacy is a 
familiar tale. Indeed, the courts and commentators have had a 
strong interest in the subject during the past three quarters of a 
century, and the judicial and secondary literature is rich. No useful 
purpose would be served by tracing the path to the present state 
of the law once more. Rather, this section will simply try to indicate 
why the existing common-law doctrines are unable, especially in 
light of the implications of the first amendment, to provide a mean-
ingful resolution of the computer-privacy issue. 
A. The Availability of Common-Law Protection 
The inadequacy of contemporary legal theories of privacy to 
deal with the realities of the computer age is clearest in the context 
of the common-law doctrines, which traditionally have used an in-
trusion upon the individual by one of the mass media as a model.2~6 
256. The exception, according to Dean Prosser, is the relatively small class of cases 
described by the term "intrusion," which usually involves some form of wiretapping or 
eavesdropping. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389-92 (1960). Privacy actions 
have been allowed even when the eavesdropper has not communicated the informa-
tion to anyone else. See, e.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. &: Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 
(5th Cir. 1965); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 
810, 817 (1939) ("Publication or commercialization may aggravate, but the individual's 
right to privacy is invaded and violated nevertheless in the original act of intrusion."); 
LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 182 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Roach v. Harper, 
105 S.E.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. App. w. Va. 1958). Similar cases are collected in R.EsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) TORTS § 652B comment b (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). See also note 258 infra. 
In several cases that purport to be based on mass publication, the amount of publicity 
held sufficient to sustain the action has been rather small. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1957) (posting notice of plaintiff's indebted-
ness in store window); Beiderman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W .2d 892 
(Mo. 1959) (plaintiff's indebtedness proclaimed orally in restaurant for three successive 
days). The minimum requirement seems to be that the information is made available 
to the general public, whether or not it actually reaches a large number of 
people. In Dean Bloustein's view, the mass publication requirement is based on the 
premise that "[u]nless there is a breach of a confidential relationship ••• the indig-
nity and outrage involved in disclosure of details of a private life, only arise when 
there is a massive disclosure ••.• " In short, "[t]he damage is to an individual's self-
respect in being made a public spectacle." Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Ruman 
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 981 (1964). 
In Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964), a case involving the 
bugging of a married couple's bedroom, there is language indicating that in some 
circumstances the plaintiff might not have to show that the defendant actually over-
heard personal information: 
If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic eavesdropper •.• have a 
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Thus, before an injured party can recover for a public disclosure 
of private facts-the form of privacy invasion that seems to be most 
analogous to a misuse of computerized information257-he must 
show that the private information was given "publicity," or that it 
was communicated to the public at large.258 By way of contrast, a 
plaintiff in an action for defamation need show only that the deroga• 
tory statement in question was "published" -that the defendant 
communicated it to a third party.259 A few exceptions to the mass 
publication requirement for privacy actions have been recognized, 
most of them involving instances in which "the information was 
gained by wrongful prying or . . . its communication involves a 
breach of confidence or the violation of an independent duty."260 
These narrow exceptions have been relatively unimportant in 
the past, but they may prove crucial in constructing a workable 
common-law theory for remedying an improper dissemination of 
computerized information-the prototypical privacy case of the 
future.261 
In terms of privacy in a computerized environment, the critical 
dissemination of information may well take place when one user of 
place in the hierarchy of social values, it ought not to be at the expense of a 
married couple . • • who have never asked for or by their conduct deserved a 
potential projection of their private conversations and actions • • • • Whether 
actual or potential such "publicity with respect to private matters of purely per• 
sonal concern is an injury to personality •••• " 
106 N.H. at 112, 206 A.2d at 242 (emphasis added). 
257. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} ToR'IS § 652A (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967): 
The right of privacy is invaded when there is 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another • • • or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ••• or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life ••• or 
(d) publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public •••• 
See also Prosser, supra note 256, at 392-98; W. PROSSER, ToR'IS § 112, at 833-44 (3d ed. 
1964). 
258. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} TORTS § 652D, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967): 
"Publicity" ••• differs from "publication," as that term is used .•. in connection 
with liability for defamation. "Publication," in that sense, is a word of art, which 
includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. "Publicity," on 
the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to 
the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. 
259. See note 258 supra; W. PROSSER, ToR'IS § 109 (3d ed. 1964); Blaustein, supra 
note 256, at 979-80. 
260. Blaustein, supra note 256, at 980. In this situation, the author concludes, the 
wrong "is not the disclosure itself, but rather the disclosure in violation of a relation-
ship of confidence. Disclosure, whether to one person or many, is equally wrongful as 
a breach of the condition under which the information was initially disclosed." Prosser, 
supra note 256, at 393, is in substantial accord. See note 262 infra. 
261. When the improper dissemination is a result of government action, the rights 
of the parties almost always will be determined by statute or regulation. See pt. VI 
infra. 
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a time-sharing system permits another user to have access to private 
files, or when the operators of two different systems agree to ex-
change tapes or interconnect their computers. Once an unauthorized 
user has gained access, he can interrogate an individual's computer-
ized file at will or disseminate its contents still further, possibly 
causing damage that may never be traced to an abuse of the file. In 
many of these situations, it it doubtful that a traditionally required 
relationship of trust or confidence exists between the file subject-
the potential plaintiff-and the authorized user-the potential de-
fendant-so as to give rise to a right of compensation. Ideally, the 
mere fact that the authorized user is a custodian of sensitive per-
sonal information should establish a duty of confidentiality as a 
matter of law, but the willingness of the courts to imply such an 
obligation is quite conjectural at this time.262 
Another inherent difficulty of a common-law action based on the 
public disclosure of private facts is the rule that the information 
disclosed must be accurate. If it is not, in theory the plaintiff is re-
mitted to an action for defamation to remedy his injury. In recent 
years this distinction has not been strictly adhered to; some privacy 
actions, notably those involving unwanted publicity that puts the 
plaintiff in a "false light in the public eye,"263 have been viewed as 
a form of defamation.264 However, the Supreme Court appears to 
262. Implying the duty would have the desirable effect of removing a latent anom-
aly in the confidential-relationship theory. The anomaly arises from the fact that the 
confidentiality of a relationship depends upon the reasonable expectations of the 
party asserting an invasion of privacy; thus, an organization that is powerful enough 
vis-a-vis the individual to coerce or entice information from him while giving him 
notice of the fact that it will not keep the information in confidence could drastically 
reduce the scope of personal privacy. Josephson, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586, 
1597-99 (1968). 
Apparently the English courts have been more alert than their American counter• 
parts to the unique dangers of handling personal information, and more willing to 
imply a confidential relationship. See, e.g., Jacob &: Jacob, Confidential Communica• 
tions, THE NEW L.J., Feb. 6, 1969, at 133: 
It seems clear that the courts have imported ideas from the law of trusts and bail-
ment into the law of confidence, for they now treat the fact that information is 
handed over for a particular purpose as itself normally sufficient for an implied 
bond of confidence to arise; and the donee of the information is not entitled to 
use the information so given for any purpose other than that for which it is 
given. 
263. See note 257 supra. 
264. The fact that the two theories have overlapped significantly in practice is 
discussed in Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 
(1962). See also Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1933); 
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), vacated 
and remanded, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 
(1967); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 326, 339-41 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 398-401, 
422-23 (1960). But cf. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First 
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have given renewed vitality to the fact-fiction line of demarcation 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill.265 
This dichotomy between fact and untruth seems to be increas-
ingly unworkable. It is insensitive to the many subtle ways in which 
personal data may be distorted or misused in a society that puts a 
premium on collecting and transmitting large quantities of infor-
mation about individuals and using it for many purposes. The 
biased "soft data" or evaluation, the derogatory entry that does not 
reveal subsequent ameliorating events, or the unexplicated bit of 
information that appears damaging when it is introduced in a 
context unrelated to the one in which it was collected, all may be 
"factual" in the strict sense of the word and yet not portray an in-
dividual or his activities and aptitudes accurately. Thus, although 
the existing legal framework provides a theory for rectifying an im-
properly disseminated truth as well as a theory for remedying an 
untruth, neither approach focuses sharply enough on the penum-
bra! area or takes account of the realities of modern communica-
tions. As a result, an injured plaintiff is left subject to the risk of 
falling between the conceptual stools. 
A good illustration of the problems confronting an individual 
who believes that he has been injured by dissemination of soft data 
is provided by Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 
lnc.266 The plaintiff, an attorney, brought a defamation action claim-
ing that his professional rating had been lowered for no apparent 
reason by a national directory. In affirming a directed verdict for 
the defendant, the Supreme Court of North Dakota indicated the 
high burden of proof that is likely to be imposed on a plaintiff when 
the damaging information is a subjective evaluation: 
[The plaintiff's] ... witnesses do not all agree that his ability is 
"very high." . . . He complains that several lawyers in [his home 
town] were rated as "very high" when he was rated as only "high." 
There is no showing that these lawyers were not of exceptional 
ability. Clearly a defamation of A is not proved by showing that 
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 
935, 958 (1968): 
Defamation protects a man's interest in his reputation. Reputation is by definition 
a matter of public knowledge •••• The right of privacy protects not reputation, 
but the interest in maintaining the privacy of certain facts. Public disclosure of 
such facts can create injury regardless of whether such disclosure affects the sub-
ject's reputation. 
265. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See text accompanying notes 280-87 infra. 
266. 69 N.D. 610, 289 N.W. 101 (1939). 
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someone says B is a better lawyer than A, when the legal ability of 
B is not shown.201 
These proof difficulties would be compounded if the plaintiff had 
been rated as a "fair" worker by an organization that considered 
this classification a mark of average ability, and this rating was later 
made available to another organization in which "fair" connoted 
unusually low performance. 
The final problem in determining whether tort relief is available 
for an alleged invasion of privacy is, of course, the issue of whether 
the information in question can justifiably be categorized as "pri-
vate." The difficulty of enunciating a manageable standard for de-
termining what kinds of personal information should be protected 
from public disclosure was foreseen by Warren and Brandeis in their 
classic 1890 article advocating recognition of the right-of-privacy 
tort: 
Since . . . the propriety of publishing the very same facts may de-
pend wholly upon the person concerning whom they are published, 
no fixed formula can be used to prohibit obnoxious publications .... 
In general . . . the matters of which the publication should be 
repressed may be described as those which concern the private life, 
habits, acts, and relations of an individual, and have no legitimate 
connection with his fitness for a public position which he seeks or 
for which he is suggested ... and have no legitimate relation to or 
bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi public ca-
pacity.2os 
Some of the uncertainty inherent in the suggested balancing of 
public and private interests was alleviated by incorporating an ex-
tensive body of privilege into the nascent law of privacy. Indeed, 
Warren and Brandeis themselves stipulated that in addition to the 
mass media's freedom to publish "matters of public or general in-
terest," the doctrine of privacy should be subject to the complex 
rules of privilege that had developed in the law of defamation as 
well as to the defense of consent.269 In theory, at least, these defenses 
mark off an area in which the individual's interest in preventing 
267. 69 N.D. at 622, 289 N.W. at 105. 
268. Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R.Ev. 193, 215-16 (1890). 
Dean Prosser's approach to the problem of defining what is "private" also is rather 
nebulous. He suggests that "what emerges is something in the nature of a 'mores' 
test, by which there will be liability only for publicity given to those things which 
the customs and ordinary views of the community will not tolerate." Prosser, supra 
note 264, at 397; cf. Batt, Law and the Bedroom, SAT. R.Ev., Aug. 3, 1968, at 45, in 
which it is suggested that the protectible "zones of privacy" should be categorized as 
the family, sexuality, the psyche or psychology of an individual, and sensual and 
emotional impression and expression. See also Rider, Legal Protection of the .Mani-
festations of Individual Personality-The Identity-Indicia, 33 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 31 (1959). 
269. Warren &: Brandeis, supra note 268, at 214-19. 
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the spread of personal data is outweighed by society's need or right 
to have access to that data. 
It seems doubtful, however, that balances struck at a time when 
the principal threat to a person's emotional tranquillity and pri-
vacy was the excesses of a newspaper gossip column270 can be applied 
without substantial modification to the incursions on individual 
freedom that are likely to arise in an age of electronic data-processing 
and high-speed transfers of large quantities of digital information 
over vast distances. For example, one extensive and relatively vague 
class of defamation privileges applies when "the publisher and the 
recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a 
kind reasonably calculated to protect or further it."271 A familiar 
application of this qualified272 privilege is the immunity of mutual 
credit organizations and credit-rating agencies in divulging financial 
data to those who have an "apparent, present interest in the re-
port."273 In the contemporary environment, one in which credit 
reports often are cavalierly given over the telephone by ministerial 
personnel, presumably any party that knows a credit grantor's iden-
tifying code number274 and has access to a telephone can tap a reser-
voir of detailed financial information that currently is maintained 
on over 100,000,000 persons. Should the credit bureau be per-
mitted to claim the privilege on the basis of the snooper's "ap-
parent interest"? And what will be the law's reaction to computer-
ized credit bureaus which will enable large institutional lenders to 
have direct access to bureau files from remote terminals located in 
270. See id. at 196: "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious 
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and 
of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as 
effrontery." 
271. W. PROSSER, TORTS § llO, at 809 (3d ed. 1964). 
272. The privilege "is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and 
for a proper purpose." Id. at 805. As applied to credit bureau operations, the privi-
lege must be exercised "in good faith and not as a mere cloak for coercion of pay-
ment." Id. at 809-10. 
273. Id. at 809. See also Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy, 57 
GEO. L.J. 509, 513-19 (1969). In Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 
160, 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952), the court stated: 
The harm that such statements occasionally do to applicants for credit is believed 
to be small in relation to the benefits that subscribers derive from frank reports. 
Since marital status and number of dependents bear on credit, the qualified 
privilege is broad enough to cover the statements [implying that the plaintiff had 
given birth to an illegitimate child]. 
The agency need not show that the subscriber was actually interested in the 
plaintiff's credit. 
274. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 147; William J. Mangan, 
General Manager of Credit Bureau of Greater Boston, Inc., Statement Before a Public 
Study Session on the Procedures and Practices of Credit Bureaus, Consumers' Council, 
Boston, Mass., Oct. 15, 1968, at 5 (unpublished mimeo). 
1162 Michigan Law Review [.Vol. 67:1089 
their offices;275 will the bureaus be protected by the privilege on the 
ground that anyone who gains access to a client's terminal appar-
ently is an authorized user? 
The common-law limitations on the availability of the privacy 
tort are not the only constraints on securing protection for indi• 
viduals. Ironically, in the context of the credit bureau industry, 
federal statutory law may contribute to the defeat of individual 
privacy in a way that is tangentially related to privileges. When the 
credit bureaus organize a trade association, as, for example, 
ACB, the association's ability to regulate its members' dissemina-
tion of credit information is circumscribed by the antitrust law. If 
the network suspects that a particular member or a credit granter is 
misusing credit information or supplying the bureau with incorrect 
data, the most effective method of maintaining file integrity is to 
deny the offending bureau access to the association's facilities or 
to terminate service to the offending subscriber. But the ACB is sub-
ject to an antitrust consent decree that justifiably makes it wary of 
refusing to deal with any party requesting service.276 This unhappy 
squeeze between contributing to the invasion of privacy and violat-
ing the antitrust laws was appropriately described by an ACB official 
as being caught "between Scylla and Charybdis."277 Along analo-
gous lines, when a credit bureau opens its files to a government in-
vestigator, it could seek to avoid liability by claiming, in the nature 
of a privilege, that it is obliged "to give information to proper au-
thorities for the prevention or detection of crime."278 In view of 
these impediments to the vindication of individual privacy through 
the law of torts, it is small wonder that credit reports regularly are 
purchased and circulated by those who have no legitimate credit-
granting purpose.279 
B. The Effect of the First Amendment 
The body of privilege surrounding the first amendment freedom 
of the press to comment on newsworthy events also serves to restrict 
the availability of common-law relief for an invasion of informa-
275. These remote terminals are now being installed. See, e.g., House Hearings on 
Commercial Credit Bureaus 93 (statement of H. C. Jordan, President of Credit Data 
Corporation). 
276. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 128-29. See also Senate Hear-
ings on Credit Bureaus (statement of the author). 
277. House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 129 (testimony of John Lashly, 
ACB lawyer). 
278. W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 110, at 811 (3d ed. 1964). 
279. The ease of obtaining supposedly confidential credit reports is discussed in 
M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 36-38 (1964). See also House Hearings on Com-
mercial Credit Bureaus 3-10, 121-24; text accompanying notes 197-201 supra. 
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tional privacy. The plaintiff's ability to avoid this bar has been sub-
stantially limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. 
Hill.280 In Hill, the plaintiff's suit for invasion of privacy arose out 
of a "fictionalized" magazine article describing an unpleasant, but 
newsworthy, event that had involved him and his family several 
years earlier.281 Although he was successful at trial, the Supreme 
Court ultimately held that the first amendment required the plain-
tiff to meet the same burden of proof as in an action for defamation 
-Hill had to show that the defendant was guilty of knowing or 
reckless falsehood. This standard-formulated in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan282-has been quite difficult to satisfy in practice.283 
Hill may well have aborted much of the doctrinal growth ca-
pacity of the law of privacy. At this writing, however, the precise 
implications of the decision must be considered unclear, especially 
since the case was founded on (and much of the opinion is devoted 
to) New York's somewhat peculiar privacy statute.284 If the Court's 
opinion is read narrowly, its effect may be limited to the "false 
light" line of privacy cases, which are viewed by some as similar to 
traditional defamation actions.285 Support for this view is found in 
the majority opinion's explicit reservation of the question whether 
the constitutional standards employed in defamation cases apply to 
the publication of truthful matters.286 On the other hand, the 
burden-of-proof standard used in Hill easily could be extended to 
280. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
281. The Hill family had been held captive by escaped convicts in a much-
publicized incident, and the event later became the topic of a popular play. Life 
magazine published an article describing the play and distorting what actually had 
happened to the Hill family during their imprisonment. 
282. 326 U.S. 254 (1964). 
283. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 264, at 952: 
[Under the New York Times standard] the issue before the jury will not be the 
truth or falsity of the defamatory statement, but rather the narrow question of 
the speaker's good faith. A jury will probably not go wrong on this narrow ques-
tion of fact in view of the Court's statement in Times that the Constitution 
demands a standard of "convincing clarity." Moreover, the burden of proof on 
this narrow issue makes it increasingly likely that an appellate court will reverse 
jury determinations against the speaker when the standard of convincing clarity 
has not been met. 
See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411 (1967) Gustice Fortas, dissenting); 
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 
1967 SuP. CT. R.Ev. 267, 284: "The logic of New York Times and Hill taken together 
grants the press some measure of constitutional protection for anything the press 
thinks is a matter of public interest." 
284. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. 
285. See notes 263-64, supra and accompanying text. 
286. 385 U.S. at 383 n.7: 
This limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not of course foreclose 
an interpretation of the statute to allow damages where "Revelations may be so 
intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the 
community's notions of decency." • • • This case presents no question whether 
truthful publication of such matter could be constitutionally proscribed. 
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all of the mass publication forms of the privacy tort, at least when 
there is no independent ground for state regulation, as might be true 
in cases involving intrusive behavior by the defendant.287 The latter 
approach is consistent with the ·warren and Brandeis article, which 
advocated the application of all defamation privileges to privacy 
actions,288 apparently on the theory that truth is entitled to at least 
as much protection as falsehood. Only a few years have passed since 
Dean Prosser found that "there is still no reason to doubt this 
conclusion."2811 
In considering Hill in the context of the computer age, two 
rather basic questions spring to mind: (1) Should the decision be 
applied to the intrasystem dissemination of data maintained in com-
puter networks, as well as to dissemination by the conventional 
media? (2) How does the decision affect transfers of information 
from computer systems to the news media? The answer to the first 
question is not as simple as might appear. If, as many commentators 
assert and as several passages in the Hill opinion indicate,290 the 
protection bestowed on the press by the Constitution is premised 
on the concept that the people must receive an unrestricted flow 
of information in order to govern themselves intelligently-the 
"Meikeljohn interpretation" of the first amendment291-then the 
role of the new information transfer technology must be evaluated 
in terms of this objective to determine how it should be character-
ized. It certainly is true that computerized data-processing and in-
formation transfer capabilities already are important to the effective 
287. See notes 303, 306 infra and accompanying text. 
288. See note 269 supra and accompanying text. 
289. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 851 (3d ed. 1964). But cf. Nimmer, supra note 
264, at 962-63: 
The Court fell into error by reason of its failure to pierce the superficial simi-
larity between false light invasion of privacy and defamation, and by its failure 
to formulate a doctrine which rationally relates the false light cases to the under-
lying interest in privacy. The heart of the problem of finding a conceptual base 
for the false light privacy cases lies in the erroneous assumption that the untrue 
representations in a false light case are necessarily defamatory (or reputation-
injuring) in nature • 
• . . [I]he injury to the plaintiff's peace of mind which results from the public 
disclosure of private facts may be just as real where that which is disclosed is not 
true. • • • The sensibilities of the young lady whose nude photo is -published 
would be no less offended if it turned out that her face were superimposed upon 
someone else's nude body. The resulting humiliation would have nothing to do 
with truth or falsity. The unwarranted disclosure of intimate "facts" is no less 
offensive and hence no less deserving of protection merely because such "facts" 
are not true. 
290. 385 U.S. at 387-91. 
291. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 256; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the 
Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965); Com• 
ment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The Implications of Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 67 CouJM. L. REV. 926 (1967). 
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functioning of government, industry, and academe, and they are 
likely to become even more significant in the future.292 Nonetheless, 
it also seems clear that computer systems, with their immense ca-
pacity for building individual dossiers, predicting human and orga-
nizational behavior, and aiding in decision-making, may well be 
more suited to institutional control of the people than vice versa. 
Moreover, the existing entities typically are closed and not acces-
sible, in any practical sense, to the vast bulk of the population. 
These systems are not designed to perform any mass media functions 
vis-a-vis the citizenry. From this perspective, the data centers and 
networks of today and the immediate future do not seem to fit the 
traditional first amendment mold. 
Of course, the current state of affairs is not immutable. Some 
observers predict that the computer terminal eventually will be as 
common as television and radio receivers,293 that they will be multi-
media in character, and that they will perform a wide variety of 
information functions-including those discharged by today's daily 
newspapers and newscasts.294 Should this come to pass, computer 
networks will be as much a part of the "marketplace of ideas"295 as 
are other media, and therefore equally entitled to first amendment 
protection for all applications which do not constitute purely "com-
292. See pt. II.C. supra. 
293. See, e.g., Sarnoff, No Life Untouched, SAT. REv., July 23, 1966, at 21: 
By the end of the century, for the equivalent of a few dollars a month, the 
individual will have a vast complex of computer services at his command .••• The 
computer in the home will be joined to a national and global computer system 
that provides services ranging from banking and travel facilities to library research 
and medical care. High-speed communications devices, linked to satellites in space, 
will transmit data to and from virtually any point on earth with the ease of a 
dial system. 
See also The National Observer, Oct. 17, 1966, at I. 
294. See Brovm, Tomorrow's l\lany-Splendored Tune-In, SAT. EVENING Posr, Nov. 30, 
1968, at 38, 78; Russel, Playing for Fun, PLAYBOY, April 1969, at ll0, 174: 
In the next medium, the medium after television, you have a terminal at home, 
with a screen-probably with higher definition than today's television • • • . 
There's a keyboard or a dial for making your wishes and feelings known, plus 
some kind of print-out device for hard copy-text and illustrations. This home 
communicator is connected by a simple cable through a buffer and switcher to 
the vast computer network and its omnibus memory •••• News is added to the 
bank as fast as it is digested; and if you want to know more about something, 
you merely ask. 
295. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Justice Harlan advocated using the concept of a "market-
place of ideas" or "independent [public] interest" in the subject of the publication 
as a test for the operation of first amendment privileges. 385 U.S. at 407-08. But cf. 
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 300: 
For centuries it has been the experience of Anglo-American law that the truth 
never catches up with the lie, and it is because it does not that there has been a 
law of defamation. I simply do not see how the constitutional protection in this 
area can be rested on the assurance that counterargument will take the sting out 
of the falsehoods that the law is thereby permitting. And if this premise is not 
persuasive, the whole Harlan edifice trembles. 
1166 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1089 
mercial speech."296 However, as long as computer technology remains 
a relatively esoteric art, understood by and available to only a few, 
and applied primarily for record-keeping rather than dissemination, 
full-scale protection under the first amendment for intrasystem 
transfers seem inappropriate. A premature application of the first 
amendment could subvert the very values that the constitutional 
guaranty is designed to protect. 
The ramifications of transplanting privileges developed in the 
context of more traditional media to the information distribution 
aspects of computer technology is indicated by the broad scope of 
the immunity from defamation and privacy actions that has been 
achieved by the press in recent years. As Professor Kalven has ob-
served, the Hill decision points toward a time when anything that 
the press decides to print will be held newsworthy and therefore 
within the first amendment's protection and beyond the law of pri-
vacy.297 This is consistent with trends in the closely related area of 
· defamation.298 Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was decided, 
the class of "public officials" who must prove knowing or reckless 
disregard for the truth as a prerequisite to recovery299 has expanded 
to such an extent that it now appears that the term may encompass 
categories of individuals who are not even on the public payroll.300 
296. The distinction between ideas and information, which are protected by the 
first amendment, and "purely commercial" advertising, which is subject to regulation, 
was established in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The continuing validity 
of this distinction is indicated by the citation of Valentine in the Hill decision, both by 
Justice Brennan for the majority and by Justice Harlan in dissent. 385 U.S. at 381, 405. 
Clearly, some types of computer use, such as the sale of computerized mailing lists, 
could be prohibited under this rationale. It also is at least arguable that the vast 
majority of computer operations in the private sector that generate information about 
specific individuals have such a limited relationship to the need for public informa-
tion that their work product could be regarded as "commercial speech." Cf. Note, 
Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1194-203 
(1965). 
297. Kalven, supra note 295, at 283-84: 
Although it was not necessary in Hill to delineate the outer boundaries of the 
newsworthy, the Court may be surprised by the extent of its commitment. The 
tort law of privacy has wrestled with the matter for some years now; and it is a 
rough generalization that the courts will not, and indeed cannot, be arbiters of 
what is newsworthy. Newsworthiness will almost certainly become a descriptive 
and not a nonnative term. 
But cf. Blaustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' 
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 611, 625-26 (1968). 
298. See Pearson v. Dodd, No. 21,910 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1969). 
299. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
300. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966), the Supreme Court held that 
"the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy 
of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial re-
sponsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." The Court then 
added, however, that "[t]he employee's position must be one which would invite public 
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and 
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In the same vein, the class of "public officials" who can defame in-
dividuals with corresponding impunity is potentially as large.801 
Obviously, there is a certain element of bootstrapping in the 
notion that the first amendment protects the publication of that 
which is newsworthy and it is the press that decides what is news-
worthy. Perhaps in the context of a traditional invasion of privacy, 
which is well represented by the Hill case, there is usually some sem-
blance of an objective standard-an event or occurrence with some 
independent contemporary significance. But this may not always be 
true when the invasion of privacy takes the form of someone rum-
maging through the entrails of the computer dossier maintained on 
one of his fellow men. In this context there is no newsworthy event 
other than the disclosure of the file's content. Although the Supreme 
Court's desire to preserve the policies favoring free dissemination of 
information that underlie the first amendment cannot be faulted in 
terms of a motivating theory, it is problematical whether these 
policies always require vindication at the expense of individual pri-
vacy. In light of the broad implications of the new technology, it 
seems desirable to reflect carefully before extending the Hill privi-
lege to the emerging information exchange formats. 
discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy." 383 U.S. at 87 n.13. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas observed: 
[I]f free discussion of public issues is the guide, I see no way to draw lines 
that exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the typist, or for that matter, 
anyone on the public payroll. And how about those who contract to carry out 
governmental missions? Some of them are as much in the public domain as any 
so-called officeholder. • . . And the industrialists who raise the price of a basic 
commodity? ••• And the labor leader who combines trade unionism with bribery 
and racketeering? 
383 U.S. at 89. But cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967): ''We con-
sider and would hold that a 'public figure' who is not a public official may also recover 
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to 
reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct .•.• " Chief Justice 
Warren, concurring in the Butts case, stated that "differentiation between 'public 
figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each 
have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy." 388 U.S. at 163. Cf. Kalven, 
supra note 295, at 307: "When •.• we remember that the appearance of victory for 
Harlan in Butts is a fluke, occasioned by Warren's vote to save the verdict for the 
plaintiff, it is apparent that the Court stands 5 to 4 in favor of the Brennan-Warren 
standard and hence in favor of an across-the-board application of New York Times." 
301. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Supreme Court held that falsehoods 
published by a government official acting within the scope of his discretionary au-
thority are absolutely privileged. In dissent, Justice Brennan strongly criticized the 
scope of this privilege: 
I see no warrant for extending [the absolute privilegel to the extent done-appar-
ently to include every official having some color of discretion to utter communi-
cations to Congress or the public •.•• [The majority's] approach seems to clothe 
with immunity the most obscure subforeman on an arsenal production line who 
has been delegated authority to hire and fire and who maliciously defames one 
he discharges. 
360 U.S. at 587. 
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One other facet of the problem deserves brief mention. In the 
information field, as elsewhere, the distinction between government 
and the private sector has become increasingly tenuous and the 
movement toward concentration is now quite pronounced. As Chief 
Justice Warren has observed: 
Since ... World War II, there has been a rapid fusion of economic 
and political power, a merging of science, industry and government, 
and a high degree of interaction between the intellectual, govern-
mental, and business worlds .... [N]ational and international prob-
lems . . . demand national and international solution. While these 
trends and events have occasioned consolidation of governmental 
power, power has also become much more organized in what we 
have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many situa-
tions, policy determinations which traditionally were channelled 
through formal political institutions are now originated and imple-
mented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, 
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the 
government.s02 
In the context of computer technology this trend is exemplified by 
the concentration of power over information and the institutional-
ization of the fl.ow of data among both public and private organiza-
tions. Considerations such as these, which have been but a peripheral 
concern in cases dealing with freedom of the press, will be at the 
heart of the question of the extent to which a data system and its 
managers should be immunized from liability for transferring dam-
aging private information about an individual. The potential for 
centralization of power that inheres in the new information transfer 
technology, the lack of internal safeguards, and the frequently secre-
tive nature of the dissemination counsel a skeptical attitude toward 
any assertion that notions of free communication developed to safe-
guard the press should be applied to a computer network, at least in 
the absence of a demonstration that the network is performing func-
tions comparable to those discharged by traditional "news" media. 
Assuming that there are no insuperabJe constitutional obstacles 
to imposing legal inhibitions on the fl.ow of information within and 
among computer systems, the question remains as to what standards 
can and should be imposed on the movement of information from 
computer systems to today's mass media. As statements in the Hill 
opinion indicate, information that the press obtains by intrusive or 
trespassory behavior still can create liability.sos This rule, although 
302. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (concurring opinion). 
303. 385 U.S. at 385 n.9. See also the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice 
Harlan at 404: "No claim is made that there was any intrusion upon the Hills' soli-
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helpful when snooping or surveillance techniques are employed to 
extract data from a computer system, does not reach the situation 
that is more likely to prove troublesome in the electrically config-
ured environment of the future-cooperation between the data 
gatherers within the computer medium and the data disseminators 
within the news media. This liaison is hardly unique to the computer 
age; the seductive minions of the press always have been able to 
cajole public and institutional officials into granting access to sensi-
tive files by employing the blandishments of personal publicity or 
the threat of public criticism.304 
The magnitude of the problem may be radically altered by the 
computer, however. I£ predictions made earlier in this Article con-
cerning the increased computerization of personal information prove 
to be accurate,305 there will be a change in the quantity, sensitivity, 
and variety of information that the mass media may be able to ex-
tract from a system once access to it has been secured. Moreover, 
when a reporter is able to procure dossiers from an investigatory 
agency, the printout is likely to consist of public-record data inter-
mingled with subjective investigative reports, information given 
with the subject's actual or technical consent, and possibly informa-
tude or private affairs in order to obtain information for publication. The power of 
the State to control and remedy such intrusion for newsgathering purposes cannot 
be denied •••• " 
Private information that is obtained as a result of intrusive behavior should re-
tain its nonprivileged character, even though the subject later becomes newsworthy. 
This rationale was adopted in Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Calif. 
1968), a case in which the plaintiff, apparently a quack doctor, had been surreptitiously 
photographed and tape-recorded in his home by Life magazine reporters posing as 
patients. The plaintiff was subsequently prosecuted for his illicit medical activities, and 
Life then published a story and some photographs obtained during the visit to his 
house. The court rejected a claim of privilege: 
Defendant [asserts] that because plaintiff was prosecuted all facts relating to 
his offenses became public information. If this be so, then the press may prepare 
a dossier on persons by illegal means, including trespass, pictures taken by hidden 
cameras in homes, offices, or other private places, conversations transmitted by 
radio transmitters, and even theft of material, then await a prosecution and 
publish everything which might in some degree relate to the offense charged, 
although such facts were not used as evidence or made a part of the public record. 
Such conduct cannot be justified under the right of freedom of the press. 
284 F. Supp. at 931. 
!104. For example, consider the following description of conditions in the state of 
New York prior to the recent revision of police record-keeping systems: 
Violation of files was frequent. Police reporters looking for a good story were 
given free access to files on suspects, and as a result were able to publish in the 
newspaper some interesting but in many cases misleading, irrelevant, and dam-
aging pieces of information. Those police chiefs who tried to protect the con-
fidentiality of their files received poor press treatment, so that they would be 
encouraged to cooperate with the press more fully in the future. 
Hearings on Government Statistical Programs 28 (statement of Professor Richard 
Ruggles). 
!105. See pt. II.C. supra. 
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tion transferred through interfaces with one or more other systems. 
A reporter unfamiliar with the structure of a computer network 
and the sources from which it draws its stored information is unlikely 
to be able to make intelligent judgments about the reliability or 
utility of various data items, as he might in the context of a manual 
filing system containing information from a circumscribed number 
of sources. 
It is also unrealistic to assume that all managers or proprietors 
of computer systems will be concerned about how the data they 
release to the press is used or interpreted. A modicum of restraint 
would be provided if the immunity afforded by Hill is not extended 
to those who supply private data to the mass media.306 In any event, 
the task of effectively protecting the individual from the risk of mass 
circulation of intimate and misleading information requires clear 
legal standards that impose a duty of care on the mass communica-
tions media in handling dossier information. In addition, legal 
standards also must be fabricated for the operation of computerized 
data systems delineating what categories of information are avail-
able: (1) for general release, (2) for circulation among specified other 
computer systems, or (3) for use only within the confines of a given 
system. Some suggestions along these and other lines will be offered 
at a later point in this Article.307 
C. The Consent Placebo 
The process of establishing effective controls over the flow of 
computerized information is complicated by another weakness in 
the existing common-law tort of privacy-the defense that the plain-
306. In Pearson v. Dodd, No. 21,910 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1969), it was held that 
newspaper reporters who had published information they knew had been obtained 
by an unauthorized intrusion into the plaintiff's files were not guilty of invasion of 
privacy. The court reasoned that the intrusion and the publication aspects of the 
tort "should be kept clearly separate." Id. at 6. Applying this analysis, the court con-
cluded that the publication was within the ambit of the first amendment privilege 
and, since the reporters had not been parties to the intrusion, they were not held 
liable in tort: 
If we were to hold appellants liable for invasion of privacy on these facts, we 
would establish the proposition that one who receives information from an in-
truder, knowing it has been obtained by improper intrusion, is guilty of a tort. 
In an untried and developing area of tort law, we are not prepared to go so far. 
Id. at 5-6. Since the plaintiff's employees who had originally intruded into his files 
were not parties to the action, the court did not reach the question of whether they 
would be able to assert the newspaper's first amendment privilege. Apparently the 
reporters did not advance this argument, but rather contended that the employees' 
disclosure was privileged by a public policy in favor of exposing wrongdoing. Id. at 
5 n.19. 
307. See pts. VII, VIII infra. 
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tiff consented to the dissemination of personal information,308 or 
waived his right to protest by engaging in activity inconsistent with 
a desire to maintain his privacy. Unfortunately, the application of 
both of these concepts by the courts has been somewhat Draconian. 
"Waiver"· often is employed to characterize the plaintiff's participa-
tion in some newsworthy event; however, the defense has been used 
under circumstances in which the notion of volitional acquiescence 
in the invasion is nothing short of unrealistic.309 But even beyond 
that, the propriety of a defense to a privacy action should be assessed 
in terms of whether or not there is an overriding public interest in 
the free dissemination of information about the event, rather than 
on the basis of an assumption as to the plaintiff's intent. 
Fortunately, there is a growing realization that the consent de-
fense is insensitive to the psychological pressures and the need for 
the material realities of modern life that often force individuals to 
disclose personal data. When information is "voluntarily" given in 
the context of a police interrogation,310 an application for welfare 
308. Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R.Ev. 193, 218 (1890). 
See also Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Jenkins v. Dell Pub-
lishing Co., 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956), aff d, 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958). 
309. Sec, e.g., Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 
(1939) (woman "waived her right to privacy" by leaping from twelve-story building). 
Concern over chilling the dissemination of information by the press may extend to 
situations in which there is little apparent interest in communication of information. 
For example, in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953), 
a young couple who were photographed embracing in a public market place were held 
to have "waived" all right to object to publication of the photograph in a national 
magazine because, inter alia, the opposite result might have deterred the publication 
of all photographs of street scenes. The dissenting judge sharply criticized the artifi-
ciality of the waiver rationale: 
By plaintiffs doing what they did in view of a tiny fraction of the public, does 
not mean that they consented to observation by the millions of readers of the 
defendant's magazine. In effect, the majority holding means that anything any-
one docs outside of his own home is with consent to the publication thereof, 
because, under those circumstances he waives his right of privacy even though 
there is no news value in the event. 
40 Cal. 2d at 232-33, 253 P.2d at 441. cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 452 
Gustice Brennan, dissenting): 
[The suggestion that the right of privacy is lost by the auditor's consent to the 
electronic transcription of the speaker's words] invokes a fictive sense of waiver 
wholly incompatible with any meaningful concept of liberty of communication. 
If a person must always be on his guard against his auditor's having authorized 
a secret recording of their conversation, he will be no less reluctant to speak 
freely than if his risk is that a third party is doing the recording ..•. In a free 
society, people ought not to have to watch their every word so carefully. 
See also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 347 (1966) Gustice Douglas, dissenting); 
Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68 CoLUM. L. 
REv. I 89 (1968). 
310. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) [quoting P. DEVLIN, 
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958)]: "[T]here is still a general belief 
that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it 
will be the worse for you if you do not." 
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payments,311 an employment relationship,312 or a psychological ex-
periment,313 a variety of complex factors may have combined to 
subvert the subject's freedom of choice. Even a questionnaire sent 
out under the imprimatur of a federal agency has an inhibiting 
effect on many individuals; it may even benefit from the respon-
dent's natural, but erroneous, assumption that it is a "crime" not to 
answer every inquiry by the sovereign.314 Although a great deal 
obviously depends on the circumstances surrounding the disclosure 
and the individual's personal characteristics, in many of these situa-
tions "consent" is simply a conclusory epithet that serves to place 
responsibility for invasions of privacy on the victim. Of course, it 
is the data gatherer who should be subject to a duty to refrain from 
employing coercion to obtain information. 
A blatant example of an attempt to manipulate consent to pro-
vide a shield for possibly intrusive practices is provided by the action 
of a national credit bureau which became alarmed at the prospect 
of a congressional investigation. It drafted the following clause for 
inclusion in its credit applications: 
311. See generally Handler &: Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance 
and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB, 377 (1966). See also OFFICE OF SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY OF TilE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL 
REsEARCH 18 (1967) [hereinafter PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH]: 
Free consent may be compromised by the subject's external circumstances. • • • 
The gravest invasions of privacy are likely to occur among the weakest and most 
helpless segments of the population-children, the very poor, the very sick, those 
who do not speak the language, and minority groups. 
312. See, e.g., S. REPT. No. 534 (to accompany S. 1035), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967): 
Each section of the bill [protecting the privacy of Federal employees] is based 
on evidence from many hundreds of cases and complaints showing that generally 
in the Federal service, as in any similar organizational situation, a request from 
a superior is equivalent to a command. This evidence refutes the argument that 
an employee's response to a superior's request for information or action is a volun-
tary response, and that an employee "consents" to an invasion of his privacy or 
the curtailment of his liberty •••• For this reason, the bill makes it illegal for 
officials to "request" as well as to "require" an employee to submit to certain 
inquiries or practices or to take certain actions. 
See also Creech, The Privacy of Government Employees, 31 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 
413 (1966). 
313. PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH 4, 18: 
Behavioral science seeks to assess and to measure many qualities of man's mind, 
feelings, and actions. In the absence of informed consent on the part of the sub-
ject, these measurements represent invasion of privacy. The scientist must there• 
fore obtain the consent of his subject. 
To obtain truly informed consent is often difficult. In the first place, the nature 
of the inquiry cannot be explained adequately because it involves complex vari• 
ables that the nonscientist does not understand .••• Secondly, the validity of an 
experiment is sometimes destroyed if the subject knows all the details of its 
conduct .•.• 
In other situations the principle of free consent falls short for less obvious 
reasons. The subject may desire to please the experimenter, he may need to talk 
about very personal problems, or he may wish to place himself on exhibit ..•• 
Requiring consent can thus pose a problem for the investigator without providing 
the desired protection of subjects. 
314. See note 174 supra and accompanying text. 
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I hereby authorize the person to whom this application is 
made, or any credit bureau, or any other investigative agency 
employed by such person, to investigate the references herein 
listed, or statements, or other information, oral or ·written, 
obtained from me or any other person pertaining to my credit 
and financial responsibility .... I hereby release any claims, 
damages and suits whatsoever which may at any time be asserted 
by me by reason of such investigation.315 
Clearly, personal privacy would become a chimera if adhesion pro-
visions of this stripe were accepted by the courts. 
In sum, assertions of "consent" and "waiver" must be regarded 
with skepticism. The defenses should not be widely available to per-
mit data collectors to shift the risks of their activities. Instead, a 
fiduciary duty that is related to the degree of coercion or pressure 
under which an individual yields control of personal information 
should be imposed on the data extractor. 316 
D. Privacy on the Societal Scale-Some Bases for 
a Judicial Balance 
As a partial counterweight to the elaborate doctrinal network for 
securing the public interest in a free flow of information, the courts 
have delineated several constitutionally grounded rights in personal 
information that are deserving of protection. Given the danger that 
the first amendment rationale of Hill may be unduly extended at 
the sacrifice of informational privacy, these affirmative constitutional 
doctrines take on added significance. Perhaps the most clearly devel-
oped of these is the right of associational privacy, which recognizes 
the "vital relationship between the First Amendment freedom to 
associate and privacy in one's association."317 Thus, when the gov-
ernment attempts to gather data concerning an individual's associa-
tion with a group dedicated to the advancement of certain beliefs 
315. House Hearings on Commerdal Credit Bureaus 28. See also text accompany-
ing note 248 supra. 
316. Cf, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH 4: 
[I]f behavioral research is to be effective, some modification of the traditional 
concept of informed consent is needed. 
• • . [T]he right [of the subject] to discontinue participation at any point 
must be stipulated in clear terms. In the meantime, when full information is not 
available to him and when no alternative procedures to minimize the privacy 
problem are available, the relationship between the subject and the scientist (as 
well as with the institution sponsoring the scientist) must be based upon trust. 
This places the scientist and the sponsoring institution under a fiduciary obliga• 
tion to protect the privacy and dignity of the subject •••• 
317. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). See also Bates v. City of Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). The principle has been applied whether the organization 
is forced to reveal the names of its members, as in NAACP v. Alabama, or the indi-
vidual is compelled to reveal all organizations of which he has been a member, as 
in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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in "political, economic, religious, or cultural matters,''318 it must 
"convincingly show a substantial relation between the information 
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."310 
However, the successful assertion of associational privacy appears to 
depend upon a showing that disclosure will result in restraint on an 
individual's ability to exercise his freedom of association. 
The threat that computer technology poses to associational pri-
vacy is particularly acute. Electronic data-processing techniques 
facilitate the composition of lists of people associated with various 
types of activities and institutions from previously uncollated bodies 
of data; thus, relationships can be inferred from apparently disparate 
information.320 The risks created by this type of analysis will be 
magnified if the trends toward increased collection of individualized 
data, the computerization and centralization of information, and in-
formation exchange through computer networks continue. As these 
practices become more prevalent, judicial relief based upon a con-
stitutional right of associational privacy will be an increasingly im-
portant source of protection even though it is available only when 
the "chilling effect" of the inquiry is in some measure attributable 
to state action rather than purely private conduct.321 In addition, 
318. 357 U.S. at 460. 
319. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963). 
See also District 12, UAW v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
320. For example, computerized financial records could easily provide a list of all 
payments that an individual has made to a given organization, or even to a person 
known to be an officer of the organization. Similarly, the records of an airline ticket 
reservation system can be audited to procure passenger lists of all flights taken by a 
surveillance suspect, and the passenger lists could be compared with a list of the 
known members of an organization. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra. 
321. The Supreme Court has not been very demanding in applying the state action 
requirement in associational privacy cases, however. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court 
reversed a civil contempt judgment that had been entered against the NAACP for 
refusing to reveal "the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents" 
as required by state law. The Court rejected the argument that any repression follow-
ing from disclosure would be the result of action by private parties. The "crucial 
factor," in the Court's view, was "the interplay of governmental and private action, 
for it is only after the initial exertion of state power [in demanding the list] that 
private action takes hold." The NAACP had shown that "on past occasions revelation 
of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of 
public hostility." 357 U.S. at 462-63. Dicta in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 
(1960), indicates that the "private pressure" to be avoided is not merely the kind that 
follows from widespread publication of membership lists, but rather may be found 
in the actions of those who have economic power over the member of an unpopular 
group: 
Even if there were no disclosure to the general public, the pressure upon a teacher 
to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny 
would be constant and heavy. Public exposure, bringing with it the possibility of 
public pressures upon school boards to discharge teachers who belong to un-
popular or minority organizations, would simply operate to widen and aggravate 
the impairment of constitutional liberty. 
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the principle that a person is entitled to confidentiality in his insti-
tutional and human relationships may provide a keystone for placing 
computerized information systems under effective legislative or ad-
ministrative controls that go beyond the minimal level of protection 
that can presently be afforded by the courts through the Constitution 
and tort litigation. 
Closely related to the right of associational privacy is another 
judicially recognized individual interest-the right to possess ideas 
and beliefs free from governmental intrusion. As the Supreme Court 
recently stated in Schneider v. Smith,322 first amendment guarantees 
and the concept of associational privacy "create a preserve where the 
views of the individual are made inviolate. This is the philosophy of 
Jefferson that 'the opinions of men are not the object of civil govern-
ment, nor under its jurisdiction ... .' "323 
As is true of associational privacy, the information-handling 
capacity of the modern technologies poses a special threat to privacy 
of ideas and beliefs. Computers provide governmental and nongov-
ernmental institutions with increased ability to store, retrieve, and 
analyze an individual's opinions as reflected in psychological tests, 
attitude surveys, machine-assisted instruction, and simulations. These 
and other techniques for securing subjective data are sufficiently 
subtle that the individual may not even suspect that his basic beliefs 
are being scrutinized or that his responses will be preserved and ex-
amined by people beyond his immediate ken. Preservation of the 
fruits of this type of data surveillance also threatens another personal 
interest that some courts have recognized-the individual's ability 
to make a fresh start and escape from past errors when there is no 
overriding public interest in the preservation and chronologically 
remote disclosure of the information.324 
The judicial recognition of freedom of association and belief is 
part of a tradition that is even more basic to the nation's philosoph-
322. 390 U.S. 17 (1968). 
323. 390 U.S. at 25. In a concurring opinion, Justice Fortas stated: "No agency may 
be permitted to require of a person, subject to heavy penalty, sworn essays as to his 
'attitude toward the form of Government in the United States' •••• " 390 U.S. at 27. 
324. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931); cf. Com-
ment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of 
Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 722, 728-30 (1963); Address by Arthur J. Gold· 
berg, The Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture: Can We Afford Freedom?, Feb. 20, 
1969, at 9; note 117 supra and accompanying text. 
Several state courts have recognized equitable relief against the maintenance of 
a plaintiff's picture in a police rogues' gallery or the dissemination of copies to other 
law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 707, 42 S. 228 
(1906). See also State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); 
State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.'W.2d 834 (1941). But cf. Hodgeman v. 
Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915). 
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ical fabric-the conception of government as an institution of limited 
powers that is obliged to meet a heavy burden of justification when 
it undertakes a program or course of action that will inhibit the 
freedom of its citizens. As Justice Douglas remarked in his opinion 
for the Court in Schneider: "The purpose of the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights, unlike more recent models promoting a welfare state, 
was to take government off the backs of people.''325 This attitude 
certainly is reflected in the spate of Supreme Court decisions recog· 
nizing various "zones of privacy.''326 
It is axiomatic that the power conveyed by widespread surveil-
lance or information control can constrict individual freedom, and 
pressures that lead in that direction must be resisted. Arguments or 
supplications couched in terms of governmental economy or gains 
in administrative efficiency cannot justify every demand for greater 
power to extract, manipulate, store, and disseminate personal data. 
In the past these very objectives have been advanced and then re-
jected as justifications for universal fingerprinting327 or passports for 
travel within the country.328 By way of contrast there is the example 
of the Chinese Communist Party's attempt to register and monitor 
every household in China. 329 
Today, however, the accelerating development of technology and 
the almost exponential expansion of the ability to manipulate per-
sonal information in variegated ways may be altering the balance 
between the individual citizen and those institutions in society that 
seek to exercise control over him. The individual has little ability 
to protect himself against governmental and private snoopers who 
can employ sophisticated electronic surveillance devices to monitor 
325. 390 U.S. at 25. 
326. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 37 U.S.L.W. 4315, 4317 (April 8, 1969); Mancusi 
v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967); 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484 (1965). 
327. See, e.g., United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967): 
There can be no denying of the efficacy of fingerprint information, photo-
graphs, and other means of identification in the apprehension of criminals and 
fugitives .••• When arrested, an accused does not have a constitutional right of 
privacy that outweighs the necessity of protecting society and the accumulation 
of this data ..•. 
However, when an accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged 
without conviction, no public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal 
identification records. • •• His privacy and personal dignity is [sic] invaded as 
long as the Justice Department retains "criminal" identification records, "crimi-
nal" arrest [records], fingerprints and a rogne's gallery photograph. 
See also McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945); note 324 supra. 
328. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 387 U.S. 500 (1964); Edwards v. California, 
314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
329. See generally J. Cohen, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, 1949-1963, at 19-20, 106-08 (1968). 
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his activities and obtain information about him.330 More substantial 
legal safeguards than those currently available are required merely 
to maintain the status quo in the privacy field. The Supreme Court 
appears to have recognized this in recent electronic eavesdropping 
cases; it has employed expansive general principles to protect a per-
son's legitimate expectations concerning personal privacy.331 In the 
process, the Court has used the traditional constitutional restraints 
on search and seizure of tangible objects to restrict governmental 
acquisition of personal information.332 
The need to accommodate existing legal doctrine to meet the ex-
cesses of a new communications medium is hardly a novel or revolu-
tionary idea. Indeed, our current theories of privacy emerged from 
a recognition that the mass media possess unique abilities to harm 
the individual. As Dean Blaustein has observed: 
330. Josephson, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586, 1596 (1968): 
It may be fair to say that the law need not prevent the disclosure of informa• 
tion about another, where the speaker himself has not manifested sufficient con-
cern in its disclosure to safeguard against its dissemination. This view would 
justify the leeway given to field-glass snoops and naked-ear eavesdroppers. Both 
types of intruders may be frustrated by simple precautions and the burden of 
self-protection is not a heavy one. Where electronic surveillance and undercover 
spies are involved, however, the individual may be truly incapable of coping with 
the threat to his privacy other than by refusing to talk. 
331. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), a case involving a police 
wiretap on a public telephone: 
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a 
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays 
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the 
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. 
See also Note, From Private Places ta Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 981 (1968): 
[T]he Katz decision has pointed the way towards a complete reorientation in the 
analysis of problems relating to governmental intrusion into individuals' private 
affairs. Rather than relying on an interpretation of the nature and legitimacy of 
the Government's searching activity, the Court's holding was based solely on the 
individual's expectation of privacy. • • • It follows that even inadvertent, non-
purposeful government activity may constitute an "unreasonable search" if it un-
earths nonpublic information legitimately within the personal dominion of the 
aggrieved party. 
332. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[W]e have expressly 
held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any 'technical 
trespass under ••• local property law.'"); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); Schwartz, The Legitimation of 
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order'', 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 
475-76 (1969) ("Privacy is invaded at the point when the information in [testimonial 
communications like conversations and letters] is obtained by one not entitled to it, 
and this can easily be by aural or visual perception .••• Where privacy is invaded 
by seeing or listening, the search and seizure are identical and simultaneous •••. "); 
Note, supra note 331, at 974 ("The essence of a search is the gathering of nonpublic 
information; this is as effectively accomplished by the reception of visual stimuli as 
by actual, physical penetration ••• .'). But see the strong dissents of Justice Black in 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 364-74, and Berger, 388 U.S. at 78-81, concluding that the fourth 
amendment applies only to tangible property. 
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[T]he small town gossip did not begin to touch human pride and 
dignity in the way metropolitan newspaper gossip mongering does. 
Resources of isolation, retribution, retraction and correction were 
very often available against the gossip but are not available to any-
where near the same degree, against the newspaper report. . . . 
Gossip arose and circulated among neighbors, some of whom would 
know and love or sympathize with the person talked about. . . . 
... A newspaper report, however, is spread about as part of a 
commercial enterprise among masses of people unknown to the sub-
ject of the report and on this account it assumes an imperious and 
unyielding influence. Finally ... the newspaper tends to be treated 
as the very fount of truth and accuracy, and tends to command 
open and unquestioning recognition of what it reports. 
Thus, only with the emergence of newspapers and other mass 
means of communication did degradation of personality by the public 
disclosure of private intimacies become a legally significant reality.333 
Computerized information-handling elevates these difficulties of 
context and interpretation to a new order of magnitude. The com-
puter printout is less likely to reflect or reveal the bias or the selec-
tivity of the information gatherer than is the newspaper article or 
television report.334 Similarly, if the newspaper is viewed as a "fount 
of truth and authenticity," the computer projects an infallible 
and omniscent image across the mind of the average American, 
despite its occasional and well-publicized foibles. Consequently, the 
probability that an apparently disinterested account or report will 
be accepted as true-a consideration that disturbed Justice Harlan 
in his concurring opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill335-seems much 
more substantial when the report is based on a computerized dossier 
than when it appears in a newspaper article or a television newscast. 
Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is the fact that computerized infor-
mation-handling is a low-visibility operation. An individual may 
never learn that a dossier exists or have any real knowledge of what 
is in it. If he does know of its existence, he is not likely to receive 
333. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 984 (1964). See also Ludwig, "Peace of Mind in 48 
Pieces vs. Uniform Rights of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REv. 734, 748-50 (1948), in which 
the author argues that the scope of privilege recognized in actions for invasion of 
privacy has varied according to the characteristics of the medium of publication. 
334. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of 
Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 342, 350 (1966): "Just as every truth 
is a partial truth, every statement of fact is at least partly an evaluation. The courts' 
abiding inability to separate 'fact' from 'opinion' is inherent in the use of language 
to represent things." See also Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 34 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 553, 566 (1966). 
335. 385 U.S. 374, 409 (1967): "The public is less likely to view with normal skep• 
ticism what is written about [the plaintiff] because it is not accustomed to seeing his 
name in the press and expects only a disinterested report." 
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notice that an erroneous or misleading entry has been made in his 
file, or that details of his life have been revealed to people who have 
no colorable need to know them. Thus, citizens generally have no 
opportunity to correct or augment the contents of their files or con-
trol their use. Decisions affecting their personal destinies, may be 
made on the basis of unseen data from unknown sources having 
untested reliability. 
But beyond these apprehensions concerning the dangers to par-
ticular individuals, the unregulated computerization of personalized 
information may have a numbing effect on the value of privacy as 
a societal norm and may debilitate the citizen's conception of the 
government as a benevolent institution. As in the case of electronic 
surveillance, the climate or atmosphere of suspicion engendered by 
an accumulation of invasions of privacy is of far greater concern 
than the direct harm caused by the incidents themselves.336 In a 
dissenting opinion in Lopez v. United States,331 Justice Brennan 
drew a distinction between informers and informers who carry con-
cealed recording or transmitting devices. He was concerned about 
the special risks to which individuals are subjected when law enforce-
ment agencies use electronic surveillance devices, and, in turn, about 
the implications that these risks have for society as a whole: 
It is not an undue risk to ... compel [people] to use discretion in 
choosing their auditors, to make damaging disclosures only to per-
sons whose character and motives may be trusted. But the risk which 
... today's decision impose[s] is of a different order. It is a risk, 
that third parties, whether mechanical auditors . . . or human 
transcribers of mechanical transmissions . . . -third parties who 
cannot be shut out of a conversation as conventional eavesdroppers 
can be, merely by a lowering of voices, or withdrawing to a private 
place-may give independent evidence of any conversation. There 
is only one way to guard against such a risk, and that is to keep 
one's mouth shut on all occasions.sss 
Another observer has stated: "Even quite reasonable surveillance 
practices which should be permissible in themselves, may in the 
aggregate form be the basis of a terribly oppressive society."339 This 
336. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Justice Douglas, 
dissenting): 
(T]he privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes 
imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. 
But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any 
we have seen-a society in which government may intrude into the secret regions 
of man's life at will. 
See also note 309 supra. 
337. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
338. 373 U.S. at 450. 
339. Josephson, supra note 330, at 1599. 
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seems to be one of the lessons to be learned from the popular outcry 
concerning the National Data Center, some of the Census Bureau's 
questions, and the congressional hearings on credit bureaus.340 
Unfortunately, the existing tort remedies seem geared to the 
activities of private mass communications media. The existing com-
mon-law structure therefore does not appear readily transferable to 
regulate the use of personal information by computer networks 
whose privacy-invading activities are far more subtle than those that 
traditionally have confronted the courts. The deficiencies of current 
doctrine will become increasingly apparent as public and private 
sector data systems continue to integrate. Thus, if the individual is 
to retain any meaningful control over decisions affecting his life and 
if society is to avoid becoming enveloped in an Orwellian miasma, 
the law must adjust and impose limitations and responsibilities upon 
the proprietors of systems that process personal information. If it 
fails to do this, these data managers inevitably will wield an increas-
ing measure of power as a greater proportion of each individual's 
life history is recorded, centralized, and made available on computer 
networks. 
VI. THE HANDLING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION BY 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CURRENT PRACTICE 
In seeking guidance for developing an adequate system of legal 
principles to regulate the flow of personal information in society, it 
is appropriate to examine the most comprehensive contemporary 
statutory and administrative framework concerning data transfers-
the body of rules controlling the federal government's power to ac-
quire and disseminate information. It is especially appropriate to 
undertake such an analysis if, as concluded in the preceding section, 
the common-law remedies are inadequate to meet the new chal-
lenges. Inasmuch as certain aspects of the federal experience provide 
insights into the special problems created by information interchange 
between the private and public sectors and among the federal gov-
ernment and other units of government, the following discussion also 
is intended to indicate some of the consequences of the national 
computer networks which are on the horizon. 
340. See generally Hearings on 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); House Hearings on the 
Computer and Invasion of Privacy; Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy; House 
Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus; Senate Hearings on Credit Bureaus; Hear-
ings on Retail Credit Company. 
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A. Confidentiality-The Census Bureau Model 
The Bureau of the Census long has been one of the federal gov-
ernment's chief data gatherers. The decennial census has evolved 
from the simple "enumeration" of the populace described in the 
Constitution341 to a comprehensive survey seeking numerous items 
of data. Citizens are now required to answer questions about their 
health, employment, finances, and even the number of bathrooms 
in their homes.342 Several of the questions on recent censuses have 
been included at the request of social planners from both govern-
mental and nongovernmental institutions, as well as industry groups 
desirous of procuring information that will aid in making marketing 
decisions. 
Information for the census is extracted under threat of criminal 
penalties,343 and; on the few occasions when the propriety of census 
techniques has been questioned in the courts, the Bureau's broad 
discretion has been upheld.344 In recent years, however, the symbi-
otic relationship between the Census Bureau's seemingly insatiable 
appetite for personal information and the Damoclean sword of 
criminal sanctions has engendered an increasing number of com-
plaints from the public, with resulting criticism in Congress.345 A 
proposal to demand data on religious affiliations was a special target 
of the critics,346 and that line of inquiry was eliminated from the 
341. U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. 1, § 2. 
342. See generally Hearings on 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
343. 13 u.s.c. §§ 221-224 (1964). 
344. See, e.g., United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963): 
The questions contained in the household questionnaire related to important 
federal concerns, such as housing, labor, and health, and were not unduly broad 
or sweeping in their scope. The fact that some public opinion research experts 
might regard the size of the household questionnaire "sample" as larger than 
necessary to obtain an accurate result does not support a conclusion that the 
census was arbitrary or in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Cf. United States v. Moriarity, 106 F. 886, 890-92 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901). 
345. See note 347 and te.xt accompanying notes 527·32 infra. See also Ricken-
backer, The Fourth House, NATL. REv., May 21, 1960, at 325. The author has had 
occasion to examine some of the mail received by Senator Ervin and the Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights on the subject of the census and governmental question-
naires. It indicates a strong concern over the loss of individual privacy and growing 
governmental intrusiveness. The staff of Congressman Jackson Betts of Ohio, a leader 
in the census reform movement in the House, reports the same phenomenon. See also 
Detroit News, March 23, 1969, at SA, col. 1: "Congressmen report receiving large 
volumes of mail from constituents demanding census reform legislation. Similar re-
actions are being received by the news media from persons who want to thwart any 
invasion of their privacy ...• " 
346. See, e.g., Hearings on 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm. on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1966) (statement of Morris B. 
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1970 census. But the dissatisfaction runs deeper and a number of 
bills have been introduced in Congress that would sharply limit the 
kinds of questions that respondents are legally required to answer.347 
In April 1969 the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 
chaired by Senator Ervin, held broad hearings on the status and the 
possible development of a theory to protect citizens from abusive 
inquiries by the government.348 
Notwithstanding the recent criticisms, it generally is agreed that 
the Census Bureau has an unequalled record among federal agencies 
in preserving the confidentiality of personal information.349 In fact, 
the Census Bureau's enviable history frequently has been cited by 
advocates of a National Data Center as indicative of the type of 
security that can be achieved by a statistical organization.350 
The basic confidentiality provisions of the Census Act impose 
three prohibitions on Census Bureau employees. They may incur 
criminal penalties351 if they 
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of ... [the 
Act] for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it 
is supplied; or 
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any par-
Abram, President, American Jewish Committee); id. at 3 (statement of Representative 
Cornelius Gallagher). See also id. at 45-46 (statement of the Most Reverend Paul F. 
Tanner, General Secretary, National Catholic Welfare Conference): 
Many commercial and welfare interests can be served by statistics about re• 
ligious affiliation. In industrial and commercial circles it is well known that 
markets are influenced by the religious affiliation of prospective customers. Market 
analyses • . . would be more complete-and better suited to the needs of the 
citizenry-if they incorporated projections based on statistics on religious affili• 
ations. 
347. See, e.g., H.R. 20, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), which would limit criminal penal• 
ties to refusals to answer questions involving name and address, relationship to head 
of household, sex, date of birth, marital status, and visitors in the home at the time 
of the census. See also S. 494, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 113 CONG. REc. H16,231-!12 
(June 19, 1967). 
348. These hearings have not been published as of this writing. Among the wit-
nesses were three law professors, including the author, and a number of citizens 
deemed "representative of thousands from every walk of life who have complained 
to Congress about unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy and about increased 
harassment by government agencies in their everlasting quests for information." Office 
of the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, press release, April 14, 1969. 
349. See, e.g., Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 218-19 (1968). 
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Census and Statistics on May 8, 1969, 
Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher revealed that the Census Bureau resisted pressure 
to disclose the names of all Japanese-Americans following the outbreak of World 
War II. 
350. See, e.g., House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 51-56; 
Hearings on 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil 
Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1966). 
351. Maximum penalties of $1000 fine and two years' imprisonment for wrongful 
disclosure of information by employees are set forth in 13 U.S.C. § 214 (1964). 
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ticular establishment or individual under this title can be identified; 
or 
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the 
Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual 
reports.352 
There have been a few instances in which these commandments have 
been violated. In 1963, for example, the Census Bureau reportedly 
provided the American Medical Association with a "statistical" list 
of 188 doctors residing in Illinois. The list was broken down into 
more than two dozen income categories, and each category was 
further subdivided by medical specialty and area of residence.353 It 
also is likely that there is a fair amount of data disclosure at the 
information-gathering level by the large corps of people employed 
to carry out the Bureau's periodic canvassing.354 This type of abuse 
may be reduced by wider use of direct mail techniques. 
One basic infirmity in the Census Act restrictions is their am-
biguity, which makes consistent application difficult. The classifica-
tion of information as "statistical" within the meaning of subdivi-
sion (I), rather than as "identifying" or "surveillance," will depend 
in large measure on how the information is presented and what can 
be inferred from it by a user who is intimately familiar with the 
subject matter of the underlying question. It also may be unrealistic 
to require Census Bureau employees to make hypothetical judgments 
about whether or not a user will be able to determine the identity 
of respondents from a particular tabulation. The task of making a 
present judgment about a possible future use is bound to become 
more difficult as computer analysis techniques become more refined. 
Moreover, the Bureau's burden of making these judgments will 
increase because requests to release data in small aggregates of 
respondent units rather than large tabulations are certain to prolif-
erate as a result of the trend toward computer analysis of "micro-
data" in the social sciences.355 
Pressure for the relaxation of Census' confidentiality restrictions 
has come from other sources. In St. Regis Paper Co. v. United 
States,306 the Supreme Court held that the confidentiality provisions 
of the Census Act did not prevent other branches of the government 
from compelling a respondent to produce file copies of reports that 
352. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1964). 
353. Hirsch, The Punchcard Snoopers, THE NATION, Oct. 16, 1967, at 369. 
354. See Miller, On Proposals and Requirements for Solution, in Symposium-
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. R.Ev. 224, 230 (1968). 
355. See pt. 11.C. supra. 
356. 368 U.S. 208 (1961). 
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it had given to the Bureau. The Court reasoned that the rights 
granted by the statute were enforceable only against the Census 
officials receiving the information, and did not attach to the informa-
tion itself. Fortunately, the St. Regis case was legislatively overruled 
in 1962,357 and retained copies of census reports are now immune 
from subpoena. 
A number of disturbing questions raised by the case remain, 
however. For one thing, St. Regis can be interpreted as supporting 
the proposition that, in spite of the collecting agency's pledge of 
confidentiality, a copy of any report supplied to the Government is 
amenable to compulsory process in the absence of a specific statute 
exempting it.358 Moreover, if the Census Act's confidentiality restric-
tions are enforceable only against officials authorized to gather the 
information initially, it is conceivable that the statutory prohibition 
cannot be enforced against a third party who lawfully obtains in-
formation from the Bureau and then proceeds to misuse the data. 
In any event, the protection afforded by the legislative resolution 
of the St. Regis affair may prove to be more apparent than real. 
It does not prevent any interested agency from framing a question-
naire asking questions that appear on a census survey, thereby 
compromising the latter's confidentiality. Moreover, many agencies 
use the ploy of having the Census Bureau conduct surveys for 
them.359 This technique enables the inquiring agency to procure 
357. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(3) (1964). 
358. 368 U.S. at 218: 
Congress did not prohibit the use of the reports per se but merely restricted their 
use while in the hands of those persons receiving them, i.e., the government 
officials. Indeed, when Congress has intended like reports not to be subject to 
compulsory process it has said so. 
359. A list furnished the author by Senator Ervin's office shows that in a period 
of approximately two years the Census Bureau performed surveys for over twenty 
federal, state, and local governmental organizations. In many instances the surveys 
were taken weekly, monthly, or annually. It is difficult to determine how many re-
spondents were involved; the figure 6,000,000 seems conservative. 
A perusal of some of the questionnaires reveals them to be lengthy and, on occa-
sion, intrusive. A document entitled Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, col-
lected by the Census Bureau for the Department of Health, Education, and ·welfare, 
is almost twice as long as the 1970 census. It is being sent to a sample group of recent 
retirees who are receiving social security benefits. The survey apparently is a response 
to a recommendation by the Advisory Council on Social Security that data be col-
lected on people who come on the benefit rolls before age sixty-five. Some of its 
inquiries, in addition to numerous probing interrogatories about the respondent's 
finances and past employment, include: 
What have you been doing in the last four weeks to find work? 
When you retire, do you expect to live here or somewhere else? Where? 
Taking things all together, would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or 
not too happy these days? 
Do you have any artificial dentures? 
Is there some kind of care or treatment that you have put off even though you 
may still need it? What is this care or treatment for? 
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the desired data directly and in the precise form it deems neces-
sary. At the same time, it gets the benefit of the quasicoercive 
demeanor of an official Census Bureau questionnaire.36° Further-
more, once the collected data is transferred to the agency that re-
quested the survey,361 the excellent record of the Census Bureau be-
comes irrelevant. At this point the requesting agency has the capacity 
to use and disseminate the data in any way that its officials and em-
ployees feel is appropriate. Most of the data turned over by Census 
will be in the form of computer tapes, and this type of transfer has 
special implications, which are discussed in the next section of this 
Article.362 
Another potential deficiency in the Census Act is the provision 
granting the Secretary of the Department of Commerce discretionary 
authority to "furnish to Governors of States . . . courts of record, 
and individuals, data for genealogical and other proper purposes, 
from the population, agriculture, and housing schedules,"363 subject 
to the palliative that "[i]n no case shall information furnished ... 
be used to the detriment of the persons to whom such information 
relates."364 This grant of authority operates as an ill-defined excep-
Do you (or your spouse) see or telephone your parent(s) as often as once a week? 
What is the total number of gifts that you ... give to individuals per year •.. ? 
How many different newspapers do you receive and buy regularly? 
About how often do you .•• go to a barber shop or beauty salon? 
What were you aoing most of last week? 
Senator Ervin has introduced a bill designed to remedy intrusive federal data• 
gathering activities. S. 1791, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill was the focal point 
of the April 1969 hearings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. See note 
348 supra. See also text accompanying notes 544-45 infra. 
360. Although most of the surveys conducted for other agencies by the Census 
Bureau are voluntary, that fact often is not indicated on the documents. A recent 
voluntary home survey questionnaire was boldly marked: "This Form Should :Be 
Completed And Returned Whether You Are A Renter Or A Homeowner, Whether 
You Live In A One-Family Home, Or A House With Two Or More Families, An 
Apartment, Or Any Other Type Of :Building." This approach apparently is typical. 
In addition, respondents who do not reply are sent follow-up letters (occasionally by 
certified mail) or receive personal visits. 
361. The Census Bureau normally codes and edits the data, sends one copy to the 
requesting agency, and retains the raw data and one copy of the coded data. See 
Survey of New Beneficiaries: Report Compiled in Response to Senator Ervin's Letter 
of Feb. 28, 1969, at 3 (prepared by Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security) 
(copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
362. See pt. VI.B. infra. 
363. 13 U.S.C. § 8(a) (1964) (emphasis added). See also id. at § 8(b): "The Secretary 
may furnish transcripts or copies of tables and other census records and make special 
statistical compilations and surveys for State or local officials, private concerns, or 
individuals upon the payment of the actual, or estimated cost of such work." Section 
8(b) also permits the furnishing of census data, but seems limited to statistical and 
aggregate material. 
364. 13 U.S.C. § 8(c) (1964). The prohibition on detrimental use extends only to 
material appearing in the three censuses enumerated in section 8(a). St. Regis Paper 
Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 215 (1961). 
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tion to the prohibitions in the confidentiality section.365 The quan-
tum of protection provided by the vague standard of "detriment to 
the individual" seems scant; it can be vitiated all too easily by a strict 
judicial interpretation. Indeed, in one state case "detriment" was 
construed to mean that the subject of the data must be deprived of 
something that is lawfully his366-a test that appears impossible to 
satisfy except under the most limited circumstances. 
The most serious limitation on confidentiality restrictions of the 
type governing the Census Bureau, however, is not the scheme's po• 
tential ineffectiveness as a means of deterring wrnngful disclosures 
by agency personnel. Rather, it is the fact that information transac-
tions are engaged in without giving notice and an opportunity to be 
heard to the citizen whose files are subject to the risk of wrongful dis-
closure or disclosure under the statutory provision described in the 
preceding paragraph. This is coupled with a total failure to deal 
with the problem of how an individual can correct erroneous entries 
or add ameliorating information to the contents of a potentially 
damaging file. 
Admittedly, the absence of procedural safeguards has not had 
catastrophic consequences in the past, primarily because the Census 
Bureau has operated on the basis of aggregate data and has restricted 
itself to relatively bland statistical endeavors. But the twin pressures 
of increased information-gathering and widespread detailed multi-
variate analysis will be felt not only by Census but by all informa-
tion-handling agencies. As a result, fissures in the existing structure 
for privacy protection are almost certain to develop. 
B. Transfers of Information Among Federal Agencies 
As has been pointed out earlier,367 the proliferation of large time-
sharing computer systems and the existing cost levels are motivating 
365. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1964). The primary utilization of this exception seems to be 
by individuals procuring data from earlier censuses about themselves, especially for 
proof of age in connection with Social Security, Medicare, and other benefits. See 
Hearings on the 1970 Census Questions Before the House Comm. on Post Office and 
Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1966) (statement of Dr. A. Ross Eckler, Director, 
Bureau of the Census). 
366. In Edwards v, Edwards, 239 S.C. 85, 121 S.E.2d 432 (1961), the defendants in 
an inheritance dispute contended that the plaintiffs' use of census records as evidence 
was detrimental to their interests. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this 
construction of the Act: 
The use of such information to the detriment of those to whom it relates does 
not mean detriment in the sense of a financial loss flowing from establishing the 
truth in a Court of law. If plaintiff is the ... brother of defendants, he is entitled 
to an equal share and they have not been deprived of anything that was lawfully 
theirs but only that which they had no lawful right to claim as theirs. 
239 S.C. at 91, 121 S.E.2d at 435. 
367. See pt. III.B. supra. 
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information managers to share bodies of data in which they have a 
common interest. Within the federal government, this tendency is 
legitimized by a statute granting the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget power to "require any Federal agency to make available to 
any other Federal agency any information which it has obtained 
from any person."368 This authority can be exercised, however, only 
if at least one of the following conditions is met: (I) the information 
consists of statistical summaries, (2) it is not confidential at the time 
of transfer, (3) the persons who supplied the information have con-
sented to its release, or (4) the transferee agency has power to collect 
the information itself.369 Moreover, transferred information is sub-
ject to the same confidentiality restrictions that protected it in the 
originating agency, and any employee of the transferee agency who 
violates these restrictions is subject to the same penalties that apply 
to employees of the transferor organization.370 
These provisions are logical enough on their face and seem to 
present little direct threat to privacy.371 However, as is true of much 
of the existing regulatory scheme, they were conceived with the 
model of a manual transfer of manila folders in mind. Thus, they 
may prove to be quite difficult to apply in the context of frequent 
large-scale transfers of information among compatible agency com-
puter systems. Computerized information can be transferred either 
by manually exchanging it in stored form-a reel of magnetic tape 
or a magnetic disc-or by feeding it directly from one computer 
memory unit to another through a machine interface. Both proce-
dures permit the data to be duplicated by the transferee unit so that 
the original can remain with the collecting agency. The transferred 
information often will not carry any indication of its source, partic-
ularly if it is used by the borrower on a random-access basis or is 
amalgamated with other data or transmogrified in some other fash-
ion. 
In short, the indicia of the process of transferring computerized 
data are so evanescent that there does not appear to be any effective 
way to insure that the limitations on the Bureau of the Budget's 
statutory authority are honored. Although it is feasible for the trans-
368. 44 U.S.C. § 422(e) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). This power is subject to several 
exceptions, the most notable of which encompasses "the obtaining or releasing of 
information by the Internal Revenue Service." Id. The term "Federal agency" is 
defined by 44 U.S.C § 426(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967) to include "any executive depart-
ment, commission, independent establishment, corporation owned or controlled by 
the United States, board, bureau, division, service, office, authority, or administration 
in the executive branch of the Government . . • ." 
369. 44 U.S.C. § 423(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
370. 44 U.S.C. § 423(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
371. The exception for the respondent's consent to release of information can be 
easily abused, of course. See pt. V.C. supra. 
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feree machine to be programmed to indicate the source whenever 
part of the transferred data is generated as output, the cost of the 
process might exceed any savings gained by sharing the data. And 
in cases in which the borrowed information is integrated with other 
data, the process might not even be feasible except in the most gen-
eral way. Moreover, it is unrealistic to assume that middle- and low-
level administrators are familiar with the disparate standards of 
confidentiality and penalties for violations that are in force in all of 
the possible transferor organizations. Of course, it is technologically 
possible (although a dubious use of computer capacity) to program 
all potential transferor computers so that they will provide this in-
formation with each bit of data they transfer. Then, in the style of 
some majestic Wagnerian prologue, each transferee computer would 
print out the rules and regulations applicable to the use of any bor-
rowed information that is to be retrieved. Whether or not they 
would be read or followed is another matter. 
At some point, surely, the basic assumption underlying the 
statutory transfer restrictions on the Budget Bureau-that privacy 
can be protected by aggregating confidentiality requirements-must 
break down by virtue of its sheer complexity. The House Committee 
on Government Operations examined an aggregation scheme as a 
method of protecting privacy in the context of a data center consist-
ing of information from thirty to forty federal agencies. The com-
mittee rejected this system as impractical: 
Each agency would have numerous bureaus and other subdivisions. 
For each of these hundreds of bureaus there would have to be de-
veloped a complicated set of standards whereby every type of report 
would have to be evaluated . 
. . . [E]ach of the hundreds of bureaus would have to rate every 
type of information it possesses separately for all other bureaus that 
might request the information.372 
The obvious alternative to an aggregation scheme, a single scale of 
confidentiality that can be used to rate every report received by the 
Government, also was rejected. The committee was of the opinion 
that the imposition of a uniform scale would obscure the fact that 
"the sensitivity of a given document is not intrinsic, but varies with 
the relationship between the agency gathering the data and the 
agency receiving it."373 
372. PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL DATA BANK CONCEPT 14-15. 
373. Id. at 15. The Committee went on to give the following example: "[A] person 
giving his income for the HUD housing survey would have his confidence violated if 
this income figure were to be given to the Internal Revenue Service, but not if it 
were given to the Bureau of the Census for aggregate purposes." 
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Resolution of the dilemma posed by the deficiencies of both 
systems is essential if a rational scheme of confidentiality is to be 
developed. As will be discussed more fully in a later section,374 the 
answer may lie in proper application of the technology itself. Hierar-
chical storage techniques, privacy systems built into the hardware 
and software, and use of cryptography principles-all supported by 
recast legislative and administrative regulations-may provide the 
necessary protective mix. Consequently, a number of studies and 
experimental information-sharing projects must be undertaken be-
fore the intricacies of maintaining confidentiality of personal infor-
mation that moves on an interagency basis can be appreciated. Un-
fortunately, there is substantial danger that the present trend toward 
data transfers will continue unabated, with yesterday's aggregated 
confidentiality restrictions375 providing a shield against information 
infiltration that is as porous as McNamara's Vietnam Wall. 
C. Federal-State-Local Transfers of Information 
The trend toward data-sharing within the federal government 
has been paralleled by the development of numerous data centers 
at the regional,376 state,377 and local378 levels. There has also been in-
374. See pt. VII.A. infra. 
375. An excellent example of the disregard for confidentiality within the federal 
government arising from cavalier data transfers is the wide latitude permitted in the 
disclosure of income tax returns; see Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-l(f) (1965): 
[I]f the head of an executive department •.. or of any other establishment of 
the Federal Government, desires to inspect, or to have some other officer or em-
ployee of his department or establishment inspect, a return . . • in connection 
with some matter officially before him, the inspection may, in the discretion of 
the Secretary of the Treasury or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the 
delegate of either, be permitted upon written application .•.. 
See also Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6103(a)-l(e) (1960); 301.6103(a)-l(g) (1960); 301.6103(a)-I00-
107 (1961). 
In United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 822-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937, 
rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958), the defendant was prosecuted for income tax 
evasion. The prosecutor asked an Internal Revenue agent to inspect the tax returns 
of the veniremen on the jury panel, and to provide a summary of events in their 
history of dealings with the IRS which might tend to make them unfavorably disposed 
toward the prosecution. This list was used as a basis for peremptory challenges, and, 
in spite of the fact that no comparable information was available to the defendant, the 
court held that this was permissible under the statute and applicable regulations. 
376. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 49-66 (plan for a regional 
economic data bank for the St. Louis region). 
377. See Project-The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the 
Individual!, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1371, 1401-10 (1968) (proposals for a state data-processing 
system in California). See generally Hearings on Government Electronic Data Process-
ing Systems Before the Subcomm. on Census and Statistics of the House Comm. on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 231-36 (1966) (statement of Dr. 
Thomas C. Rowan, Vice President, Systems Development Corporation); Pennsylvania 
Senate Bill No. 239 (1969) (state police computerized data bank). 
378. See, e.g., A City Where Computers Will Know About Everybody, U.S. NEWS &: 
·woRLD REP., May 15, 1967, at 78 (New Haven, Connecticut); Senate Hearings on 
Computer Privacy, pt. 2, at 303-25 (Washington, D.C.). 
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creasing pressure to establish interfaces for the transmission of data 
between these centers and the federal government. In some respects, 
the sharing of information among different levels of government, 
and perhaps even with the private sector, is more threatening to 
individual privacy than the transmission of data within the federal 
government. In the first place, multilevel systems of this type are 
bound to increase the potential audience for sensitive data. In addi-
tion, local information handlers may be more likely to be inefficient, 
insensitive, or animated by malice or idle curiosity about the content 
of the data than are their federal counterparts. In many cases they 
· are in a better position to harm individual citizens through misuse 
of personal information than relatively remote federal officials. More-
over, the difficulties of interpreting noncomparable bodies of infor-
mation are likely to arise in more extreme form when data centers 
that have been designed to meet the particular needs of different 
levels of government later are patched together to effect data trans-
fers.379 
In spite of these concerns, programs already are in existence that 
provide for the sharing of personal data between the federal govern-
ment and the states. For example, section 6103 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code grants access to federal income tax returns to state officers 
charged with the collection of any state tax.880 The treasury regula-
tions under this section also open federal estate and gift tax returns 
to states that are willing to reciprocate by allowing the federal gov-
ernment to peruse their tax records.381 Over forty states have entered 
"agreements of cooperation" with the Internal Revenue Service,882 
379. Cf. Hearings on Data Processing Management 24-25 (statement of Phillip S. 
Hughes, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget): 
The incompatibility that continues to exist among equipment and software 
remains a serious obstacle in making the most effective and efficient use of our 
vast ADP resources. This problem is assuming even greater significance in view of 
the accelerated trend toward the development of systems that involve the exchange 
of data in machine-processable form among many different computers. This trend 
is illustrated by the growing interchange of information among Federal, State, and 
local governments, between the private sector and governmental agencies, and 
within major segments of Government and industry. 
380. INT. REv. Com;: of 1954, § 6103(b)(2): 
All income returns filed with respect to the taxes imposed by chapters I, 2, 3, 
and 6 ••. shall be open to inspection by any official body, or commission, law• 
fully charged with the administration of any State tax law, if the inspection is 
for the purpose of such administration or for the purpose of obtaining informa• 
tion to be furnished to local taxing authorities . . . . The inspection shall be per-
mitted only upon written request of the governor of such State .••• 
Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-598, 1954-2 Cu111. BuLL. 121. See generally Clurman &: Provorny, Pub• 
licity and Inspection of Federal Tax Returns, 46 TAXES 144 (1968). 
381. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-l(d) (1965). 
382. CCH 1968 STAND. FE!>. TAX REP. ,I 5209.576. 
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and more than twenty-five of these have begun exchanging magnetic 
tapes with the federal government.883 
Although the administrative and revenue advantages of tax in-
formation interchange are obvious, the fact remains that they are 
being achieved at the expense of exposing financial data concerning 
our citizens to a wider group of people-in many cases to a wider 
group than the taxpayer ever anticipated would be privy to it. Aban-
donment of the program is not being suggested; an evaluation of the 
privacy-protecting procedures that are being employed does seem 
appropriate, however. A tax return in the wrong hands can result 
in great damage to an individual and, in certain circumstances, ele-
ments of organized crime or unscrupulous political operatives would 
be very interested in seeing selected tax returns. They undoubtedly 
would be willing to pay handsomely for that privilege, and this 
makes the maximum statutory penalty of 1,000 dollars fine and one 
year imprisonment for wrongful disclosure384 seem dangerously in-
effective as a deterrent. 
Comparable threats to personal privacy are inherent in the devel-
opment of "integrated information systems" for law enforcement 
agencies. This is a technique that has been advocated to counteract 
the difficulties that the police encounter in dealing with a highly 
mobile criminal population. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
has established a National Crime Information Center, which eventu-
ally will enable the states and many of the large cities to have im-
mediate access to computerized files of stolen property and wanted 
persons.885 Although application of the new technologies to public-
record information of this sort does not pose a significant indepen-
dent threat to personal privacy, it is obvious that a wide variety of 
information is useful in law enforcement. Thus, pressures to include 
more extensive data in the system are almost certain to increase.386 
383. CoNG. REc. E2656 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1968). 
384. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 7213. This section also provides that federal em-
ployees convicted of wrongful disclosure are to be discharged from their jobs. 
385, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 72-74. 
386. The TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 72 suggests fifteen general 
categories of information for inclusion in police intelligence systems, including state 
motor vehicle registrations, sex and narcotics offenders, and known criminal associates. 
John de J. Pemberton, Jr., the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
has expressed apprehension that a different kind of information could find its way 
into intelligence files: 
Our . . . concern regarding the proposed FBI Crime Information Center is 
that it will be the repository not just for crime information . . . but for other 
types of information not at all relevant to [the] prevention and detection of crime. 
It is said that other Federal investigative agencies will be invited to feed whatever 
information they choose into the huge reservoir that the national network of com-
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Realistically, the National Crime Information Center has to be 
viewed as the initial element of a broader crime information net-
work that eventually may link all of the nation's law enforcement 
agencies into a single data system. New York, which is probably the 
leader among the states in computerizing police records, already has 
in operation the essential features of a system built around a single 
computer center in which the various state and local law enforcement 
agencies store and retrieve data through remote-access terminals.387 
This system could easily be linked both to the FBI's center, and, in 
the other direction, to police station houses and individual patrol 
cars.ass 
The same pressures that are leading to information integration 
among different levels of government may lead to even more expan-
sive systems. In today's climate of student activism and public and 
governmental reactivism, it is not unreasonable to believe that inter-
faces between law enforcement and educational data centers are 
feasible. After all, the Justice Department is obligated to enforce 
recent federal legislation concerning students who engage in disrup-
tive campus activities,389 and proposals for comparable state legisla-
tion are becoming increasingly fashionable.390 The process would be 
exedited for all concerned if data collected by the FBI, the Justice 
Department, local law enforcement agencies, and the universities 
could be coordinated and distributed to the interested organizations. 
But the risks to the individual are enormous. 
A refined sifting process to insure that damaging information is 
not allowed to flow unverified and uncontrolled among local, state, 
and federal organizations is needed. Unfortunately, the designers 
and advocates of integrated information systems have been more 
concerned with making data available than they have been with 
puters will store and retrieve. Data concerning a person's political beliefs and asso-
ciations, gathered by various Federal security agencies, thus will become part of 
the crime data bank. The implications are obvious: every local police official will be 
able to learn with facility not only whether a suspect has a criminal record, a 
proper disclosure, but also whether he has at all deviated from his community's 
political or social norms, a highly improper disclosure which threatens the en-
joyment of first amendment protections. 
House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 182-83. 
387. For a description of the New York State Identification and Intelligence System, 
see House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 146-81; cf. TASK FORCE 
REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 69, 160. 
388. TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 35-36. New York City currently 
is using a system of computer-assisted dispatching of patrol cars, called "SPRINT" 
(Special Police Radio Inquiry Network). N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1967, § 7, at 53, col. I. 
389. See, e.g., Pub. L. 90-550 (1968); Pub. L. 90-575, § 504(a) (1968). 
390. See, e.g., H. 815, 75th Gen. Ass. of the State of Missouri; H. 92 (Minnesota 
Legislature, introduced Jan. 15, 1969); H. 1138, 1st Sess., 32d Legislature of the 
State of Oklahoma. 
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safeguarding individual privacy.391 Although the objectives of these 
planners cannot be faulted, their inability to define the proper 
parameters of their task can be. 
D. The Federal Government and the Public-
The Freedom of Information Act 
The disclosure of information gathered by the federal govern-
ment to private individuals and organizations creates its own threats 
to personal privacy. In many cases, the information held by the gov-
ernment has been extracted from the individual under a statutory 
mandate or through the use of subtle forms of coercion.392 Nonethe-
less, if any of this vast store of personal data finds its way into one of 
the mass media, the broad implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill393 and 
other first amendment cases indicate that it can be used with virtual 
impunity. The problem is not simply the press. Employers, creditors, 
business rivals, and a multitude of others having an "interest" in a 
particular individual also have occasion to seek information from the 
files of the federal government. 
The past balance between the Government and the public has been 
altered radically by the enactment in 1967 of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,394 a relatively short piece of legislation that requires the 
391. For example, the TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 74-75 devoted 
a page and a half to the problem of individual privacy and concluded, "This problem 
still needs much more study, analysis and judgment." 
The vulnerability of computerized crime information systems is illustrated by the 
following account of difficulties in the New York State Identification and Intelligence 
System: 
The reluctance of law enforcement agencies to share information on organized 
crime may pose fatal problems for a state plan to develop a central computerized 
source of information about criminals. 
"When it gets right down to it," [a] state official said, "I just don't know 
whether [New York County District Attorney Frank S.] Hogan is going to let 
N.Y.S.1.1.S. see the sensitive kind of stuff he's got in his files, especially when 
there's a possibility it might fall into the hands of a corrupt sheriff or police 
chief at the other end of the state." 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1968, § I, at 27, col. 4. 
392. See pt. V.C. supra. 
393. For a discussion of the impact of Hill and related cases, see pt. V.B. supra. 
394. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1965-1967). See generally Davis, The Information 
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967); Paul, Access to Rules and 
Records of Federal Agencies: The Freedom of Information Act, 42 L.A. BAR BuLL. 459 
(1967); Sky, Agency Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act, 20 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 445 (1968); Sobeloff, The New Freedom of Information Act: What It Means to 
Tax Practitioners, 27 J. TAXATION 130 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information 
Act: Access to Law, 36 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 765 (1968); Recent Statute, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
909 (1967); Note, The Information Act: Judicial Enforcement of the Records Provision, 
54 VA. L. R.Ev. 466 (1968). 
The Act does not apply to records maintained by the federal courts. Cook v. 
Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968). 
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disclosure, upon request, of broad categories of information held by 
governmental agencies. The purpose of the statute is to insure that 
the public has access to enough information to enable it to scruti-
nize the activities of federal administrators, thereby providing a 
theoretical check on abuse. In the process of fulfilling this function, 
however, the Act is certain to have a profound effect upon an indi-
vidual's capacity to prevent the circulation of information that he 
has divulged to the Government under various federal reporting 
programs.395 
The conflict between the public's right to know and the individ-
ual's right to have some control over the flow of personal informa-
tion held by the Government is extremely difficult to resolve, and it 
is doubtful that new legislation-even if it contained significantly 
more detail than the Freedom of Information Act-could offer more 
than general guidelines for handling the kaleidoscopic factual prob-
lems that will arise. Realistically viewed, however, the Information 
Act, perhaps unthinkingly, has partially resolved this conflict by 
establishing a statutory policy favoring disclosure of governmental 
records. In essence, it reverses the traditional presumption in favor 
of personal privacy, and places the burden on the information-hold-
ing agency to find a specific statutory ground for refusing to honor 
a request for disclosure.396 In some instances the Act not only has 
shifted the burden of proof, it apparently has increased it as well. 
The most important statutory exemption from disclosure for pur-
poses of the present discussion immunizes "personnel and medical 
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."397 
395. The fundamental conflict between these two objectives is perhaps best illus-
trated by the following excerpt from Statement of President Johnson on Signing 
Public Law 89-487 (the Freedom of Information Act) on July 7, 1966, reprinted in 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON 
THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ii (1967) [here-
inafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO]: 
A citizen must be able in confidence to complain to his Government and to provide 
information • . •. 
Fairness to individuals also requires that information accumulated in personnel 
files be protected from disclosure •.•. 
I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only the 
national security, not the desire of public officials or private citizens, should deter-
mine when it must be restricted. 
396. The Act "does not authorize withholding of information ••• except as specif-
ically stated" in nine exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). See Benson 
v. General Servs. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 r:,N .D. Wash. 1968). See also § 
552(a)(3). 
397. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). Professor Davis, supra note 394, at 
798, has argued with considerable logic that this provision forces the government official 
who has custody of a requested document to commit "an invasion of personal privacy 
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The Information Act also has greatly expanded the class of per-
sons who can compel disclosure398 by conferring standing on "any 
person,"300 a standard that one commentator suggests may preclude 
the courts from attempting to strike a balance between the privacy 
interests threatened on the one hand, and the importance of access 
to the information on the other.400 Although the Act permits anyone 
to compel disclosure judicially, it does not provide standing or 
assure notice, either of a request for information from an agency 
or of a judicial proceeding to compel an agency to honor a request, to 
the party whose interest is most clearly in jeopardy when disclosure 
of personal information is sought-the individual who is the subject 
of the data.401 It is doubtful that reliance on bureaucratic inertia, 
and it even requires an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy so long as it is not 
'clearly unwarranted.'" Perhaps this is one situation in which the triumph of bureau-
cratic inertia over nice legalistic distinctions will prove beneficial. It is hard to 
imagine a low-level bureaucrat engaging in the type of sophisticated analysis suggested 
by Professor Davis. However, it also is disturbing to remember that these same officials 
will be making the initial determination of whether or not release of a given docu-
ment constitutes an invasion of privacy-a question that few legal scholars would 
analyze the same way. But again Professor Davis: "The terms 'personnel and medical 
files,' 'similar files,' and 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' are all 
reasonably clear standards •.• .'' Id. 
398. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967) grants the federal district courts 
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding records or to order the production 
of records withheld. An action brought under this section is to take precedence on the 
docket over all matters e.xcept those the court considers to be of greater importance. 
399. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); see Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 
523 (7th Cir. 1968). 
400. Davis, supra note 394, at 765-66. See also Recent Statute, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 909, 
911 (1967): 
[A]gency records will be equally available to litigants, newspapers, and officious 
inquirers, unless the courts interpret "any person" restrictively to mean "any per-
son with a legitimate interest." Such an interpretation arguably would actually 
help to expand the area of publicly available information, on the theory that if 
information were equally available to any person, the courts would hesitate to 
order disclosure of information to persons with a particularly su·ong need because 
the same or similar information would have to be made available to everyone. 
However, the 1.:mrpose of the Act, as shown by the legislative history, would seem 
to preclude such an interpretation of "any person." 
Notwithstanding the legislative history, the ATIORNE\' GENERAL'S MEMO 28 concludes 
that a restrictive reading of "any person" is defensible. According to the Memorandum, 
the district court in a trial de novo under the Act can "exercise the traditional discre-
tion of a court of equity" and weigh factors such as "the purposes and needs of the 
plaintiff, the burdens involved, and the importance to the public interest of the 
Government's reason for nondisclosure." Another route to the same result is a variable 
interpretation of the standard "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" described in 
note 397 supra and accompanying text: "Some regulations •.• provid[e] that the 
exemption will not apply to disclosures to certain classes of persons, on the assump-
tion that release to such persons either would not be an invasion of privacy or would 
be justified by some public interest.'' Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute 
and the Regulations, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, 45 (1967). 
•101. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S l\IEMO 28: "Following the statutory plan, the district 
court would presumably issue an order directed to the agency, which, under the lan-
guage of th~ statute, is the only party defendant.'' The Memorandum did not discuss 
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obstinacy, or traditional administrative reluctance to disclose the 
contents of files to the public are adequate substitutes for giving the 
person whose privacy is threatened the right to participate in the 
process. A statutory scheme that ignores a supposedly basic societal 
norm such as the right to privacy by requiring a demonstration that 
disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of pri• 
vacy" and then fails to provide a mechanism for giving notice to the 
person most interested in discharging that burden gives the impres• 
sion of having been sketched by a surrealistic draftsman. 
Because the Information Act may have a drastic impact on pre-
vailing standards of privacy, the scope of the exceptions permitting 
information to be withheld is crucial. Unfortunately, the language 
of these provisions ranges from the obscure to the opaque, and has 
moved Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to proclaim that the Act is 
"a shabby product indeed."402 The statute is not even consistent in 
describing the units of information that may be withheld. The 
introductory sentence in the exemption section provides that the 
subdivisions are inapplicable to "matters,''403 which would seem to 
indicate that the agencies are able to withhold individual items of 
information. This interpretation also appears consistent with the 
discretionary power to delete identifying details, which is given 
earlier in the Act.404 Yet, several of the most significant exceptions 
are phrased in terms of "files,'' "memorandums,'' or "letters,'' so that 
it is possible to read the statute as exempting the release of all infor-
mation in a given "file" if it fits the statutory categorization.405 These 
constructions are conjectural, however, and the inescapable conclu-
sion is that it is not clear whether the statutory exemptions apply to 
individual bits of information, specific documents, or entire files, or 
the ,possibility that the party whose privacy was threatened by disclosure might be 
able to intervene in the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. However, it is conceivable 
that the threat to privacy would be sufficient to confer that right. According to rule 
24(a)(2), the test is whether or not "the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that 
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability 
to protect that interest ... .'' The real problem, of course, is lack of notice to the 
party whose personal data is being sought. Even when the agency refuses to release 
the data and is made the defendant in a court proceeding, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a}(3) (Supp. 
III, 1965-1967) provides that the action shall "take precedence on tee docket over 
all other causes," and hence the data subject is quite likely to be presented with a 
fait accompli. 
402. Davis, supra note 394, at 807. 
403. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
404. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. III, 1965-1967): "To the extent required to prevent 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying 
details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, inter-
pretation, or staff manual or instruction." 
405. See generally Davis, supra note 394, at 797-99. 
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whether synoptic or raw data will be treated differently than collated 
or evaluated information. 
These interpretive difficulties are compounded in the context of 
computerized records. Of what relevance are words such as "files," 
"memorandums," "letters," and "matters," when the storage me-
dium is a stack of tabulating cards, a reel of magnetic tape, or a disc? 
Does the Act envision the turning over of a tape or permitting the 
requesting party to duplicate it? If either is the case, it might enable 
the recipient to subject the data to highly detailed computer analysis 
that would reveal relationships and permit the drawing of inferences 
about people that would not be possible with less sophisticated 
methods. Another question is whether or not the Information Act 
obliges an agency to process all the data in its files on a given subject 
or to integrate its information with accessible data elsewhere within 
the Government. ls it possible that a person requesting disclosure 
of the data available on someone else has a right to have that data 
collated from the far reaches of the federal information system and 
printed out for him in dossier style?406 
Perhaps the most confusing statutory exemption deals with 
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained 
from a person and privileged or confidential,"407 a provision which, 
as the Attorney General's Memorandum on the Act admits, is "sus-
ceptible of several readings, none of which is entirely satisfactory."408 
Even the legislative history of this section is less than pellucid, but 
it seems to indicate that Congress intended to exempt all privileged 
information, trade secrets, and information obtained by the govern-
ment under a pledge or reasonable expectation of confidentiality.409 
406. The rather arbitrary interpretations advanced by the Attorney General's 
Memorandum do little to alleviate the confusion. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) 
(Supp. III, 1965-1967) exempts "matters that are ... personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy" (emphasis added). The Memorandum concludes that this language 
encompasses all material contained in personnel and medical files, and "all private 
or personal information contained in other files which, if disclosed to the public, 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of ... privacy." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
l\lEMO 36 (emphasis added). 
The courts seem reluctant to impose any significant burden of search on the 
agencies; see, e.g., Bristol Meyers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968). 
407. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
408. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO 32. See also Davis, supra note 394, at 802-03, in 
which the author contends that a literal construction of this provision leads to the 
conclusion that "[t]he Act is a nullity with respect to all commercial or financial in-
formation, and with respect to all non-commercial and non-financial information 
which is privileged or confidential" (emphasis removed). 
409. S. REP. No. 813, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBUC TO 
INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965): "[Exemption 
four] is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information which .•. would cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained ..•• 
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This interpretation, together with the statutory exception for "mat-
ters ... specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,"410 carves 
out a substantial area of immunity from disclosure; in effect, it super-
imposes the confusing structure of the Freedom of Information Act 
upon the existing morass of confidentiality statutes and regulations. 
This construction of the exemption also creates an intriguing di-
lemma. It is supported by the notion that if personal information 
that has been extracted under a pledge of confidentiality is not 
exempted from disclosure under the Information Act, the citizen's 
trust in the Government will have been betrayed. The fear, of 
course, is that people will be deterred from furnishing candid or 
voluntary reports in the future. On the other hand, if each agency's 
pledge of confidentiality is honored, then each may be able to im-
munize many of its records and activities from public scrutiny by 
the simple expedient of pledging confidentiality for all information 
gathered from the public.411 
Since the Freedom of Information Act has so many theoretical 
and linguistic shortcomings, the manner in which the Act is admin-
istered by the agencies will determine how the conflict between the 
individual's right to privacy and the public's need to know is re-
solved.412 Although it is too early to make a confident assessment of 
It would ••• include information customarily subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-
client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges." The House Report is substan-
tially similar, and also states that the exemption includes "information which is given 
to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. 
Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose 
documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor sucli obliga-
tions." H.R. REP. No. 1497, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO 
INFORl\rATION, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966). See also Benson v. General Servs. Admin-
istration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968). At present, there are nearly 100 statutes 
regulating access to information held by the Government. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra, 
at 10. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO 31-32. 
Another problem is whether or not the exemption abrogates the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege. See Recent Statute, 80 HARV. L. REv. 909, 912 (1967). Compare Cooney 
v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("[A] claim 
of executive privilege is validly made only by the head of the executive department or 
administrative agency involved, after actual personal consideration by that officer."), 
with Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (grant of an executive privi-
lege delegable within the Department of the Army upheld). Both of these cases were 
decided under the Freedom of Information Act. 
410. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
411. In Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. 
L.J. 18, 37 (1967), this possibility is described as "one of the greatest loopholes in the 
bill." 
412. Cf. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
SENATE COMM. 01', THE JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT (TEN MONTHS' REVIEW) I (Comm. Print, 1968): 
The usefulness of the act • • • will not depend on court decisions alone. The 
act called for a change in attitude, and hence, the success or failure of the act 
depends on the sound judgment and faithful execution of the law bv agency 
officials. The record of the agencies in this regard is far from clear. 
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the Act's impact on personal privacy, there is some basis for opti-
mism. Apparently, many of the agencies affected by the Act are 
developing regulations for administrative appeals from initial deci-
sions refusing disclosure.413 This procedure should bring the hard 
cases before a relatively high-level official who is more likely to be 
attuned to the privacy implications of disclosure than is the custodian 
of the document. These administrators also are less likely to be 
pressured into releasing the requested data by the threat of litiga-
tion. Of course, the Act's goal of rapid and easy disclosure might be 
defeated by interjecting an administrative appeal that must be ex-
hausted before the judicial remedy becomes available. This certainly 
would be true if ministerial personnel adopt a general policy of 
"bucking it upstairs" whenever confronted with a request for dis-
closure. However, the reported cases thus far indicate that the prin-
cipal users of the Information Act are not the representatives of the 
mass media,414 who had lobbied for its enactment,415 but private 
litigants invoking the Act as a supplement to the discovery rules,416 
parties threatened by administrative action,417 and companies inter-
ested in contracting with the Government.413 In these situations, at 
least, it does not seem that the public's need to know will suffer un-
duly if administrators proceed with caution and err on the side of 
protecting privacy. 
Although agency regulations along these lines will help, they 
cannot overcome all of the linguistic and philosophical inharmony 
between the Freedom of Information Act and the needs of individ-
ual privacy in the computer age. The statute simply ignores the im-
plications of increased governmental data collection and transmis-
413. This procedure was apparently contemplated by Congress. See ATIORNEY 
GENERAL'S MEMO 28; H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 409, at 9. For an example of 
regulations governing such administrative appeals, see 15 C.F.R. § 60.11 (1968) (Census 
Bureau); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1206.800-.805 (1968) (National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration). 
414. See N.Y. Times, June IO, 1968, § 1, at 22, col. 4: 
Senator Long, chairman of the Senate Administrative Practice and Procedure 
subcommittee, said in a statement he was surprised that the news media had not 
taken greater advantage of the remedies provided by the act, 
"I feel certain that if more people were aware of the act, especially newsmen, 
we would see more demands for information being made on the agencies," he said. 
See also Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1968, at 1, col. I. 
415. Davis, supra note 394, at 803. 
416. See, e.g., Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &: Drydock. Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. 
Pa. 1968); Clement Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. 
Ga. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). 
417. See, e.g., Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968); American 
Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulik, 37 U.S.L.W. 2497 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 17, 1969); Tuchinsky v. 
Selective Serv. Sys., 294 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill. 1969); cf. Martin v. Neuschel, 396 F.2d 
759 (3d Cir. 1968). 
418. See, e.g., Benson v. General Servs. Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W .D. 
Wash. 1968). 
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sion resulting from the capacities of the new technology. In the 
event a National Data Center with interfaces with state, local, and 
private centers is established, the potential applications of the Act 
stagger the mind. This problem has yet to be subjected to a rational 
analysis. Also unnoticed thus far is the nexus between the Informa-
tion Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Hill.419 Considering 
the two in tandem, the Freedom of Information Act gives the public 
in general-and the mass communications media in particular-a 
statutory right of access to a large segment of the constantly expand• 
ing and deepening store of personal information held by the fed-
eral government, and Hill may permit the cavalier use of this data 
by the mass communications media by presaging the elimination of 
the restraint of any duty of reasonable care in a broad range of 
situations. The juxtaposition of the Act and a broad judicial con-
ception of the first amendment is likely to have startling and sig-
nificant effects. 
E. Information in Transit-
Wiretapping and the Crime Control Act 
As a result of the enactment of title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Stree~s Act of 1968,420 the nation's law enforcement 
officers now have extensive statutory authority to intercept commu-
nications.421 Despite its recent enactment and the insights that devel-
oped out of the contemporaneous public debate over the National 
Data Center, the Crime Control Act in many ways is a technological 
anachronism. Even though a substantial and rapidly increasing pro-
portion of the transmissions carried by the nation's communications 
networks involve data in digital form,422 the Act is framed almost 
419. See text accompanying notes 280-89 supra. 
420. 82 Stat. 197 (1968) [hereinafter Act]. Ironically, large portions of title III of 
the Act were taken from the proposed Right of Privacy Act of 1967, S. 928, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1967), which led one senator to observe: "Title III, in the form proposed by 
the administration as S. 928, was properly described as the Right to Privacy Act. As 
accepted by the committee [and ultimately enacted], Title III is more appropriately 
described as the End to Privacy Act." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1968) 
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 1097] (individual views of Senator Hiram Fong). See generally 
Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749 (1968). 
421. For a discussion of the vast number of state and federal crimes that will sup-
port a grant of eavesdropping authority under title III, see Schwartz, The Legitimation 
of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 
481-82 (1969). See also id. at 486-95. 
422. Less than five per cent of the total communications channel milage currently 
consists of data communications. UNIVAC Brief at H&l-2. However, the annual volume 
of data communications is doubling every two years, Comments of Microwave Commu-
nications, Inc., at 3 (March 5, 1968) (submitted in connection with In re Regulatory 
and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communi-
cation Services and Facilities, FCC Doc. No. 16,979), and an official of the American 
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entirely in terms of voice communications.423 As a consequence, its _ 
application to digital data transmissions is uncertain at best. At worst 
the Crime Control Act may be construed to permit privacy-invading 
interceptions that apparently were not contemplated by its drafts-
men. 
Much of the interpretive difficulty stems from the fact that the 
Act does not define "communications." However, numerous cases 
decided under section 605 of the Communications Act, 424 many of 
which are referred to in the legislative history of title III of the Crime 
Control Act, indicate that the term may apply only to transmissions 
of information from one person to another.425 Thus, the term might 
not extend to eavesdropping on machine responses to a remote user's 
inquiry or to the direct transfer of data from one computer to 
another.426 This construction would leave data communications 
without the protections against wiretapping that are embodied in 
the federal act; there would be protection only to the extent that 
Telephone and Telegraph Company has predicted that it will not be long until the 
volume of information carried by data communication will exceed that carried by 
voice transmissions. UNIVAC Brief at H&I-3 to H&I-5. 
423. An excellent example is the definition of "intercept" given in section 2510(4) 
of the Act: "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication 
through the use of any • • • device" (emphasis added). Unless the word "aural" is 
given a strained construction, the Act does not seem to be applicable to a tap of the 
communications lines of a time-sharing system when the tap is linked to another com-
puter that will print out the intercepted data or display it visually. The absurdity of 
such a result is emphasized by the fact that some computers are able to respond orally. 
The IBM 7770 Audio Response Unit, for example, "allows the computer to give oral 
answers to questions by use of a pre-recorded vocabulary.'' International Business 
Machines Co. news release, June 29, 1967. The quality and use of this oral response 
capability undoubtedly will increase. 
424. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). Section 605 was amended by section 803 of the Crime 
Control Act. 
425. E.g., Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Goldstein v. United States, 
316 U.S. 144 (1942); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Weiss v. United States, 
308 U.S. 321 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also note 426 
infra. 
426. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1966): 
The dial telephone system does not generally require human intervention to con-
nect two telephones. The telephone company was not therefore the intended recip-
ient of the signal. The "intended recipient" was the telephone of another sub-
scriber . . • . Ultimately, the intended human recipient of the signal was the 
subscriber called. 
Cf. S. REP. No. 1097, at 90: 
Other forms of surveillance are not within the proposed legislation ..•• An exam-
ination of telephone company records by law enforcement agents . . . would be 
lawful because it would not be an "interception." (United States v. Russo, 250 
F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966)). The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent 
the tracing of phone calls. The use of a "pen register,'' for example, would be 
permissible. But see United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th 1966). The proposed 
legislation is intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not 
the means of communication. 
See also Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). 
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state legislation affords some relief427 and the fourth amendment pro-
scribes governmental activity in conjunction with a criminal prose• 
cution.428 From a privacy perspective, therefore, it actually would 
be better to bring computer communications under the limited 
safeguards of the Act. 
Common sense undoubtedly will prevent a horse-and-buggy con• 
struction of the Crime Control Act and the courts can be expected 
to extend its terms to data transmissions. But this may be easier said 
than done in several contexts, Significant and troublesome problems 
will arise in connection with the Act's grant of authority to eaves• 
drop on a transmission when one of the parties to the communica• 
tion gives. his consent.429 It is unclear who the "parties" to a com-
puter transmission are, particularly in the case of a time-sharing 
system in which a user may have access to data deposited by some 
but not necessarily all of the other users. The provision at least sug-
gests that an authorized user may permit law enforcement officials to 
gain access to any part of the computer's memory bank that is acces-
sible through his terminal. But who are the "parties" when the com-
munication simply involves a machine-to-machine transfer of infor-
mation? 
Another source of difficulty is the section of the Act allowing 
eavesdropping on an "extension telephone."430 This provision has 
broader application than the reference to that mundane instrumen-
tality would suggest because the term encompasses all equipment 
"furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common 
carrier ... and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary 
course of its business."431 Thus, if the input-output devices of a 
remote-access computer system, such as the increasingly common 
touch-tone telephone, are supplied by the telephone company-a 
situation that is not unlikely in view of the extensive control that 
the communications carriers have over the equipment that can be 
linked to their network432-police access to one carrier-owned output 
427. The conflict between state and federal wiretapping laws has long been a 
difficult problem. See, e.g., Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 {1968); Pugach v. Dbllinger, 277 
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), afj'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961): Recent Development, 
Inadmissibility of Wiretap Evidence in State Courts, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1008. See gener-
ally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1967). 
428. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967); Schwartz, supra note 421. 
429. Act § 2511(2)(c). 
430. See generally Schwartz, supra note 421, at 495-96. 
431. Act § 2510(5)(a)(i). 
432. The telephone carriers' ability to control "foreign attachments"-the linking 
of customer-supplied equipment to the national telephone network-currently is a 
subject of heated controversy. A series of recent decisions has sharply limited the 
telephone companies' monopoly over transmitting devices; see In re American Tel. &: 
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device433 of a computerized credit bureau system would permit ex-
tensive eavesdropping that is unregulated by even the lenient stan-
dards of the Crime Control Act. 
Nor is there any doubt that police forces will be in a position to 
take advantage of any permissive construction the courts may give to 
the Act. As noted earlier,434 the telephone companies are beginning 
to convert voice transmissions from analog to digital form, which 
means that the law enforcement agencies will need to have the equip-
ment and expertise necessary to intercept digital communications in 
order to carry on traditional tapping activities. 
Title III of the Crime Control Act, as is true of many federal 
statutes governing information transfers,435 provides only a narrow 
grant of standing to protest the illicit acquisition of personal infor-
mation. The remedy of suppressing illegally seized eavesdropping 
evidence436 extends only to an "aggrieved person," a term that is de-
fined as "a party to any intercepted ... communication or a person 
against whom the interception was directed."437 The first portion of 
the quoted clause again requires a construction of the word "party." 
According to the legislative history of the passage, the provision will 
not safeguard a person who was the subject of an illegally seized 
communication that originates or terminates at a computer data 
center containing individualized personal information.438 The sec-
tion authorizing civil damages makes this limitation even clearer, 
stating that the remedy is available only to a person "whose wire or 
oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used" in violation of 
the Act.439 
Denying a remedy to the party who is most affected by disclosure 
is objectionable when normal telephone conversations are in-
Tel. Co., 15 F.C.C.2d 605 (1968) ("Foreign Atatchment" tariff rev1S1ons in AT&T 
Tariff, FCC Nos. 259, 260, 263); In re Use of Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tele-
phone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). However, it seems clear that the communica-
tions carriers will still supply a substantial number of the devices used in data 
transmissions. 
433. One example of an essential carrier-supplied communications device which 
may be vulnerable to eavesdropping is described in IBM Brief 1-69: "A modem 
(modulation/demodulation device) is generally required to convert data signals into 
a form suitable for transmission. Since modems are included within the foreign attach-
ment provisions, they must be furnished by the carriers if they are to be used with 
a public exchange service." 
434. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. 
435. See pt. VI.A.-E. supra. 
436. Act § 2518(10). 
437. Act § 2510(II). 
438. S. REP. No. 1097, at 91, 163, 173. 
439. Act § 2520. 
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volved;440 in the context of the interception of transmissions of 
extensive computerized dossiers and other forms of personal data, it 
becomes totally offensive, especially in light of system operators' 
tendency to cooperate with the police.441 Conceivably, a court could 
be persuaded that the statute's standing provision was framed with 
only voice communication in mind and therefore should not be ex-
tended to data communication. A distinction between voice and data 
communication for standing purposes might be drawn in terms of 
their qualitative difference442 and the system operator's relative lack 
of interest in protecting the data subject, his allegiance being to the 
system user. Inasmuch as the Crime Control Act's limitation on 
standing is based on the desire to minimize the exclusion of reliable 
evidence in criminal cases,443 it should not be extended to civil liti-
gation-especially damage actions to remedy improper interception 
and use of data communications. Of course, in the unlikely event 
that the operative passages of the Act are construed to apply only to 
person-to-person communications, then the individual who is the sub-
ject of intercepted data might not be barred by the statutory limita-
tions on standing. This would afford little succor to the data subject, 
however, since the cases involving standing to protest against wire-
tapping and eavesdropping in a situation not governed by statute 
have been extremely restrictive.444 
The legislative history of the second portion of the standing 
clause-"person against whom the interception was directed" -is 
rather sparse,445 but a reference to Jones v. United States446 indicates 
that it probably was taken from the following passage in the opinion 
in that case: 
440. See Schwartz, supra note 421, at 484-86. 
441. See, e.g., notes 104, 228 supra and accompanying text. 
442. See text accompanying notes 450-52 infra. 
443. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 755 (1952); Pitier, "The Fruit of the 
Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 586-88 (1968). 
444. In Alderman v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4189 (March 10, 1969), the Supreme 
Court held that under the fourth amendment a party who was merely the subject of 
an illegally seized conversation does not have standing to suppress evidence taken from 
the illegal interception. 
445. S. REP. No. 1097, at 91, merely states that the language "is intended to reflect 
existing law" and cites several cases. 
446. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The legislative history also cites Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 
U.S. 364 (1968), which the Supreme Court had not decided when the Senate Report 
was written. In Mancusi, the Supreme Court held that since the papers seized at the 
petitioner's office were the property of his employer, his claim of standing to suppress 
the fruits of the search would have to be based on the language of the fourth amend• 
ment proclaiming the "right of the people to be secure in their •.• houses." 392 U.S. 
at 367. The court then cited Jones and concluded that the "capacity to claim the pro• 
tection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place 
but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of 
freedom from governmental intrusion." 392 U.S. at 368. 
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In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search 
and seizure" one must have been a victim of a search and seizure, 
one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from 
one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gath-
ered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone 
else .... The restrictions upon searches and seizures were obviously 
designed for protection against official invasion of privacy and the 
security of property. They are not exclusionary provisions against 
the admission of kinds of evidence deemed inherently unreliable or 
prejudicial. The exclusion in federal trials of evidence otherwise 
competent but gathered by federal officials in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is a means for making effective the protection of pri-
vacy. 447 
The Supreme Court's language seems to give standing to anyone who 
has been the victim of an invasion of privacy, which, if carried over 
to the Crime Control Act, would afford the data subject an oppor-
tunity to vindicate his rights. Although Justice Fortas construed the 
Jones passage in this fashion in his dissenting opinion in Alderman 
v. United States,448 a majority of the Court took a constrictive view 
of its earlier language in Jones; they limited standing to those who 
were parties to the conversation and those with a special interest in 
the premises on which the violation took place.449 Since the decision 
in Alderman followed the enactment of the Crime Control Act, that 
case's reconstruction of the Jones language does not necessarily fur-
nish the standard for interpreting the words "person against whom 
the interception was directed." Obviously, however, there is every 
likelihood that the federal courts will adhere to the Supreme Court's 
narrow view of standing, although a distinction between voice and 
data interceptions should be urged. 
The preceding discussion admittedly is highly episodic and super-
ficial. The newness of the legislative scheme and the uncertain move-
ments of the technology caution against more than a tentative pre-
sentation at this time. The specific problems chosen for description 
merely highlight a fundamental shortcoming of title III of the Crime 
Control Act. By virtually ignoring data communications and the 
447. 362 U.S. at 261. 
448. 37 U.S.L.W. 4189, 4198 (March IO, 1969) (footnote omitted): 
It is my position that this quotation [from Jones, containing the language "one 
against whom the search was directed'"], read in light of the Court's rejection of 
property concepts, requires that we include within the category of those who may 
object to the introduction of illegal evidence "one against whom the search was 
directed." Such a person is surely "the victim of an invasion of privacy" and a 
"person aggrieved," even though it is not his property that was searched or 
seized. • . . The Government violates his rights when it seeks to deprive him of 
his rights by unlawfully seizing evidence in the course of an investigation of him 
and using it against him at trial. 
449. 37 U.S.L.W. at 4192-93. 
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new computer technology, the Act makes it possible for law enforce-
ment agencies to treat these increasingly important information 
transfers as if they were nothing more than telephone conversations. 
This failure to differentiate between types of communications dis-
plays either a lack of awareness of recent developments in commu-
nications or a degree of disingenuousness on the part of the drafts-
men. Given the preoccupation with voice communication at the 
time the legislation was enacted, its imprecise language probably 
is attributable to the former. 
The differences between voice and data communications are 
marked. Days of continuous wiretapping450 may be necessary to ob-
tain a significant amount of information from telephone conversa-
tions, and even then the "evidence" often will consist of soft, hear-
say narratives. Unlike the normal telephone fl.ow, however, a data 
communications circuit may be in virtually continuous high-speed 
operation, transmitting extensive bodies of information that have 
been purged of trivial or extraneous matter and contain a high de-
gree of hard, record data.451 In many instances this information will 
have been extracted under the coercive force of a criminal statute, a 
governmental ukase, or as a precondition of receiving some social or 
financial benefit. Data transmissions also are more likely than tele-
phone conversations to contain privileged or confidential data. 
These differences in character between wiretapping on voice com-
munications and data communications in turn are dwarfed by the 
possibility of law officers using dial-access devices to extract data 
directly from a variety of public and private computer centers and 
networks. If the Crime Control Act is construed to permit the 
seizure of vast quantities of computerized information on the basis 
of routine ex parte applications452-without affording any mode of 
redress to the data subject-a major battle in the struggle to preserve 
individual privacy will have been lost. Rather than subjecting the 
field of electronic data transmission to the gauntlet of judicial con-
struction of the inapposite language of the present Act, fresh legis-
lative consideration of the subject seems desirable. 
450. Act § 2518(5). 
451. Conceivably, a tap on a trunk line connecting a primary and a backup central 
unit of a computer system could result in interception of the entire store of data 
present in the system. Cf. UNIVAC Brief at H&:1-8 to H&:1-9: 
In a highly critical real-time operation, the effects of computer breakdown are 
catastrophic. Therefore, in such operations, standby facilities are kept available, 
If a computer fails, it may instantly be drained of its crucial contents, both data 
and programs, and these transferred to the standby computer where operations are 
continued practically without interruption. 
452. For a discussion of the weaknesses in the judicial supervision provided by the 
Act, see Schwartz, supra note 421, at 483-86. 
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VII. SAFEGUARDING THE PRIVACY OF 
COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION 
1207 
The present legal structure, at both the state and federal levels, 
appears to be virtually unprepared to cope with the threats to pri-
vacy that rapidly are becoming a part of our computerized age. The 
fragmented, ad hoc approach that has been taken to informational 
privacy problems is disheartening, for it simply aggravates the exist-
ing system's unsuitability for solving the problems raised by the com-
puter. The result is confusion concerning the scope of protection 
afforded by various common-law doctrines and legislative provisions, 
and, quite frequently, uncertainty regarding the source of law ap-
plicable to a particular invasion of privacy. Moreover, isolated 
public responses to individual threats-as exemplified by the debate 
over the proposed National Data Center-may draw an undue 
amount of attention. 'With public concern focused on relatively 
narrow problems, there is a substantial risk that many legitimate 
social interests relating to privacy and the free dissemination of in-
formation will be ignored or left to the mercies of interested admin-
istrators. As argued at an earlier stage of this Article,453 a broad con-
ceptual framework is necessary to achieve a rational balance between 
the often competing objectives of preserving personal privacy and 
maximizing the benefits of efficiency inhering in the new technol-
ogies. In order to come to grips with this task more effectively, it is 
desirable to consider the range of privacy-protecting safeguards that 
are technologically and practically feasible for use in conjunction 
with a modern information system. 
A. Technological Methods of Protection-
The Quest for Security 
The problem of insuring the physical security of computerized 
information thus far has received little more than passing mention 
in most commentaries,454 even though improvements in security 
methods are a prerequisite to the effective use of several types of 
large multiple-access systems.456 In point of fact, a variety of mechan-
453. See pt. IV.C. supra. 
454. In 1966, computer expert Paul Baran testified: "As one who has for many 
years been interested in the problems of preserving privacy in interconnected com-
puter-communications systems, I have been unable to find [a) large body of literature 
[on security devices] •.. .'' Hearings on 1970 Census Questions 5. 
455. See, e.g., Kramer &: Livingston, Cashing In on the Checkless Society, 45 HARV. 
Bus. REv., Sept.•Oct. 1967, at 141, 143, in which it is suggested that two of the major 
technical problems preventing the implementation of a "checkless-cashless society" 
based on computer systems are "[c]hoosing and applying a numbering to identify sys· 
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ical techniques have been developed, others presently are possible, 
and additional schemes undoubtedly will become feasible in the 
future. 
Since many security devices and procedures of varying cost, com-
plexity, and effectiveness may be available, the choice of an appro-
priate protective system will depend upon a prior determination of 
how much storage and transmission security the particular data base 
deserves and who should be allowed access to it. This often will be 
a difficult task, not only because opinions on the subject will diverge 
but also because information of differing degrees of sensitivity usu-
ally will be stored in the same complex system and various groups of 
people will have to be able to reach different parts of the data.456 
In addition, it often will be hard to perceive the nature and dimen-
sion of future challenges to security since there will be changes in 
the character of the information and its attractiveness to snoopers 
over time. 
If the data stored in a given system is deemed sensitive enough to 
create a credible threat of eavesdropping on radiations from the 
equipment, the physical surroundings of the central processor and 
the remote terminals probably can be protected with shielding ma-
terials.457 A related technique might be desirable for the stored data 
as well.458 In the case of remote-access systems, protection against 
wiretapping can be achieved by using "scramblers" to garble the data 
before transmission, and installing complementary devices in the 
authorized terminals to reconstitute the signal.459 If scrambling or 
tem users" and "[p]erfecting security protection systems and devices for preventing 
accidental or fraudulent transactions." Cf. Baran, supra note 454, at 6: 
The safeguards built into the present generation of time-shared systems all suffer 
the defect of requiring the assumption of the complete integrity of too many per-
sons connected with the computer installation. Can you think of any general• 
purpose, time-shared computer systems that are presently approved to handle 
governmental classified data? 
456. Cf. Ware, Security and Privacy: Similarities and Differences, 30 AFIPS CoN• 
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS 287 (1967), indicating that the problem of privacy protection is 
greater than military secrecy-the military has discreet categories of confidential, secret, 
and top secret, and a unitary organization accepting those categories. See also text 
accompanying notes 461-64 infra. 
457. See, e.g., UNIVAC Brief at J-22 to J-23: 
One solution is to shield the entire building which houses the central site with 
a special form of metalized paper barrier. In addition to this or by itself, depend• 
ing on the degree of security required, the computer may be provided with a 
shielding of copper screening. Or, the more vital portions of the equipment may 
be protected by the use of circuit suppressors and selective filters .•.• They are 
capable of providing a high level of protection against electronic surveillance. 
458. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324 (1967); Petersen & Turn, System Implica• 
tions of Information Privacy, 30 AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 291, 294-95 (1967). 
459. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 78 (statement of the author); UNIVAC 
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encoding of data is necessary, the number of people with access to 
the cryptography principles must be limited and the code keys 
changed periodically.46° Coding has a number of tangential advan-
tages from the privacy perspective, including verifying the source of 
an inquiry or input into the data center and, in complex systems, 
allowing different types of information having variant levels of sen-
sitivity to be processed accordingly. 
At least one other approach is available to meet the problem of 
preserving the integrity of the data by controlling access to certain 
portions of the files. In many cases this can be accomplished by stor-
ing the data hierarchically on the basis of its level of content sensi-
tivity. To a degree, this type of protection can be built into the hard-
ware and software of the central processor. The working storage of 
a time-sharing system can be "partitioned" so that each user's 
"worker programs" have access only to a limited area of the com-
puter's memory.461 To support this procedure, the monitor or con-
trol program can be designed with a series of "privileged instruc-
tions" that provide the only possible means of altering the monitor 
program.462 If any user's worker program attempts to alter the mon-
itor program and invade a portion of the memory that is "off limits" 
to it, the monitor program can inform the system's supervisory per-
sonnel and shut down the offending terminal.463 The effectiveness of 
this procedure can be tested by periodically checking a master copy 
of the monitor program against the one that is in operation in order 
to detect any alterations.464 The monitor program's efficacy in pro-
tecting against unauthorized disclosure can be verified further by 
using a diagnostic program designed to make periodic attempts to 
deceive the monitor.465 The monitor program also can be designed 
Brief at J-22: "This kind of protection can be provided in several degrees ranging from 
quite simple, which an expert would not find difficult to decipher, to the almost un-
breakable." 
460. It may not be worth the effort or expense to develop completely break-proof 
codes. Sufficient scrambling or coding to make it uneconomic for an eavesdropper to 
attempt to intercept computer transmissions probably is enough. Alternatively, if 
information is arranged and stored on a hierarchical basis according to sensitivity 
or accessibility, the most efficient procedure may be to use codes of different degrees 
of complexity. The subject of computer cryptography is discussed in Baran, On Dis-
tributed Communications: IX Security, Secrecy, and Tamper-Free Considerations, Rand 
Corporation Memorandum RM-3765-PR (1964). 
461. See IBM Brief at 1-68. 
462. See generally Graham, Protection in an Information Processing Utility, 11 
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 365 (1968). 
463. UNIVAC Brief at J-28. 
464. IBM Brief at 1-69 to 1-70. 
465. UNIVAC Brief at J-27: IBM Brief at I-70. 
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to clear the working memory of the computer after each user has 
finished running his program and thereby eliminate the risk that 
any residual data will be left accessible to a subsequent user.466 
Another important security function that a privacy-oriented mon-
itor program must perform is the identification of all users and 
terminals attempting to gain access to the files. One workable 
method of identifying terminals is a "call-back" system, which re-
quires a user at a remote console to key in a terminal identification 
code as a precondition to entering any of the files. The computer 
then shuts down the terminal, checks its files to see if the code num-
ber is correct,467 and reopens the terminal if everything is in order.468 
Presumably this function could be performed automatically by 
building a device into the terminal that would emit a unique identi-
fying signal as a preface to each communication. 
Call-back systems have their limitations, however. A security 
system based upon the identification of terminals determines only 
whether or not the terminal is an authorized member of the system; 
it provides no assurance that the person at the terminal's console has 
a right to be there. Nor does a call-back system necessarily incorpo-
rate guidance as to what portion of the files that particular termi-
nal should be given access. There is no doubt that a greater degree of 
security is achieved by a system that decides whether to grant or 
deny access on the basis of user, rather than terminal, identification. 
Unfortunately, the problems of constructing an effective system of 
this type are quite extensive. 
Magnetically coded identification cards, even those designed to 
receive new invisible magnetic code numbers after each transmis-
sion, 469 can be lost, stolen, or transferred, as can a code number that 
is assigned to each user. These schemes not only are vulnerable to 
the risk that people will enter the system who have no authorization 
whatsoever, but they also can be compromised by the exchange of 
cards and numbers by authorized personnel when the access keys 
open up different portions of the data store or allow different users 
to reach different information nodes on a network. "Fail-safe" sys-
tems, which require several users to insert their keys in a terminal be-
fore certain files will be made available, 470 will provide greater secu-
466. IBM Brief at I-68 to I-69. 
467. IBM Brief at I-65, 
468. UNIVAC Brief at J-23 to J-24. 
469. See Kramer & Livingston, supra note 455, at 144. 
470. IBM Brief at I-64 to 1-65: 
One presently available terminal (used in the banking industry) has three locks 
and keys. Two keys are used to enable tellers to unlock the terminal to gain 
access to the system for routine transactions. A third key is available only to man• 
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rity than single keys or cards by making it necessary for the snooper 
to subvert a larger group of persons in order to gain access. Another 
possibility is closed-circuit television between the terminal and the 
central processor permitting visual identification of the user,471 but 
this would be a relatively costly and cumbersome procedure. In the 
long run, the most promising method of assuring accurate user iden-
tification may be automatic scanning of fingerprints or voiceprints; 
however, this is not technically feasible at the present time.472 Per-
fection of this technique-perhaps coupled with an "answer-back" 
system that requires the user to respond to a request to input some 
additional unpredictable identifying data in order to preclude the 
use of a record of another user's identifying input473-would provide 
a high degree of security. 
·whatever technical safeguards are deemed appropriate for par-
ticular computer systems, they undoubtedly will be most efficient 
and economical if they are incorporated into the original design of 
the hardware and software than if they are added subsequently.474 In 
many cases, however, this is not being done currently, and it prob-
ably will not be done in the near future unless computer manufac-
turers and users begin to think systematically about problems of 
privacy. From a pragmatic perspective, it must be recognized that 
the more elaborate technical safeguards are likely to be relatively 
expensive to design and implement. One expert has predicted that 
security routines in time-sharing systems will occupy up to twenty 
per cent of the computer's memory capacity.475 It therefore is unreal-
istic to expect profit-conscious businessmen or government admin-
istrators laboring under limited budgets to undertake expensive 
measures to protect privacy out of self-interest or benevolence. "En-
couragement" through industry or official regulation may well be 
necessary. 
agerial personnel. It permits the terminal to be used for opening, closing, auditing 
and summary transactions. 
See also A. WESTIN, supra note 458, at 324. 
471. IBM Brief at I-66. 
472. UNIVAC Brief at J-25. See also Computer Encoding of Fingerprints, 93 SCIENCE 
NEWS 494 (1968). Community Systems Foundation is now testing a system that identifies 
users by a combination of physical characteristics and responses to questions asked 
the user. Further details are unavailable at this time. 
47!!. Cf. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 78 n. 9 (statement of the author). 
474. Computer expert Paul Baran concludes in House Hearings on the Computer 
and Invasion of Privacy 126 that "[t]he best time for applying fundamental safeguards 
is during initial system design. 'Patchups' at a later date may be relatively less effec-
tive compared to a good initial design that includes an awareness of the existence and 
importance of the problem." 
475. Behrens, Computers and Securitj•, 91 SCIENCE NEWS 532 (1967). 
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B. Administrative Methods of Improving Security 
Technical safeguards for a computer system must be supported 
by a series of workable procedural controls designed to prevent care-
less or intrusive personnel from bypassing the security devices. These 
administrative rules must be comprehensible to all personnel who 
have access to the system and they should be accompanied by realistic 
penalties. In short, administrative procedures are a necessary part of 
an over-all "protective philosophy," but they will prove effective 
only if they are understood by all people connected with the sys-
tem;476 the willingness to abide by these regulations should be a basic 
attribute of personnel selected to work in the system. Only careful 
employment practices and gentle indoctrination can develop a cadre 
of systems operators who are sensitive to privacy considerations. 
A log listing every user of the data, the files he examined, and all 
significant events that take place within the central processor should 
be maintained.477 This log can be kept either by the operator of the 
central processer, by the machine itself, or by both.478 It should be 
audited periodically by security experts for signs of abuse and in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the entire protection program. 
Individuals whose personal data is stored in a system should have 
access to the audit from time to time. They should also, as has been 
suggested, have access to the data itself, so that they can retain a 
modicum of control over both the dissemination and the accuracy 
of the stored information relating to them.479 The cost of granting 
access for these purposes is certain to be substantial, particularly if 
the system is obliged to mail printouts to everyone on whom it main-
tains data, 480 although in the case of information maintained by the 
Government, the printout could be included in one of the periodic 
communications sent to most citizens. To the cost of giving indi-
viduals notice of the contents of their files must be added the ex-
pense of handling the fl.ow of petty squabbles that might result from 
the procedure. Moreover, some loss in the value of certain types of 
data might result from its disclosure to the subject. Nonetheless, the 
right of an individual to be protected against governmental or pri-
vate dissemination of erroneous or sensitive information about him 
476. See Peters, Security Considerations in a Multi-Programmed Computer System, 
30 AFIPS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 283, 284 (1967). 
477. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 78 (statement of the author); A. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324 (1967); Peters, supra note 476, at 284. 
478. Peters, supra note 476, at 284. 
479. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 77 (statement of the author); Ruggles, 
On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Computers, Data Banks, and 
Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 219 (1968). 
480. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 77 (statement of the author). 
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is so important that some price may have to be paid to preserve it. 
Perhaps an appropriate compromise would be to inform individuals 
when their files are first opened, and then to designate particular 
times and places for them to examine their records, either in person 
or through remote terminals, and to lodge any protest they might 
have concerning inaccuracies or improper disseminations.481 Incon-
venience and expense undoubtedly would prevent some people from 
taking advantage of this opportunity, but a relatively small number 
of successful challenges at least would serve to point out procedural 
and technical defects in the system's security and to sensitize its 
personnel to the privacy question. 
Computer experts seem to disagree on another important admin-
istrative aspect of security: the question of whether or not the per-
sonnel operating the central processor should have any detailed 
knowledge about the design of the monitor program. One school of 
thought argues that knowledge of the monitor program's intricacies 
should be limited to as small a group as possible. Under this scheme, 
the operators of the central processor never are told how the monitor 
program works, and the program's designers are prevented from 
gaining access to the monitor unless there is a need to make changes 
or improvements in it.482 The detractors of this approach believe that 
it is desirable to have someone continuously on duty at the central 
processor who is thoroughly familiar with the security procedures 
and the principal weaknesses of the system.483 The suitability of 
either of these methods in a particular situation probably depends 
upon practical considerations such as the relative costs, the demon-
strated dependability and faithfulness of the operating personnel, 
the sensitivity of the information in the system, and the degree to 
which the monitor program contains novel features that can best be 
protected by secrecy. 
Any system that contains sensitive data or data that for any 
reason is attractive to the snooping fraternity should be put under 
the aegis of personnel who are segregated from those charged with 
the daily operation of the machines. This group should be trained 
in the philosophy and techniques of security, and occasionally should 
act as "devil's advocates" by trying to circumvent the existing pre-
cautions in order to assess the system's security.484 This type of 
neutral force approach seems especially appropriate in the context 
481. Id. 
482. UNIVAC Brief at J-30 to J-31. 
483. Peters, supra note 476, at 284. 
484. Allen, Danger Ahead!-Safeguard Your Computer, 46 HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.• 
Dec. 1968, at 97, 101; Peters, supra note 476, at 285. 
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of any type of integrated information system in order to protect 
against hyperactivity on the part of some of the participants. 
C. Controls on Input, Output, and Storage 
Perhaps the most critical set of regulations governing the opera-
tion of data centers are those prescribing the information that may 
be included in or obtained from the system and the types of manip-
ulations that may be performed on the data store. No technological 
or administrative security measures, however extensive they may be, 
can assure the complete integrity and privacy of the information con-
tained in a given system. A computer's data store essentially is a file, 
and whatever has been placed in it can be extracted or altered.485 
Thus, if informational privacy is to be protected, it is crucial to 
screen data initially to prevent some of it from being placed in the 
system. 
Extremely sensitive personal information-for example, records 
of mental illness, or inherently "soft" data, such as psychological test 
results-normally should be excluded from large multiaccess sys-
tems,486 even if the files customarily are stored in a secure area re-
moved from the central processor. Unless there is some definable and 
compelling reason to include this type of information in a multi-
access system, every effort should be taken to keep it out of the infor-
mation flow. When highly sensitive or potentially damaging infor-
mation must be preserved, it should be subjected, as suggested 
earlier,487 to special storage and access procedures. In the case of any 
information of a sensitive character, each individual data subject 
should be told at the collection stage what uses are to be made of the 
data and what the extent and character of the group having access to 
it will be. 
Furthermore, all personal information that is put into a large 
computer system should have to meet rigid standards of accuracy 
485. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 119 (testimony of Dr. Emanuel R. 
Piore, Vice President of International Business Machines Corp.); House Hearings on 
the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 128 (testimony of Paul Baran of the RAND 
Corporation). 
486. See generally Douglas, The Computerized Man, 33 VITAL SPEECHES 700 (1967). 
At least one bill has been proposed to Congress that would classify certain kinds of 
information as too sensitive to be collected by government agencies. S. 1035, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1967), would make it unlawful for federal administrative agencies to "require 
or request" from employees information concerning their race or national origin, 
participation in ,political organizations, religious or sexual beliefs and practices, and 
psychological test results. The bill does, however, provide numerous exceptions to 
these general prohibitions. 
487. See pt. VII. A. supra. 
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and objectivity.488 Hearsay and ex parte evaluations, especially when 
prepared by someone whose position ordinarily does not require 
preparation of personal reports, should be screened out or carry a 
special warning when they are retrieved. The scope of present efforts 
to standardize computer languages and data-collecting methods, 
which presently are intended to facilitate the movement of data 
among different systems, should be broadened to develop practices 
that would help alleviate the risks of misinterpretation inherent in 
transfers of personal data.489 Similarly, whenever possible, individ-
uals should be given the right to supplement or explain personal in-
formation that is likely to give rise to erroneous or damaging infer-
ences.4n0 
A significant percentage of personal information becomes more 
sensitive as it grows older and is forgotten by the general public; 
other data atrophies and becomes less important with the passage 
of time.401 For example, the record of an isolated past arrest may 
be extremely damaging if it is dredged up after the subject has made 
a fresh start, whereas many types of financial data pose less of a threat 
the more ancient they become. In short, the desirability of preserv-
ing different types of recorded personal information should be re-
evaluated continuously in light of privacy considerations. Computer-
ized information must not be allowed to petrify. Data that is shmvn 
to be inaccurate, archaic, or of little probative value should be 
expunged, reclassified, or its age brought to the attention of users. 
Computer systems should establish a formal procedure for period-
ically determining when data is outmoded or should be removed 
from the file for any of a number of other reasons. 
Since it is relatively simple to purge stale data from a computer 
system, 492 regulations concerning the storage life of various types of 
488. See Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 77 (statement of the author); Sawyer 
&: Schechter, Computers, Privacy and the National Data Center: The Responsibility of 
Social Scientists, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, Nov. 1968, at 810, 816. 
489. Cf. Sawyer &: Schechter, supra note 488, at 813; Karst, "The Files": Legal Con-
trols over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 342, 361 (1966). 
490. See note 565 infra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying notes 
242-44 supra. 
491. See, e.g., House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 278: 
[An official] of the Securities and Exchange Commission expressed the view that 
corporate concern dealt mainly with current affairs. It was his feeling that, after 
a period of 5 or IO years, back data could be exposed to public view without 
serious objection by respondents. There would be difficulty perhaps in applying 
such a rule retroactively but a notice to this effect on future collections of data 
might serve to make the problem less troublesome in the years ahead. 
492. See, e.g., House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 89 (testimony of H. 
C. Jordan, President, Credit Data Company): cf. note 70 supra. 
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information should be easier to implement than they would be in 
a manual :filing system. Programming techniques also should be able 
to prevent the output of data that is damaging because it is incom-
plete or has not been brought up to date. An arrest record, for exam-
ple, always should be accompanied by data describing the disposition 
of the case, whether the party requesting the data asks for it or not. 
Other procedures for protecting anonymity can aid system de-
signers in preserving the supposed distinction between statistical 
data centers and intelligence systems. In some cases, data can be put 
into the system in small aggregates rather than individualized units; 
thus, no single person's data could be traced with certainty.493 'When 
it is essential to identify an individual for purposes of updating the 
data, some protection can be secured by assigning each respondent 
an arbitrary identifying number. The data then can be divided 
into a "substantive deck" for normal statistical use, which would 
contain the data along with the arbitrary numbers, and an "identifi-
cation deck," which is needed to link the individual to his code 
number in order to make a new entry in his data.494 Modern sam-
pling techniques also make it possible to reach statistically valid 
results without analyzing the data on every available respondent 
unit. Thus, it should be possible to deter snoopers by using a ran-
dom sample selected to make it unlikely that a successful in-
trusion will yield a dossier on a particular person.495 This procedure 
may not always be feasible. In multipurpose statistical centers such 
as the proposed National Data Center, the objective is to pro-
vide one body of data that can be used for a wide variety of 
analytical projects. This means that the Center's underlying "sam-
ple" would have to be large enough to contain data on the different 
variables needed by numerous researchers pursuing various proj-
493. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 44 (statement of Charles J. Zwick, 
Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget). 
494. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy pt. 2, at 310: 
[W]hile the identification of individuals is essential at the time the information 
is being incorporated into the [file), once it has been incorporated, the identifica-
tion becomes hTelevant. It is therefore possible to split the file into two parts: 
(1) an identification deck which contains only such identifying information as 
name, date of birth, social security number, and address, together with the iden-
tification number; and (2) a substantive deck which contains only the identification 
number and the accumulated substantive information about the individual ..•. 
Each deck is kept in locked files. 
See also Pemberton, On the Dangers, Legal Aspects, and Remedies, in Symposillm-
Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211, 224 (1968). 
495. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 44 (statement of Charles J. Zwick, Assis-
tant Director of the Bureau of the Budget); Hearings on Government Statistical Pro-
grams 10; Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data 
Center, 82 HARV. L. REv. 400, 413 (1968). 
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ects.496 When extensive samples or entire populations are required 
for a statistical data center, perhaps the most effective protection is 
an instruction in the control program that allows the computer to 
output data only 'in aggregates that contain a sufficient number of 
individual respondents to make identification of individuals diffi-
cult.407 
D. Managing the Information Managers 
Effective technical and procedural safeguards, combined with 
input-output controls, all are critical prerequisites to maintaining 
the privacy and factual reliability of computerized information. But 
they are not sufficient by themselves. Even the most sophisticated 
set of safeguards can be undermined by the people who gain access 
to the system in one fashion or another. 498 The reports of college 
students at MIT and elsewhere defeating the monitor protections 
in time-sharing projects emphasize the reality of this threat.499 
It would be a mistake to believe that the risks to privacy created 
by computerization lie exclusively in the misuse of the system by 
malicious or profit-seeking interlopers. Those who live on intimate 
terms with the data bases and the technology may prove to be 
a more dangerous group, even though they may have no interest 
496. Cf. Note, supra note 495, at 413-14: 
To facilitate comparative analysis of particular variables, the samples tested for 
the variables would have to be identical. Where the samples are not identical, 
correlations of the variables are possible only on a global basis-that is, by finding 
a third factor which correlates with each of two factors for which different samples 
have been tested, an analyst can make an indirect correlation between two factors 
in which he is interested. However, global comparisons constitute the very type of 
imprecise and unreliable analysis which the data center is intended to obviate. 
497. See, e.g., Lozowick, Steiner, &: Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Anal-
ysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1641, 1650 n.13 (1968); cf. House Hearings on the 
Computer and Invasion of Privacy 94: 
You can teach the machine to distinguish appropriate inquiries-statistical ques-
tions-from inappropriate inquiries-intelligence questions or individual data .... 
You can teach the machine to identify "trick" inquiries-either accidental or 
purposeful. That is, you can teach the machine to say, "This is a statistical 
inquiry but it is framed in such a way that the population or group you have 
defined contains only one individual or less than some specified number of indi-
viduals." 
498. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy II9 (testimony of Dr. Emanuel 
R. Fiore, Vice President of International Business Machines Corporation): 
Because these [time-sharing] systems permitted many people to use a central com-
puter from their remote locations • . • it has become necessary to exercise control 
over what a user can do through his terminal. 
This control resides, above all, with the men in the room with the central 
computer-the men who alone can select the operating system, put it into the 
machine, and start it working. 
The information stored in a computer is basically a file. Whoever organizes a 
file can recover anything that he wishes from it. 
499. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
1218 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1089 
in the informational content of the material they handle. Thus, the 
technicians who design and operate computer systems cannot be 
treated as a Brahmin caste. They already perform many disparate 
roles, and in the future they are likely to assume managerial func-
tions that range far beyond their technical expertise. In addition to 
the mundane tasks of collating and disseminating data and oversee-
ing machine operations, programmers and system operators un-
doubtedly will be called upon to take part in the information anal-
ysis and decision-making processes. 500 In many instances this pattern 
will emerge because the volume and variousness of the data will be 
too great, the methods of storing and manipulating the information 
too complex, and the technical language too arcane to enable scien-
tifically naive executives and public officials to maintain effective 
control over the structure and activities of their systems. As a result, 
policy control over data centers may fall into the hands of "com-
puterniks." There is a danger that these people will become so 
entranced with operating sophisticated machine systems and manip-
ulating large masses of data that they will not be sufficiently sensitive 
to the question of privacy.501 This threat will be particularly difficult 
to control because they are absolutely essential to the effective func-
tioning of the information systems and they cannot be replaced at 
various critical points in the information-handling process. 
Concern about the growing power of computer operators and 
programmers has led some commentators to suggest that it would be 
desirable to "professionalize" various jobs in the data-processing 
industry, so that those who deal with sensitive information would 
be subject to an enforceable code of professional ethics.502 This pro-
500. See, e.g., Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual 
Freedom and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 270, 279-80 (1964): 
[G]iven his deeper understanding of how the data are being processed, what 
assumptions are made about relationships among the data, what constraints must 
be put on the data in order for the computer to use it [sic], it is entirely possible 
that the programmer may be called upon in difficult cases to enrich the executive's 
basis for decision making . • . . 
• . • The way he arranges the relationships in the information to be processed 
and the relative emphasis he gives to different items could result in distortions 
of the "history" of the person and, hence, in the implications of the data. 
501. See R. BocusLAw, THE NEW UTOPIANS 97-98 (paper ed. 1965). See also Senate 
Hearings on Computer Privacy 75 (statement of the author). 
502. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 489, at 362-63. See also Professional Conduct in 
Information Processing, 11 COMMUNICATIONS OF nm ACM 135 (1968) ("guidelines" 
adopted by the Council of the Association for Computing Machinery on November 11, 
1966): 
1.1 An ACM member will have proper regard for the health, privacy, safety and 
general welfare of the public in the performance of his professional duties. 
2.1 An ACM member will act in professional matters as a faithful agent or trustee 
for each employer or client and will not disclose private information belonging 
to any present or former employer or client without his consent. 
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posal has several beneficial features. At this comparatively embryonic 
stage of the technology, it is doubtful that legislation or even admin-
istrative regulation could provide a set of principles that would be 
adequate to govern the wide variety of situations in which computer 
personnel will be called upon to manipulate or analyze personal 
data.1503 The inculcation of a sensitivity or professional commitment 
to the values of personal privacy and the dignity of the individual 
may provide a far more effective long-term check on the custodians 
of personal information. Moreover, it may be that the basic philo-
sophical question-what are the duties and responsibilities of those 
who handle personal information affecting their fellow man-is as 
much an ethical dilemma as it is a legal issue. If so, perhaps it is best 
left for regulation by the practitioners of the art in the first in-
stance.1504 
Unfortunately, there seem to be equally good reasons why the 
professionalization of computer personnel is an unrealistic solution 
to the privacy problem, at least at the present time. Computer pro-
gramming and operation, system design and analysis, and most of 
the other occupations relating to the new technology are very young 
and rapidly expanding5°5 vocations that lack well-developed tradi-
tions. It is questionable whether this atmosphere is congenial to 
effective self-regulation or the adoption of a code of ethics that almost 
503. Cf. PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL llEsEARCH 7: 
Legislation to assure appropriate recognition of the rights of human subjects [in 
behavioral science experiments) is neither necessary nor desirable if scientists and 
sponsoring institutions fully discharge their responsibilities in accommodating to 
the claim of privacy. Because of its relative inflexibility, legislation cannot meet 
the challenge of the subtle and sensitive conflict of values under consideration, 
nor can it aid in the wise, individualized decisionmaking which is required to 
assure optimum protection of subjects together with the fullest effectiveness of 
research. 
504. Cf. id. at 14: 
The values held by an individual or a society are, and must be, in competition 
since no single value can be absolute .••• Thus the conflict between the claim of 
the individual to his privacy and the needs of society to become better aware of 
human characteristics is no rare or isolated phenomenon. 
In each instance of conflict, the decision must rest on the totality of all the 
relevant issues and the result will vary from one occasion to another, and from 
one setting to another depending on the context within which the issue arises .•.• 
No general rule can be formulated to apply in each situation •••• 
505. See, e.g., Hearings on Data Processing Management 149: 
[A National Science Foundation] survey found that 120,000 undergraduates and 
29,000 graduate students received some computer training during 1964-65. In addi• 
tion, approximately 4,000 undergraduates and 1,300 graduate majors in "computer 
science" were estimated to have been enrolled in 1964-65. By 1968-69, it is esti-
mated these enrollments for these majors will have increased fourfold. An esti-
mated 226 degree programs in computer science or related areas were being offered 
in the fall of 1966 and an additional 331 were reported planned by 1969. 
See generally PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, COMPUTERS IN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION (1967), reprinted in Hearings on Data Processing Management 255-337. 
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certainly would require circumscription of particular activities and 
the development of a well-defined set of socially oriented attitudes. 
Unlike the physician or lawyer, the computer operator does not 
deal directly with the people whose life histories he processes. The 
data subject is not present to engage his sympathies and serve as a 
reminder that the operator's conduct has an important impact on 
human beings. To the contrary, in most cases the immediate object 
of his sense of professional obligation is to the system that employs 
him, and he often ascribes anthropomorphic qualities to that system. 
Thus, he may find it difficult to visualize himself as the protector 
of an amorphous agglomeration of individuals whose computerized 
files happen to fall within his jurisdiction, and whose actual exis-
tence may be evidenced only by a ~tring of binary digits or a se-
quence of magnetic impulses. Again, this environment is not con-
ducive to enlightened self-restraint. 
Finally, it is possible that the emerging class of data managers is 
imbued with values that are fundamentally incompatible with a 
commitment to the preservation of individual privacy. According to 
this theory, computer designers and operators-as a subspecies of 
modern technological man-are devoted to a scientific quest for 
efficiency, even if it comes at the expense of humanistic values; indi-
viduals are viewed as little more than operating units that must be 
made to act predictably and function properly within a well-
designed system.506 This judgment undoubtedly is too harsh and 
ignores the many knowledgeable and socially concerned people who 
have helped give birth to the new technology and who are advancing 
its growth today. But it is plausible enough to caution those respon-
sible for establishing and enforcing public policy that they must 
exercise continuing vigilance over the information managers rather 
than abdicate responsibility to them. 
An alternative method of reducing the risks created by careless, 
insensitive, or dishonest personnel is to encourage those professions 
that are the beneficiaries of computerized data to develop ethical 
standards governing their own collection, use, and dissemination of 
personal information.507 Obviously, this method has certain inherent 
506. R. BocusLAw, supra note 501, at 97-98, 202-04. 
507. See ·westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 
66 CoLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1218 (1966); PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 28-29: 
The scientific associations in the behavioral sciences are custodians of and 
spokesmen for the values of their scientific disciplines. . . . 
It is obvious that the Federal Government cannot and should not prescribe 
a set of moral principles. Likewise, we cannot expect each man to develop de nova 
his own set of ethical principles without the guidance of those who have already 
experienced the ethical conflicts that are involved in behavioral research. It is 
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limitations. The computer is so flexible a device, and personal in-
formation is employed for so many purposes, that comprehensive 
user self-regulation seems unrealistic, which means that this approach 
probably could reach only a relatively small proportion of potential 
abuses. Moreover, as suggested earlier,508 the most effective privacy 
protection scheme is one that minimizes the amount of potentially 
dangerous material that is collected and preserved; a regulatory 
scheme that focuses on the end use of the data by governmental or 
private systems might be a case of too little, too late. Uniformity also 
would be difficult to achieve because of the diffuseness of the user 
groups. One suggested list of users includes "doctors, Ia-,vyers, ac-
countants, journalists, sociologists, political scientists, historians and 
anthropologists."509 It seems doubtful that any two of these occupa-
tions would have similar views on how much or what kinds of pro-
tection an individual should have against misuse or widespread dis-
semination of intimate personal facts. The professions, at least those 
listed above, also are likely to be primarily concerned with statistical 
analyses, and therefore any scheme that regulates them might leave 
the bulk of the intelligence or surveillance uses that are most inim-
ical to personal privacy unregulated. Nor will all of these professional 
groups have the resources, technological experience, or motivation 
to develop and enforce privacy-protecting codes on their own initia-
tive. If professional self-regulation is to have any meaningful impact, 
it seems necessary to provide some measure of central coordination 
and an overarching apparatus for channeling the benefits of current 
research and thinking on privacy to all user groups. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, professional self-regulation 
and self-examination undoubtedly will play an important role in 
the over-all protection scheme. If handled properly, the very lack 
of traditions or calcified attitudes among the current generation of 
computer specialists and the inherent diversity of outlook among 
different user groups might prove to be important assets in pre-
serving individual privacy. But to capitalize on these conditions, 
the development of professional codes of ethics must be approached 
as an innovative and experimental process. Furthermore, self-regu-
lation must be viewed as a supplement to, and not a substitute for, 
policy determinations by other interested societal institutions as to 
appropriate minimum levels of privacy protection. 
thus logical to expect that these professional associations . . • will accept the 
responsibility for establishing ethical principles and guidelines for conduct of 
research as one of their major purposes. 
508. See pt. VII.C. supra. 
509. Westin, supra note 507, at 1218. 
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VIII. THE SEARCH FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Although the threat to personal privacy presented by the new 
information transfer technologies is substantial and imminent, the 
preceding section demonstrates that a number of workable technical 
and procedural safeguards are available and undoubtedly more can 
be developed if the appropriate private and governmental groups 
are given sufficient impetus to make the needed adjustments in 
practice. The central problem is to determine how the legal system 
can best insure that a proper balance is struck between the tradi-
tional libertarian ideals embodied in the concept of privacy and the 
immense social benefit that computer technology offers. This prob-
lem is of a type that has many antecedents. Striking a balance be-
tween democracy and technocracy has been a frequent chore in the 
past and the la·wmakers should not shrink from the task. 
But the challenge of developing a meaningful level of protection 
in a computerized age is a formidable one and the law's past record 
of dealing with emerging technologies is not entirely encouraging. 
Indeed, the legal system's reluctance to deal coherently and promptly 
with novel phenomena seems to have been greatest when innovation 
has occurred in the field of communications. In the past, the impor-
tance and vulnerability of first amendment freedoms were ample 
reason for treating the information media with caution. But the 
computer's potential as an engine of social change-and human 
control-indicates that a greater threat to freedom may lie in in-
action or continued application of ancient or inapposite doctrine 
in the face of the growing power of information in contemporary 
life and the increasing concentration of control over it. 
As discussed above, 510 the current patchwork of common-law 
remedies and statutory regulations is characterized by uncertain 
application, lack of predictability, frequent inconsistency, un-
awareness of the ramifications of the new communications media, 
and an almost total disregard for the individual's right to participate 
in information transactions that have a profound impact on his life. 
It is unequal to the task at hand. Even if the common-law privacy 
remedies were rehabilitated and the constitutional freedoms of 
association and belief were expanded, it would be unwise to rely 
exclusively on private actions for damages, restitution, or injunctive 
relief to protect a citizen from misuse of personal information. The 
difficulties and imprecision of converting a loss of privacy and re-
lated injuries to an individual's personality into monetary damages 
510. See pts. V, VI supra. 
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make private remedies inadequate. Furthermore, is it even likely 
that an individual will discover that maligning or inaccurate infor-
mation has been placed in his dossier or that an improper dissemi-
nation of confidential matter has cost him a government position, 
denied him a promotion, or impaired his commercial, personal, or 
professional relations with others? 
The difficulty of finding an appropriate mode of relief is com-
pounded by the protean character of the computer; it permeates 
both the public and private sectors and has ramifications that cut 
across the relevant traditional legal theories. Almost any doctrinal 
legal response is bound to seem Procrustean or anachronistic. Thus, 
although a number of ingenious modifications of the existing com-
partmentalized legal structure have been proposed, no single theory 
promises to be expansive enough to respond effectively to the com-
puter's multifaceted threat to individual privacy. 
A. Property Theories of Privacy 
Perhaps the most facile approach to safeguarding privacy is the 
suggestion that control over personal information be considered a 
property right, vested in the subject of the data and eligible for the 
full range of constitutional and legal protections that attach to 
property.1111 Support for this theory can be drawn from the fact that 
personal data often is treated as a commodity,1112 as well as from 
511. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967), concludes that "personal in-
formation, thought of as the right of decision over one's private personality, should 
be defined as a property right, with all the restraints on interference by public or 
private authorities and due process guarantees that our law of property has been so 
skillful in devising." Unfortunately, the author does not offer any enlightenment 
concerning what he means by "property right." A more metaphysical approach to the 
same result is offered in Shils, Privacy and Power, reprinted in Senate Hearings on 
Computer Privacy 231, 247: 
The "social space" around an individual, the recollection of his past, his conversa-
tion, his body and its image, all belong to him. • . • He possesses them and is 
entitled to possess them by virtue of the charisma which is inherent in his exis-
tance [sicJ as an individual soul-as we say nowadays, in his individuality-and 
which is mherent in his membership in the civil community. 
In contexts such as the sale of personal information by credit bureaus, however, 
it is not the subject of the data but a third party who is selling the data. Thus, recog-
nition of a property right in the subject could not be justified on the theory that 
the law merely was acknowledging the realities of the marketplace. Moreover, prop-
erty theory, like the defense of consent in privacy actions, is open to the objections 
that it is simply a conclusory label and places responsibility on the individual rather 
than on the organization that wants to use the data, and usually has the leverage to 
extract it. Credit bureaus, for example, would be no less able to "purchase" property 
rights than they are presently able to obtain "voluntary" consent to credit investiga-
tions. See text accompanying notes 248, 315 supra. 
512. It is true that a few courts have recognized property rights in the names and 
likenesses of celebrities for advertising purposes, but that situation is much more 
clearly an arm's length transaction, and is almost wholly devoid of traditional privacy 
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analogies to recent decisions dealing with search and seizure513 and 
the holdings of a few privacy cases. 514 The property theory is also 
the most direct method of resolving the problem of standing to sue 
and of eliminating the current ability to deal in the intimate de-
tails of a person's life history without his knowledge or consent anc: 
with little likelihood of legal liability. 
The basic objection to granting a property right in personal in-
formation for these purposes is the irrelevancy of property concepts 
to the values that privacy doctrine seeks to safeguard. The protec-
tion of individual privacy is intended to preserve emotional and 
psychological tranquillity by remedying a damaging publication or 
dissemination, rather than to define the legal title to or control the 
exploitation of a commodity.515 There also are practical reasons to 
oppose the property rationale. The development of property rights 
in personal information probably would take place under state law. 
Yet experience with state-created property rights in literary works 
and commercial values indicates that confusion, uneven protection, 
and difficult conflict-of-laws problems are certain to result if the 
considerations. See generally Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954). But cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 299 
F .2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962), which demonstrates the range of potential absurdities that 
could result from treating personal information as property. 
513. See notes 331-32 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Alderman v. United 
States, 37 U.S.L.W. 4189, 4201 (March 10, 1969) CTustice Harlan, concurring and dis-
senting): "[T)he right to conversational privacy is a personal right, not a property 
right." 
514. See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847, 848 (3d Cir. 1936), in which an 
injunction was granted preventing revenue agents from examining bank accounts. 
The court rejected a contention that the bankers' acquiescence in the search precluded 
the taxpayers from seeking relief, stating: 
It is Zimmermann and his wife, and not their bankers and brokers, who are the 
real and aggrieved parties before us. To say that their bank accounts, withdrawals, 
their loans and collateral deposits, are the property of their bankers and brokers, 
and the taxpayers have no right or standing to prevent an unreasonable search 
thereof, is to lose sight of substance and rest on shadow .••. The bankers and 
brokers have no interest in contesting the search • • • but, when the notice to 
produce is served on them, coupled as it is with the assertion that noncompliance 
with the order will subject [them to criminal penalties], prudence and regard for 
the banker's own alleged liability ••• all unite to constrain him ••• [to] give the 
government a searching power of the defendants' affairs which it cannot legally 
assert against the taxpayers themselves. 
See also Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929): "There is an implied obliga-
tion ••. on the bank, to keep [records of deposits and withdrawals] from scrutiny 
until compelled by a court of competent jurisdiction to do otherwise. The information 
contained in the records is certainly a property right." But cf. note 525 infra. 
515. Cf. Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 200-01 
(1890): "[W]here the value of the production is found not in the right to take the 
profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by 
the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as onr 
of_property, in the common acceptation of that term." 
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recogmt10n of property rights in a transitory intangible such as 
personal information is left to the states.516 Especially in the con-
text of computer transmissions on multistate media, national uni-
formity is an extremely desirable-and may be an imperative-goal. 
Along the same lines, it is difficult to perceive how a common-law 
property theory would solve some of the problems raised by federal 
data centers. It would be ironic, indeed, if the law governing com-
puter systems unwittingly followed the unsatisfactory pattern that 
the law of literary property is now struggling to escape.517 Finally, 
creation of property rights in personal information might prove to 
be too inflexible a method of regulating the development of impor-
tant phases of a technology that still is in its infancy and it might 
tend to abort attempts to pursue other avenues of legal control. 
Certainly the creation of a property right in information does not 
obviate the need to impose technological and procedural restraints 
on information handlers of the type previously described.518 
The fact that a property theory of personal information would 
involve the recognition of rights in an inexhaustible commodity 
suggests that the enigmatic tort theory of misappropriation may be 
somewhat more adaptable to the problems of computerized data-
processing than a conventional property right would be.519 The 
leading case of International News Service v. Associated Press, 520 
which held the defendant liable for the pirating of wire service news 
reports prepared by a rival company, indicates that misappropri-
ation is concerned primarily with the relationship of those who are 
competitors. The Supreme Court concluded that a right existed be-
516. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 484-85, 
493-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 
Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REv. 734, 759-62 (1948); Comment, 
Copyright Pre-emption and Character Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of 
Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1018, 1029-31 (1968). 
517. See, e.g., S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 30l(a) (1969): "On and after January 1, 
1971, all rights in the nature of copyright ••• are governed exclusively by this title. 
Thereafter, no person is entitled to copyright, literary property rights, or any equiva-
lent legal or equitable right under the common law or statutes of any State." 
518. See pts. VII.A.-C. supra. 
519. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. R.Ev. 888, 932 
(1964): 
Misappropriation consists not in taking the physical object but in copying or 
drawing upon the conception or underlying intangible value for the use of the 
appropriator. 
In contrast to tangible property, the significant character of intangibles is 
their inexhaustibility: any number of persons may exploit or enjoy the intangible 
at one time •••• Yet, though the appropriated intangible is not lost to the 
originator, its market value-largely dependent upon the intangible's scarcity-
is lost, or at least diminished. 
520. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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tween the parties, which it described as a "quasi-property"1121 in-
terest in obtaining a just return on capital and resources invested 
in obtaining the news reports. 
Misappropriation is an appealing theory because personal data 
can be viewed as the individual's "sweat of the brow," and arguably 
whatever value it has must be attributed to the subject's "capital 
and resources." It also recognizes that relations between particular 
people can give rise to different rights and liabilities in items of 
economic value. If that is true of competitors, as was the case in 
INS, there is no reason why it cannot also be true of information 
subjects on the one hand and information disseminators and users 
on the other. Moreover, misappropriation has sufficient doctrinal 
vagueness to accommodate a variety of different policy interests and 
factual situations.522 But, as in the case of traditional property 
theory, misappropriation has been used primarily to vindicate eco-
nomic rather than emotional or personal values, and, as a creature 
of state law, it is subject to all of the confusion and inequality of 
application inherent in using an ad hoc approach to a very complex 
problem. 
B. Information Trusts and Privacy 
A more innovative legal approach than the recognition of a 
property right in information calls for the adaptation of a venerable 
legal device, the trust, to provide the mechanism for protecting 
521. 248 U.S. at 236. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, 248 U.S. 
at 250: 
An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others 
from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right of exclusion may be absolute; 
if the property is affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is quali-
fied. . • • There are • • • many • • • cases in which courts interfere to prevent 
curtailment of plaintiff's enjoyment of incorporeal productions, and in which the 
right to relief is often called a property right, but is such only in a special sense. 
In those cases, the plaintiff has no absolute right to the protection of his pro• 
duction: he has merely the qualified right to be protected as against the defen• 
dant's acts, because of the special relation in which the latter stands or the 
wrongful method or means employed in acquiring the knowledge or the manner 
in which it is used. 
522. Cf. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 946 
(1964): "The process of deciding an individual misappropriation case is likely to take 
place on several levels. The merits of a claim rest chiefly on considerations of incen-
tive, social cost, alternative sources of protection, and the interests of others involved 
in the exploitation of the intangible." 
The continued viability of the misappropriation tort is open to serious question 
in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck&: Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 
225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Compare 
Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 
578 (E.D. Pa. 1965), with Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. De Costa, 377• F.2d 315 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). See also Comment, Copyright Pre-emption and Char-
acter Values: The Paladin Case As an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REv. 
1018, 1027-29 (1968). 
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privacy from the vicissitudes of modern computer systems. This 
method currently is being tested by the United Planning Organi-
zation (UPO), a body formed to establish a "Social Data File" that 
integrates information on the administration of a number of wel-
fare programs. The UPO has computerized large bodies of personal 
information secured from various agencies in the District of Colum-
bia and created a trust, treating the data as a res. Control over the 
data is vested in a number of independent trustees, whose actions 
are regulated by an elaborate agreement governing permissible 
disclosures. 1123 
The existence of a watchdog group, which does not have an 
active interest in exploiting the data in its custody and is circum-
scribed by clearly defined fiduciary duties, is appealing on its face. 
However, the trust device is not free from conceptual difficulties. 
It is a traditional principle that the subject matter of a trust must 
be a legally enforceable property interest,1124 and the assumption 
that the UPO is the "owner" of the personal data embodied on the 
magnetic tapes and punch cards that constitute the trust res seems 
to be a major feat of question-begging. Much of the data undoubt-
edly is public record information and incapable of being "owned" 
by anyone; the residue, if it is property at all, surely ought to be-
long to the individual to whom it pertains rather than to a group 
that has possession of one notational version of it. The anomaly is 
emphasized by the fact that the information in question could be 
523. The trust instrument is summarized as follows in Senate Hearings on Com-
puter Privacy, pt. 2, at 310-11: 
The property that the UPO now has, data that we have received from public 
agencies and collected through some of our own programs, will be transferred to 
three persons who will serve as trustees for the data. • • • They will own and col-
lect the data which constitute the trust estate-subject to the conditions which 
are specified in the Agreement • 
• • • The conditions that would be imposed are several. 
First, the trustees must hold the data only for a specified purpose. The Agree-
ment describes this purpose as evaluation of social problems and agency practices 
in the District of Columbia .••• This is an aggregate, statistical purpose which 
does not include evaluation of any individual. 
Second, the trustees must place the data in the custody of the UPO for its use 
as long as UPO exists and does not disclaim its right under the Agreement to 
have custody of the data .••. 
Third, the trustees can only place the data in the custody of UPO •.• if we 
use it for the purpose described ••• and do not use it to breach the confidentiality 
of information collected concerning named individuals. • • . 
Although the recipient would be permitted to delegate research projects to 
other persons or organizations, it would be prohibited from placing data iden-
tifying individuals by name in anyone else's custody •••• 
Fourth, the trustees cannot transfer their control over the data ...• 
Fifth, the trust is created in perpetuity and is irrevocable. 
For the full text of the agreement, see id. at 312-17. See generally Brooks, The Role of 
the Data Bank in UPO (May 25, 1967) (mimeo). 
524. See, e.g., 1 G. G. BOGERT &: G. T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ Ill, at 562-63 (2d ed. 1965); I A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 74-77 (3d ed. 1967). 
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publicly revealed by the subjects of the data or obtained by third 
persons; thus, the same data theoretically can be "possessed" by 
everybody in the world without physically disturbing the trust res 
or impairing its primary value as a research tool.525 Consequently, 
the effectiveness of the trust approach seems limited, as a practical 
matter, to the use of the data by the parties to the trust and 
provides little or no security to the individual against abuses by 
other users of the information. Nor does it reach the data-collection 
phase of the information process, although it is possible to extend 
the trust concept to every aspect of information-handling. But this 
is an extremely clumsy and circuitous way of establishing a regula-
tory scheme. A more philosophical objection to this approach stems 
from the question whether the law of trusts, which throughout its 
evolution has been designed primarily to safeguard the economic 
well-being of beneficiaries, is really the most suitable mechanism 
for creating and enforcing rules to protect the emotional tranquil-
lity and community status of individuals. 
The trust concept also is suspect as a protector of privacy be-
cause it is essentially an ex parte creation of the party controlling 
a particular data base, which means that the terms and conditions 
of the trust instrument are, within very broad limits, wholly a mat-
ter of the discretion or benevolence of the party executing it. The 
United Planning Organization's trust agreement illustrates this de-
ficiency very clearly, since it creates no enforceable rights in the 
parties who are, at least in theory, its beneficiaries-the citizens 
whose personal information has been collected by the governmental 
agencies that furnished the data.526 Apart from this problem, which 
could be ameliorated judicially, the trust approach has the poten-
tial of resulting in an even greater lack of uniformity of treatment 
525. Cf. Pearson v. Dodd, No. 21,910, at 11-12 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1969), in which 
plaintiff asserted that photocopying of documents from his files and unauthorized 
dissemination of the copies invaded his property rights. The court rejected the prop-
erty theory: 
The question here is not whether appellee had a right to keep his files from 
prying eyes, but whether the information taken from those files falls under the 
protection of the law of property, enforceable by a suit for conversion. In our 
view, it does not ..•• Insofar as we can tell, none of it amounts to literary prop• 
erty, to scientific invention, or to secret plans formulated by appellee for the 
conduct of commerce. Nor does it appear to be information held in any way for 
sale by appellee, analogous to the fresh news copy produced by a wire service. 
Because no conversion of the physical contents of appellee's files took place, 
•.. the District Court's ruling that appellants are guilty of conversion must be 
reversed. 
526. The trust provision by which the United Planning Organization, the donor-
recipient, reserves the power to seek judicial enforcement of the terms of the agree-
ment is set out in Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy, pt. 2, at 315. 
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than the property or misappropriation theories. And, given the 
conceptual difficulty of applying trust theories to computerized 
personal information, it seems likely that any judicial scrutiny of 
a trustee's behavior might degenerate into a highly convoluted doc-
trinal analysis of trust law or a baroque construction of the language 
of the trust instrument. 
On balance, therefore, the establishment of personal information 
trusts may be more suited to providing full employment for lawyers 
than to fashioning a workable balance between the competing in-
terests in the flow of personal information. Far from being a pan-
acea, it is little more than a legalistic, ad hoc attempt to finesse the 
highly complex problems that should be dealt with directly by in-
formation users. At the same time, the trust concept also obfuscates 
a number of the underlying policy issues. It is a useful expedient 
for providing a small measure of control over the manipulation of 
data by particular groups or data systems; in a sense, it is a first step 
toward creating a professional sensitivity to the value of personal 
privacy on the part of the information managers and UPO should 
be commended for developing it. But trust law is unlikely to be the 
seminal mechanism for solving the privacy problems of the com-
puter age. 
C. Federal Privacy Legislation 
The computer's impact on traditional relationships between 
individuals and organizations, and the impending emergence of 
computer technology as a medium of communication with national 
dimensions, suggest that congressional action to protect privacy 
values may be both necessary and appropriate. By pre-empting in-
consistent state laws and affording protection to individuals in con-
texts in which none presently exists, Congress could provide a 
uniform and comprehensive formula for the development of multi-
state computer systems and at the same time infuse a measure of 
coherence into the law of privacy. But the uncertain direction of 
the computer age and the lack of obvious and easy solutions have 
combined to make the desirability and effectiveness of congressional 
action still very much a matter of conjecture. 
A legislative solution can take a number of different forms. The 
simplest approach, and certainly an effective method of protecting 
against misuse of personal information, is to enact statutes prohibit-
ing governmental, and perhaps even nongovernmental, organiza-
tions from collecting designated classes of data or, at the least, 
prohibiting them from using or threatening formal or informal 
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sanctions to coerce disclosure of the data. An example of this type 
of legislation is the series of recent bills that would eliminate the 
existing criminal penalties for failure to answer many of the ques-
tions asked by the Census Bureau.527 Although the scope of the 
current decennial census ranges far beyond the periodic "enumer-
ation" contemplated by the Constitution,528 Congress generally has 
passively acquiesced in administrative determinations of what in-
formation should be collected by the Government. To be sure the 
national government has the power to proliferate the census process 
as a necessary and proper adjunct to the effective planning of nu-
merous federal programs. But the increasingly elephantine char-
acter of the census indicates that middle- and low-level bureaucrats 
-often in response to pressures exerted by large industrial lobbies 
or other government administrators529-in effect are expanding the 
contours and the potential application of the criminal sanctions 
imposed for noncompliance with a census request by determining 
what questions will be included in it. 
As attractive as excision of the sanctions appears to be, other 
considerations counsel against hasty use of this legislative technique. 
Even a mild restriction such as removing the in terrorem effect of 
criminal penalties from the census process could have an adverse 
effect on the federal government's over-all statistical effort. If popu-
lar resentment against the spectrum of contemporary privacy in-
vasions and the never-ending stream of governmental and private 
questionnaires focuses on the census, removing the formal sanctions 
arguably might precipitate a widespread failure to respond that 
could impair the statistical validity of surveys that are urgently 
needed for the analysis of fundamental social problems. The hypo-
thetical character of this observation must be emphasized. Although 
there is a division of opinion as to whether the elimination of the 
criminal penalties would skew the results of the census to any ap• 
527. See note 347 supra. Over 100 congressmen have endorsed bills removing these 
penalties. CONG. 115 REc. H858 (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1969). In the ninetieth Congress, the 
Senate unanimously passed S. 4092, which was virtually identical to the present bills 
to eliminate the census sanctions. 
528. See notes 341-44 supra and accompanying text. 
529. See text accompanying notes 178-81 supra. See also 115 CONG. R.Ec. H859 (daily 
ed., Feb. 6, 1969) (remarks of Congressman Betts): 
Large corporations are behind the extensive household utility items such as 
[census] questions asking if a person has a television, clothes washing machine, 
dryer, home food freezer, and so forth, and Government officials who have an 
insatiable appetite to extract more and more facts about the American citizenry 
have prodded inclusion of dozens of income, marital, housing, and employment 
subjects. The cozy relationship between the Census Bureau and Federal statistical 
users has gone beyond the semblance of public service. I believe this is an un-
wholesome alliance which causes improper expansion of the collection of personal 
data under threat of fine or imprisonment. 
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preciable degree,530 it seems unlikely that a sizeable portion of the 
population would refuse to honor the census request. For some 
people the process of responding to interrogatories of this type has 
taken on a Pavlovian character and for others it simply is a matter 
of good citizenship. There also seems to be little doubt that more 
refined sampling techniques are available that would cure any prob-
lem that might arise. 531 In addition, elimination of the sanctions 
would not ameliorate the coercive "follow-up" practices of the Gov-
ernment or the subtle forms of pressure that are at work when a 
citizen is asked to furnish information to his Government. A veteran 
receiving a pension is likely to complete a Defense Department 
questionnaire whether or not his obligation to do so can be en-
forced by fine or imprisonment.532 But whatever the intrinsic merits 
of eliminating the census sanctions, prohibitions on coercive data 
collection can remedy only some of the more blatant affronts to 
individual privacy. Most of the dangers of the computer age are far 
more subtle. 
The task of developing legislative safeguards to maintain the 
privacy of data is more difficult in cases in which the information 
may be used for varied purposes or must be made available to cer-
tain agencies or groups but withheld from any wider circulation 
than it is when all dissemination can be proscribed. Part of the 
problem stems from the chameleon-like character of many types of 
data. As congressional investigations of the proposed National Data 
Center revealed, the "sensitivity" of information-its potential 
ability to harm the individual if inaccurate or if improperly dis-
seminated-depends in large measure upon the context in which 
it was first given, and the context in which it is later used. 533 It will 
be a rare information system in which all of the data has a uniform 
level of sensitivity. 
As indicated earlier, 534 access regulations, personnel controls, 
and machine safeguards all are available to develop privacy-pro-
tecting systems that can discriminate among different users and 
differentiate data on the basis of sensitivity. But these techniques 
530. This point was discussed by several of the witnesses before the Senate Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights during its hearings on S. 1791 in April 1969. See 
generally Hearings Before Subcomm. on Census and Statistics of the House Comm. 
on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 114 CONG. REc. H4053-75 
(daily ed., May 21, 1968). 
531. Id. See also 113 CONG. REc. at Hl3,429-31 (daily ed., Oct. 16, 1967) (remarks by 
Congressman Betts). 
532. See text accompanying notes 308-14 supra. 
533. See text accompanying notes 88-100 supra. 
534. See pt. VII supra. 
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are interdependent in the sense that a weakness in one security sys-
tem will undercut the other protective schemes. Thus, legislation 
dealing with one aspect of security or one level of sensitivity will 
not effectively preserve privacy. It seems obvious that a potpourri 
of legislative controls will be needed; some would establish varying 
degrees of confidentiality for different kinds of data and others 
would prescribe the technical and procedural safeguards to be em-
ployed by the system, with the safeguards organized hierarchically 
in terms of different levels of data sensitivity. This type of refined 
structuring presumably would be predicated on an evaluation of 
how much "privacy" the data in a given system deserves and a bal-
ancing of the damage that can be caused by misuse of the informa-
tion against the cost and loss of efficiency that would result from 
implementing various safeguards. This assessment takes on an over-
whelmingly complex demeanor if it has to be made in the context 
of a highly sophisticated network or system that involves data from 
numerous sources and is used by discrete people, groups, agencies, 
and organizations for highly disparate purposes. 
Since the myriad facets of the privacy problem would be difficult 
to resolve legislatively even if only a single computer system con-
taining personal information required regulation, it seems unlikely 
that a single statutory scheme can deal effectively with all computer 
systems. The limited present experience with data centers and net-
works and the enormously complex problems of distinguishing be-
tween governmental and private systems and determining the extent 
to which the latter should be federally regulated make the obstacles 
to drafting comprehensive national legislation virtually insur-
mountable at the present. 
A less ambitious course may be appropriate, however. Perhaps 
it is not necessary for federal legislation to grapple with the minutiae 
of the specific methods of protection to be followed by every con-
ceivable computer system. It has been asserted that the Freedom of 
Information Act is effecting a substantial relaxation of government 
secrecy even though it hardly could be called a model of clarity or 
specificity.535 Since protection of informational privacy always will 
depend in some measure upon the discretion of the data managers, 
it may be sufficient to adopt an approach similar to that of the In-
formation Act by providing a set of general legislative guidelines 
and a philosophical orientation that will encourage the enlightened 
exercise of that discretion. 
But there are several reasons why the Freedom of Information 
Act is not entirely apposite as a model for federal privacy legislation. 
535. See text accompanying notes 394-419 supra. 
April 1969] Computers and Privacy 1233 
To be effective, an informational privacy statute should be as ex-
tensive as the applications of computer technology, embracing, at 
least to some degree, both public and private data centers and taking 
cognizance of the interactions of these systems. The scope of the 
Freedom of Information Act, however, is much more limited in the 
sense that it deals with the disclosure obligations of the individual 
federal agencies-bodies that at least have similarities of structure 
and function, and share a basic commitment to the ideals of public 
service. Moreover, the Information Act attempts to avoid conflicts 
with other legislation by explicitly deferring to existing restrictions 
on disclosure.536 Any attempt at effective privacy legislation should 
strive to bring some order to the existing welter of conflicting and 
often meaningless confidentiality statutes, which might necessitate 
supersession or modification of some aspects of other federal legis-
lation, such as the Federal Reports Act, the Crime Control Act, and 
the Information Act itself. Finally, the Freedom of Information Act 
deals with familiar problems and was built upon a history of prior 
legislation and well-defined administrative practice. Computer tech-
nology is essentially a new medium of communication, and, in spite 
of the recent profusion of books and articles on the subject, very 
little really is known about its long-range impact on the fabric of 
our society. 
In view of the manifold difficulties of drafting comprehensive 
privacy legislation, especially in the context of computerized infor-
mation, it is not surprising that most of the bills that have been 
introduced in the ninetieth and ninety-first Congresses relating to the 
subject have had relatively narrow scopes.537 As mentioned earlier, 
some of these proposals deal with the information-handling activi-
ties of particular agencies, such as the Census Bureau.538 Other 
proposals involve attempts to protect certain groups that are vul-
nerable to privacy invasions; this is true of Senator Ervin's bill re-
lating to government employees.539 On both the federal and state 
levels, there has been a flurry of legislative activity in the credit 
bureau field.540 
In one of the most ambitious efforts to date, Congressman Koch 
has introduced a bill which would amend the Freedom of Informa-
536. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
537. See, e.g., H.R. 7214, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 889, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969); H.R. 20, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 15,627, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 
S. 1035, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
538. See, e.g., H.R. 20, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
539. S. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). An earlier version appeared as S. 1035, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See also S. REP. 534, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
540. See note 244 supra. State legislation would be rendered superfluous by the 
enactment of the Proxmire Bill, S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See notes 241-44 supra. 
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tion Act to require that all agencies maintaining files of personal 
information give notice to the individual if information concerning 
him has been procured from any source other than himself.541 The 
bill also provides that the agency must open these files to the indi-
vidual so that he can inspect and copy them.542 The access provision 
could perform a valuable function in allowing the individual to 
detect potentially damaging errors in his files; however, it also sub-
jects an individual to the possibility of coercion by those who want 
access to any governmental information on him and are in a position 
to insist upon his procuring a copy.543 The agency also would be 
obliged to undertake certain precautions in the handling of the in-
formation and to refrain from disclosing personal data without ob-
taining permission from the individual. There is no doubt that the 
enactment and enforcement of this bill would have a substantial 
ameliorative effect on the present information-handling practices 
of a number of federal agencies; but it would accomplish little on 
the information-gathering side of the ledger. Realistically, the Koch 
bill has a difficult road to traverse and passage cannot be predicted 
with confidence. 
Most recently, Senator Ervin has introduced a broadly worded 
proposal that takes a somewhat novel approach to the subject.1544 It 
would prohibit the executive agencies and their personnel from re-
quiring any individual to divulge personal information unless the 
collection of that information could be based upon a constitutional 
provision and a specific act of Congress. When this is the case, dis-
closure would be mandatory. The bill also would limit federal data 
collection on a voluntary basis to those matters specifically autho-
rized by an act of Congress. In this category of inquiries the bill 
541. H.R. 7214, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
542. Id. § 552(a)(5). 
543. Cf. Annot., Discovery and Inspection of Income Tax Returns in Actions Be• 
tween Private Individuals, 70 A.L.R.2d 240, 242-43, 246-47 (1960): 
By the great weight of authority, state as well as federal, a court in which a 
civil action is pending may require one party to produce a copy of a federal or 
state income tax return for inspection by an adverse party under the rules or 
statutes which deal with discovery procedures. 
State and federal tax authorities will ordinarily furnish a certified copy of an 
income tax return to the taxpayer or his agent. • • • And since it is within the 
power of the taxpayer to obtain a copy of his income tax returns from the gov-
ernment, the court may order him to do so, or to sign a form which in effect 
designates the attorney for the moving party as an agent to obtain a copy. 
The fact that the Internal Revenue Code protects the taxpayer against the 
disclosure of his federal income tax returns by public officials and employees does 
not give the taxpayer an absolute privilege, and does not prevent a court from 
ordering that he, rather than public officials or employees; shall produce copies of 
his returns for inspection and copying by his adversary. 
544. S. 1791, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Congressman Betts has introduced a com-
parable bill in the House. H.R. 10,566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
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would require the collecting agency to inform the respondent group 
that disclosure is volitional. The Ervin bill has some faults. There 
are a few problems of language that might unduly limit or render un-
certain its scope of application. Generally these stem from the 
absence of an adequate definition of either the character of the in-
formation or the nature of the data-gathering activities that would 
be covered by the bill. Moreover, reliance on the Constitution 
as a limitation on mandatory disclosures might be rendered nuga-
tory by a broad application of the necessary and proper clause. 
Finally, requiring all voluntary surveys to be predicated on specific 
acts of Congress might tend to produce a rubber-stamp effect or 
undue congressional preoccupation with the details of agency sur-
veys. A better approach might be to proscribe all forms of volun-
tary data-gathering unless the agency can satisfy a series of legislative 
guidelines or standards.545 On the whole, however, the bill repre-
sents a highly desirable attempt both to limit federal data collection 
activities to those expressly authorized by Congress and to curtail 
the use of subtle forms of coercion against individuals. 
Although each of the current legislative proposals can be criti-
cized for its lack of scope and the failure of its proponents to inves-
tigate the broader implications of informational privacy, the present 
leveJ. of legislative activity is a healthy sign. Furthermore, the cumu-
lative effect of these bills may be quite effective. In any event, beyond 
the possible integration of the various proposals described above, 
it simply is unrealistic to expect comprehensive legislation to be 
proposed at this relatively early date. There is insufficient experi-
ence with the computer-privacy phenomenon to permit rational and 
detailed legislative judgments to be made. Indeed, an attempt to 
achieve them at this time seems premature and might yield an un-
malleable product that would prove to be obsolete shortly after its 
enactment. Furthermore, the somewhat uncertain future shape and 
application of the technology and the understandable desire on the 
part of Congress to refrain from interceding in the operation of 
nonfederal information systems until the need for doing so becomes 
clear, makes highly detailed statutory regulation in the immediate 
future unlikely. 
545. The prerequisites to conducting a voluntary survey might include: (I) an 
administrative demonstration of a clear and significant need for the data; (2) a show-
ing that the data has not been secured by other federally conducted surveys; (3) a 
demonstration that the data is not available through prior state, local, or private 
information-gathering efforts; (4) a finding that the sampling group is no larger than 
that necessary to obtain the requisite data base; and (5) an articulated administrative 
determination that the questions to be asked are not intrusive or violative of in-
dividual privacy. 
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D. Federal Administrative Regulation 
The present lack of detailed knowledge about the computer's 
long-term impact indicates that perhaps the problem of how indi-
vidual privacy should be protected against the excesses of this new 
medium is more amenable to administrative treatment than to 
legislative resolution; at least this may be the case for the foresee-
able future. Administrative regulation is less immutable than a 
statute, thus providing sufficient flexibility to permit experimenta-
tion and shorter reaction time when new problems present them-
selves. 
I. The Locus of Regulatory Power 
Assuming the validity of this proposition, it is not immediately 
apparent where power to regulate should be centered and what 
form the regulation should take. It seems safe to postulate at 
the outset that regulatory power should not be entrusted to an 
agency that has operating responsibilities involving the use of 
personal information. The debate over the proposed National Data 
Center and revelations before congressional subcommittees540 con-
cerning the intrusive activities of the Post Office, the Internal 
Revenue Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice have made it abundantly clear that privacy values ofte11; get 
short shrift if fundamental policy decisions are made by an agency 
that has a vested interest in gathering and using data.547 The fact 
that personnel in various agencies have systematically engaged in 
mail cover operations, electronic bugging, wiretapping, harassment, 
and other invasions of privacy demonstrates that governmental 
officials often become too oriented toward the objectives of their 
institutions or too vulnerable to pressures from other organizations 
to be entrusted with responsibility for preserving the privacy of 
others. Consequently, an administrative approach that completely 
abdicates regulatory control to each agency and bureau probably 
is unsatisfactory from a privacy-protection prospective and is likely 
to produce such tremendous variations in practice that there would 
be little gain over the existing unstructured situation.548 
546. See generally House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy; 
Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy; Senate Hearings 011 Computer Privacy, pt. 2. 
547. See generally Hearings on Constitutional and Administrative Problems of En-
forcing Internal Revenue Statutes Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice 
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 
Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1·3 (1965) 
(Government Agencies), pt. 4 (1965-1966), 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5 (1966), pt. 6 (1966) 
(Telephone Systems). 
548. See text accompanying notes 164-84 supra. It is interesting to note that the 
Proxmire Bill to regulate credit bureaus, S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), proposes to 
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The question then becomes whether there is any single organ-
ization that should be given administrative responsibility for de-
veloping a privacy scheme for the federal agencies and perhaps for 
nonfederal information systems. The Census Bureau and the Bureau 
of the Budget immediately spring to mind. Even though it has an 
enviable security record,549 the Census Bureau has become so in-
doctrinated with the information acquisition syndrome it is difficult 
to believe that it could overcome its present function and orientation 
and develop a balanced regulatory scheme for protecting privacy. 
As to the Bureau of the Budget, its supervision over federal report-
ing programs has proven ineffectual from a privacy perspective. 550 
This is not surprising in view of the institutional bias that the 
Budget Bureau's duties create, but it does argue against giving the 
Bureau further responsibility for preserving privacy. It also is worth 
noting that both agencies are primarily federally oriented and might 
not be appropriate institutions to the extent that certain activities 
of nonfederal systems eventually will have to be brought under fed-
eral regulation. 
A more promising candidate for receiving regulatory authority 
is the Federal Communications Commission, which already has 
recognized the importance of privacy by including the subject as 
one of the central concerns of its inquiry into computer communi-
cations technology.551 A relatively minor extension of the FCC's 
statutory jurisdiction would enable it to deal with the full range 
of computer-privacy problems, including those raised by nonfederal 
systems.552 Indeed, this might fruitfully be done as an adjunct to its 
give the Federal Reserve Board extensive regulatory authority. See 115 CONG. REc. 
SI 163-69 (daily ed., Jan. 31, 1969). See also notes 241·44 supra. 
549. See Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Com-
puters, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 2ll, 218-19 (1968). 
550. See text accompanying notes 164-72 supra. 
551. Federal Communications Commission Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 16,979, 
reprinted in Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 87. 
552. The extent of the FCC's jurisdiction has proved to be a prime subject of 
controversy in its present inquiry into computer technology (see note 551 supra). See, 
e.g., IBM Brief at 1-6 to 1-7: 
It has been suggested that message switching constitutes a fusion of data processing 
and communications making separation difficult or impossible. This suggestion 
results, we believe, from confusion created by the generality of the term "message 
switching." Message switching has been defined as the technique of receiving a 
message, storing it until the proper outgoing circuit and station are available, 
and then retransmitting it towards its destination. The fact that a particular 
activity constitutes message switching within this definition does not determine 
whether it should be regulated. It is the purpose of the particular message switch-
ing that is determinative. In general, message switching occurs in one of the 
following forms: 
(I) As an adjunct to a public transmission sen•ice. As such, it is subject to 
traditional common carrier regulation. 
(2) As an adjunct to a private data processing or private communications sys-
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present investigation of-the threat posed by systems that rely on the 
common carrier networks. 
Entrusting the field of informational privacy to the FCC could 
prove to be a less than ideal solution, however. There is some pos-
sibility that the FCC would find itself torn by an ideological con-
flict of interest, inasmuch as its primary concern is the efficient 
exploitation of communications technology. In the context of regu-
lating the telephone system, for example, economic considerations 
typically have predominated over efforts to insure the confidentiality 
of communications.553 And it appears that a similar process is oc-
curring in the FCC's present inquiry into data communications; in 
the responses filed by various organizations, privacy generally has 
received only minimal attention in comparison to the questions of 
whether or not regulation of computer systems is economically de-
sirable.554 But this may simply reflect the parochialism of the com-
munications industries, rather than the Commission's inability to 
deal with the privacy problem once it directs its attention to that 
subject. Perhaps it does indicate that it is unwise to burden the 
FCC with primary responsibility for regulating a highly complex 
and multifaceted problem that will take it far outside its traditional 
bailiwick. Moreover, any attempt at comprehensive regulation 
would require the FCC to enter areas that would be completely 
new to it, such as single- and multi-level governmental informa-
tion systems, computer-manufacturing, and software development, 
which might represent a potentially unhealthy expansion of its 
jurisdiction. 
It is quite possible that none of the existing federal bureaus, 
agencies, or departments has enough background or is sufficiently 
independent-in the sense of not being obligated to various insti-
tutional "clients" or committed to values of efficiency or policy 
objectives that are inconsistent with privacy-to be an effective 
tem operated by and for the user. Such private use-not involving service to 
others-should not be subjected to regulation. 
(3) As an adjunct to the furnishing of a data processing service. Message 
switching that is an incidental part of a data processing service should not be 
subject to regulation. 
553. See generally Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Ad· 
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 2364-75, 2380-86, pt. 6 (1966). Part 5 of these hearings con-
tains a diverting account, at 2356-58, of five college students who "broke" the telephone 
system so that they were able to make free long-distance calls for a period of six 
months and threaten the security of secret defense lines. 
554. Semling, The Computer-Communications Inquiry, MODERN DATA SYSTEMS, 
July 1968, at 48-52: "While most respondents [to the FCC inquiry] expressed aware-
ness of [the privacy] problem there was little interest in the need for the FCC to do 
something about the privacy question. Generally, it was considered an industry prob-
lem, both by the manufacturer and user." 
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guardian of individual privacy. If this is the case, the conclusion is 
inescapable: regulatory control must be lodged outside the existing 
administrative channels. As repugnant as it may sound in an era of 
expanding governmental involvements, it may be necessary to estab-
lish a completely independent agency, bureau, or office-perhaps 
preceded by a Study Commission on Informational Privacy-that 
can establish policy under broad legislative guidelines in order to 
insure the privacy of all citizens.555 The organization might regulate 
the nature of the information that can be recorded and stored in 
various systems, enforce a congressional standard of care for insuring 
the accuracy of recorded information, and direct various types of 
data centers to employ the latest technological advances to protect 
themselves against breaches of security. 
2. Functional Aspects of Effective Administrative Control 
Whatever the most desirable locus and structure for adminis-
trative control over the privacy aspects of computer systems may be, 
the subject obviously involves numerous political implications and 
any proposal would be subjected to the vagaries of the legislative 
process. Consequently, any attempt to predict the precise contours 
of the regulatory scheme at this time would be a somewhat sterile 
exercise. However, there are several obvious attributes that any ad-
ministrative body would have to possess in order to be an effective 
guardian of informational privacy. 
A governmental organization that undertakes to regulate any 
significant aspect of a technology as dynamic and pervasive as the 
computer must be able to draw upon a wide range of expertise. At 
a minimum, then, the agency charged with this responsibility should 
be composed of people who are conversant with the scientific and 
technical disciplines, the business community, the social sciences, 
555. Many of the commentators on the proposals to create a National Data Center 
stress the importance of locating control of the center outside of the existing regu-
latory framework. See, e.g., Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a 
National Data Center, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 400, 404 (1968): 
The proposed data center would be organized within the Executive Office of 
the President and would be under the control of the "Director of the Federal 
Statistical System." The Director would have two advisory councils: one to repre-
sent the interests of government users, the other to speak for the private users 
and the public-at-large. The councils would advise the Director on such matters 
as confidentiality, user needs, and the burden on those providing information. 
The Office of Statistical Standards would be transferred from the Bureau of the 
Budget to become a staff office for the Director. The Bureau of the Census would 
also be placed under his control on a coordinate level with the new data center. 
See also Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 79-80 (statement of the author); Rug-
gles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, in Symposium-Computers, Data Banks, 
and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. R.Ev. 211, 219 (1968); Zwick, A National Data 
Center, in ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REsl>ONSIBILITIES, MONOGRAPH No. 1, 
at 33 (1967). 
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the communications and computer industries, and the law.15156 Ob-
viously, the agency also should maintain a close liaison with other 
branches of the government in order to inform itself of the infor-
mation needs of the public-policy makers and to be in a position to 
recommend needed legislation. One potential model for such an 
organization is the Commission for the Review of Federal and State 
Laws Relating to 'Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, which 
was created by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.m 
One of the basic duties of the agency, and any study commission 
that might precede it, should be education, both of the policy 
makers and the public. At present there seems to be a substantial 
amount of formless, and to some degree needless, anxiety about the 
556. Cf. Senate Hearings on Computer Privacy 80 n.15 (statement of the author). 
557. 82 Stat. 197 (1968): 
Sec. 804. (a) There is hereby established a National Commission for the Review 
of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil• 
lance .•.• 
(b) The Commission shall be composed of fifteen members appointed as 
follows: 
(A) Four appointed by the President of the Senate from Members of the 
Senate; 
(B) Four appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from 
Members of the House of Representatives; and 
(C) Seven appointed by the President of the United States from all segments 
of life in the United States, including lawyers, teachers, artists, businessmen, 
newspapermen, jurists, policemen, and community leaders, none of whom shall 
be officers of the executive branch of the Government. 
(c) The President of the United States shall designate a Chairman from 
among the members of the Commission. 
(d) It shall be the duty of the Commission to conduct a comprehensive study 
and review of the operation of the provisions of this title, in effect on the effective 
date of this section, to determine the effectiveness of such provisions during the 
six-year period immediately following the date of their enactment. 
(e) (1) .•• the Chairman shall have the power to-(A) appoint and fix the 
compensation of an Executive Director, and such additional staff per-
sonnel as he deems necessary .••• 
(2) • • • the Chairman shall include among his appointment individuals 
determined by the Chairman to be competent social scientists, lawyers, 
and law enforcement officers. 
(g) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive branch of 
the Government, including independent agencies, is authorized and directed 
to furnish to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairman, such 
statistical data, reports, and other information as the Commission deems 
necessary to carry out its functions under this section. The Chairman is 
further authorized to call upon the departments, agencies, and other offices 
of the several States to furnish such statistical data, reports, and other 
information as the Commission deems necessary to carry out its functions 
under this section. 
(h) The Commission shall make such interim reports as it deems advisable, 
and it shall make a final report of its findings and recommendations to 
the President of the United States and to the Congress within the one-
year period following the effective date of this subsection. Sixty days after 
submission of its final report, the Commission shall cease to exist. 
Variations on this general theme can be found in Senate Hearings on Computer 
Privacy 41-42; House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 49; PRIVACY AND THE 
NATIONAL DATA BANK CONCEPT 8-9. See also the proposal for a commission to study 
copyright and the new technologies, in title II of S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1969). 
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specter of Big Brother, but very little informed concern of the kind 
that can be translated into effective governmental action. In further-
ance of its educative function, the agency and any antecedent study 
commission should hold public hearings and symposia on a broad 
range of subjects, undertake technical and social science research 
projects, and act as a clearinghouse for information concerning ac-
tivity in each of the many disciplines that touch upon computer 
technology or individual privacy. By use of these and other methods, 
an informational privacy agency could implement a philosophy 
analogous to that embodied in proposals to create a Technology 
Assessment Board558-the belief that it no longer is sufficient simply 
to respond to technological threats as they become acute, but that 
it is necessary to anticipate them and undertake enlightened plan-
ning to insure that scientific innovation is used in socially desirable 
ways.rmo 
Another aspect in evolving policy for the computer technology-
privacy area would be to grant the agency authority to engage in 
rulemaking governing the technical features, personnel qualifica-
tions, and administrative procedures to be employed by all data 
centers that deal with substantial quantities of personal informa-
tion. Defining the scope of this rulemaking power, and any attendant 
licensing authority, undoubtedly will be one of the most politically 
sensitive phases of establishing the agency. Controversy certainly 
will arise over whether or not the agency's activities should extend 
to systems operated by state and local governments or private in-
terests. Similarly, industrial groups can be expected to oppose at-
tempts to apply privacy protection standards to the manufacturing 
of computer hardware and transmission equipment as well as to 
software systems. Although ideally the agency's regulatory power 
should be broad enough to cover those activities of nonfederal in-
formation systems and business concerns that bear on individual 
privacy, it stands to reason that any rulemaking power probably will 
be exercised sparingly in these contexts and might have to be more 
circumscribed than in the case of federal data systems. One can hope 
that self-regulation and the availability of model systems will obviate 
558. H.R. 6698, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
559. See, e.g., Daddario, Technolog)' Assessment-A Legislative View, 36 GEo. "WASH. 
L. REv. 1044 (1968) ("[T]echnological changes have become so extreme and occur so 
rapidly that it is incumbent upon us to reverse the process .•.. ·we cannot any longer 
let technology run rampant and structure our social environment because of a plan• 
ning vacuum.'); Muskie, The Role of Congress in Promoting and Controlling Tech-
nological Advance, 36 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 1138 (1968) ("[T]echnological advance per 
se cannot be considered an unqualified benefit to man. If man is to reap the benefits 
of technological advance, such advance must be controlled and directed so that it 
benefits society as a whole.'). 
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the need for a heavy commitment of agency time and effort in the 
nonfederal arena. 
To implement the controls that it ultimately deems appropriate 
for protecting informational privacy, the new agency should engage 
in several other types of activity. One method of encouraging com-
pliance is suggested by the extensive press coverage and popular 
response to congressional hearings on the proposed National Data 
Center and the credit bureau industry. Apparently there is enough 
concern for privacy to make the glare of public hearings and pro-
nouncements a realistic avenue of expression to which both govern-
mental and nongovernmental groups often will respond. But it 
would be illusory to believe that public or private officials are always 
responsive to press releases or the power of persuasion. Despite 
the fact that two congressional subcommittees were holding hearings 
during April 1969 on the propriety of some of the census questions 
and the desirability of retaining the criminal sanctions for non-
compliance, the Census Bureau, apparently with White House ap-
proval, ordered the printing of the 1970 census in its present form, 
although it did reduce the number of people who will receive the 
long form of the census from fifteen to twelve million.560 The move 
was justified with the usual bureaucratic protest that it was "too 
late" to make changes.561 More effective would be statutory author-
ity in a single agency to investigate, direct correction, and award 
appropriate relief for any alleged information abuses brought to its 
attention by citizens. Through the use of these techniques and its 
ability to negotiate with the information managers, the agency or 
commission could play the role of an information ombudsman. 562 
In developing procedures for discharging its role as a privacy 
protector, the agency should place central reliance on measures that 
give some level of effective control over personal information to the 
individual. The lack of this type of involvement may be the most 
important defect of the existing regime. The quest must be to de-
560. Wall St. J., April 18, 1969, at 1, col. 3. 
561. N.Y.L.J., April 2, 1969, at 3, col. 5. 
562. Cf. Hearings on S. 1195 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968), de-
scribing the proposed office of Administrative Ombudsman: 
He can be characterized briefly as a high level officer, with adequate salary and 
staff, free and independent of both the agencies he may criticize and the power 
that appoints him, with long tenure of office sufficient to immunize him from the 
natural pressures concurrent with seeking reappointment, with power to investi-
gate administrative practices on his own motion. He is a unique officer whose 
sole job is to receive and act on complaints without the necessity for charge to 
the citizen. He should have the power to subpoena records. He operates informally 
and expeditiously without formal hearing procedures. His principal corrective 
weapons are publicity, criticism, persuasion, and reporting. 
See generally Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers To Criticize Administrative Ac• 
tion, 109 u. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1961). 
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velop procedures that give the individual a voice in the important 
transactions concerning his personal life history-transactions that 
often are essentially "private adjudications"563 and profoundly affect 
his future economic and social well-being. The law's traditional 
dedication to ideals of due process indicates that any set of rules 
regulating the handling of personal information should accord the 
individual, or someone who will represent his interests adequately, 
the right to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
decisions are made concerning the information. 564 The right to be 
heard should include the ability to rebut damaging evaluations565 
and the right to demand that personal information conform to 
minimal standards of accuracy. 566 Disputes concerning the exercise 
of these rights undoubtedly will arise, and the development of an 
expeditious administrative means of resolving conflicts might be 
desirable. 
563. See House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 26-27 (testi• 
mony of Professor Charles Reich): 
Another source of information that gets into the files is something I would call 
private adjudications, that is, formal decisions about people that are made outside 
of the courts .•.• [W]hat validity do these private decisions have? They can be 
a curse on the individual for the rest of his life, but you may not have any idea 
whether they are really accurate or not. They may meet no standards of fairness 
with which we are familiar. 
564. Cf. the concurring opinion of Justice Black in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1951): "Assuming, though I deny, that the 
Constitution permits the executive officially to determine, list, and publicize indi-
viduals and groups as traitors and public enemies, I agree ..• that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment would bar such condemnation without notice and a 
fair hearing." See also House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 28 
(testimony of Professor Charles Reich); House Hearings on Commercial Credit Bu· 
reaus 14 (testimony of Professor Alan "\\Testin); Creech, Psychological Testing and 
Constitutional Rights, 1966 DuKE L. J. 332, 362-64; H.R. 7214, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969). 
565. See, e.g., Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus 14 (testimony of Professor 
Alan Westin): 
I would suggest requiring notification to the individual whenever a derogatory 
public-record item such as an arrest, lawsuit ... or prosecution was entered in 
his file. The individual then would have the right to enter an explanation of 
reasonable length and would be asked to notify the credit bureau of the outcome 
if the matter were disposed of in any manner that did not produce an official 
disposition. 
See also H.R. 7214, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 552a(a) (1969): 
Each agency which shall maintain records concerning any individual which 
are indexed according to the individual's name and which contain any information 
obtained from any source other than such individual shall • . • 
(6) permit an individual to supplement the information contained in his 
record with any information such individual deems pertinent to his record. 
566. Cf. Miller, Invasion of Privacy by Computer, N.YL.J., June 4, 1968, at 4, 
cols. 6-7: 
First: Any government agency or private individual or firm which gathers per• 
sonal data from several sources for the purpose of distributing that data to third 
parties should be required to: 
(a) Give notice to individuals that such data is being collected about them. 
(b) Afford access to the data for the purpose of verification. 
Second: Public authorities should not be authorized to purchase or use equip• 
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The effectiveness of an information agency designed to protect in-
dividual privacy obviously depends upon its ability to avoid becom-
ing a captive of the governmental units and private interests that will 
have a stake in information networks and systems. The tendency of 
the so-called independent regulatory agencies to become captives of 
the industries they supposedly regulate is a disheartening prior his-
tory from which to proceed.567 Perhaps with proper staffing and well-
chosen lines of authority, an information agency can achieve the 
degree of independence needed to perform its watchdog role. The 
other extreme must be avoided as well. It cannot be permitted to 
become an island unto itself, populated by technocrats whose con-
duct is shielded by the alleged omniscience of the machines they 
manage, neither responsive nor responsible to anyone. Nor can its 
activities and regulations be permitted to ossify. For the foreseeable 
future the key to effective activity in the computer-privacy area will 
be to maintain the flexibility to adjust to changes in the technologi-
cal and social environment. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Bureaucracy is the only way to coordinate the complex functions 
of a modern economy and society and therefore cannot be dismissed 
with a curse. Yet it is also an enormous potential source of arbitrary, 
impersonal power which folds, bends, spindles and mutilates indi-
viduals but keeps IBM cards immaculate.508 
It may seem surprising, and perhaps distressing to some, that 
several of the tentative suggestions offered in this Article as re-
sponses to the problem of preserving the modest level of privacy 
ment for the purpose of storing and distributing personal data to third parties 
unless a public necessity is established after public hearings. 
See also S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 164(9)(e) (1969) (Proxmire Bill). 
Even in the context of the mass circulation media, in which first amendment con-
siderations are dearly strongest, it has been argued that a state still might impose a 
duty to print retractions or corrections of damaging news items. Barron, Access to the 
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1659 (1967). Further 
analogical support for a right to correct potentially damaging data items can be found 
in 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. III, 1965-1967), which provides that the individual has a 
right to compel anyone who mails "pandering advertisements" to remove his name 
from the mailing list. 
567. Cf. House Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy 126 (statement 
of Paul Baran, computer expert for the Rand Corporation): 
[Regulation] is viscerally unsatisfying as it carries with it a built-in loss of 
freedom. The creation of another government agency peering over one's shoulder 
contains the possible dangers of bureaucratic delay and arbitrary conclusions 
based upon inadequate understanding of complex problems. 
Historically, Government regulatory agencies start as highly effective bodies 
but lose momentum as the original personnel leave and their replacements come 
from the industry being regulated. 
For a discussion of these problems in a different context, see Bonfield, Representation 
for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511, 536-545 (1969). 
568. M. HARRINGTON, TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC LEFT 144 (1968). 
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that we presently enjoy against the intrusive capacities of computer 
technology-a problem that is only beginning to emerge-should 
entail extensive federal intervention. Perhaps this merely reflects 
the impact that the computer is having on our society and the way 
it has permeated the daily affairs of virtually every individual and 
institution. 'With considerable justification, modern information-
transfer networks have been described as a global electronic equiva-
lent of the biological central nervous system569 because of their 
unprecedented ability to interrelate social institutions, to create 
awareness and responsiveness to human problems, and to provide a 
massive store of information subject to instant recall.570 As such, the 
computer is capable of immense social good, or monumental harm, 
depending upon how human beings decide to use it. Given the 
magnitude and significance of this new technology, a response from 
the national level is necessary. 
And if the foregoing discussion seems slightly alarmist in tone, 
that is so because it is necessary to counteract the fact that "progress 
is a comfortable disease"571 and the all-too-often complacent attitude 
of citizens toward the management of our affairs by astigmatic ad-
ministrators in government and the private sector. The very real 
benefits conferred by computer technology may opiate our aware-
ness of the price that is exacted in terms of personal freedom. It 
also seems desirable to sound the klaxon to arouse a greater aware-
ness of the possibility that the computer is precipitating a realign-
ment in the patterns of societal power and it is becoming increasingly 
important to decision-making in practically all of our significant 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions. As society becomes 
more and more information oriented, the central issue that emerges 
to challenge our legal system is how to contain the excesses and 
channel the benefits of this new form of power. If the concept of 
personal privacy is fundamental to our democratic tradition of in-
569. Cf. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE Exn:NSIONS OF MAN 304 (paper 
ed., 1964): 
Any process that approaches instant interrelation of a total field tends to raise 
itself to the level of conscious awareness, so that computers seem to "think." In 
fact, they are highly specialized at present, and quite lacking in the full process 
of interrelation that makes for consciousness. Obviously, they can be made to 
simulate the process of consciousness, just as our electric global networks now 
begin to simulate the condition of our central nervous system. 
See also Rapoport, Technological Models of the Nervous System, in THE MODELING 
OF MIND: COMPUTERS AND INTELLIGENCE 25 (paper ed., 1968). 
570. Cf. Benn, Where Power Belongs, THE NATION, Aug. 26, 1968, at 136, 137: 
"Processed information about individuals could be the basis for a police state, and 
a mass of new safeguards would be required. But on the positive side this informa-
tion could and should compel government to take account of every single individual 
in the development of its policy. Just to exist will be to participate." 
571. 100 SELECTED POEMS BY E. E. CUM:JIUNGS 89 (paper ed., Grove Press 1959). 
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dividual autonomy, and if its preservation is deemed desirable, then 
the expenditure of some verbal horsepower on its behalf seems 
justified. 
Perhaps the most imperative need at this point in time is a sub• 
stantial input of human resources to help solve the many privacy 
problems posed by the new technologies. The experimental labo-
ratories exist-the federal agencies and many private organizations, 
such as the Interuniversity Communication Council, can provide 
the necessary structural context in which to test the privacy-pro-
tecting capacity of hardware, software, and administrative pro-
cedures. The scientific and business communities seem to be awak-
ening-privacy protection techniques appear to be receiving in-
creased attention in both of these fraternities. But is the legal 
profession ready to come to grips with the ramifications of the com-
puter? Leading professional groups, such as the American Law In-
stitute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, and the American Bar Association, must move to the 
forefront of the effort to develop a legal framework that will secure 
personal privacy while permitting effective implementation of the 
new information technologies. 
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NOTES 
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-Inadequacy of 
Consideration As a Factor in Determining 
Unconscionahility Under Section 2-302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) provides 
that a court may refuse to enforce all or part of a contract if it finds 
that the contract, or any part of it, was unconscionable when made.1 
In American Home Improvement, Inc. v. l\1.aciver2 the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire apparently held that a price substantially 
in excess of the value of the goods and services sold was sufficient in 
itself to constitute unconscionability under this provision of the 
Code. The high price was at least in part attributable to high time-
credit charges, and, as noted by the court, the contract could have 
been invalidated on the ground that the seller had violated a state 
law by not disclosing these charges in full.3 Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of the opinion leads to the conclusion that the inadequacy of 
consideration alone constituted unconscionability.4 
In several other cases5 striking down contract provisions, it is 
unclear whether courts viewed inadequacy of consideration as suffi-
cient to make the contract unconscionable within the meaning of 
section 2-302. Others factors may have been essential to these courts' 
I. This section provides: 
(I) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the court in making the determination. 
2. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). 
3. Under the new Truth in Lending Bill (Consumer Credit Protection Act), 15 
U.S.C. § 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1968), disclosure of credit terms is required in all states, 
Id. § 1631. 
4. The court stated that there was "[an] independent reason why the recovery 
should be barred in the present case because the transaction was unconscionable" and 
then proceeded to document the disproportionate price. 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 
888. 
5. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see FrostiFresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 
52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966) (contract calling for excessive 
credit charges was held to be unconscionable, the court noting that negotiations were 
conducted in Spanish, while the contract itself, which was not explained to the defen-
dant, was in English); Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 15 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1967) (defendant, after exacting several fees from the plaintiff, refused to 
return plaintiff's repossessed car; contract held unconscionable and defendant ordered 
to return the car); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1016 (E.D. 
Pa. 1965); In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965) 
(referee in bankruptcy refused enforcement of two security agreements under section 
2-302 because they were too one-sided in favor of creditors). 
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decisions. In In re State v. ITM, Inc.6 the defendants sold electrical 
appliances door-to-door, charging extremely high prices and making 
misrepresentations which were fraudulent under a state statute.7 
The New York trial court stated that the disparity of consideration 
was equivalent to that in Aiaclver and was sufficient "to clearly 
render such transactions unconscionable."8 However, in the same 
sentence, the court stated that "when the deceptive practices are 
also considered, there can be no doubt about the unreasonableness 
and unfairness of these agreements."9 In another New York case, 
Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,10 plaintiff seller brought suit to 
enforce a contract for the sale of a 1959 Buick. The buyer's defense 
was that after the sale he had discovered several mechanical defects 
and that therefore the contract price was much more than the car 
was worth. In denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
the court noted that "[ e ]xcessively high prices may constitute uncon-
scionable contractual provisions within the meaning of Section 2~302 
UCC."11 But the court added that defendants should have an op-
portunity to present evidence as to the over-all purpose and effect 
of the contract to aid the court in determining whether it is un-
conscionable.12 This latter statement arguably implies that uncon-
scionability should not be found solely on the basis of excessive 
price. 
In a recent case, Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,13 a New York 
trial court relied on section 2-302 to hold that welfare recipients 
who had paid almost 620 dollars on the installment purchase of a 
6. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
7. The defendants violated subsection 12 of section 63 of the Executive Law of 
New York which provides: 
'Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or 
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting 
or transaction of business, the attorney-general may apply ... for an order enjoin-
ing the continuance of such business activity ... and the court may award the 
relief applied for .... The word "fraud" or "fraudulent" as used herein shall 
include any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresen-
tation, concealment, suppression, false pretence, false promise or unconscionable 
contractual provisions. 
N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969). The court found the defendants' 
statements to be both false and unconscionable within the meaning of this statute. 
Defendants also violated section 402(2) of N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (McKinney Supp. 1968-
1969) which provides that "[a] contract or obligation shall contain the entire agree-
ment of the parties with respect to the goods and services," that promises to the 
buyer to compensate him for referrals must be in the contract, and that the contract 
must contain a clause permitting compensation earned to be deducted from the out-
standing balance otherwise due under the contract. 
8. 52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
9. 52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
IO. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 69 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. Rec. 1967). 
II. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 70. 
12. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 70. 
13. 37 U.S.L.W. 2549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., March 21, 1969). 
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freezer with a maximum retail value of 300 dollars14 were entitled 
to keep the appliance in spite of the seller's claim that the purchasers 
still owed nearly 820 dollars in payments. The judge stated that 
"[t]here is no reason to doubt ... that [section 2-302] is intended 
to encompasss the price term of the agreement."15 But in phrasing 
the issue for decision, the court asked "whether or not, under the 
circumstances of this case, the sale ... is unconscionable as a matter 
of law."16 The court held that it was, but not without discussion of 
the "circumstances."17 It stressed the huge disproportion between 
price and retail value, and stated that this mathematical disparity 
"carries the greatest weight."18 Thus, the court did not clear up the 
uncertainty about whether excessive price alone can constitute un-
conscionability. 
Under the general common law of contracts, inadequacy of con-
sideration by itself was simply no basis for legal relief.19 Even in 
equity, relief for excessive price was difficult to obtain. In a few 
cases courts cancelled contracts solely because of inadequacy of con-
sideration, but in these cases the inadequacy was so great as to "shock 
the conscience."20 Equity courts were more willing to grant relief, 
both affirmative and defensive, when an excessive price was accom-
panied by other inequitable incidents.21 In both situations, how-
ever, the courts based their decisions on the traditional theories 
of fraud, mistake, and undue influence, and not on inadequacy of 
consideration. 
An affirmative fair exchange doctrine, known as laesio enormis, 
existed in medieval law and has been incorporated into many civil 
law codes.22 These codes authorize recision of contracts of sale 
when it can be shown that there was disproportionate consider-
ation. A precise mathematical standard is sometimes used to evalu-
ate prices, the courts considering a price "disproportionate" if it is 
a certain percentage greater than the market value of the item for 
which it is exchanged.23 Cases under the Louisiana Civil Code, 
14. The plaintiffs' (purchasers) proof at trial of the maximum retail value of the 
freezer was not controverted by the defendant seller. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549. 
15. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549, citing FrostiFresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966); In re State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 
303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); and American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 
201 A.2d 886 (1964). 
16. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549. 
17. See notes 44-45 infra and accompanying text. 
18. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2550. 
19. 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 127, 128 (1963 ed). 
20. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 927, at 634 n.13 (S. Symons, 5th ed. 1941). 
21. Id. at § 928. 
22. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 127, 128 (1963 ed.); 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU· 
DENCE § 927, at 637 n.18 (S. Symons, 5th ed. 1941). See Dawson, Economic Duress and 
the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, (pts. 1 &: 2), 11 TuL. L. REV. 345, 364 
(1937), (pt. 3) 12 TuL. L. REv. 42 (1937). 
23. See Dawson, supra note 22, at 364-76. 
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which adopts the civil law principle of lesion by providing that a 
reasonably proportionate price is required to sustain a contract of 
sale,24 illustrate that in practice civil-law courts are reluctant to 
assess price differentials. The Louisiana courts have refused to inter-
fere with merely highly profitable bargains and have demanded 
gross disproportion between price and market value before they 
will set contracts aside. In effect, they thereby limit the doctrine of 
laesio so that it operates to invalidate only those contracts which 
are supported by no more than nominal consideration.25 Under 
such a test even the contracts involved in Maclver and the other 
three cases discussed above could have been upheld. However, it is 
important to recognize that the laesio doctrine, whether applied 
conservatively or liberally, does focus solely on price. 
It is doubtful that the Uniform Commercial Code was intended 
to authorize a shift to the laesio approach. Prior to the adoption of 
section 2-302 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, there 
was concern that inclusion of such a provision in the Code would 
interfere with the freedom of a buyer and seller to contract and 
that judicial investigation of the adequacy of consideration was in-
consistent with our competitive economy.26 Perhaps in reaction to 
this fear, the official comment to section 2-302 indicates that, at least 
in the drafters' opinion, the main function of section 2-302 was 
merely to reaffirm the propriety of judicial scrutiny in areas pre-
24. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 2464 (West 1952), which requires that the price not be 
"out of all proportion of the thing." For an interpretation of this section, see Herbert 
Be Lazarus, Some Problems Regarding Price in the Louisiana Law of Sales, 4 LA. L. REv. 
378, 412-18 (1942). A number of states have adopted statutes which permit courts to 
use inadequacy of consideration as a basis for the denial of specific performance. See, 
e.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 3391 (West 1954). In such states, while a legal right to relief 
theoretically exists, at least one study indicates that when equitable relief was denied, 
no legal relief was in fact forthcoming. See Frank &: Endicott, Defenses in Equity and 
"Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954). 
25. See Brooks v. Broussard, 136 La. 380, 67 S. 65 (1914) (price which equalled at 
least one-half the value of the property sufficient to support the contract). See also 
Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co,, 143 F. Supp. 826 (D.C. La. 1956). In 
cases decided under the California statute relating to the denial of specific performance, 
courts were more willing to assess the inadequacy. For cases holding that consideration 
was inadequate, see Cornblith v. Valentine, 211 Cal. 243, 294 P. 1065 (1930) (price was 
two-thirds of the value); Wilson v. White, 161 Cal. 453, 119 P. 895 (1911) (discrepancy 
of 1,000 dollars in 14,000 dollars transaction sufficient where other elements of over-
reaching appeared); Dessert Seed Co, v. Garbus, 66 Cal. App. 2d 838, 153 P.2d 184 
(1944) (price 3,400 dollars, reasonable market value 5,000 dollars); cf. Miami Tribe v. 
United States, 281 F.2d 202 (Ct. CI. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961) (payment 
of less than one-half market value is unconscionable), 
26. See, e.g., Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk 
Sales Articles of the U.C.C., 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 42 (1962); King, Suggested Changes in 
the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 116 (1954); Legislation, 
Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable Contracts, 58 DICK. L. REv. 161 (1954); 
Note, Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 
146, 151 (1950); Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Conse-
quences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954). 
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viously subject to the courts' supervision-for example, limitations 
on remedies and disclaimers of warranty.27 The comment asserts 
that section 2-302 was designed to prevent "oppression and unfair 
surprise"; it was not intended to change the "allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power,"28 nor was it designed to pro-
tect the foolish from bad bargains. It appears, therefore, that cases 
like Maciver and Jones, which apparently equate excessive price 
with unconscionability, are beyond the intended purview of sec-
tion 2-302. 
Whatever the drafters of the Code may have intended, the cases 
demonstrate that courts examining contractual arrangements may 
consider adequacy of consideration an important factor; some courts 
may go so far as to hold that proof of inadequacy of consider-
ation is enough in itself to establish unconscionability. This recent 
development raises two major questions: How should a court assess 
the price charged by the seller to determine whether it is in fact 
too high for the goods or services offered to the buyer?29 And, if a 
court requires other elements than disproportionate price for a 
showing of unconscionability, what should these other elements be? 
A two-step approach can be used to develop a standard for de-
termining whether a seller's price is out of line. The first step is to 
decide whether a seller's markup-the difference between the selling 
price and the wholesale price of the goods, or his profit-the differ-
ence between the selling price and the cost of the goods sold (includ-
ing selling and operating expenses), provides the best measure of the 
fairness of his price. If markup is used, a seller could legitimately 
complain that he was denied the same rate of return as other sellers 
27. See, e.g., Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 
414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 
144 S.E. 327 (1928). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 69 (1960); Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the U.C.C., 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
401, 408-15 (1961). 
The decision to define unconscionability by reference to those areas in which courts 
had previously deemed contracts unconscionable-for instance, warranty disclaimers 
and liquidated damage clauses---is anomalous because the Code deals in detail :with 
what is permissible in these types of clauses. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316, 
2-719 [hereinafter UCC]. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485, 516-24 (1967) which suggests that in view of the way 
the Code regulates such clauses in detail, it is difficult to assume that section 2-302 
adds anything in the way of protection from unconscionability. Leff suggests that the 
reason for the paradox may simply be imprecise drafting. 
The only case referred to in the official comment which would support the proposi-
tion that inadequacy of consideration should suffice for unconscionability is Campbell 
Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). If the drafters intended to incorporate 
this notion into the Code, it is likely they would have made a more substantial refer• 
ence to it than a "cf.'' See Leff, supra, at 530, 538. 
28. See UCC § 2-302, comment I. 
29. The result in Maclver emphasizes the need to develop standards for assessing 
the fairness of the price. The carrying charge in that case, which the court failed to 
calculate, was apparently only eighteen per cent. See Leff, supra note 27, at 549-51, 
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because he had sales expenses, overhead, bad debts, or other costs 
which were not reflected in this measure of consideration.3° Consum-
ers may also be adversely affected by the use of a markup standard. 
Many sellers provide transportation, installation, or other services 
free of charge when goods are purchased. Such a seller's price may 
be relatively high, but it may be the best price obtainable for the 
combination of goods and services which he provides. If this price 
is deemed unconscionable, as it might well be under a strict markup 
standard, the seller will probably eliminate or at least reduce his 
free services, and this would be to the detriment of consumers. A 
profit standard, by taking all costs into account, presents a fairer 
picture of the transaction and thus seems to be a better unit of 
measurement. The only difficulty with using profit is that different 
accounting methods will often produce different results, even when 
individual sales are involved. This difficulty is not insurmountable; 
in other circumstances, courts have weighed the merits of different 
accounting systems to determine which best reflects a seller's costs.31 
A similar approach should be used in cases involving claims of un-
conscionability because of excessive price. 
The second important step in analyzing a challenged transaction 
is to develop a standard of fair profit with which the particular 
seller's profit can be compared. The simplest standard would be a 
fixed percentage of profit applicable to all sellers, but this seems to 
be inconsistent with the ideal of a free market economy regulated 
by the mechanism of competition.32 According to this ideal, the 
emergence of abnormally high profits in a particular market will 
30. The usury laws typically set a flat rate which may be charged for the use of 
money. This approach resembles the use of a markup standard in that costs are not 
taken into account in computing the rate of interest. The inflexible rate set by the 
usury laws has been criticized as unreflective of the true costs and risks involved to 
the lender. See, e.g., F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 9-10, 174 (1924). 
31. See INT. R.Ev. CooE OF 1954, § 446, which requires that taxable income be 
computed according to an accounting method which clearly reflects a taxpayer's in-
come. "[W]e read 'clearly reflect the income .. .' to mean •.. that income should be 
reflected with as much accuracy as standard methods of accounting practice permit 
[rather than merely fairly and honestly].'' Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 112, 
114-15 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Niles Bement-Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357 
(1930) (an accrual method was required); Kahuku Plantation Co. v. Commissioner, 
132 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1942) (allowed a hybrid method to be used); Boynton v. Pedrick, 
136 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afj'd., 228 F.2d 745 (2dpr. 1954); Motors Securities 
Co., Inc., ,r 52,316 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1952) (tax court held discounts on notes not 
to be income to an auto finance company in the year of purchase; instead, the court 
ruled that it was permissible to spread the income over the life of the notes when 
that practice had been followed for years and income was not distorted); Bellevue 
Mfg. Co., 1J 57,094 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1957) (tax court required a cash accounting 
method). 
32. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 3-11 (1967); J. BAIN, PRICING DISTRIBUTION 
AND EMPLOYMENT 5, 65-66, 130 (rev. ed. 1953). See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 39-57, 
778-93 (1967). 
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attract new entrants into that market.33 These will be new en-
terprises or will come from relatively unproductive segments of 
the economy, and their entry into the market to take advantage of 
the demand creating the high pro.fits will achieve a desirable allo-
cation of resources.34 Their arrival is also supposed to drive profits 
down to a level consistent with the costs and risks of operating in 
the particular market.35 Theoretically, judicial precedent prohibit-
ing profits above a certain percentage of the cost of a good would 
place an artificial limitation on sellers in the market, with the result 
that new entrants would not be attracted, economic resources would 
not be correctly allocated, and price competition would not be stim-
ulated. It may be argued that these theories of a free market econ-
omy do not conform to the realities of the economic system.86 How-
ever, these theories are embodied in the antitrust laws37 and in other 
state and federal statutes,38 and inconsistent rules should not be 
promulgated by the courts.39 
A better test would be to compare a seller's profit to the profits of 
similarly situated sellers. This would remove the problem of dis-
couraging market entry, because sellers in the market would not be 
forced to maintain an artificially low price. However, if a court does 
not make certain that the sellers used for comparison to the chal-
lenged seller are indeed similarly situated, its decision may yet be in 
conflict with the ideal of a free market economy. Some sellers who 
are more successful than their competitors should be allowed to reap 
greater profits; they provide additional benefits for consumers and 
spur their competitors to emulate them. If other sellers in the market 
do improve their operations in some manner, there will be increased 
consumer benefits and, because of the resulting increase in comped-
33. See P. ARE.EDA, supra note 32, at 3. 
34. Id. at 11. 
35. Id. at 4. 
36. See T. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937). See also P. ARE.EDA, supra note 
32, at 11. 
37. See P. ARE.EDA, supra note 32, at 3-4; see also A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-30 (1966). 
38. See P. AREEDA, supra note 32, at 3. 
39. Suggesting that the theories underlying the unconscionability clause of section 
2-302 are the same as those underlying antitrust laws and other statutes does not imply 
that the unconscionability clause is to be administered as extensively as some of those 
laws are. Obviously, courts are not to police contracts for unconscionable provisions in 
the same way that the Federal Trade Commission polices contracts, mergers, and other 
agreements which restrain trade; courts are to determine unconscionability only when 
a private litigant has raised the issue, Because most buyers do not know of the uncon-
scionability clause and because most losses which occur as a result of unconscionable 
contract provisions are not costly enough to warrant a court action, the unconscionabil-
ity clause will not deter unreasonable commercial practices to any great degree. More 
regulation may be needed in this field; if so, legislatures will have to provide more 
effective enforcement machinery than section 2-302. For an example of such legislation, 
see the discussion in note 7 supra, of the New York statute which authorizes the state 
attorney general to bring suit when a seller misleads a buyer. 
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tion, these benefits may well be available at a lower price. Thus, 
sellers should not be penalized for higher profits if these profits 
are attributable to excellent business locations, to particularly effi-
cient operations, or to access to a particular class of customers who 
are willing and able to pay more for their products;40 competitors 
should be encouraged to improve their locations and operations and 
to seek out high-paying customers. Greater profits would also be 
justified if the seller offers a high-quality or an unusual product 
or if he provides a better quantitative or qualitative selection of 
ancillary services than his competitors. 
All of these considerations make it clear that great care must be 
exercised in deciding which sellers in a given market are "similarly 
situated." A certain fixed percentage of the average profit of sim-
ilarly situated sellers could be chosen as the dividing line for deter-
mining whether a challenged seller's profit is excessive, but this 
probably would not be desirable. Because of the possibilities of error 
inherent in determining a seller's profit and in finding comparable 
sellers, there can be no certainty to the test suggested above. More-
over, applying a fixed standard based on percentage of profit above 
cost of goods sold would create only the illusion of certainty. Worse, 
such a test would be inflexible. Courts should not evaluate the seller's 
price in a vacuum, as they would in effect be doing if they applied a 
a fixed standard. The judge should ascertain the extent to which the 
seller's profit exceeds that of his competitors-that much is clear. 
However, he should weigh this factor in the context of the particular 
case, requiring less in the way of excess profits for a finding of un-
conscionability when certain other factors are present. Factors which 
a court should consider are those which demonstrate, with more force 
than the mere presence of high prices and profit margins, that the 
seller intended to take unfair advantage of the buyer. Because of the 
imprecision involved in comparing prices and profits, courts should 
be reluctant to declare contracts unconscionable when such circum-
stances are not present in the case. 
The buyer's inability to comprehend the transaction is one factor 
which could lead to a finding of unconscionability. In FrostiFresh 
Corp. v. Reynoso,41 a contract calling for excessive credit charges was 
40. A seller can cultivate high-paying customers as long as he does not restrict other 
sellers from dealing with those customers: 
As we see it, the laws of the United States do not require that persons engaged in 
private trade and commerce must deal with everyone. When they do deal they 
may not discriminate, but they do have the right to choose their customers. 
The Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act itself provides in sec-
tion 2(a) "Nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged m selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona 
fide transactions and not in constraint of trade." Sec. 13(a), Title 15 U.S.C.A. 
Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karper & Bros., 177 F.2d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 1949). See also 
FTC v. Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
41. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966). 
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held unconscionable. The New York court noted that negotiations 
for the contract were conducted in Spanish, but the contract itself, 
which was not fully explained to the defendant, was in English.42 
This factual context presents a substantial possibility that the buyer 
misunderstood the implications of the contract and that he was in 
fact exploited by the seller. The court was clearly correct in taking 
it into account. The question arises, however, whether courts should 
consider less obvious indicia of a buyer's low degree of commercial 
sophistication, such as his low intelligence level or his lack of knowl-
edge of the seller's business. Courts are justifiably much more likely 
to consider these relatively subjective indicia of the buyer's knowl-
edge if it is clear that the seller was aware of the buyer's short-
comings and played upon them. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co.,43 for example, the court held two installment con-
tracts unconscionable on the grounds that the seller knew of the 
buyers' lack of education and poor financial position and yet in-
serted in each of the contracts an "obscure" provision which allowed 
the seller in the event of a default, to repossess all items the buyers 
had previously purchased from him.44 In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 
discussed above, the New York Supreme Court stated that 
a caveat is warranted lest we reduce the import of Section 2-302 solely 
to a mathematical ratio formula. It may, at times, be that; yet it may 
also be much more. The very limited financial resources of the 
purchaser, known to sellers at the time of the sale, is entitled to 
weight in the balance. Indeed, the value disparity itself leads inevi-
tably to the felt conclusion that knowing advantage was taken of 
plaintiffs.40 
Some sales techniques might be sufficient in themselves, or at 
least when coupled with excess price, to render a contract uncon-
scionable. A seller's failure to disclose an important aspect of the 
42. It is not clear that these facts were necessary to the court's decision. 
43. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
44. See Note, Contracts-Enforcement-Unconscionable Installment Sales Contract 
Is Unenforceable, 79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1299 (1965). The court could not base its decision 
on section 2-302 because the Code was not in effect in the District of Columbia when 
the contracts in question were made. It held that the rule of section 2-302 was part 
of the common law of the district, and, alternatively, that it could adopt this rule 
pursuant to its power to develop the common law of the district. 350 F.2d at 447-48 
(D.C. Cir. 1965). The contract provision referred to in Williams is commonly called 
an "add on" clause. Only one state has a statute forbidding such clauses and Maryland 
specifically allows them. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485, 554-55 (1967). 
In Jones, discussed at notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text, the court cited 
Walker for the proposition that "the meaningfulness of choice essential to the making 
of a contract, can be negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power." 37 U.S.L.W. 
at 2550. 
45. 37 U.S.L.W. 2550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 21, 1969). 
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transaction to the buyer is one factor which might support a finding 
of unconscionability. Thus, in Maciver the court was probably influ-
enced by the fact that the seller had failed to disclose finance 
charges.46 High pressure sales tactics would also be relevant in de-
termining whether a contract is unconscionable. In In re State 
v. ITJ1, Inc. the court held that the seller's "deceptive prac-
tices," in conjunction with disproportionate price, established 
grounds for a holding of unconscionability.47 Maclver and In re 
State v. ITJ1, Inc. were relatively easy cases because the sales prac-
tices engaged in were defined as illegal under state statutes. 48 In 
addition to such state legislation, the courts might examine standards 
of fair dealer activity developed by government agencies devoted to 
consumer protection49 and by trade associations. When such criteria 
for evaluating particular selling tactics are not relevant or available, 
the courts should probably consider the practices of other sellers. 
Before accepting dealer practices as evidence, however, courts should 
make sure that the practices are designed to provide fair treatment 
for buyers and are not used simply to promote efficiency.60 
There is, of course, a counterargument that courts should not 
consider the buyer's degree of commercial sophistication or the sel-
ler's business practices, at least when these practices do not violate 
state or federal statutes. It may be argued that such an approach 
eliminates the traditional adversary relationship between buyer and 
seller and institutes an agency relationship in which sellers have a 
vague duty to warn and to care for buyers. However, since requiring 
sellers to conform to statutes which define moral business practices 
does not seem to be harsh or unjustifiable,51 administrative guides, 
trade association rules, and accepted dealer practices should be re-
garded in the same way. Such requirements certainly do not give rise 
to agency relationships; nor do they impose new duties. Section 
2-302 and other provisions of the Code were apparently intended to 
eliminate the harsh consequences of a completely adversary relation-
ship between buyer and seller, and this purpose can be accomplished 
only by allowing courts to inquire into sellers' practices and buyers' 
46. See notes 2•4 supra and accompanying text. 
47. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
48. The statute involved in Maciver required disclosure of time-credit charges. The 
statute involved in In re State v. ITM, Inc. is quoted in note 7 supra. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission, for example, issues guidelines for use in examining the 
fairness of such dealer practices as price advertising, reduction of prices, and retail 
price comparisons. See FTC Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. pt. 233 (1949). 
49. For a general discussion of trade associations and professional codes of ethics, 
see J. BRADLEY, THE ROLE OF TRADE AssocIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS SOCIETIES 
IN AMERICA (1965); G. LAMB, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE (1956). 
50. For example, it may be common practice to fill in all the blanks on a credit 
form simply because doing so tends to insure accuracy later. 
51. See In re State v. ITM, Inc., 52 ~lisc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
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capabilities.52 Statutes are helpful in determining which events and 
circumstances make a contract unconscionable, and more compre-
hensive legislation is certainly needed in this area. However, con-
sidering the infinite variety of contract provisions and selling prac-
tices, it is doubtful that legislatures could designate all the activities 
which a court should consider in assessing the cases which come be-
fore it. Furthermore, extremely detailed legislation might prevent 
courts from weighing different dealer practices in light of the effect 
they have on purchasers with different intelligence levels and back-
grounds. For these reasons courts should look beyond legislation to 
other prevalent definitions of acceptable business practices in deter-
mining unconscionability. 
It is more questionable whether courts should follow the prece-
dent set in Williams and consider the buyer's financial status and the 
seller's knowledge of it. A buyer's wealth is not necessarily indica-
tive of his ability to bargain with sellers, although, given facts 
similar to those in Jones, a court may suggest that this is the 
case. However, a buyer's financial position is relevant to some 
issues arising in these cases and probably should be considered for 
that reason. In usury cases it has been observed that poor borrowers 
often do not question the terms set by lenders because they fear they 
will be refused loans elsewhere.53 Some lenders probably take advan-
tage of this state of affairs by charging usurious rates and by imposing 
other difficult contract terms on borrowers. If the poor borrower is 
buying goods on an installment basis, the seller-lender has the oppor-
tunity to exploit the buyer's fear of being refused credit elsewhere. 
In an attempt to circumvent the usury laws, he may charge an ex-
cessive price for the goods instead of imposing high interest rates. 
Since the buyer's financial status and the seller's knowledge of it 
are the determinants of the buyer's vulnerability, courts should 
examine these factors for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether 
and to what extent coercion and deception exist.64 It has been argued 
52. It is nevertheless true that the drafters of section 2-302 may not have envisioned 
such inquiries. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
Some states have also increased their legislation regulating dealer activities. See, 
e.g., Maryland Retail InstaUment Sales Act, Mo. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 132A-52 (Supp. 
1968) [referred to in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965)]; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969); N.Y. PERS. PROP. 
LAw § 402(2) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969) [referred to in In re State v. ITM, Inc.,. 52 
Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966)]. 
53. See In re WiUiam Sylvester Branch, 40 REF. J. 101, 102 (N.D. Tenn. 1966) (mem.). 
54. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1965): 
Unconscionability has generaIIy been recognized to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is 
present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of 
,the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. 
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that a court's consideration of these factors would confuse the issues 
and create uncertainty as to the basis for the decision;55 but this 
criticism holds true only when the court does not make its limited 
purpose clear, and thus it seems to be mainly a criticism of judicial 
writing. 
In summary, although the draftsmen of the Code did not intend 
such results, several recent cases seem to hold that excessive price is 
enough in itself to constitute unconscionability under section 2-302. 
Since these decisions stress price as the most important factor in the 
determination of whether or not a contract is unconscionable, stan-
dards should be developed for asserting price. It is submitted that a 
price should be held sufficiently excessive to render a contract uncon-
scionable if it gives the seller a greater profit than similarly situ-
ated sellers ordinarily receive. This test presents the most accurate 
assessment of the transaction in question and it also conforms to the 
economic theories incorporated in our antitrust laws and other stat-
utes. However, the courts should not apply an inflexible percentage 
standard to determine in the abstract whether a seller's profit is 
excessive; instead, they should evaluate the differential between the 
seller's profit and that of his competitors in the light of such factors 
as the buyer's ability to understand the transaction and in light of 
generally accepted commercial practices. Finally, because of the pos-
sibilities of error inherent in assessing price, it is suggested that 
courts ordinarily should not declare contracts unconscionable if 
there is no evidence of the seller's overreaching other than the 
excessive price. 
55. The attorney who argued the Walker-Thomas case for Mrs. Williams has stated 
that the infusion of the financial status of the consumer confuses the issues, "creating 
a degree of uncertainty" around the decision. See Skilton &: Helstad, Protection of the 
Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 
1465, 1480 (1967). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W:-Equal Protection-Property 
Ownership Qualifications on the Right To Vote 
in Special Municipal Elections-Cipriano 
v. City of Houma* 
Plaintiff, a resident of Houma, Louisiana, who owned no real 
property, brought a class action seeking to prevent the city from 
issuing utility revenue bonds approved by a vote of the property 
taxpayers at a special election. He argued that the Louisiana statute1 
restricting the right to vote in such elections to property owners2 
was unconstitutional. Plantiff relied on Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections,3 in which the Supreme Court declared that Virginia's re-
quired payment of poll taxes for voting in general elections was a 
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Harper, he claimed, established that any voter qualification 
based on property ownership violates the equal protection clause. 
The three-judge federal district court rejected this argument, one 
judge dissenting; held, the denial to residents who do not own 
property of the right to vote in municipal elections on the issuance 
of revenue bonds for public utilities does not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
In general, ·there appear to be two types of limitations on the 
right to vote that are constitutionally permissible. Voter-qualifica-
tion requirements may be sustained either when they promote in-
telligent or responsible voting4 (voting competence) or when they 
• 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968). This case was reversed by the Supreme Court in 
a unanimous decision on June 16, 1969 while this issue was in the final stage of being 
printed. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 57, col. 5. 
1. LA. REv. STAT. § 33:4258 (1950), pursuant to LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(a). In the 
case of utility revenue bonds, LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14(m) contemplates an optional 
election, but the section first mentioned above makes it mandatory. If the voters in 
the special election veto the bond issue, that veto is decisive. If they approve it, final 
approval must still be given by the local governing body. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 33:4252, 
33:4258 (1950). Only the constitutionality of the distinction between property owners 
and nonproperty owners will be examined here; it should be noted, however, that the 
Louisiana statutes cited require that bond issues be authorized by a majority of the 
property taxpayers in "number and amount"-a requirement of doubtful constitu-
tionality in light of the development of, and emphasis on, one man-one vote. 
2. The property taxpayer requirement has been interpreted as a property ownership 
requirement. McFatter v. Beauregard Parish School Bd., 211 La. 443, 30 S.2d 197 
(1947); C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 90 (3d ed. 1968) ("By 
property taxpayers are meant property owners, of course"). 
3. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
4. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), the 
Court upheld North Carolina's literacy requirement, concluding that "[t]he ability to 
read and write has some relation to standards designed to promote the intelligent use 
of the ballot." Other qualifications the Court there cited as constitutionally permissible 
were age, re.-;idence, and previous criminal record. 
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serve to separate persons with a substantial interest in the outcome 
of an election from others with little or no such interest5 (interest 
in the result). If the property ownership qualification in Cipriano 
performs either of these functions, the decision of the district court 
should be upheld. 
Qualifications for voting are traditionally established by the 
legislature, and thus it might seem that the legislative determina-
tion on the questions of voting competence and interest in the 
election should prevail. A strong presumption of validity normally 
attaches to legislative enactments,6 and consequently it is not the 
function of the judiciary to decide whether the means adopted by 
the legislature are the best means possible to attain the end sought.7 
Indeed, the court in Cipriano relied heavily on the legislature's 
There is some indication that restrictions on the states may be even more stringent 
when a congressional enactment is involved than when the fourteenth amendment alone 
is involved. In Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966), the Court found that by force 
of the supremacy clause and section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(e) (Supp. III, 1965-1967), the State of New York's English literacy requirement 
cannot be enforced against persons legally literate in Spanish by virtue of successful 
completion of sixth grade in a public school, or in a private school accredited by the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
The Court has condemned voter qualifications which bear no demonstrable relation 
to the promotion of intelligence and responsibility in voting. For instance, in Carring-
ton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), it struck down a provision of the Texas constitution 
which prohibited any member of the armed forces who moved to Texas from ever 
\'Oting in that state while still in the armed forces. 380 U.S. at 91-92. In Harper, the 
Court declared the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional saying, "Voter qualifications 
have no relation ••• to paying •.• this or any other tax." 383 U.S. at 666. 
5. The Supreme Court has stressed the basic premise that issues should be decided 
by a majority of the people concerned. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962). As one distinguished observer has concluded, "In all the cases emerges 
the basic proposition that a majority of the human beings concerned ,viii determine 
their political and economic fate." A. SUTHERLAND, CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 508 
(1965). 
It is apparent that if a person has no concern with the outcome of an election, it is 
not a denial of equal protection to deny him the right to vote. However, it will not 
always be possible to say that a person has no interest whatsoever in the outcome of 
an election. Rather, the line must be drawn on the ground that certain people have a 
substantially greater interest in an issue than others, whose interest may be indirect or 
insubstantial. If this is established, it is not unreasonable or unfair to exclude the 
latter group from voting on a particular issue. For instance, a resident of Ann Arbor 
who commutes fifty miles to Detroit to work is undoubtedly affected by and interested 
in the outcome of the municipal elections in Detroit; however, it is not unconstitutional 
to deny him the right to vote in those elections. The distinction would have to be 
drawn on the basis of the fact that property owners as opposed to those who did not 
own property in Detroit were substantially more interested in the outcome and issues 
of such general elections, and the latter group had no other interests substantial enough 
to entitle them to vote. 
6. See, e.g., Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643, 647 (1930); Home Tel. &: Tel. 
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908). 
7. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909); cf. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). See also Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers 
Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); 
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Board of Directors, 207 F. 338 (8th Cir. 1913). 
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determination that the property ownership qualification serves as 
a wise fiscal restraint.8 However, it is clear that the legislature 
cannot choose a method that violates the fundamental liberties 
of individuals if the same end can be achieved without infringing 
those liberties.9 In the Cipriano situation, there might well be 
alternative means for promoting fiscal restraint which do not im-
pinge on a number of citizens' right to vote, as the property owner-
ship qualification does. Possible alternatives include such mech-
anisms as manipulation of debt ceilings, state approval of locally 
approved bond issues, or the present requirement of the Louisiana 
statute that final approval of the bond issue be given by the local 
governing body.10 If these alternative means are as reasonable and as 
workable as that of a property ownership requirement, the statutory 
limitation on the right to vote in Cipriano would be unconstitu-
tional.11 
But even assuming that there are no such reasonable and work-
able alternatives, the legislative determination is not necessarily 
conclusive. When the franchise is involved, the normal presumption 
in favor of the legislature is not as strong as it is in other cases. The 
Supreme Court has indicated more than once that "any alleged in-
fringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized."12 Harper and subsequent voting rights 
cases established that statutorily imposed restrictions on voters run 
afoul of the equal protection clause if they are "irrational," "arbi-
trary," or "invidious"13 or if they are not "reasonable in light of 
8. Principal case at 827-28. 
9. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see Note, Constitutional Law-
Police Power-Michigan Statute Requiring Motorcyclists To Wear Protective Helmets 
Held Unconstitutional, 67 MICH. L. REv. 360, 366-67 (1968). This principle is supported 
by the general rule, stated in People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889), 
that the state may impose restraints on the individual only to the extent which is 
required or necessary for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare. This seems 
to imply that if a statutory restriction is not necessary or essential-that is if there is 
another method to the same end that does not infringe a fundamental right-the 
restriction is invalid. Note, supra, at 366 n.35. 
10. See note 1 supra. 
11. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which the 
Court stated that a municipality may not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its 
people, if reasonable nondiscriminary alternatives, adequate to conserve local interests, 
are available. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 
CTustice ·Frankfurter, concurring) (emphasis added): 
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in 
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the 
procedure that was followed • . . the balance of hurt complained of and good 
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judicial 
judgment. 
12. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) [quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)]. 
13. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968) (extending the principle of 
the apportionment cases to local government elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966). 
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their purpose."14 Thus, it is clear that state statutes that affect vot-
ing rights will be struck down despite the legislative presumption 
when they make invidious discriminations, are patently arbitrary, 
or are irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.15 
Assuming that the courts will take a more active role in assessing 
legislative restrictions on the franchise, the task of determining 
whether voter qualification requirements are irrational, invidious, 
or unreasonable requires a careful evaluation of possible justifica-
tions on the basis of voting competence or interest in the election. 
Obviously, if neither justification appears to be particularly rele-
vant to a given set of circumstances, the restriction is improper.16 
Thus, if the property ownership qualification applied in the prin-
cipal case can be justified realistically on one of these bases, it would 
be constitutional and the Cipriano decision would be correct.17 
One justification for a property ownership qualification on 
voting rights is based on the traditional idea that property owner-
ship is related to voting competence.18 The historical notion was 
that such a requirement would promote the intelligent and re-
sponsible use of the ballot. In colonial times, "property ownership 
and payment of taxes [were] the accepted symbols of community 
membership and interest."19 Professor Galbraith has stated that 
"[i]n the New World, as in the Old, it was assumed that power be-
14. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965). 
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. 
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50·51 (1959). 
16. The court in Cipriano appeared to disagree with this analysis. It noted that the 
standards of voting competence and interest in the result were applicable only in 
general elections and that they did not apply to special elections such as the one in 
question. According to this argument, a voter qualification for a special election would 
not violate the equal protection clause even if it did not meet one of these standards. 
In proposing this principle, the court relied on Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 
(1967), in which the scheme for selecting county school board members was challenged. 
In that case, local school boards were elected by popular vote of the residents of the 
district; no constitutional question was raised respecting those elections. The con-
stitutional claim was based on the fact that the county board was chosen not by the 
electors of the county, but by delegates from the local boards, every local school board 
(irrespective of population, wealth, or other differences) having one vote. The Supreme 
Court ruled that this scheme was not inconsistent with equal protection and that 
municipalities could experiment in the selection of members of administrative agencies. 
The court in Cipriano found that the election to approve the issuance of bonds was 
not a general election but concerned only administrative functions of the municipality, 
and relied on the distinction made in Sailors to approve the property ownership 
requirement. However, the Court in Sailors indicated that "where a State provides for 
an election of a local official or agency-whether administrative, legislative, or judicial 
-the requirements of [equal protection] must be met ...• " 387 U.S. at lll. Although 
it did not go on to decide what the requirements of equal protection would be if 
there were to be elections for county school board members, there is no apparent reason 
for the special-election standard to depart from the criteria applied to general elections. 
17. But see notes 9 &: ll supra and accompanying text. 
18. The court in the principal case relied primarily on this justification. Principal 
case at 827. 
19. J. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 175 (1960). 
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longed, as a right, to men who owned land. Democracy, in its mod-
ern meaning, began as a system which gave the suffrage to those who 
had proved their worth by acquiring real property and to no 
others."20 
No state today has property qualifications for voting in general 
elections.21 Professor Phillips has described the abandonment of 
such limitations: 
In time [however] leveling influences prevailed, and most Americans 
refused to accept the contention that there was a necessary rela-
tionship between property ownership or payment of taxes and 
interest in government or capacity to govern. North Carolina, in 
1865, was the last state to abolish property ownership as a qualifica-
tion for voting in state and national elections .... 22 
Moreover, even by the end of the 1950's, only a few states re-
quired property ownership for voting on bond issues or special 
assessments.23 The unanimous abandonment of property ownership 
as a prerequisite for voting in general elections and its apparently 
infrequent use as a test for voting in special elections weaken the 
purely historical justification for its present-day use. The same sort 
of historical and traditional justification was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Harper when it was used in defense of the poll tax. Dis-
senting in that case, Justice Harlan restated the argument: 
It is ... arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political 
theory by a large percentage of Americans through most of our 
history, that people with some property have a deeper stake in 
community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more 
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than 
those without means, and that the community and the Nation 
would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such 
citizens.24 
20. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW !NDUSfRIAL STATE 52 (1968). 
21. XVII THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1968-1969, 
30 (1968). 
22. J. PHILLIPS, supra note 19, at 175. 
23. Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 P. 802 (1922) (state constitution construed 
to permit cities to impose property requirements in local bond elections); LA. CONST, 
art. 14, § 14(a); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 33:4252, 33:4258 (1950) (see note I supra); MICH, 
CoNST. art. 2, § 6 (tax-limit increase or bond issue); MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 2 [creation 
of levy, debt, or liability; construed to apply only to debts or liabilities to be retired 
by ad valorem taxes in Cottingham v. State Bd. of Examiners, 134 Mont. I, 328 P.2d 
907 (1958)]; NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 387.365-.395 (property owners' veto of approval of sd1ool 
bonds), 539.123 (irrigation district elections) (1967); N.M. CoNsr. art. IX, § IO (county 
elections on borrowing), § 11 (sdtool district elections on borrowing), § 12 (elections to 
increase municipal indebtedness); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(4) (1962) (alternative to 
literacy requirement in all elections); TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 3 (certain sdtool taxes), art. 
9, §§ 4-9, 11 (certain hospital taxes), art. 16, § 59(c) (certain conservation district bonds); 
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 7 (property ownership requirement permissive in elections to 
create indebtedness or to levy special taxes). 
24. 383 U.S. at 685. 
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Nevertheless, the majority concluded that "[v]oter qualifications 
have no relation to wealth nor to paying ... this or any other tax."25 
Payment of a property tax, or property ownership, when employed 
as a device to promote the "intelligent" use of the ballot, is an 
anachronism. Today, there is no reason to believe that property 
ownership in any way enhances one's ability to exercise intelligent 
judgment in any election. Property owners are not necessarily bet-
ter educated than others, and a literacy requirement would be a 
better device for measuring a potential voter's basic level of edu-
cation or intelligence than would property ownership. Apart from 
considerations of education, there is no reason to believe that 
property owners are per se more responsible or more worthy 
of confidence than nonproperty owners. With increased mobility 
throughout our society-manifested especially by the large num-
ber of property owners employed by national public and private 
enterprises-it is by no means clear that property owners as a 
class have a greater stake in community affairs than those who 
do not own property. 
However, in a case in which the election involves financing by 
increased property taxes, it might be argued that property owners 
would indeed be more likely to vote responsibly than those who 
do not own property. Nevertheless, when it is recognized that 
the property tax is generally not paid by property owners alone, 
but is often passed on to tenants,26 this argument becomes question-
able. 'Without the assumption that property owners alone pay 
the property tax, there is no fundamental difference between prop-
erty owners and nonproperty owners that would make the former 
more likely to vote responsibly in such an election.27 In short, it 
25. 383 U.S. at 666. Whether or not the property tax qualification attacked in the 
principal case (as opposed to property ownership qualifications generally) is ipso facto 
unconstitutional by virtue of Harper is not clear, although such a conclusion is cer-
tainly within a literal reading of the words quoted in the te.'Xt. 
26. When the demand for rental housing is price inelastic, owners of such property 
will raise rents and pass on the increased tax promptly. D. NETZER, EcoNOMICS OF THE 
PROPERTY TAX. 45-46 (1966). This would be the case especially with respect to multi-
family units, owned and maintained for investment purposes; and this is the largest 
share of rental housing by property value. See also C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2, 
at 90: "Contrary to popular misunderstanding, a renter pays just as much in property 
taxes as an owner, although it is hidden in the rent." 
27. There is some suggestion that while there is no economic difference between 
owners and lessees with respect to payment of property taxes, there may be a psychological 
difference. C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, supra note 2, at 90. It may be true that property owners 
ha\'e a greater awareness of the burden of financing when the property tax is to be 
used to finance the improvement or e."Xpenditure authorized by an election. Neverthe-
less, the distinction is merely one of degree, and its magnitude cannot be demonstrated. 
Moreover, the common practice of landlords of justifying rent increases by virtue of 
increased property taxes weakens the claim that tenants are less aware of the relevant 
is~ues at stake in such an election. It should be noted, however, that the bond issue 
election in Cipriano did not present a case in which the property tax was to be used 
to finance the improvement. Principal case at 824; Judge Wisdom's dissent at 829; LA. 
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is impossible to find any significant connection between the owner-
ship of real property and the ability to exercise the franchise 
intelligently and responsibly.28 Consequently, any property qualifi-
cation such as that in Cipriano seems to be irrational and arbitrary 
with respect to voting competence and the legislative presumption 
in favor of that qualification is thus overcome.29 
The property ownership requirement might still be justified, 
however, if it serves to separate citizens with a substantial interest 
in the outcome of the election from those whose interest is not 
substantial.30 If the outcome of an election affects property own-
ers alone, or if it affects them to a substantially greater degree31 
than it does others, a property ownership qualification would not 
violate the equal protection clause.32 But it is clear that when the 
issue at stake in an election affects all citizens in much the same 
manner and degree, restricting the class of voters to property own-
ers is arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional.33 
This type of analysis has been applied recently. In Pierce v. 
Village of Ossining,34 a three-judge federal district court held that 
a restriction of the franchise to "owner[s] of property in the village 
assessed upon the last preceding assessment-role thereof"35 was 
invalid. The issue at stake in the election was whether or not the 
village should change from a mayoral system to a village-manager 
system of government. In holding that this classification of voters 
was arbitrary and had no reasonable relation to proper qualifica-
tions for voting, the court declared: 
The proposition on which plaintiffs have been excluded from 
voting would work a fundamental change in the village govern-
ment where they live. Whether that change should be made affects 
all who live in the Village so that denying the franchise to those 
who do not own real property is an invidious discrimination.36 
CoNsr. art. 14, § 14(m). Consequently, any argument as to the greater responsibility of 
property owners by virtue of their financing of an improvement through the property 
tax, or their greater awareness of such financing, should have no bearing on the 
decision in the principal case. See text accompanying note 4 infra. 
28. For a discussion of property ownership as a qualification on the right to bold 
elective town office and a conclusion that it is impermissible, see Landes v. Town of 
North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 421, 231 N.E.2d 120, 122, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444, 
(1967). But cf. Schweitzer v. Plymouth City Clerk, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W.2d 35 (1969). 
29. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. 
30. See note 5 supra. 
31. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text. 
32. See note 5 supra. 
33. Id. 
34. 292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unanimous decision by three-judge court), 
35. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 4-402(b) (McKinney 1966). 
36. 292 F. Supp. at 115. But see Croen v. Vetrano, 52 Misc. 2d 915, 277 N.Y.S.2d 354 
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (sustaining a restriction on the right to vote in referenda on the question 
of incorporation of a village to owners of real property in the territory involved). 
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Thus, when all residents of a community have equal concern with 
an election issue, the fourteenth amendment demands that they 
have equal voice in the decision. 
Conversely, when there is a substantial difference between the 
interests of various classes of persons and when a reasonable attempt 
is made to identify those classes which have a substantially greater 
interest in a particular election, the vote may be constitutionally 
denied to others.37 In Kramer v. Union Free School District No.15,38 
a resident of the defendant school district-a twenty-eight year 
old bachelor living in the home of his parents-launched a four-
teenth amendment challenge against the provisions of the New 
York Education Law39 which denied him the right to vote in school 
district elections. The statute provided that only residents who 
owned taxable real property, their spouses, lessees in the school 
district (but not their spouses),40 and parents or guardians of chil-
dren attending district schools had the right to vote in such elec-
tions. The majority of the three-judge federal district court found 
the statute valid as a reasonable attempt to limit the vote 
to those district residents who, [the legislature] believes, have a 
direct interest in the administration of the school system because 
they are either real estate taxpayers (or renters of taxable real 
estate) and thus carry the burden of paying for a major share of 
the services provided by the school districts, or because they are 
directly involved as parents of pupils attending the schools in 
question.41 
The interests recognized in the statute as qualifying residents 
to vote are clearly relevant to the issues presented in the election-
electing members to the school board, approval of the budget, and 
levying taxes on taxable real property in the district to meet the 
expenses for the coming year.42 The classes enumerated in the 
statute have direct and substantial interests in those issues in addi-
87. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
88. 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (2-1 decision), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S. 
818 (1968) (No. 258). The issue presented on appeal is whether N.Y. EDuc. LAW 
§ 2012 (McKinney 1953) as applied to deny petitioner his right to vote in school district 
elections violates the equal protection clause or the first amendment as made applicable 
to the states by the fourteenth. The first amendment issue was not discussed by the 
lower court. 
39. N.Y. EDUC. I.Aw § 2012 (McKinney 1953). 
40. Since Kramer, the statute has been amended (effective June 16, 1968) to extend 
the vote to the spouse of "one who leases, hires or is in possession of a contract of 
purchase of, real property in such district liable to taxation for school purposes •••. " 
N.Y. EDuc. I.Aw § 2012(3)(a) (McKinney 1969). The constitutionality of the former 
provision extending the vote to spouses of owners of taxable real property while deny-
ing it to spouses of lessees of such property seems doubtful. However, the question was 
not raised in Kramer since the plaintiff had no standing to represent spouses of lessees. 
41. 282 F. Supp. at 73. 
42. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§§ 2021, 2022 (McKinney 1953). 
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tion to the general interest-which is all that could be asserted 
by the plaintiff-in educational policy and in the schools as socio-
cultural institutions. Although it cannot be said that the plaintiff 
was completely unaffected by or disinterested in the issues decided 
by the school district elections, the substantial difference between 
his interests and the interests of those eligible to vote indicates 
that the Kramer decision is a sound one. 
Another type of election in which the right to vote might be 
constitutionally restricted to a certain class of citizens-in this case 
property owners--is a special assessment election on the issue 
of whether to construct public improvements affecting property in a 
specific area.43 Special-assessment financing generally assumes that 
the property adjacent to certain types of public improvements re• 
ceives special benefits from the improvements; therefore, it im-
poses the burden of paying for this kind of improvement upon the 
owners of adjacent parcels of land.44 It might be reasonable to 
restrict the right to vote on whether to construct public projects 
financed in this way to the same group of property owners.40 How-
ever, if people who did not own property-for example, lessees of 
real property that was to be specially assessed-were affected in 
substantially the same way, the property ownership qualification 
could still be held unconstitutional. It might be argued that al-
though lessees do share to some degree in the benefits and bur-
dens, their interests are not nearly so great as those of the property 
owners. Factors which might be said to cause this difference in 
interest are transiency and investment of the property owner in 
the community in terms of the length of his connection with it 
and his direct payment of taxes. However, it is doubtful that 
property ownership is an accurate measure of connection with the 
43. Special assessments for public improvements are special charges imposed by law 
on land to defray the expenses in whole or in part of a local improvement on the theory 
that the owner of the property has received special benefits from the improvement over 
and above the benefits accruing to the community in general. See, e.g., Fluckey v. 
City of Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 450, 100 N.W. 2d 486, 489 (1960); County of West-
chester v. Town of Harrison, 201 Misc. 211, 215, 114 N.Y.S.2d 492,497, (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
This is not to say that there are no benefits outside the group whose property is 
assessed, but that this group has benefited specially by the enhancement of their 
property. 
No state statute authorizing such a special-assessment election could be found, such 
assessments normally being made by the local legislative body. See, e.g., l\I. HOWARD, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 298-99 (1940); ·w. WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 
TODAY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 67-68, 98 (Michigan 
Governmental Studies, No. 26, 1952). Hence, it is posed here as a hypothetical. 
44. See note 43 supra. 
45. Although it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a municipal improve-
ment in a particular neighborhood would not have some incidental effects on other 
residents or property in the city, merely incidental beneficiaries with a small and 
intangible interest need not be allowed to vote. See note 5 supra and text accompanying 
notes 37-41 supra. 
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community or concern with the special improvement.46 It must 
be reiterated that often lessees effectively pay the property tax.47 
and share the benefits of improvements such as improved sewers, 
wider streets, or community parks; thus, it appears that the inter-
ests of lessees and property owners are likely to be identical. More-
over, it may be unrealistic to expect a state or local legislative body 
to establish adequate guidelines which would take account of all 
possible variations in the comparative interests of the two classes 
of residents. It may be impractical, therefore, to attempt to restrict 
the lessees' franchise so that they can vote only when their interests 
are exactly equivalent to the interests of property owners. Further-
more, such a determination should not be left entirely to the courts 
since the establishment of voter qualifications has traditionally been 
a legislative concern. Thus, it appears that the best course, con-
sistent with both practicality and the equal protection clause, is 
to extend the franchise to lessees and property owners whenever 
the interests of the two groups in the burdens and benefits at stake 
in an election are generally similar. 
Although the three-judge federal district court in Cipriano 
did not consider this standard, the case appears to be wrongly de-
46. Transiency may indeed be relevant in determining the degree of one's interest 
in a public improvement, but the usual method of taking account of this factor is to 
use a residency requirement. It is more direct and does not encompass considerations 
which are irrelevant to the concern; consequently, it should be used if the goal is to 
limit the franchise to those who have a relationship to the community of significant 
duration. 
It might also be argued that one's investment in the community is to be inferred 
from the length of his connection with it, but again residence would appear to be the 
relevant consideration rather than the fact of property ownership. See Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 37 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. April 21, 1969). This case stresses the restriction 
which welfare residence requirements place on the right to_ travel freely within the 
United States, 37 U.S.L.W. at 4336-37. It could be argued that residence requirements 
imposed on the franchise in special assessment elections have a similar effect; however, 
it seems clear that there is a significant difference in the magnitude of the effect. Per-
haps one's participation in civic affairs is more indicative of a concern about the com-
munity than any of the foregoing considerations; but there is no necessary relation 
between such participation and property ownership. 
,vith respect to payment of taxes as a measure of one's investment in the com-
munity, both property owners and lessees pay taxes, including the property tax. See 
note 26 supra and accompanying texL Although there may be some difference in degree 
with respect to the latter, such differences are not easily measured since the lessee's 
payments arc merged in his rcnL Consequently, any distinctions between property owners 
and lessees based on differences in degree of payment of property taxes would be 
administratively impracticable. 
There is a difference in investments in the community in that the tenant's rent 
does not buy a permanent interest in the property. Yet the significance of this differ-
ence for the question of the restriction of the vote in special assessment elections is 
not clear. Public improvements may indeed affect the value of property in either 
direction. ,\'hcthcr property values increase or decrease, the fact that they are affected 
makes it doubtful that property owners arc in the best position to pass exclusive 
judgment on the wisdom or desirability of a public improvement that also affects others. 
47. See note 26 supra. 
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cided when the standard is applied. Property owners have no greater 
interest in the bond issue election involved in that case than do 
those residents who do not mvn property in the community. All 
residents of the city would benefit in substantially the same way 
from the construction of the utility, and because the utility was not 
to be financed by property taxes, 48 property owners would bear 
no more burden than other residents. Since the burdens and bene• 
fits were equal for all, the question was essentially a general one 
involving the administration of city affairs. And because property 
owners were no more concerned with or affected by the outcome 
of the election than were other residents, the property ownership 
qualification was clearly inconsistent with the demands of equal 
protection and should be invalidated. 
LABOR RELATIONS-Consumer Picketing Under 
Section 8(h) (4) (ii) (B) of the National 
Labor Relations Act-Honolulu Typographical 
Union, No. 37, 1.T.U., A.F.L.-C.1.0. v. NLRB* 
When a dispute arose between a local of the International 
Typographical Union and a Honolulu newspaper, the union pro-
.ceeded to picket several restaurants which advertised in that news-
paper. The pickets carried signs and distributed handbills identifying 
the dispute and asking potential consumers of the restaurants not 
"to purchase ... products advertised in the struck [newspaper]."1 
However, since the restaurants did not advertise individual products 
but claimed generally that they were good places to eat, the pickets' 
appeal was, in effect, a request to the public to avoid patronizing 
those restaurants. The picketed restaurants subsequently instituted 
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board claiming 
that the picketing should be prohibited because it was a secondary 
boycott which violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).2 The union argued that its actions con-
48. See note 27 supra. 
• 401 F. 2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) [hereinafter principal case]. 
1. Principal.case at 954. 
2, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section provides in part: 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) ••• (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce 
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person • • • 
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stituted consumer picketing and that therefore they were protected 
under the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. 
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).3 
The Board found that the picketing was a violation of the NLRA 
and issued a cease and desist order against further picketing by the 
union. The union appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the NLRB's finding and granted its 
cross-petition for enforcement of the cease and desist order. The 
court stated that the pickets' request was aimed at the restaurants' 
business in general and not at a specific product;4 thus, the picketing 
was not protected by the Tree Fruits doctrine and was an illegal 
secondary boycott.15 
The principal case is concerned generally with the problem of 
secondary activity by unions, and specifically with the application of 
a judicially created exception to the general prohibition against 
such activity. As originally written, section 8(b)(4) was intended to 
protect neutral employers from becoming involved in disputes be-
tween other employers and unions by prohibiting certain union 
activities.6 Among the practices forbidden was the traditional sec-
ondary boycott which arises when a union in a dispute with a 
primary employer brings pressure to bear on other employers (sec-
ondary employers), through their employees, to cease doing business 
with the primary.7 However, the statute did not seek to insulate the 
primary employer from this indirect pressure; rather, "the gravamen 
of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the 
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third 
party who has no concern in it."8 In short, Congress intended to 
prevent those who were only tangentially related from becoming in-
volved . 
• • • [N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, 
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including 
customers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute 
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have 
an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the 
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, 
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the employer engaged in 
such distribution •••• 
3. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra. 
4. Principal case at 954. 
5. Principal case at 957. 
6. As added by section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 
§ 303(a), 61 Stat., 158 (1947), section 8(b)(4) forbade a union to induce "employees of 
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their 
employment." For a discussion of the shortcomings of this approach to the problem 
of protecting neutral employers against secondary pressures by unions, see Aaron, 
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1086, 
1112-13 (1960). 
7. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 6. 
8. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d 
Cir. 1950) Gudge Learned Hand). 
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The language of the original section 8(b)(4) prohibited unions 
only from inducing "the employees" of a secondary employer.0 This 
construction proved far too narrow, and in 1959, Congress sought 
to expand the scope of prohibited secondary activity by enacting 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This new provision makes it an unfair labor 
practice for a union "to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person 
engaged in commerce" if its objective is to force him to stop doing 
business with "any other person."10 Obviously, this prohibitory 
language is very broad, but Congress did make a specific exception 
for truthful publicity, communicated by means other than picketing, 
designed to inform the public that a product of the primary em-
ployer is being distributed by secondary employers.11 According to 
many commentators, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), when viewed in light 
of this proviso, is intended to operate as a complete ban on consumer 
picketing.12 In their view, any attempt by the union to pressure a 
secondary employer by inducing his customers to stop doing busi-
ness with him is illegal secondary activity under the NLRA. The 
effect of such secondary pressure is certainly similar to a union at-
tempt to influence the primary by appealing to the secondary's work 
force. In both cases, the neutral employer is forced into a dispute 
which does not directly concern him. 
Five years after the 1959 amendments, in Tree Fruits,13 the 
Supreme Court declared that the ostensibly comprehensive prohibi-
tions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) do not forbid all consumer picketing. 
In that case, the union's dispute was with a producer of apples, 
but it chose to picket a retail supermarket which sold the apples as 
one of many items. The picketing was not specifically aimed at the 
retailer; it clearly identified the primary employer-the producer 
-as the union's target and asked only that the consumers refrain 
from purchasing his apples. The Court held that peaceful secondary 
picketing of retail stores was not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
when its sole purpose was to ask consumers not to buy the primary 
employer's product.14 The Court found that Congress intended to 
9. See note 6 supra. 
~ IO. NLRA, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1964). This section is repro• 
duced in note 2 supra. See note Zl infra. 
11. Id. 
12. E.g., Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of 
Tree Fruits, 49 MINN. L. R.Ev. 479, 481 n.6 (1965). See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin 
Amendments to the NL.R.A., 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 274 1959; Aaron, supra note 6, 
at 1114-15. 
13. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 
(1964). 
14. 377 U.S. at 71. It would appear necessary to come within the standard estab• 
lished that the picket signs clearly identify the primary employer (both who he is and 
that he is the target) and ask only that consumers not buy his product. Such a test 
very closely approximates the language of the proviso to section 8(b)(4), which 
states that the union does not commit an unlawful secondary boycott if its actions 
amount only to "truthfully advising the public ..• that a product or products are 
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distinguish picketing which merely follows the struck product and 
attempts to persuade consumers not to buy it from picketing which is 
aimed at preventing all trade with the secondary employer. The 
majority opinion stated: 
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers 
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely con-
fined to the primary dispute. . .. On the other hand, when con-
sumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade 
at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck 
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure 
designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such a case, 
the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it 
creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer.115 
In the Court's view, then, only that picketing aimed at preventing 
all trade with the secondary corresponds to the traditional secondary 
boycott proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
Despite the Court's rationale in Tree Fruits, the decision is diffi-
cult to support as a matter of strict statutory interpretation; section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and its proviso seem to indicate that all consumer 
picketing is illegal.16 In fact, the NLRB's opinion in Tree Fruits 
states that " 'by the literal wording of the proviso . . . as well as 
through the interpretative gloss placed thereon by its drafters, con-
sumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is pro-
hibited.' "17 Thus, the Board held that the picketing in question was 
illegal. The Board's holding, then, as well as the views of some com-
mentators,18 indicates that Tree Fruits must be regarded as a ju-
dicially created exception to the general rule against consumer 
picketing. Consequently, the decision should be narrowly construed 
to assure the continuing validity of the general rule. 
The Tree Fruits case distinguished between picketing one of 
many products handled by a secondary-a partial boycott-and an 
attempt to prevent all trade with the secondary-a total boycott. This 
test is difficult to apply in factual contexts that differ from the situa-
tion in Tree Fruits. For instance, when the struck product encom-
passes all or a substantial part of the secondary's business ("one 
product" cases),19 consumer picketing of the primary's product at the 
secondary's place of business may well produce the same pressures on 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute 
and are distributed by another employer [as long as there are no effects on employees 
of anyone other than the primary in the course of their employment]." 
15. 377 U.S. at 72. 
16. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
17. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. II72, II77 (1961). 
18. See note 6 supra. 
19. That is, if he sells only one particular brand of gasoline or one type of car. 
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the secondary as would the traditional secondary boycott which 
section 8(b)(4) proscribes.20 
The principal case presents a somewhat related problem. The 
picketed restaurants did not advertise a specific product in the 
struck newspaper; rather, they claimed that they were good places 
to eat. Picketing the advertised product, therefore, necessarily af-
fected the secondary's entire business.21 The court applied the Tree 
Fruits doctrine and found the total-partial boycott distinction to be 
crucial. Picketing, the court stated, is permissible when only a small 
part of the secondary's business is affected (as in Tree Fruits), but 
impermissible when the "picketing appeal to consumers is expanded 
to request a total boycott of the secondary seller . : .. "22 In the latter 
situation, found to exist in the principal case, the picketing is illegal 
under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
Although this conclusion is consistent with the Tree Fruits ra-
tionale, it ignores the conceptual problems involved with extending 
that rationale to cases in which intangible services rather than 
products are furnished by the primary. It is suggested that these con-
ceptual problems might be solved by dividing consumer picketing 
situations into two basic types which could be called "chain" and 
"merger." Tree Fruits and the "one product" situations23 are ex-
amples of chain cases.24 The struck product of the primary passes to 
the retailer-secondary (perhaps through middlemen) unchanged. 
Consequently, it is relatively easy to visualize the product in ques-
tion as that of the primary, although it is ultimately picketed at the 
secondary's place of business. The problem with chain cases then 
becomes one of deciding what portion of the secondary's business 
must be involved in order to make the picketing a violation unde1 
the Tree Fruits distinction between total and partial boycotts. 
This question, although vital for an effective application of the 
test, has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court. 
Cases like the principal case, however, do not fit this chain con-
20. The court in the principal case expressly reserved opinion on the "one 
product" case. Principal case at 956 n.9. The Tree Fruits decision did not spe-
cifically discuss "one product" cases either. However, the effect in such a case of 
consumer picketing appears to be indistinguishable from the effect in the principal 
case. Both fact situations appear closely analogous to a total boycott of the secondary, 
which, under Tree Fruits, would be illegal. 
21. The court in the principal case stated: 
[T]he picketing appeal to consumers not to buy "products advertised in the 
struck ••• [p]ress" was an attempt to cling to a legal concept evolved for another 
case even though the language patently does not fit the facts of this situation. 
The only realistic meaning of the appeal is the traditional "do not patronize this 
establishment. 
Principal case at 954. 
22. Principal case at 955. 
23. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
24. There may be other chain cases involving more than one product picketed, but 
the analysis would be the same. 
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cept, because the product of the primary (intangible services) is not 
simply passed along to and sold by the secondary in the same form. 
The picketing, therefore, is not directed at the particular service 
in question-in the principal case the newspaper advertising-but 
at the products ultimately produced and sold by the secondary. 
In order to visualize the primary's product as the one being picketed, 
resort must be made to a concept such as merger. In the principal 
case, for instance, since advertising costs contribute to the cost of 
the secondary's product and ultimately to the price a diner pays for 
his meal, the advertising might be thought of as "merged" into the 
secondary's product.25 The unions would undoubtedly argue that 
this merger of the primary's product into the secondary's is sufficient 
to identify the two so as to justify consumer picketing of the 
secondary's product. It is submitted, however, that such an argument 
should be rejected. Since the product of the secondary in merger 
cases is substantially different from that of the primary, permitting 
consumer picketing of the secondary's product does not accord with 
the Tree Fruits rationale. In these situations the union's appeal 
cannot be said to be "closely confined to the primary dispute." It 
also seems that this type of picketing "create[s] a separate dispute 
with the secondary employer."20 Moreover, in merger cases, since 
picketing the primary's contribution means picketing the entire 
product sold by the secondary, the appeal of the pickets is aimed 
directly at the secondary's total business. Therefore, the picketing 
becomes, in effect, a total boycott of the secondary which, under 
Tree Fruits, clearly violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). At least one recent 
Board decision is in accord with this analysis.27 
25. Examples of "merger" cases, in addition to the advertising situation, would be 
cases in which the primary provided some intangible service or component part that 
contributed to what the secondary ultimately sold to his customers. For an example of 
an intangible service other than advertising, see Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House 
Workers International Union, Local 259, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328. See also 
note 27 infra. 
An example of a component parts type of merger case is Twin City Carpenters 
District Council &: Boot &: Shoe Workers Union, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO, 167 N.L.R.B. 
No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,858 (1968). In that case, the union picketed a 
builder and seller of houses advising that the cabinets being used in the houses were 
not made by union members, but failing to name the cabinetmaker at whom the 
pickets were directed. The Board found this activity to be a coercive attempt to get 
the builder to stop dealing with the cabinetmaker. 
26. NLRB v. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 
377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
27. In Laundry, Dry Cleaning &: Dye House Workers Intl. Union, Local 259, 
1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,i 21,328 (1967) the union picketed a restaurant that used a 
linen service supplied by a laundry with which the union was engaged in a dispute. 
The restaurant did not sell linen service to its customers, but merely used it in its 
operations. The Board found that there was not sufficient identification between the 
picketing and either a primary product or primary employer to render the picketing 
permissible as an attempt to persuade consumers not to buy a struck product. See also 
Twin Cities Carpenters Dist. Council & Boot & Shoe Workers, Local 527-C, AFL-CIO, 
167 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,J 21,858 (1968). 
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Under the approach presented above, the Tree Fruits rationale 
might be stated as follows: consumer picketing which acts exclu-
sively on the demand for a struck product of the primary and which 
does not affect either any other part of the secondary's business or so 
much of his business as to be a threat to its continuance is not a 
secondary boycott for purposes of section 8(b)(4). If there are any 
coercive effects in such chain situations, they are merely incidental 
or insubstantial. On the other hand, in merger cases it is impossible 
to act exclusively on the demand for the primary's product without 
disturbing other business of the secondary. Therefore, in such 
situations the basic evil of the traditional secondary boycott-pres-
suring the secondary into a complete cessation of business with the 
primary-is likely to occur. It is this difference which suggests that 
the Tree Fruits exception should not be extended to merger cases. 
The principal case recognizes this approach. 
The court in the principal case suggested another possible test 
for determining the legality of consumer picketing. According to 
that test, the determination would tum on whether the union's 
picketing subjects the secondary employer to greater pressure or dis-
ruption than he would suffer from a successful strike against the 
primary.28 In the chain cases, assuming a successful strike against the 
primary, the unavailability of the primary's product because of that 
strike would have substantially the same effect as a successful appeal 
to consumers--the secondary would be unable to sell any of the 
struck product.29 In such cases, consumer picketing of the primary's 
product at the secondary's place of business should be allowed. 
On the other hand, in the "merger" cases, picketing the secondary 
would have a substantially greater effect on him than would a strike 
against the primary. On the facts of the principal case, for example, a 
successful strike against the newspaper would merely extinguish one 
source of advertising services and might therefore have little impact 
on the demand of the secondary' s customers for his meals. However, 
if the union were allowed to picket the advertised product, the 
secondary would be subjected to much greater pressure affecting 
his entire business. In the event of a strike, the secondary could 
merely change advertising outlets, while if picketed he would bear 
28. This test was suggested earlier by Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary 
Boycott, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1363, 1412 (1962). Although Professor Lesnick's focus is 
limited to "common situs," "roving suits," and "reserved gate" problems, the distinc-
tion he suggests seems no less appropriate in determining when secondary picketing 
should constitute a violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii){B). Carried to its logical conclusion, 
however, this test would seem to permit consumer picketing in the total boycott situa-
tion when the secondary sells only the struck product (the "one product" case). This 
demonstrates the weakness of the suggested test and indicates that the "merger" theory 
would be preferable. 
29. Of course, he might get a similar product elsewhere and, therefore, lose nothing. 
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a considerable risk of losing business. Accordingly, in merger cases 
consumer picketing of the secondary should be disallowed. 
The result in the principal case can be supported on several 
grounds, as discussed above. It is suggested that the merger-chain 
analysis is preferable since it eliminates automatically any need to 
consider the application of Tree Fruits once the merger label is 
attached. But, helpful as this categorization is, it is not a panacea 
for solving the problems of determining when consumer picketing 
violates section 8(b)(4). As chain cases approach the one product 
situation, a difficult line-drawing task awaits the Board and the 
courts. 
RECENT BOOKS 
BooK REVIEWS 
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By J. Woodford 
Howard. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1968. Pp. x, 
578. $12.50. 
Dramatically and unexpectedly, Frank Murphy learned within 
hours of the death of his predecessor, Justice Pierce Butler, that he 
would be appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States. On 
that day, November 16, 1939, there had been a Cabinet meeting at the 
White House. Desiring to speak privately with President Roosevelt 
about several routine matters, Attorney General Murphy stayed 
behind after most of the other Cabinet members departed. In the 
midst of this discussion with the President, the following episode took 
place, as described in Murphy's own handwritten notes: 
The Assistant Secretary of Commerce was in the room at the 
time. He stood looking out the window at the far end of the Cabinet 
Room. I had drawn a chair-the Secretary of State's chair-near the 
President's right side. He was in his chair at the head of the table. 
In the midst of our chat and when Noble wasn't looking he 
reached over and whispered in my ear "Do you appreciate the signifi-
cance of what happened this morning-Justice Butler's death?" In a 
sense I did but did not want to assume that my name would be con-
sidered so I remained silent. Without a moment's delay he now 
leaned back in his chair and with a handsome grin on his face he 
chucked his arm full length at me, index finger pointing just under 
the head of the table over against my arm and whispered "You, 
you!" I was bewildered not only that he had so briefly come to a 
conclusion on the subject but also, despite the fact that I am fully 
aware of his love of surprises, that he would announce it to me in 
this fashion. "It begins to look like it," he added. 
I quietly said to him, "Mr. President, I am of course at your 
service but expect you to do only what is in the best interest of the 
Country." Beyond this, I said nothing. I did not indicate that I 
hoped it was true, that I was pleased with it or that I would reject it. 
"Think it over for a week and then we will have a visit about it." 
My thoughts were not settled on the subject for I honestly knew 
he could make a better choice for the Supreme Court than myself. 
My long years of training have made me to a degree proficient and 
very fond of administrative work. Reform and modernization of 
government, [and] the selection of discriminating personnel attracted 
me mightily and for these and other reasons I believe I could serve 
the nation better off the Court than on it. Be that as it may a 
Supreme Court Justice was born in the informal and boylike per-
formance recited above. He was in glee throughout the brief episode. 
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He loves with some sort of gleeful passion deflating an important and 
solemn occasion into a normal affair. 
Thus was born a Court appointment that was to span more than 
nine years, an appointment that brought to the Court a man whose 
judicial talents were both unique and controversial. J. Woodford 
Howard, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, 
has sought in this "political biography" to bring meaning and under-
standing to the judicial career of Frank Murphy. And he has done 
so with the postulate of Jerome Frank in mind: 
The ultimately important influence in the decisions of any judge are 
the most obscure .... They are tied up with intimate experiences 
which no biographer, however sedulous, is likely to ferret out, and 
the emotional significance of which no one but the judge, or a psy-
chologist in the closest contact with him, could comprehend .... 
For in the last push, a judge's decisions are the outcome of his entire 
life history.1 
While not a psychologist and never an acquaintance of Justice 
Murphy, Professor Howard has managed to draw a most perceptive 
and realistic portrait of the Justice. He has come as close as possible, 
at least for an outside observer, to comprehending the emotional 
significance of the events in Murphy's life that influenced his work on 
the Court. This is no hasty tract or superficial biography. It repre-
sents thorough research and mature reflection covering more than a 
decade, starting with the author's doctoral thesis at Princeton under 
Mason.2 And he has had the advantage of examining the recently 
available papers of the Justice, including those of the Court tenure. 
The story of Frank Murphy, as sketched by Professor Howard, "re-
solves itself into an impressive unity ... a life of unwavering defense 
of human rights" (p. 496). As a public prosecutor and criminal court 
judge, as Mayor of Detroit, Governor-General of the Philippines, 
Governor of Michigan, and then as Attorney General of the United 
States, Frank Murphy exhibited an amazing consistency of purpose 
and action in the civil rights arenas. He was an activist in his complete 
and uncompromising dedication to the basic democratic ideals that 
most Americans profess but . so often ignore. And he brought that 
activism, that dedication, to his role as Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court. 
Therein lies the key to the enigma of Frank Murphy-a key that 
serves to explain a great deal about what have been described as his 
strengths and his weaknesses as a Justice. During the 1940's, the period 
of Murphy's service on the bench, the Court was confronted with two 
1. LAW AND THE l\lODERN MIND 114-15 (1930). 
2, Howard, Frank Murphy: A Liberal's Creed (unpublished doctoral thesis in the 
Princeton University Library, Department of Politics, Feb. 1959). 
1280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67 
major types of civil liberties problems: (1) those generated by wartime 
controls and restrictions; and (2) those emanating from the awakening 
of the legal system to the need for greater constitutional and judicial 
protection of basic human rights. To those tasks, Justice Murphy 
brought a full measure of understanding and insight. In forceful and 
colorful language, he gave voice to the libertarian idealism that under. 
lies the Bill of Rights and that came into greater prominence in the 
subsequent years of the Warren Court. Seldom has the judicial and 
public C<?nscience of the nation been so eloquently expressed than in 
the opinions of Murphy during this period, opinions that for the 
most part were dissenting from or concurring with the results reached 
by the Court majorities.3 
So complete was Murphy's commitment to Christian morality 
and democratic principles that he sometimes appeared to overplay 
his hand, thereby causing much of his conventional work on the Court 
to be overshadowed and little appreciated. As Professor Howard has 
noted, "The essential fact to be grasped about Murphy is that, while 
he was capable of functioning in conventional terms and did so more 
often than not, he chose different tactics when battling for principles 
he felt most deeply" (p. 478). From his earlier experiences in public 
life, Murphy brought to the Court a fighting, evangelical, and emo-
tional approach to civil liberties. It was an approach that sometimes 
translated complex problems to simpler moral terms and allowed 
few procedural niceties to stand in the way of giving vent to vigorous 
constitutional condemnations. 
As a result, Justice Murphy completely antagonized those who 
profess that the legal system is simply a process of calm objective 
discovery of pre-ordained and immutable principles. He appeared to 
some observers to use his seat on the Court as a pulpit from which, 
to use the words of Felix Frankfurter, "'he exercised the compas-
sionate privileges of a priest when in fact he was only a judge' " 
(p. 480). He became known as a "lawless" judge who confused the 
"law" with his own notions of compassion and morality. 
Such denigrating comments, perpetuated and echoed throughout 
the two decades since Murphy's death in 1949, do not find their ulti-
mate refutation in any re-evaluation of Murphy's opinions or in 
a defense of his vanity or the other personal idiosyncrasies that obvi-
ously annoyed some of his fellow men. Rather, that refutation is to 
be found in the growing recognition that the Supreme Court, in 
many of its functions, is necessarily a political institution that is 
3. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 233 (1946): Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945); Steele v. Louisvilie 
&: NashviIIe R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 555 
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109 (1943). 
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forced to play an activist role in the development of certain constitu-
tional doctrines, whether they be the federalist doctrines of the 
Marshall Court or the reapportionment concepts of the Warren 
Court. The Court is something more than an arbiter of conflicting 
views among lower courts as to the proper interpretation of a tax 
or jurisdictional statute; it is something more than a vehicle for 
resolving legal problems through the use of legal logic or the correla-
tion of past precedents. The Supreme Court is also a unique and 
human institution designed to forge and expand our basic legal and 
constitutional doctrines to meet men's needs. In so acting, the Court 
and its members must perforce reflect and apply, in the context of 
cases and controversies, some of the fundamental notions of public 
and historical morality. 
A natural part of the Court's function in these respects is the 
individual expression of views by the Justices. Confronted from time 
to time with some of the most controversial and significant of our 
nation's social problems, Justices who hold strong views about the 
legal or constitutional implications of those problems have consis-
tently given expression to their views. On occasion those views can 
be contained within the limited bounds of a majority opinion. More 
often, strong views can best and most effectively be set forth in con-
curring and dissenting opinions. Frank Murphy was thus no pariah 
in utilizing such means to voice his abhorrence of what he conceived 
to be invasions of personal freedom. He was not the first nor the last 
to use his seat on the Court as a "pulpit" to preach his notions of 
constitutional freedom. 
History will doubtless judge Frank Murphy not as a lawless 
innovator of personalized views but as a dramatic expositor of con-
stitutional ideals. He had an established right to express those views 
and he will ultimately be judged by the intrinsic merit of what he 
had to say, rather than by the mere fact or manner of expression. 
History will also judge him on the merits of his conventional but 
nonetheless significant contributions to other aspects of the Court's 
role in the judicial system. Such in-depth studies of the man as that 
by Professor Howard make it possible for history to make its judg-
ment dispassionately and with all the relevant facts revealed. 
When President Roosevelt whispered "You, you" in Frank 
Murphy's ear on that day in November of 1939 he was perhaps creat-
ing a judicial figure of greater stature and more enduring qualities 
than either could then foresee. Certainly Justice Murphy's final 
place in judicial history will be more important and significant 
than that assigned to him by those who cry that he misconceived 
his function with that of God. The ultimate truths that time alone 
can establish may well prove that much of what Justice Murphy 
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so eloquently stated in the 1940's had meaning not only £or that 
period but for all of our constitutional time. 
Eugene Gressman, 
Member of the Washington, D.C., Bar and 
former clerk to Justice Murphy. 
RIGHTS. OF THE PERSON. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: 
Macmillan. 1968. Pp. xi, 1018 (2 vols.) $25. 
The publication of Rights of the Person marks the completion 
of Professor Bernard Schwartz's magnum opus, his commentary on 
the Constitution of the United States.1 Appropriately enough, these 
final two volumes focus upon the most recent preoccupations in 
constitutional law. 
Rights of the Person canvasses the hotly contested battlegrounds 
of constitutional adjudication in our generation: the controversies 
concerning the position of radical politics in a nation fearful of its 
security, the meaning of equality for a long-suppressed racial mi-
nority, the role of the police and the uses of the criminal process, 
the position of religion in education and in public life, and the 
essential institutions of politics itself. Merely to list these issues sug-
gests the difficulty of presenting them meaningfully within the con-
fines of a comprehensive survey. Within the past two clecades each of 
them has become a recognized specialty of scholarship, pu::sessing its 
own vast literature of historical research, logic-chopping casuistry, 
contentious propaganda, behavioral impact studies, philosophical 
punditry about the merits or about the judicial role, and so forth-
a torrent of learning in which even the specialist can only hope to 
paddle his own canoe without capsizing in the rapids. Surely no legal 
institution has ever been the subject of such continuous observation, 
analysis, and comment as the United States Supreme Court and its 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
Thus, it is understandable that one picks up an all-embracing 
review of the Constitution with skeptical curiosity. The appearance 
of these latest volumes was peculiarly timely in 1968-a year that 
signaled a major shift in the nation's political mood, marked by the 
impending end of the "Warren Court" and a revolt against its works 
in a historical fight over the successor to the Chief Justice. The time 
1. A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. Part I appeared in 
two volumes in 1963, under the title THE POWERS OF GoVERNMENT, Part II in one 
volume, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY, in 1965. 
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may well be ripe for stock-taking, for consolidating some theoretical 
positions, whether or not the changing of the guard brings a slowing 
or reversal of the flow of innovation. Still, a general commentary on 
constitutional "rights of the person" seems at first blush an impossible 
undertaking. The issues at stake are as ancient as the earliest articu-
lated concerns of civilization, and more universal than the member-
ship of the United Nations. They are timeless themes of philosophy 
and literature, and they are the daily grist of politics and litigation. 
An exposition of these issues under our Constitution can be pre-
sented as a study in historical evolution, as the ultimate challenge to 
the contest of reason this country uniquely entrusts to la,;vyers, or as a 
grand procession of classic dilemmas-the antinomy which Cardozo 
stated rather than resolved in his phrase about "ordered liberty." To 
understand the scope of any guarantee stated in the Constitution, we 
want to examine its historical origins, the verbal choices its text offers 
to exegesis, the rhetoric of claims and counterclaims in which it ap-
pears, and the social context in which these claims once had, now 
have, or may someday have validity. To do one of these things well 
practically excludes doing the others within any reasonable compass, 
as anyone who teaches constitutional law has learned to his frustra-
tion. To undertake a synthesis of these diverse approaches and to 
apply it to the Constitution as a whole is an impressive ambition. 
Fortunately, Professor Schwartz did not let himself be deterred 
by the false choices of whether to write another history of constitu-
tional adjudications in the Supreme Court, or a philosophical dis-
quisition on human rights, or an annotated encyclopedia of leading 
cases. These volumes repeat none of these particular forms. Rather, 
they borrow from each; none is missing entirely, but none is wholly 
dominant. In less capable hands, so eclectic an approach might pro-
duce a disaster of uncritical generalities and superficial populariza-
tion. This author's erudition maintains a notable depth of scholar-
ship for the breadth of the topics covered. His books represent a 
highly personal combination of ingredients. They are a commentary, 
as they purport to be, but they are also a solidly professional work. 
Of course, any choice of ingredients put into the combination 
creates problems. Commendably, Rights of the Person is a commen-
tary on the Constitution, not on the Supreme Court. Too often 
legal scholarship forgets the difference, or assumes that the Constitu-
tion is only what the Supreme Court says it is. Professor Schwartz 
does not enter at length into the learned debates of the Court 
watchers that stir the academic world. Nevertheless, these books do 
not, nor could they, often venture beyond the Constitution as law 
to consider it in action outside courts; for instance, these volumes 
do not deal with the Constitution as a factor in legislative debate 
and executive messages, or as a still powerful appeal in public 
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rhetoric, or as the ultimate touchstone of ideological legitimacy in 
America. Rights of the Person remains a commentary on constitu-
tional law, though free of the technical constraints of a legal treatise. 
Thus, the author illuminates his exposition with frequent judicial 
quotations without strict concern for the immediate use of the quoted 
statement in a majority opinion, dissent, or extra-judicial essay, or for 
its place in an on-going contest of ideas with a competing philosophy. 
And in finding illustrative examples in cases from many courts, he 
risks misleading the unwary or nonprofessional reader about the 
relative weights of citations. In particular, the decisions of state 
courts on federal constitutional rights, although indisputably a part 
of our constitutional. reality, are still a most unreliable guide to 
authoritative constitutional law. In a book that undertakes to com-
bine extensive description, accurate exposition, and independent 
evaluation, these divergent uses of the sources must be kept clear in 
the reader's mind. 
Of course, many pages of exposition also can present only familiar 
material, without containing any surprising information or novel 
insights for anyone who is acquainted with constitutional law. That 
is an unavoidable cost of comprehensiveness; one who undertakes 
to be encyclopedic cannot be expected to be continuously profound. 
What of the substance of Professor Schwartz's Constitution? 
Much is implicit in the very title of these two volumes. Rights of the 
Person avoids the risk of becoming a mere annotation of the separate 
clauses as they appear in the Constitution in favor of grouping the 
constitutional safeguards into "rights" that are related by the interest 
protected, not by the usual circumstances of their invasion. Thus the 
protections of personal security through the stages of the criminal or 
administrative process, from arrest, bail, and fair trial, to habeas 
corpus, double jeopardy, and legislative attainder, are collected under 
the heading Sanctity of the Person (ch. 15). The next chapter, on 
privacy, covers conventional searches and inspections as well as 
electronic surveillance for both criminal and administrative purposes. 
This discussion is followed by chapters on freedom of expression, 
the equality principle, and religion. But the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination-including the problem of coerced 
confessions-and the prohibition against cruel or unusual punish-
ments are separated from the rest of criminal procedure and pre-
sented along with citizenship and nationality law in a final chapter 
on Dignity of the Person. Here, too, we find the closely circumscribed 
law of treason, far separated from the other constitutional doctrines 
which have developed in response to the governmental pursuit of 
"subversion" that gives us its modern functional equivalent. 
The gain in focus and readability achieved by this organization 
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carries a price. Professor Schwartz has introduced an unacknowledged 
bias toward seeing the "rights" discussed as something apart from the 
constitutional text that attempted, so far as the foresight and the 
language of 1789 and 1866 would permit, to give them legal expres-
sion-a form of analysis one would consider a throwback to the 
"higher law," but for the fact that Griswold2 commands caution in 
dismissing the recurrence of "natural rights." This bias might have 
been counterbalanced by inserting reminders, in discussions of the 
case law, of the constitutional words before the judges for interpreta-
tion. But perhaps the implicit "natural rights" flavor is, if not de-
liberate, at least not uncongenial to the author's thinking. As a 
matter of fact, this may be as good a place as any to mention-though 
it seems unbelievable-that I could not find the text of the Con-
stitution of the United States printed anywhere in these two volumes 
of commentary on that Constitution. 
On the substance of the issues, the author's positions defy the 
Procrustean categories of "liberal," "conservative," "activist," "ab-
stentionist," or whatever. He is emphatic on the importance of enforc-
ing procedural guarantees against government agents of all kinds, 
in the investigatory as well as in the trial process. A striking contri-
bution, because the problem is so often ignored in the mainstream 
of the alien and the immigrant, particularly with respect to entry 
and deportation; these two emphases join, for instance, in a critique 
of Abel v. United States.3 On the other hand, Professor Schwartz is 
satisfied to leave wiretapping policy to Congress; and his reasonable 
apprehension of the irrational and destructive force of mobs, direct 
action, and organized extremism (he refers more than once to the 
experience of the Weimar Republic) allows him little sympathy for 
the constitutional claims of those engaged in picketing and other 
forms of demonstration, door-to-door canvassing, civil disobedience, 
group libel, or communism. 
The treatment of the first amendment, though painstaking, 
largely recapitulates conventional wisdom. The author scornfully dis-
misses the debate on whether the free speech clause states an "abso-
lute" by viewing, and refuting, the claim as one of an "absolute" 
right of speech regardless of circumstances. This analysis is consistent 
with his own approach, but it fails to examine the more plausible 
claim that the amendment states an absolute prohibition against any 
restraints directed in terms against speech. Yet we might have been 
spared much if that approach had been developed in Gitlow4 and 
after; if it had confined the clear-and-present-danger test (or later 
versions of it) to the restraint of speech under nonspeech laws, where 
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
3. 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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it originated, and had prevented the extension of that test to controls 
expressly directed at speech rather than deferring to a supposed 
governmental predetermination of the constitutional necessities. 
Moreover, the author's first amendment analysis is obfuscated 
by a curiously old-fashioned conception of "the police power," as 
though this were some kind of affirmative grant of a defined authority 
instead of a name for the residue of all plenary power that is not 
constitutionally denied to state government. Thus he attempts to 
explain why, though the first amendment protects only the verbal 
element in speech, wearing "freedom buttons" is a privileged form 
of protest but hanging rags on a clothesline is not: the police power 
can reach the latter but not the former (pp. 396-97). These analytical 
tools prove equally inadequate in the commentary on obscenity, in 
Professor Schwartz's jurisprudence as in Justice Brennan's; the dis-
cussion begins with the "simple proposition" that the police power 
includes the power to protect public morals, therefore it plainly 
encompasses the power to protect the public against obscenity (p. 
314). As this formulation indicates, the search for a "power" before 
examining a claimed constitutional limitation prejudices the latter. 
Of course the search is illusory; unlike the Federal Constitution, 
state constitutions do not grant or delegate lists of powers any more 
than do the national constitutions of unitary states or the British 
constitution. But the method of analysis implies the possibility of a 
"lack of power" antecedent to the first amendment claim-a theory 
for which there can be no federal constitutional source save a rever-
sion to generalized substantive due process. And the needless finding 
of "power," which focuses on the case for control, will likely pre-
judge the real question of constitutional limitation, which focuses 
on the case against control.5 
There is another drawback implicit in using the terminology of 
"rights" of persons rather than that of constitutional limitations on 
governmep.t: it obscures rather than highlights one of the most 
interesting current phenomena in constitutional law. This is the 
impending shift from ancient demands for limitations on a govern-
5. If the cited illustrations of the "freedom buttons" and the clothesline display, 
for example, are to be distinguished by delimiting the reach of a "power" and not 
only the reach of the first amendment's limitations, then a finding that the "power" 
falls short would logically apply also to wearing similar buttons without a "freedom" 
or any other message-that is, it would support a "right" that could not be founded 
on the first amendment and, by the hypothesis of a prior search for "police power,'' 
need not be. These premises create trouble for the analysis of our most recent claims 
of right in dress, hair styles, and the like (p. 396). They similarly confuse the deduction 
of the constitutional status of obscenity from the power of the Court of King"s Bench 
to punish Sir Charles Sedley for "making water on the persons below" from a balcony 
in Covent Garden (p. 314). One would confidently assume that this would not give 
rise to a first amendment claim even by today's more advanced theoreticians--despite 
reports of some disputed emission from a hotel window during last summer's political 
discussions in Chicago. 
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ment of circumscribed functions to modem demands for affirmative 
action from a pervasive government. As an eminent comparativist, 
Professor Schwartz knows the different history, style, and role of 
the power-limiting Bill of Rights and the concept of judicial review 
in the Anglo-American tradition, as contrasted with the programmatic 
social assertions which the Continental tradition enshrines in consti-
tutions as the highest political symbols of past victories and present 
commitments. vVhen constitutions of the latter tradition assert a 
right to health, to welfare, to education, to employment, to a fair 
share of the nation's material goods, they create a standard for the 
political performance of government that is no more sought to be 
enforced in courts than is the preamble of the Constitution of the 
United States. In the present commentary, the author recognizes 
that similar claims are being pursued at the frontiers of constitu-
tional litigation under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment; it would have added clarity if this development had been 
displayed, and if the difficulty of deriving such political claims from 
what are historically and textually restraints on government had 
been discussed, uncluttered by the ambiguity of "rights." 
But if much of the book's wisdom is conventional, it is so from 
conviction and not from failure to recognize the troublesome ques-
tions. The conclusions are stated reasonably, without shouting or 
preaching. The style matches the content. Much of it necessarily 
is a parade of declarative sentences reciting holdings and citations, 
enlivened by an occasional retelling of some significant case. The 
author is an indefatigable collector of quotations from historic and 
literary as well as legal sources, but these quotations are scattered 
through the text as grace notes rather than for the relevance of the 
source. The subject of constitutional rights is rife with temptation to 
pontificate in orotund generalities and indisputable abstractions, and 
sometimes those drawn from Supreme Court Justices and those of 
the author tend to merge into one another. The chapter titles are 
forced into an awkward parellelism of "rights"-Sanctity of the 
Person, Privacy of the Person, Expression of the Person, Equality of 
the Person, Belief of the Person, and Dignity of the Person-and 
these capitalized titles are then used in the text as if they were estab-
lished terms of constitutional law. The style also suffers from alternat-
ing the editorial "we" with abuse of the passive voice ("It is felt," "it 
has been pointed out"), which sometimes leaves the source in doubt. 
The most irritating quirk, however, is the author's undeviating misuse 
of "such" for "this" or "the," paragraph after unrelenting paragraph, 
until one is distracted from the substance to search for even one 
"this." Such kind of editing ought to be one modest service a pub-
lisher extends to an author and his readers. 
Despite its shortcomings, the completed work adds up to an im-
1288 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67 
pressive accomplishment. It is a detailed inventory of American con-
stitutional rights as they exist two thirds of the way through the 
twentieth century. The picture it presents is that of a mature legal 
system, hedging the application of power to the individual by pro-
cedures evolved over centuries of English and American history and 
by a few substantive axioms with which men of good will seek to 
umpire the many collisions between the claims of government and of 
individuals in a complex modem society. 
Such an inventory largely submerges the original excitement of 
clashing principles in a judicious review of working compromises. 
But the reasonable judgments of judicious men-as lawmakers, 
judges, or academic commentators-do not exhaust the function of 
these principles. The protections against authority that law promises 
the individual are always unfinished business. Their classic state-
ment in the Constitution permits the perennial questions always to 
be reopened: whether this Constitution does not pledge the society it 
governs to be even more free, committed to tolerating even hostile 
heresy and offense to good taste, committed to trusting in its survival 
even without elaborate structures of secrecy and surveillance to 
protect it. In the nature of things, such questions will long be pressed 
only as minority views, in dissent on and off the Supreme Court. 
They are not then "constitutional law." We knew, when we studied 
the Constitution in the post-war years, that it did not forbid racial 
segregation, or prosecutions based on illegally obtained evidence, or 
the malapportionment of legislatures. Today there are other claims 
that are not constitutional law. But even if some minority views 
never become "constitutional law," it is nonetheless important that 
those who assert them are appealing to the Constitution of the 
United States-not against it. 
Although Professor Schwartz stays close to prevailing doctrine 
both in his presentation of "the law" and in his own preferences he 
knows that his commentary necessarily speaks from its own time, 
and he indicates where some of the known constitutional frontiers 
in our time are. Whatever may lie beyond those, his work will have 
lasting value in telling the future where the Rights of the Person 
stood in the United States of 1968. 
Hans A. Linde, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Oregon 
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SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.). By 
Richard W. Jennings and Harold Marsh, Jr. Mineola, N.Y.: Founda-
tion Press. 1968. Pp. xxxv, 1261. $15. 
Thirty-six years after the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 
the first of the federal statutes, it is almost unbelievable how rapidly 
the subject of securities regulation is still changing in some areas and 
how slowly in other areas. The elapsed time is important because it 
means that the 1933 Act is more than half as old as the onset of 
modern times, which can be dated for this purpose from the be-
ginning of mass production of the automobile and other con-
sumer goods at the turn of the century. This statute was one of the 
achievements of the first hundred days of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
first term, a period that marked the assumption of an active role for 
the federal government in stimulating the economy, controlling 
financial affairs, and promoting public welfare. Today, securities 
regulation has become a substantial portion of the content of cor-
poration law. 
Just as Professor Loss' treatise1 is the almost indispensable book 
for the study of securities regulation in the law office, the Jennings 
and Marsh casebook is the almost indispensable volume for the 
study of this topic in the classroom.2 Thus, we may welcome the 
appearance of an improved and updated second edition.3 
The editors have provided compilation of really necessary work-
ing data for a "cases-and-materials" student book. The text in-
cludes many of the important SEC interpretative releases. On oc-
casion they could have chosen different cases-for example, I would 
have preferred the leading "first Hughes case"4 and the "second 
Hughes case"5 both of which announce doctrines, rather than some 
of the later follow-up decisions, in which the basic doctrine is never 
clearly stated. But these are matters of judgment, and on the whole 
the selection is clearly right and provides the indispensable cases. 
I. L. Loss, SEcuRmES REGULATION (2d ed. 1961) (3 vols.). 
2. The only rival casebook seems to be H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW (1966). 
This book has undeniable merits, but one may comment that it is heavily weighted 
toward matters which reflect its author's ·western and enforcement experience, and 
that it is one of the most discouraging layout jobs ever produced by a printer. 
Professor Loss also has a one volume edition designated "Temporary Student 
Edition," but this is in no sense an abbreviated form of the monumental treatise. 
While whole chapters of the treatise are left out, the chapters which are included 
appear without abbreviation or even repaging; therefore, by reason of its tremendous 
detail this edition is just as difficult for student use as his three-volume treatise. 
3. R. JENNINGS &: H. MARSH, SECURmES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 
1968). 
4. Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 189 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 
786 (1944) (the first judicial recognition of the "shingle theory"). 
5. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (the first judicial formulation of 
the fiduciary theory). 
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The editors were lucky enough to catch the BarChris case;6 un-
lucky enough to close the book too early for the Second Circuit's 
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur1 and the district court decision in 
Globus v. Law Research Service;8 and, in my opinion, unlucky 
enough to catch North American Research9 without the time neces-
sary to edit it down to a size digestible by a student. 
The treatment of the Securities Act exemptions is basically un-
changed. While the materials are there, I have great difficulty teach-
ing the section 4 exemptions under the editors' divisions of the 
material: chapter 6, Offerings by an Issuer or Underwriter; chapter 
7, Secondary Distributions; and chapter 8, Private Offerings. Iviy 
students and I get lost along the way. I find the same material much 
easier to teach if organized by problems: (1) the mechanism of the 
statutory hold on a controlling person; (2) the single-level private 
offering to a limited group; and (3) the double-level offering that 
turns out to be public when the limited group lacks investment in-
tent. The latter leads naturally into a preliminary discussion of the 
section 3(a)(9) exemption and then of convertible securities, which 
I pull from the end of chapter 9 and teach with the foregoing. 
The second edition runs 1251 pages compared to 984 in the 
first edition. Yet, to keep the book within bounds after this ex-
pansion, Professors Jennings and Marsh have had to omit not only 
the Jones case, 10 which some of us old-timers remember with 
nostalgic resentment, but also the Columbia General case,11 which 
appeared in the first edition. They have omitted such old stalwarts 
as the Tucker case,12 the Statement on Pegging, Fixing and Stabiliz-
ing,13 In re NASD,14 and the Halsey Stuart caseto-all to make room 
for the expansions discussed below. 
Part of the new bulk of the book comes from the inclusion of 
materials on the developing frontiers of securities law: the anti-
trust laws; the rate structure and exclusionary practices of the 
New York Stock Exchange; the third market; the impact of mutual 
fund and other institutional trading on the foregoing; variable 
annuities and bank efforts to enter the mutual fund field; and some 
other current principal problems of mutual funds. There is no 
time in a three-hour SEC course designed to follow a single corpora-
6. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
7. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. 
nom. Coates v. SEC, 37 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. April 21, 1969). 
8. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
9. SEC v. North American Research&: Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
10. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
11. Columbia Gen. Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1959). 
12. In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947). 
13. Statement of Policy on the Pegging, Fixing and Stabilizing of Securities Prices, 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 2,446 (1940). 
14. In re National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945). 
15. In re Halsey, Stuart &: Co., Inc., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949). 
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tion law course to take up such advanced materials, but the book 
provides much of the necessary fodder for a seminar in these and 
other advanced securities problems. 
While the book has been expanded, it is still regrettable that some 
of the editors' footnotes are as short and condensed as they are. Those 
on fiduciary obligation have been rewritten and are reasonably 
lengthy and helpful, but my students seem to get very little out of 
the ones in the exemption chapters of the book, which have not been 
expanded from the first edition and which I believe suffer from 
undue compression. This is, however, a small matter. No one could 
learn securities law solely from this book or the Loss treatise or both 
in combination; students must have a teacher or an older lawyer ex-
perienced in the field with whom to interact. Every teacher must 
bring to the text his own practical background, and when he does, 
the general excellence of this book will outweigh its very minor 
deficiencies.16 
I will conclude this Review by presenting some thoughts on 
teaching securities regulation in relation to the corporation law 
segment of the curriculum. Such reflection is made timely by the 
almost simultaneous appearance of this second edition of the securi-
ties regulation casebook and a new edition of a casebook on corpora-
tions17 with Professor Richard W. Jennings of the University of 
California at Berkeley appearing as a co-author of both. It is par-
ticularly interesting to note the correlation between the two books 
and to compare this correlation with the earlier editions of the SEC 
casebook18 and the corporations casebook.19 Together the two pairs 
of books illustrate the difficulty of determining a clear position as 
to the allocation of SEC materials between the two courses. First, 
the earlier edition of the corporations book has nothing on distribu-
tion of securities, while the 1968 edition has about sixty-five pages. 
Of course, both editions of the securities regulation casebook deal 
with this topic at length. Second, the earlier edition of the corpora-
tions book has only eleven pages of non-SEC material, and no SEC 
material, on the use of inside information, but the 1968 edition has 
about twenty-five pages of rule I0b-5 material. The securities regula-
tion book contains much more extensive treatments of rule IOb-5 
in both editions, and the 1968 edition is heavily reorganized and on 
16. The book is nearly but not quite impeccable in readability and mechanical care. 
One strike should be called on the publisher's staff for having obliterated in the Table 
of Cases to the first edition the distinction between Securities Act Releases and Securi-
ties Exchange Act Releases, and two more strikes must be called on them for having 
perpetuated the error in the present edition. 
17. N. U'ITIN, R, JENNINGS 8:: R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 
(4th ed. 1968). 
18. R. JENNINGS 8e H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (1st 
ed. 1963). 
19. N. LATTIN 8e R. JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1959). 
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the whole more useful for instruction than was the first edition.28 
Third, in the earlier edition of the corporations book, the SEC 
proxy rules were inadequately treated, and the first edition of the 
SEC book failed to deal with them. This latter omission was a mis-
take that I felt I had to rectify with mimeographed materials. The 
treatment in the 1968 edition of the corporations casebook is some-
what expanded. Some material has also been introduced into the 
SEC casebook, but its focus is more upon the problem of liability, 
tying into rule IOb-5, than upon a broad view of the functions of 
the proxy machinery; this matter is presumably left to the corpora-
tions course. Fourth, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 is treated inadequately in the earlier edition of the corpora-
tions casebook and not at all in the first edition of the SEC case-
book. Again, I felt that, to teach the SEC course, I had to supple-
ment the casebook with mimeographed materials. In the new 
1968 editions, the corporation casebook contains about the same 
coverage, but the SEC volume has a new and reasonably adequate 
treatment of the subject. 
It is clear that many of these topics fell unsatisfactorily beween 
the two stools in the older editions, but Professor Jennings and his 
co-editors have now found a generally acceptable solution to the 
problem of how to teach securities regulation-that is, a warning dose 
of "the federal law of corporations" in the corporations course and an 
integrated treatment in a separate securities regulation course. But 
this approach is by no means universal. The former Chairman of the 
SEC, Professor Cary of Columbia Law School, takes a somewhat per-
plexing position on this question of teaching securities regulation. His 
1959 tome on corporations, written in collaboration with the late Pro-
fessor Ralph J. Baker of Harvard,21 contains a smattering of SEC ma-
terial, leaving a need for a separate securities regulation course. 
This, of course, fits naturally into the program at Harvard, the fief 
of the redoubtable Professor Loss. But the Columbia Law School 
catalogue shows only a seminar-not a basic course-in securities 
regulation. Moreover, the matter gets more puzzling upon con-
sideration of Professor Cary's 1968 supplement to the corporations 
book.22 It contains a great deal of SEC material, but there is neither 
the comprehensiveness that is necessary to obviate the need for a 
full SEC course nor the compactness needed for an introduction to 
20. By saying "more useful," I do not mean to say that rule IOb-5 has become more 
understandable. Professor Marsh's article, What Lies Ahead Under Rule l0b-51, 24 
Bus. LAw. 69 (1968), predicting that the future of Rule lOb-5 is "more chaos," was 
written before the court of appeals decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, but one would 
guess that he would not be disposed to withdraw the characterization. 
21. R. BAKER&: w. CARY, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (3d rev. ed. unabr. 
1959). 
22. R. BAKER&: w. CARY, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (!Id ed. Supp. 1968). 
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federal securities regulation in the first corporations course. In a 
recent conversation, Professor Cary indicated, I believe, that he is 
swinging toward the view that a full securities regulation course will 
be necessary. 
There remain, however, other teachers whom I respect who use 
still another approach. They tell me that their schools simply do 
not off er an SEC course, but that they teach the necessary materials 
on fiduciary obligation as part of the corporations course, and the 
exemptions and other materials as part of courses on corporation 
finance or the like.23 I cannot believe that this approach is satis-
factory. I strongly doubt that one could give enough attention to 
fiduciary obligation in a corporations course of ordinary length. 
Certainly rule l0b-5 looks very different if one leads up to it through 
common-law liability and the express statutory liability than it does 
when taught standing in isolation in a corporations course. One 
cannot teach section 16(b) adequately in a corporations course with 
a hasty treatment that emphasizes only its function as a prophylactic 
against breach of fiduciary obligation, instead of providing enough 
detailed analysis to expose its remaining fearful traps.24 Moreover, 
I feel that to a student who has learned only a smattering of the 
Securities Act exemption system, a little knowledge can be a dan-
gerous thing. The subject is so bogged down with elusive inter-
pretative "theology"25 that one who has not been immersed in it 
deeply enough to be ordained had better not think he can grant dis-
pensation from the registration requirement. 
Finally, after thirty-five years during which securities regulation 
theology has been ramifying in complexity and lack of predictability, 
we face both the urgent need for a house-cleaning effort and the 
certainty that programs for reform will be an important concern 
during the next five years. The result of the Disclosure Policy Study 
23. For a book constructed on this theory, see D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING (1966). 
24. Notably, (1) corporate reorganizations, see Lang 8: Katz, Liability for "Short 
Swing" Trading in Corporate Reorganizations, 20 Sw. L.J. 472 (1966); Marsh, What 
Lies Ahead Under Rule l0b-51, 24 Bus. LAw. 69, 72 (1968); (2) the possibility that 
trading in an option or warrant might cross trading in the stock, see Chemical Fund, 
Inc. v. Xerox Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [Transfer Binder 1964-1966] ,I 91,653 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Cook 8: Feldman, 
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REY. 612, 617-24 
(1953); SEC Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8,325 (1968), amending rule 16a-2; SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8,229 (1968), adopting rule 16b-ll and expressly 
reserving this question. 
25. The word "theology" is in such common use among practitioners that I cannot 
recall where it first appeared. It appears in Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal 
Securities Acts-A. Program for Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REY. 1323, 1340 (1968). Former 
Chairman Demmler referred to the "priesthood" of practitioners in the Conference on 
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 832 at 833 (1967). 
Former Chairman Cohen's approach is more decorative than religious. He refers to 
"the many decorative curlicues and imaginative interpretations with which it has been 
embellished over the years." Cohen, The Lawyer's Role in Securities Regulation, 24 
Bus. LAW. 305 (1968). 
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by an internal SEC committee headed by Commissioner Wheat has 
just been published.26 In addition, the Council of the American Law 
Institute has voted to work on a study and revision of the securities 
laws, subject to obtaining financing of the cost.27 Given this focus on 
reform, students can receive proper preparation in the topic of 
securities regulation only in a separate, carefully integrated survey 
course. 
Homer Kripke, 
Professor of Law, 
New York University 
26. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SEC FROM THE DISCLOSURE PoUCY STUDY, 
DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF Am,nNISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND 
'34 Acrs (March 1969). 
27. For the leading discussions chronologically, see Knauss, A Reappraisal in the 
Role of Disclosure, 62 MrcH. L. REv. 607 (1964); Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 
79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966); Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities 
Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967); Schneider, Reform of the Federal Securities Laws, 115 
U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1967); Schneider, An Administrative Program for Reforming the 
Federal Securities Laws, 23 Bus. LAw. 737 (1968) (with colloquy); Wheat, The Disclosure 
Policy Study of the SEC, 24 Bus. LAW. 33 (1968); Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-
Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 43 (1968). 
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ceptacle for foreclosed property and non• 
conforming loans. (a) Robert J. Jensen. 
42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 70-91 (Fall). 
The tax bargain in executive compen• 
sation. 47 Texas L. Rev. 405-20 (Feb.). 
The tax consequences of redemption 
of convertible bonds. 49 B.U. L. Rev. 96· 
113 (Winter). 
Tax consequences of withdrawal from 
a two man partnership: sale or liquida• 
tion. 54 Cornell L. Rev. 438-47 (Feb.). 
Tax-exempt organizations: the attack on 
unreasonable accumulations of income. 
(a) Stuart Duhl. 57 Geo. L.J. 483-507 
(Feb.). 
INDIANS 
Indians: better dead than red? 42 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 101-25 (Fall). 
INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION 
See Community Property, Foreign Re-
lations. 
INTEGRATION 
The Sweatt case and the development 
of legal education for Negroes in Texas. 
47 Texas L. Rev. 677-93 (March). 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW 
See also Discrimination, Treaties. 
The foundations for a universal inter-
national system. (a) Quincy Wright. 44 
Notre Dame Law. 527-47 (April). 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The application of article 85(3) of the 
treaty establishing the European economic 
community to exclusive dealing agree-
ments. (a) David M. Cohen. 54 Cornell 
L. Rev. 379-407 (Feb.). 
IRISH REPUBLIC 
The Irish judiciary. (a) Paul C. Bar-
tholomew. 44 Notre Dame Law. 560-72 
(April). 
JUDICIAL EULOGIES 
Crossing the bar. 78 Yale L.J. 484-91 
Gan.). 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
See Urban Renewal. 
JURIES 
The jury as the underwriter of the 
presumption of innocence in state crimi-
nal cases-a role made possible by Dun-
can v. Louisiana. 49 B.U. L. Rev. 144-53 
(Winter). 
JURISDICTION 
See Military Law. 
JUVENILE COURTS 
Due process as a gateway to rehabili-
tation in the juvenile justice system. (a) 
Paul D. Lipsitt. 49 B.U. L. Rev. 62-78 
(Winter). 
LABOR LAw 
See also Arbitration & Award, Collec-
tive Bargaining, Labor Management Re-
lations, Public Employee Unionism. 
The concurrence conundrum: the over-
lapping jurisdiction of arbitration and 
the national labor relations board. (a) 
Daniel C. Bond, Jr. 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
4-58 (Fall). 
The final determination clause: de-
fense to employee section 30I(a) suits. 
1969 Duke L.J. lll-37 (Feb.). 
The labor law obligations of a succes-
sor employer. (a) Stephen B. Goldberg. 
63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735-835 Gan.-Feb.). 
Removal of suit for breach of no-strike 
clause in collective bargaining agreement: 
problems posed for future enforcement. 
63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 723-33 (Nov.-Dec.). 
Some observations and suggestions con-
cerning a misnomer-"protected" con-
certed activities. (a) George Schatzki. 47 
Texas L. Rev. 378-403 (Feb.). 
Union political involvement and re-
form of campaign financing regulation. 
2 Prospectus. 347-70 (April). 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
See also Arbitration & Award, Col-
lective Bargaining. 
Restructuring grievance arbitration pro-
cedures: some modest proposals. {a) 
Harold W. Davey. 54 Iowa L. Rev. 560-
78 (Feb.). 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 
A proposal for reshaping the urban 
rental agreement. (a) John G. Murphy, 
Jr. 57 Geo. L.J. 464-82 (Feb.). 
LEGAL HISTORY 
Law and science in seventeenth-century 
England. (a) Barbara J. Shapiro. 21 Stan. 
L. Rev. 727-66 (April). 
LONGSHOREMEN AND STEVEDORES 
Tugs, stevedores, and the warranty of 
workmanlike performance. (a) David G. 
Davies. 44 Ind. L.J. !35-58 (Winter). 
MARITIME LAW 
See also Longshoremen & Stevedores. 
Judicial expansion of remedies for 
wrongful death in admiralty: a proposal. 
49 B.U. L. Rev. 114-43 (Winter). 
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
A legal structure for a national medi-
cal data center. (a) Roy N. Freed. 49 
B.U. L. Rev. 79-94 (Winter). 
:MENTAL HEALTH 
See also Sex Crimes. 
Civil commitment "as you like it." (a) 
Leonard V. Kaplan. 49 B.U. L. Rev. 14-
45 (Winter). 
Demonstration and research in com-
petency for trial and mental illness: re-
view and preview. (a) A. Louis McGarry. 
49 B.U. L. Rev. 46-61 (Winter). 
MILITARY LAW 
Criminal jurisdiction over United States 
civilians accompanying the armed forces 
abroad. 54 Cornell L. Rev. 459-72 (Feb.). 
MINES AND MINERALS 
See Income Tax. 
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MOTOR VEHICLES 
Automobile manufacturers-a new lia-
bility for design defects. 49 B.U. L. Rev. 
167-80 (Winter). 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
The municipal revenue crisis: Cali-
fornia problems and possibilities. (a) 
Donatas Januta. 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1525-
58 (Nov.). 
NEWSPAPERS 
The duty of newspapers to accept politi-
cal advertising-an attack on tradition. 
44 Ind. L.J. 222-41 (Winter). 
Press releases and defamatory plead-
ings. 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 699-722 (Nov.-
Dec.). 
OlL AND GAS 
The lease allowable system: new 
method of regulating oil production in 
Texas. 47 Texas L. Rev. 658-76 (March). 
PAROLE 
See Constitutional Law. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
See Income Tax. 
PENOLOGY 
Short-term rehabilitation and crime 
prevention. 2 Prospectus. 451-64 (April). 
POVERTY LAW 
See also Public Utilities, Social Wel-
fare, Zoning. 
Administration of a negative income 
tax. (a) William D. Popkin. 78 Yale L.J. 
388-431 ijan.). 
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 
See Corporations. 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
See also Motor Vehicles. 
The remote purchaser of made-to-order 
goods: third-party beneficiary in prod-
ucts liability law. 54 Cornell L. Rev. 
473-81 (Feb.). 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Client service in a defender organiza-
tion: the Philadelphia experience. 117 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 448-69 ijan.). 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM 
See also Labor Law. 
Labor relations in the public sector: 
a symposium. Articles by Russell A. 
Smith, Charles M. Rehmus, Theodore H. 
Kheel, Arvid Anderson, H. W. Arthurs, 
Eli Rock, Donald H. Wollctt, Ida Kaus, 
and Ralph S. Brown, Jr. 67 Mich. L. 
Rev. 891-1082 (March). 
State and local public employee collec-
tive bargaining in the absence of explicit 
legislative authorization. (a) Richard F. 
Dole, Jr. 54 Iowa L. Rev. 539-59 (Feb.). 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Public utilities and the poor: the re• 
quirement of cash deposits from domestic 
consumers. 78 Yale L.J. 448-63 ijan.). 
REs JUDICATA 
Res judicata and the bifurcated negli• 
gence trial. 16 UCLA L. Rev. 203-15 
(Nov.). 
RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
Credit investigations and the right to 
privacy: quest for a remedy. 57 Geo. L.J. 
509-32 (Feb.). 
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Equality of educational opportunity: 
are "compensatory programs" constitu-
tionally required? 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 146-
68 (Fall). 
Public secondary education: judicial 
protection of student individuality. 42 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 126-45 (Fall). 
The scope and sources of school board 
authority to regulate student conduct and 
status: a nonconstitutional analysis. (a) 
Stephen R. Goldstein. 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
373-430 ijan.). 
ScIENCE 
See Legal History. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Scope limitations for searches incident 
to arrest. 78 Yale L.J. 433-47 ijan.). 
Stop and frisk. 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 837-61 
ijan.-Feb.). 
SECURITIES REGULATION 
Civil liabilities under the federal se-
curities acts: the BarChris case-part I 
-section 11 of the securities act of 1933. 
(a) Ernest L. Folk, III. 55 Va. L. Rev. 
1-82 (Feb.). 
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.: 
"due diligence" defenses under section 11 
of the securities act of 1933. 16 UCLA 
L. Rev. 177-202 (Nov.). 
Securities regulation and the foreign 
issuer exemption: a study in the process 
of accommodating foreign interests. (a) 
Richard M. Buxbaum. 54 Cornell L. Rev. 
358-78 (Feb.). 
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SELF·INCRI!IIINATION 
The marijuana tax and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 117 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 432-40 Gan,). 
SENTENCING 
Demonstrating rehabilitative planning 
as a defense strategy. (a) Samuel Dash, 
Richard Medalie, and Eugene L. Rhoden, 
Jr. 54 Cornell L. Rev. 408-36 (Feb.). 
SEX CRIMES 
Indiana's sexual psychopath statute. 44 
Ind. L.J. 242-66 (Winter). 
SOCIAL 'WELFARE 
See also Poverty Law. 
Snell v. Wyman and the constitutional 
issues posed by welfare repayments pro-
visions. 55 Va. L. Rev. 177-97 (Feb.). 
Social welfare-an emerging doctrine 
of statutory entitlement. 44 Notre Dame 
Law. 603-29 (April). 
TAXATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
The chief counsel's policy regarding 
acquiescence and nonacquiescence in tax 
court cases. 44 Ind. L.J. 206-20 (Winter). 
Tax compromises and the statute of 
limitations. 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441-47 
aan.). 
TEXAS SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
Small claims courts in Texas: paradise 
lost. 47 Texas L. Rev. 448-62 (Feb.). 
TRADE REGULATION 
See also Oil b Gas. 
Legal and regulatory aspects of the 
container revolution. 57 Geo. L.J. 533-52 
(Feb.). 
The new administrative state: judicial 
sanction for agency self-determination in 
the regulation of industry. (a) Ralph F. 
Fuchs. 69 Colum. L. Rev. 216-45 (Feb.). 
Politics, planning and trade regulation: 
a glance toward an emerging utopia. (a) 
Lawrence A. Sullivan. 16 UCLA L. Rev. 
1-35 (Nov.). 
TRANSPORTATION 
Coordination of intermodal transpor-
tation. 69 Colum. L. Re·,. 247-76 (Feb.). 
TREATIES 
See also Discrimination, International 
Trade. 
Toward the peaceful modification of 
treaties: the Panama Canal proposals. 
21 Stan. L. Rev. 938-61 (April). 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
See Community Property. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Outline of buyer-seller rights and 
remedies in default and breach situations 
under the UCC. (a) Stanley V. Kinyon. 
53 Minn. L. R'ev. 729-37 (March). 
The prepaying buyer: second class citi-
zenship under uniform commercial code 
article 2. (a) Irving A. Gordon. 63 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 565-94 (Nov.-Dec.). 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
The uniform probate code: a possible 
answer to probate avoidance. 44 Ind. L.J. 
191-205 (Winter). 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
The Fortas controversy: the senate's 
role of advice and consent to judicial 
nominations: the broad role. (a) Robert 
P. Griffin. 2 Prospectus. 285-303 (April). 
The Fortas controversy: the senate's 
role of advice and consent to judicial 
nominations: the discriminating role. (a) 
Philip A. Hart. 2 Prospectus. 305-10 
(April). 
URBAN RENEWAL 
The interest in rootedness: family re-
location and an approach to full indem-
nity. 21 Stan. L. Rev. 801-76 (April). 
Judicial review in urban renewal cases: 
concepts and consequences. 5" Geo. L.J. 
615-30 (Feb.). 
ZONING 
Tight little islands: exclusionary zon-
ing, equal protection, and the indigent. 
(a) Lawrence G. Sager. 21 Stan. L. Rev. 
767-800 (April). 

